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existed since before the 1917 revolutions, journalists were not incorporated into a 
professional body until 1959, several decades after their counterparts in other creative 
professions.  Using sources from Russian and American archives together with published 
documents, I investigated the reasons for the organization’s formation and its domestic 
and creative work to “develop professional mastery” in its members at home while 
advancing the Soviet cause abroad. Chapter one explores the reasons for the Journalists’ 
Union’s formation, and the interrelationship between Soviet cultural diplomacy and 
domestic professionalization. Chapter two describes journalists’ efforts to make sense of 
the immediate aftermath of de-Stalinization through a case study of the Communist 
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establishment and the debates about journalism’s value at its inaugural congress. Chapter 
four is devoted to the creative union’s international work, specifically its management of 
the International Organization of Journalists, a front organization based in Prague, 
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and the challenges to professionalization in Putin’s Russia.  Throughout the study, I 
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value of their profession even as they acknowledged the leading role of the Communist 
Party and frequently responded to political interventions in their work.  
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  1 
Introduction 
 In his 1981 short story collection, The Compromise, the writer Sergei Dovlatov 
describes his journalistic career at the newspaper Soviet Estonia during the 1970s. 
Finding himself unexpectedly out of work, a friend who worked in television suggested 
he apply for a vacant post at the newspaper. Dovlatov disliked his editor, and described 
his ten years of columns as “ten years of lies and deceit,” though each story reflected 
some genuine experience, if only subtextually. Following this theme, Dovlatov begins 
each chapter of the work with a selection from his newspaper columns. Following each 
excerpt, Dovlatov shows his readers the real and often humorous events behind each 
piece. In one case, a short description of a scientific congress involving Western 
Europeans saw Dovlatov called into an editor’s office because he had committed a “grave 
ideological error.” In listing all of the countries alphabetically, he had given an improper 
understanding of global class conditions by not listing the Eastern bloc nations first, 
followed by neutral countries, and then capitalist ones. After submitting a second draft, 
Dovlatov discovered that his editor was furious. The man asked him, “Аre you mocking 
me? Did you think this up on purpose?” When Dovlatov asked what the problem was, he 
was told,  “You mixed up the countries of the people’s democracies. You have the GDR 
after Hungary. Alphabetical order again?! Forget this opportunistic word! You are a 
worker at a Party newspaper. Hungary goes in third place! There was a putsch there!” 
Dovlatov reminded his editor that the USSR had fought a war with Germany, and was 
then told, “Don’t argue!” and accused of “moral infantilism.” Dovlatov concluded 
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laconically, “They paid me two rubles for the article. And I thought they would pay 
three…”1 
With this anecdote, and through the collection as a whole, Dovlatov aims to 
convince the reader that Soviet newspapers were far from an accurate reflection of 
reality—a reality that was often absurd, though editors failed to grasp this fact and clung 
to rigid interpretations of Marxism-Leninism rather than confront the deficits around 
them. Dovlatov was only able to publish the work after his emigration to New York; he 
had previously been expelled from the Journalists’ Union of the Soviet Union for 
publishing other materials abroad. Dovlatov’s collection had at least some impact on 
Western scholarly assessments of Soviet journalism: political scientist Thomas 
Remington concludes his article on Soviet journalism’s reform potential and professional 
development arguing that the “malaise” Dovlatov depicted was also shared by less 
overtly oppositional Soviet journalists, perhaps due to the failure of earlier reform efforts, 
Khrushchev’s included.2 
Official Soviet texts, unsurprisingly, offer a far more optimistic view of Soviet 
journalism’s value. One such comprehensive textbook, The Journalists’ Handbook, was 
issued in three editions between 1961 and 1971. The work was comprehensive, 
discussing not only genre and writing but also publishing, television, radio, and the 
technical aspects of newspaper layout. At the same time, these sources do offer some 
insight into the politicized nature of Soviet media work—only the preface to the second 
edition, issued in 1964, contains explicit references to the “unmasking of Stalin’s 
                                                
1 Sergei Dovlatov, “Kompromiss,” (New York: Serebriannyi Vek, 1981), 3–6.  
2 Thomas Remington, “Politics and Professionalization in Soviet Journalism” Slavic Review 44 no. 3 
(1985): 499–502. 
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personality cult.”3 Where official texts are relatively silent about the challenges of de-
Stalinization, this dissertation, the first detailed archival study of the Journalists’ Union 
of the Soviet Union, investigates how journalism’s development as a profession was 
shaped by Khrushchev’s pursuit of political reforms and the realities of Cold War 
competition. I focus on the formation and activity of the Journalists’ Union of the Soviet 
Union, from its establishment in 1955 to its second all-Union Congress in 1966.  In 
contrast to Dovlatov’s cynical stance, the key figures of my dissertation expressed pride 
in their work and their sense of public mission, especially during the early months of 
1956, after Khrushchev’s official denunciation of Stalin’s personality cult. As we will see 
below, Dovlatov was far from the only Soviet journalist who experienced strict oversight 
of his work when it touched on foreign policy issues—the relationship between the 
Journalists’ Union and Cold War politics is a major theme of my study. 
Soviet journalists insisted on the superiority and uniqueness of their work, both 
in interactions with foreigners and in domestic discussions of genre and expertise. 
Comparability is an important theme for my analysis of writing and genre: as we will see 
below, the Soviet attachment to writing and reading was intense, and ideological 
understandings of genre and reader needs profoundly shaped journalists’ understandings 
of their professional responsibility. At the same time, Soviet journalists grappled with 
similar challenges to their Western counterparts, especially in higher education. Though I 
have found that creative union members took their responsibilities seriously, they also 
felt that their profession was undervalued and were frustrated with official obstruction of 
                                                
3 Nikolai Bogdanov and Boris Viazemskii, Spravochnik zhurnalista (Leningrad: Lenizdat), 1961, 1964, 
1971. Here I refer to the second edition, especially page 3 and 45–7. 
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their work and with the creative union’s ability to provide them with social prestige and 
material support, especially in the early Brezhnev era. The successes and failures of 
journalistic professionalization in the 1950s and 1960s help explain the depths of 
Dovlatov’s pessimism and suggest that it was the product of a particular historical 
moment rather than a pervasive postwar condition. 
Though recent work on the Khrushchev period has underlined the importance of a 
new “honest journalism” founded on a new conception of the Soviet person, most 
historians examine journalists as lone authors or focus on single publications rather than 
locating journalists’ lives in their institutional context. While Khrushchev’s son-in-law, 
Aleksei Adzhubei, features prominently in these accounts for his leadership of Izvestiia, 
there is little sense of Adzhubei’s colleagues in these narratives.4 The Journalists’ Union 
was one of the last creative unions to be established, and its history demonstrates the 
diverse approaches to intellectuals under Khrushchev. Since the other creative unions 
formed in the 1930s, their history is most closely associated with the tumult of the Stalin 
era and the efforts of writers, artists, and composers to adapt to a changing political and 
cultural landscape. This “cultural revolution” was focused almost exclusively on the 
Soviet Union itself, as befit the new doctrine of “socialism in one country.” In contrast, 
the Journalists’ Union, formed only in 1956, was a product of the Soviet Union’s 
superpower status and the “dilemmas of de-Stalinization.” Throughout my study, I 
demonstrate that journalists, like other intellectual and cultural figures, struggled to make 
sense of the new political landscape. Even individuals who supported reform efforts 
                                                
4 On “honest journalism,” see Vladislav M. Zubok, Zhivago’s Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2009), 140–54; see also Thomas Wolfe, Governing Soviet Journalism: The 
Press and the Socialist Person After Stalin (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006). 
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expressed anxieties and doubts about how to achieve their goals.5 While some 
scholarship exists on creative unions under Stalin, my study is the first such 
organizational history of creative intellectuals in the Khrushchev era.6  Though the 
Journalists’ Union was created “from above,” through Party initiative, its formation was 
due to the Soviet Union’s new superpower status rather than the Party’s need to direct 
and guide media work. 
The Journalists’ Union was first conceived of in 1954, after a well-known foreign 
correspondent named Danil’ Kraminov wrote to the Central Committee to advocate for 
its establishment. His motives were rooted in fears about Cold War competitiveness and 
the Soviet Union’s international needs. The absence of a Journalists’ Union was, in 
Kraminov’s view, jeopardizing Soviet Union’s leadership of its front organization for 
progressive journalists, the International Organization of Journalists (MOJ), which was 
based in Prague. In the nearly six years between Kraminov’s memo and the Journalists’ 
                                                
5 One thorough overview of this process is Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in 
Revolutionary Russia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); For an introduction to the problems of 
conceptualizing Khrushchev’s rule, see Polly Jones, “Introduction,” in The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization 
ed. Polly Jones (London: Routledge, 2005), 1–18.  The literature on the Khrushchev era intellectuals has 
grown vast in recent years, resulting in a more nuanced approach focused on conflict and uncertainty as 
much as liberalization. Particularly influential works that feature at various points in this study are: Stephen 
V. Bittner, The Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw: Experience, Myth, and Memory in Moscow’s Arbat 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); Miriam Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, 
Crime, and the Fate of Reform After Stalin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), and Zubok, Zhivago’s 
Children. 
6 Kirill Tomoff’s recent study of the Union of Soviet Composers ends with Stalin’s death, and work on the 
Writers’ Union was produced before the Soviet collapse. See Creative Union: The Professional 
Organization of Soviet Composers, 1939–1953 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); the classic study of 
the Writers’ Union is John Gordon Gerrard and Carol Gerrard, Inside the Soviet Writers’ Union (New 
York: Tauris, 1990). 
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Union’s inaugural congress in November of 1959, the organization took over 
management of the MOJ and established its domestic membership structure.7 
Though the organization was at least partly established in response to 
international concerns, I have found that the Journalists’ Union’s formation and activity 
are crucial to understanding journalists’ social and political identities, not only in terms of 
the Party’s expectations but also for how journalists themselves understood their roles 
and responsibilities. From its inception, the Journalists’ Union would always have dual 
functions—to promote socialist journalism abroad while developing the “professional 
mastery” of its members at home. Throughout, I refer to this as the creative union’s dual 
mandate.8 The Journalists’ Union’s formation process provided unique opportunities for 
both media elites and rank-and-file journalists to think critically about what journalism 
was, who practiced it, and who could rightfully claim the privileges the new organization 
dispensed. This began as an elite process but would eventually become a truly national 
conversation among journalists, as journalists from all local branches of the new creative 
union commented on the organization’s draft bylaws— these comments form the main 
subject of my first chapter. Though radio and television professionals were also eligible 
to become Journalists’ Union members, the preponderance of print journalists in the 
                                                
7 Rossisskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii (RGANI), f. 5 (Apparat of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), op. 16, d. 671, ll. 33–38. I describe the episode in more detail in 
chapter four. 
8 Michael David-Fox comments on the intertwined nature of Soviet cultural diplomacy efforts in his 
Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and Western Visitors to the Soviet Union (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 12–13). The first published use of “mastery” as a positive journalistic trait in a 
Journalists’ Union publication is from the first issue of its trade journal. See “Tvoi dolg, zhurnalist” 
Sovetskaia pechat’ no. 1 (October 1955): 1–2, though the term was applied to other creative professions as 
well. 
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organization means that this study is almost exclusively focused on those who worked for 
newspapers and journals.9 
In studying the union at length, and advancing arguments about its social and 
political importance, I take a position distinct from other scholars who have been 
dismissive of the Journalists’ Union as an institution too close to the Party to provide real 
reform or professional autonomy.10 In some respects, this view of the organization is 
accurate: creative union members did have high levels of Party membership, and the 
organization’s international activities were closely supervised by the Central Committee 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but these institutional relationships reflect the 
creative union’s importance as much as its limitations. Dismissing the organization 
entirely, however, obscures the consultative aspects of its development. In later years, 
creative union leaders took particularly active roles in promoting Soviet interests abroad 
and in developing journalistic genres that were considered essential to social reform.  
The most obvious challenge to the creative union’s development, of course, was 
the leading role of the Communist Party in directing the mass media. Previous research 
tends to search for journalists operating independently from the Party, assuming that 
Soviet media workers were all secretly “liberal subjects” who sought freedom from 
official ideology. Most of my protagonists were born after the October Revolution, and 
                                                
9 For demographic data demonstrating the dominant presence of print journalists in the organization, see 
the stenogram of its first Congress: Pervyi vsesoiuznyi s’’ezd sovetskikh zhurnalistov 12–14 noiabria 1959 
goda (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politiheskoi literatury, 1960), 131–135. The overwhelming 
majority of conference delegates were newspaper journalists or worked in journals. Less than one percent 
worked in radio or television.  The Journalists’ Union’s official journal also devoted very little coverage to 
radio and television for the period of this study.  Radio and television developed separately from print 
journalism and have been well-documented in recent studies, especially Kristen Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime 
Time: How The Soviet Union Built The Media Empire That Lost the Cultural Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2011). 
10 Here I have in mind Thomas Remington’s article on the profession—see note two.  
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few of them had the opportunity to travel abroad. Logistics and demographics alone 
would suggest that active interest in the idea of a “free” press would be difficult for them 
to cultivate. More fundamentally, assuming that Soviet journalists merely performed their 
commitment to socialism cannot account for the pride individuals took in their work or 
the discomfiture they experienced when a story that seemed to advance socialist values 
was criticized by authorities. While it is true that the Journalists’ Union had less control 
over mass media content than the Composers’ Union, this was related to journalism’s 
significance: the profession was too large for a single body to control. Similarly, 
newspaper content was too vital for officials to abdicate their supervisory role.  Unlike 
music, newspaper content was readily accessible to the bureaucrats who supervised it, 
given that many members of the Agitation and Propaganda department had previously 
worked as journalists.11 While maintaining their proximity to the Party, journalists could 
“interpret and act upon” their commitment to write for the domestic public and engage 
foreign colleagues in different ways.12 
Since most of the creative union’s activities focused on print journalism, reading 
and writing practices, and their history in Russian and Soviet cultural space, are crucial 
background to this study. Journalists self-identified as part of the “creative 
intelligentsia”—a social stratum dedicated to mental labor in the service of a Communist 
                                                
11 On the search for liberal subjects and its obscuring of the Bolshevik vision of the self, see Jochen 
Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary Under Stalin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2006), 86–87; on agency and expertise, especially as it enhanced creative union autonomy, see Tomoff, 95–
96. I consider Tomoff’s distinction between agency and autonomy lacking in analytical utility; instead, I 
describe moments when my protagonists themselves experienced frustration or constraint, or sought greater 
advantage and prestige, without imposing categories that cannot be meaningfully measured, especially due 
to journalists’ unique subject position.  
12 This phrase is taken from Benjamin Tromly, Making the Soviet Intelligentsia: Universities and 
Intellectual Life Under Stalin and Khrushchev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 11. 
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utopia. Applying this term to Soviet professionals requires engaging with the persistent 
historical and historiographic debate about the origins and nature of this social group and 
the value and meaning attached to writing in Russian and Soviet culture.  
Though they publicly celebrated the Soviet Union’s multiethnic print culture, 
most journalists invoked Russian-language traditions in their analyses of genre and their 
own professional identity. In the early nineteenth century, Russian literary culture 
became more focused on prose and literary criticism, at the same time as publishing itself 
grew into a viable commercial enterprise. This expanded interest in fiction involved a 
search for new genres, such as the satirical feuilleton, travel narratives, and 
ethnographies. The origins of a modern Russian literary canon were inextricably bound 
up with this new print culture and genre politics—Pushkin envisioned his journals as a 
source of “beneficial influence on the public” that would also be economically viable. In 
this environment, the boundaries between journalism and literature were especially 
porous. In his classic study of the “thick journal” from the imperial period to the 1920s, 
Robert Maguire argues that it became increasingly common to consider “any kind of 
writing about the problems of the time as fuel for the great machine of fiction.”13  In 
contrast, the growth of a mass-circulation press in the late imperial period saw some 
journalists endeavor to re-establish stricter boundaries between fields—emerging ideas of 
“objective” reporting were in some cases opposed to the “didactic” approach favored in 
thick journals.14  
                                                
13 Robert Maguire, Red Virgin Soil: Soviet Literature in the 1920s, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007), 34–35, 58–59. 
14 Louise McReynolds, The News Under Russia’s Old Regime: The Development of a Mass Circulation 
Press (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). 
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This interest in less overly politicized reporting was a comparatively brief 
moment in the history of Russian print culture. The Soviet insistence that genuine 
“objectivity” required acknowledging the material and class-based underpinnings of 
human existence owed far more to the “didactic” approach. The Bolshevik adulation of 
the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia included figures like Belinskii and Pushkin, especially 
the former’s insistence on a socially responsible literature. In his analysis of the pre-
revolutionary intelligentsia, Michael Confino argued that Pushkin and Belinskii’s 
generation of intellectuals “viewed action as consisting of the spoken and written word.”  
Though they did not always invoke this legacy directly, Soviet journalists vociferously 
rejected any view of language as ideologically neutral: the newspaper was meant to 
instruct readers and bring about their self-improvement, in addition to informing them 
about events.15 At the same time, when journalists positioned themselves as critics of a 
social evil, they often expected an article to have tangible results, such as the firing of a 
corrupt official, in addition to any possible effects on an individual’s thinking or 
philosophical position. Though Lenin and the Bolsheviks repudiated the old intelligentsia 
and sought to replace it with a popular one, Stalin formally declared the intelligentsia a 
“social stratum” in 1936.  This maneuver allowed intellectuals—especially students—to 
embrace Pushkin or Belinskii as models of socially responsible behavior, especially in 
the years following the Great Patriotic War. Though intellectuals became more closely 
tied to the state apparatus, they retained a commitment to the social and moral uplift of 
                                                
15 On the “pedagogical” role of the Soviet press, see Wolfe, Governing, 6–7; On adulation of the old 
intelligentsia in the postwar period, see Tromly, Making the Soviet Intelligentsia, 34; for a primary source 
describing real objectivity as based in Marxism-Leninism rather than dispassionate analysis, see Bogdanov 
and Viazemskii, Spravochnik, 31–32; On Belinskii and social criticism, see Victor Terras, Belinskij and 
Russian Literary Criticism: The Heritage of Organic Aesthetics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1974). 
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the nation, particularly as carriers of culturedness, or “kulturnost,’” and demonstrating a 
love of books and reading remained particularly important. In his study of the postwar 
university, Benjamin Tromly treats the Soviet intelligentsia as a Weberian status group—
that is, a group defined by its “social honor” and commitment to ethical codes, such as a 
disdain for materialism. Where members of the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia have 
often been treated as a group entirely disdainful of state power and institutions, the Soviet 
intelligentsia was not necessarily alienated from existing power structures, especially as 
levels of Party membership rose in the postwar period.16  
Though Tromly concentrates almost exclusively on university students rather than 
working professionals, many aspects of his framework demonstrate that Soviet journalists 
should be considered part of the intelligentsia. Vladislav Zubok goes some way toward 
demonstrating this point by including reform-minded journalists in his study of 
“Zhivago’s Children,” the name he gives to those intellectuals who came of age after the 
Second World War.17 In many respects, the institutional history of the Journalists’ Union 
corresponds to many of Tromly’s points, though my findings expand upon them in 
important ways. Journalists, especially during the creative union’s formation process, 
defended their social value precisely in terms of their writing skills, though they struggled 
not only with the great cultural value attached to literature but also with the greater 
material privilege of the Writers’ Union. The historical overlap between journalism and 
literature described above, along with the greater material status of writers, complicated 
journalists’ efforts to defend the dignity of their work. Some leading journalists, 
                                                
16 Tromly, 5–9. 
17 For an example of Zubok’s inclusion of journalists, see Zhivago’s Children, 148–9. 
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including Khrushchev’s son-in-law Aleksei Adzhubei, insisted that journalism’s social 
resonance and commitment to factual accuracy made it more socially significant than 
belles-lettres. At the same time, as we will see, journalists often employed the language 
of social responsibility in describing professional achievement. And, though they decried 
“bourgeois” journalism’s emphasis on profits, creative union members also insisted that 
their socially useful labor entitled them to a certain standard of living, one that would put 
them on equal footing with writers.    
Though I treat journalists as part of the Soviet intelligentsia and stress the novelty 
of the creative union, the legacies of Soviet print culture before the organization’s 
formation are key to understanding the effects of Khrushchev’s reform agenda. 
Journalists were instrumental in the 1930s drive for industrialization and the 
establishment of socialist realism as a dominant literary genre. The new creative union 
would continue to elaborate on these cultural legacies, though media elites frequently 
acknowledged that their audiences had become more sophisticated in the intervening 
years.18  Newspapers were equally critical to the establishment of the personality cult, 
with its continuous focus on the “economy of the gift” and Stalin’s role as benevolent 
provider to the Soviet people. While the Second World War is somewhat understudied by 
historians, the contributions of war correspondents to the renewed “moral authority” of 
Soviet journalism have been acknowledged frequently.19 Memoir literature also points to 
the war as a critical moment for a generation of journalists. Il’ia Shatunovskii, who would 
become famous as a satirist and feuilletonist for both Komsomol’skaia pravda and 
                                                
18 See Matthew Lenoe, Closer to the Masses: Stalinist Culture, Social Revolution, and Soviet Newspapers 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 6–8. 
19 Jeffrey Brooks, Thank You Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture From Revolution to Cold War 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 167–70, 181. 
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Pravda, described the war as a maturation experience which forever shaped his writing 
career—he thought of his fellow frontoviki (the Soviet term for war veterans) and their 
possible reactions to every piece of his writing. Like others of his generation, 
Shatunovskii lacked an established career before his war service and felt uncertain and 
adrift in civilian life. A chance meeting with a journalist in his home city of Ashgabat’, 
Turkmenistan, while he had not yet acquired a civilian wardrobe, transformed him from 
an aimless young man into a journalist.20 Several of the senior figures in the creative 
union attained stature as war correspondents and applied their expertise to the new 
organization. Moscow University’s journalism department was established in 1950—the 
first separate academic department for the field. Shatunovskii and many of his colleagues 
would study there before embarking on newspaper careers. Higher education would 
become an important part of the Journalists’ Union’s domestic agenda, and features in 
chapter five.  
The pivotal role of war correspondents soon gave way to the renewal of Stalin’s 
personality cult and an exacerbation of domestic and international tensions. Andrei 
Zhdanov, Stalin’s chief ideologue, launched campaigns against foreign influence in 
Soviet culture, while the show trial against the Kremlin doctors intensified attacks on 
Jews as “rootless cosmopolitans.” Though Zhdanov used the press in his cultural 
campaigns, journalists themselves came under increased scrutiny at the end of Stalin’s 
rule, even those who had formerly been hailed as heroes. The writer Il’ia Ehrenburg, who 
served as a war correspondent, had once been so popular that an officer who criticized his 
anti-Nazi rhetoric was brought up on charges. Ehrenburg began to write articles sharply 
                                                
20 Il’ia Mironovich Shatunovskii, Zapiski streli’anogo vorobia (Moscow: Voskresen’e, 2003), 7–10. 
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criticizing the United States during the height of the Zhdanovschina. By this time, many 
of his fellow members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee had been murdered, so the 
turn toward anti-Western rhetoric was likely an attempt at self-preservation.21 The young 
satirist Shatunovskii also experienced the political challenges of late Stalinism. As the 
son of someone sentenced under Article 58, the criminal statute for counter-revolutionary 
activity, he too was in a precarious position. To get him away from the capital, Dmitri 
Goriunov, the editor of Komsomol’skaia pravda, sent Shatunovskii to report on the 
construction of the Volga-Don Canal. In his memoir, Shatunovskii described the 
suffering of forced laborers who worked on the project and notes that their story was 
absent from his optimistic dispatches. He encountered the infamous Major-General 
Rapoport during this time, a figure who would become nationally known after the 
publication of Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago. Shatunovskii claimed that he could 
only call himself a “journalist by profession” (zhurnalist po-professii) after this period, 
echoing existing scholarship about the transformative effects of the Gulag on self-
perception and literary identity.22 In the period of my study, journalists intensely debated 
the meaning and value of Stalinist cultural codes and operated in an environment of 
intensified xenophobia in the aftermath of the Hungarian uprising in November 1956, 
along with the presence of dedicated reformers who embraced the more permissive 
climate of de-Stalinization.  
In my first chapter, I discuss the work of the Journalists’ Union’s Orgburo. Short 
for organizational bureau, this body was made up of senior newspaper editors and 
                                                
21 Joshua Rubenstein, Tangled Loyalties: The Life of Il’ia Ehrenburg (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 194. 
22 See Thomas Lahusen, How Life Writes the Book: Real Socialism and Socialist Realism in Stalin’s Russia 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Shatunovskii, Zapiski, 50–53. 
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seasoned journalists, who were tasked with defining the creative union and specifically 
its efforts to define the creative union and refining its bylaws by soliciting feedback from 
the organization’s rank-and-file members. The formation process points to the 
importance of Cold War competition to Soviet domestic change—the creation of the 
Journalists’ Union was a direct response to the need for more cultural exchange and 
direct management of the International Organization of Journalists (hereafter referred to 
with its Russian acronym, the MOJ). The MOJ, which is also a major subject of chapter 
four, was a Soviet front organization based in Prague aimed at working with 
“progressive” journalists throughout the world. The construction of a creative union, 
however, soon had domestic repercussions both for Orgburo members and rank-and-file 
journalists, as they strove to determine the qualifications for creative union membership 
and the responsibilities and privileges it would convey. This process highlights that 
creative unions were, at least in the Khrushchev era, self-reflective organizations 
dedicated to promoting high standards for intellectual work. Many of these traits 
correspond to sociological definitions of a “profession,” in other modern states, 
especially as this scholarly literature has recently expanded beyond the Anglophone 
world to include studies of German professions and the Soviet music field.23 The creative 
union’s domestic mandate was most often expressed by the requirement to cultivate the 
“professional mastery” of its members. While this term was employed in a variety of 
ways, its more substantive definitions usually involved successful reader engagement, 
language skill, and mastery of particular genres. In presenting journalists as professionals 
throughout the dissertation, I find meaningful continuities between Soviet journalism and 
                                                
23 For an overview of professions, see Tomoff, Creative Union, 3–5. 
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that of other modern states—in contrast to studies of Stalinist media work which have 
tended to stress Soviet uniqueness.24 
My close reading of the Orgburo’s interactions with rank-and-file journalists, 
largely in the form of comments on the organization’s draft bylaws, offers insights into 
how rank-and-file journalists defined their profession. The bylaws were the creative 
union’s governing document, and both elite journalists and rank-and-file members took 
the drafting process very seriously. Rank-and-file journalists continually advocated for 
more material and social privilege, especially for access to leisure and material funds that 
would put them on par with the Writers’ Union, and argued for high moral and literary 
standards in membership. In so doing, they expressed a strong sense of what factors 
distinguished the Soviet creative professional: material and social privilege, influence 
over higher education and employment, and a conviction that writing for the public, 
especially as creative union members, required both quality of output and a certain moral 
and political stature. Members’ sense of what the creative union should be was strongly 
and clearly articulated throughout my study, but the organization remained relatively 
weak. One reason for this was its persistent failure to establish a financial support fund, 
which would have enhanced journalists’ social and economic position. This failure was 
more likely the result of the profession’s large size than any substantive desire to ensure 
that journalists remained inferior to writers, though stating this with certainty this would 
require a more substantive economic history of the creative intelligentsia than I have been 
able to undertake. The other practical challenge to the creative union’s total control of 
professionalization was related to employment and demographics: creative union 
                                                
24 Lenoe, Closer to the Masses, 5–7. 
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membership was not required for work in the journalism profession, and the organization 
never asserted power over the operations or content of the newspapers in which it 
members worked, no doubt because the creative union was the largest in the USSR and 
such an undertaking would have required a massive bureaucratic structure.    
Soviet journalists’ intellectual commitments—including their work in the new 
creative union—took place in a period of extraordinary upheaval, as Khrushchev actively 
pursued reform projects and repudiated parts of Stalin’s legacy. Because the creative 
union began its most significant work well after 1956, I use the newsroom of 
Komsomol’skaia pravda to understand how journalists navigated the immediate 
aftermath of the Twentieth Party Congress. Though I argue that most of my dissertation 
subjects were likely far less cynical than Dovlatov, I have found that editorial meetings 
are a particularly useful way to discover the social and political tensions behind 
newspaper stories. Like other scholars, I question the utility of the dominant “Thaw 
metaphor,” pointing to the diversity of opinion among journalists about de-Stalinization’s 
meaning and their own capacity to criticize authority in order to bring about social 
change.25 Though some KP staff members embraced reform, others were fundamentally 
anxious about the de-stabilizing nature of the project, especially after unrest in Eastern 
Europe during the fall of 1956. The “putsch,” which Dovlatov ignored in his 
alphabetization efforts, was a major turning point for KP’s reform agenda. Episodes at 
the newspaper also point to the limits of journalists’ close association with the Party and 
the Komsomol: even the paper’s senior leadership would experience surprise and 
uncertainty when some articles were received unfavorably. 
                                                
25 Tromly, Making the Soviet Intelligentsia, 21. 
  18 
In chapter three, I turn to the public inauguration of the Journalists’ Union at its 
all-Union Congress held in Moscow in November of 1959. This event, attended by senior 
Central Committee members and concluding with an official reception where 
Khrushchev himself spoke, was a public celebration of the professionalization process, 
where senior journalists, Adzhubei among them, celebrated the formation of the creative 
union as a sign of the Party’s regard for their work. At the same time, they continued to 
debate and discuss the nature of professional stature and whether the final form of the 
bylaws accurately reflected journalists’ needs and goals. The event’s major domestic 
themes, such as genre, reader engagement, and the relationship between journalism and 
literature, underlined journalists’ status as members of the creative intelligentsia, with 
close relationships to literature but a distinct social and political mission. The creative 
union’s dual mandate to cultivate professionalism abroad while pursuing foreign 
exchange was another key issue, especially as senior media managers sought to ensure 
that Soviet ideological purity was not compromised by increased engagement with 
foreigners.  
Journalists were unique among Soviet creative professionals in that their creative 
union was formed as an explicit response to the Cold War—specifically, the pursuit of 
cultural exchange to ensure both Soviet competitiveness with the “bourgeois” world and 
further alliances with developing nations.. The role of journalists in foreign exchange, 
both as hosts of foreign guests and participants in trips abroad, is the principal subject of 
my fourth chapter. Soviet cultural diplomacy first thrived in the interwar period, as 
Michael David-Fox has shown in his study of the All-Union Society for Cultural Ties 
Abroad (VOKS), and the larger “party-state system” of cultural diplomacy it participated 
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in. David-Fox convincingly demonstrates that VOKS, and other cultural diplomacy 
agencies, helped shape not only the impressions of foreigners but also of Soviet citizens, 
as well as a broader “superiority-inferiority complex,” in which Soviet elites alternately 
admired and denigrated the West. After the Stalinist purges removed many of its key 
players, and the Cold War resulted in new foreign policy priorities, VOKS was 
restructured and replaced by the State Committee for Cultural Connections Abroad 
(GKKS). Though the creative union both hosted and received foreign delegations, the 
MOJ was its most important cultural diplomacy undertaking, and my analysis reflects this 
focus. My findings demonstrate that journalists were key players in restructuring the 
cultural diplomacy apparatus to make it more effective in a Cold War climate and in 
shifting Soviet priorities toward the developing world as Europeans became more 
difficult to win over.26 Though much of this work was conducted under the auspices of 
“peaceful coexistence” with the West, Soviet journalists and the media managers they 
answered to were often deeply anxious about cross-cultural encounters, as their Stalinist 
predecessors had been.  
In chapter five, I discuss the creative union’s domestic endeavors the years after 
its inaugural congress, specifically its plenums and more significant creative seminars. 
Where plenums were often devoted to membership issues or political objectives, most 
creative seminars were focused on genre and reader needs. These events reveal ongoing 
rank-and-file dissatisfaction with the organization, including the explicit wish that the 
creative union exercise more control over its members’ work environments and access to 
                                                
26 Michael David-Fox, Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and Western Visitors to the 
Soviet Union, 1921–1941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 5–27. On the GKKS and the Cold War 
contrasted to the interwar period, see 320–23. 
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material privilege. At the same time, the organization’s leadership expressed concern that 
its original membership criteria were too relaxed. Though the content of creative 
seminars and other professional gatherings points to continued Party supervision of the 
Journalists’ Union, this relationship is not readily discernible from archival records I have 
been able to access. Rather than engage in conjecture about the forms such supervision 
might have taken, I concentrate on journalists’ own perceptions of this relationship. 
Other creative union members frankly discussed problems of journalism 
education and training, expressing doubts about the current curriculum’s capacity to 
produce successful journalists. In their effort to operate as professionals—especially as 
they sought to control the qualifications of future entrants—Soviet journalists confronted 
similar challenges to their American competitors.27 Creative seminars under Khrushchev 
heavily featured supporters of a renewed journalism self-consciously reflecting on 
changing audience needs, the effects of de-Stalinization, and the relationship between 
journalism and literature. Elaborating on these issues requires a brief overview of major 
Soviet newspaper genres, as genre skill was seen as an important professional attribute, 
and often used to contrast newspaper work from belles-lettres. In most cases, I leave 
terms in the original Russian to avoid imprecise translations. Though I analyze satire in 
less depth than other genres, the feuilleton was particularly important to journalists 
engaged in social reform, as they targeted individuals based on the social and political 
challenges of the day. Soviet satire, like other forms of criticism, was often limited in the 
subjects it could describe—in the late 1950s, for example, Literaturnaia gazeta was 
                                                
27 On education as a common challenge for Western journalists and journalism’s uneasy fit in the 
university, see Barbie Zelizer, Taking Journalism Seriously: News and the Academy (London: Sage, 2004), 
15–18. 
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extensively criticized for satirizing the unsatisfactory conditions in the new apartments 
Khrushchev championed for Moscow’s workers. It was more common—and less risky—
for newspapers to satirize delinquents who impeded social progress.28  Journalists 
considered the ocherk, sometimes translated as a feature story, as especially key to 
professional development to the extent that novice journalists would often work to 
produce one as a demonstration of their skill. The essence of the genre was not only to 
report on an event or a person but to focus on a central theme or fact and immerse the 
reader in a location or individual life.29 This linked the ocherk to another genre or 
journalistic approach—publisistika, a term that was used to describe politically minded 
journalism of great social importance, which allowed the author to interpret or defend a 
position. As Dina Fainberg has noted, many journalists claimed that all of their work had 
some element of publisistika or identified the genre with journalism itself, since it was 
considered essential to properly forming informed audiences.  The genre was also closely 
associated with the literary heritage of the nineteenth century, including such notable 
figures as Belinskii and Pushkin.30 
Though aspects of the ocherk bore a strong resemblance to the short story, they 
were always founded on a real person. The ideal form, as described in an overview of 
Soviet genres, “showing them in action, opening up the essence of a phenomenon. Its 
heroes are living people, events in it are depicted in a documentary manner.” To illustrate 
the importance of this value, I turn back to the Bogdanov and Viazemskii textbook. They 
                                                
28 N. L. Volkovskii, Otechestvennaia zhurnalistika, 1950–2000 (Saint Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo Sankt 
Peterburskogo Universiteta, 2006), 87–88. 
29 Ibid., 84–5. 
30 Dina Fainberg, “Notes from the Rotten West, Reports from the Backward East: Soviet and American 
Foreign Correspondents in The Cold War, 1945–1985” (PhD diss., Rutgers University, 2012), 54–57; the 
value of publisistika is a central theme of chapter five. 
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described a case from Leningrad where an ocherkist exaggerated his subjects so much 
that they wrote to the newspaper to complain. Soviet journalists often invoked reader 
interests and needs to justify their insistence on factual accuracy and their need for 
updated information. Тhe ocherk was also more tightly contained than other literary 
forms, using only a few details to describe what might go on for several pages in a short 
story. The genre did not have to be relentlessly positive—though it could “show the high 
moral qualities of our people…as it helps form the charter of the new person, his moral 
image,” struggles or deficits could also be appropriate subjects. Describing the goals for 
the genre after the creative union’s 1958 seminar, the authors highlighted the value of 
attention to the “living person” and their “spiritual image” as a corrective example for 
journalists focused on “the narrow interest of his profession.”31 As these lines suggest, 
cultivation of the ocherk was considered especially important in engaging with readers 
and depicting the diversity of human experience. This effort had its own genre rubric in 
many newspapers by the 1960s and was known as the “moral and ethical theme.” In the 
Khrushchev era, many ocherki, except those about science or technology, were expected 
to touch on both the working lives and inner struggles of individuals. Tatiana Tess, a 
longtime journalist at Izvestiia, was acknowledged as a master of this type of ocherk, as 
we will see.32 
In their reflections on genre, particularly the newly popularized moral and ethical 
theme, Soviet journalists elaborated their own visions of the relationship between writing, 
reading, and the individual’s moral and social position. Though they were committed to 
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narratives about individuals, creative union members’ visions of emancipation remained 
fundamentally collectivist, much like their visions of professional conduct. While their 
relationship to political authorities was not without friction, Soviet journalists never 
embraced the core values of Western print culture, such as the absence of direct 
censorship and a commitment to apolitical conceptions of objectivity, and indeed actively 
rejected them.33 The development of Soviet polling was much more closely associated 
with state initiative than similar projects in other nations, particularly the United States, 
which was one of the first states to widely adopt polling and sociological research.34  
By the time of Khrushchev’s ouster in October of 1964, the Journalists’ Union 
had expanded both its cultural diplomacy mission and its domestic professional activities. 
Chapter six focuses on the creative union’s restructuring efforts and the extent and nature 
of newspaper editors’ struggles with the new regime. The early Brezhnev years were 
somewhat tumultuous for journalists, especially for those who had been close to 
Khrushchev, such as his son-in-law, Aleksei Adzhubei. The senior leadership of central 
newspapers, along with the creative union, underwent significant changes from 1964 to 
1968, though these changes were less the result of a coherent program than a series of ad 
hoc responses to events and publication controversies. Though many reformers 
experienced personal setbacks in this period, some important continuities in professional 
priorities and practices remained, such as the creative union’s greater involvement with 
higher education. Creative union leaders continued to refine their thinking about 
membership, professional responsibility, and material privilege. But where the first 
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bylaws debate displayed journalists’ pride and optimism, the second featured a greater 
sense of disappointment. Most importantly, by this time, it was clear that the organization 
would always remain subordinate to the Party, and the focus on bylaws reflects this: 
rather than substantively intervening in policy debates, creative union leaders confined 
themselves to revising a single document. Where the creative union’s origins reflect a 
moment of optimism and professional pride, its second decade helps to account for 
Dovlatov’s more critical approach in The Compromise.  
  25 
Chapter 1  
“He Who Does Not Write, Is Not a Journalist”: The Formation of the Journalists’ 
Union of the Soviet Union, 1954–1959 
In October of 1954, Danil’ Feodorivich Kraminov, a senior journalist at Pravda, 
was distressed that he and his colleagues did not have a creative union that would 
facilitate cultural exchange with foreign journalists, and he took it upon himself to draft a 
lengthy proposal to the Central Committee’s Agitation and Propaganda Department about 
this problem. Kraminov had previously worked as a TASS foreign correspondent and war 
correspondent for the Allied Forces.35  His concern stemmed from a recent trip to 
Budapest, where he attended an executive committee meeting of the International 
Organization of Journalists (hereafter the MOJ), an organization for “progressive” 
journalists based in Prague but funded and largely directed from Moscow. The MOJ was 
an early battleground in the cultural Cold War: by 1950, most members from Western 
Europe and the United States left to form the “bourgeois” International Federation of 
Journalists.36 Foreign exchange between socialist countries was a major agenda item at 
the meeting and in Kraminov’s memorandum to the Central Committee. To his dismay, 
the GDR had taken such a leading role in the MOJ’s professional exchange work that 
other socialist journalists had drafted resolutions formalizing its position, though these 
did not pass thanks to a Soviet counterproposal. In his memo, Kraminov lamented that, 
                                                
35 Biographical data on Kraminov can be found in A.A. Grebel’nikov et al., eds., Zhurnalisty XX veka: 
Liudi i sud’by  (Moscow: Olma Press 2003), 248–50. 
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International Movement of Journalists (Prague: International Organization of Journalists, 1986); the rivalry 
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“it is impossible to note without acrimony that not one of the speakers…raised the 
possibility of professional exchange with Soviet journalists, insofar as it is known that 
there is no Journalists’ Union in the Soviet Union, and therefore Soviet journalists can 
offer no professional exchange in this area.”  For capitalist colleagues, the absence of a 
journalists’ union raised “puzzling questions.” He argued that the “demands of 
international relations” and the “internal goals of promoting the professional mastery and 
creative growth of journalists” demonstrated the necessity of a Journalists’ Union. 
Kraminov’s vision of on organization that not only promoted Soviet interests abroad but 
also provided domestic professional opportunities and would become the new creative 
union’s foundational principles.37 
I discuss the creation of the Journalists’ Union of the Soviet Union аs a response 
to the cultural Cold War. Its domestic formation process prompted a national 
conversation about the nature of the journalism profession. These exchanges took place 
in a variety of venues and contexts—Kraminov’s memo was merely the initial stage of a 
lengthy effort. In this chapter, I concentrate not only on the reception to his proposals but 
also the first organizational structures of the creative union and the ultimate production of 
its draft bylaws. Because journalists from all over the Soviet Union participated in the 
process, understanding the development of the bylaws and the debates surrounding them 
are crucial to understanding Soviet journalists’ conceptions of their work and social 
standing. The elite media managers who formed the creative union’s Organizational 
Bureau (Orgburo) were the first to formulate specific goals and objectives for the creative 
union, and members of this body assumed responsibility for drafting bylaws and 
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soliciting feedback on them. They then oversaw the establishment of local union 
branches, which were responsible for the organization’s first membership drives. I focus 
particularly on the years 1957 to 1959, the period when elite and rank-and-file journalists 
concentrated most intensely on the draft bylaws. The ratification of permanent bylaws 
took place at the organization’s inaugural congress in November of 1959, which forms 
the main subject of chapter three. Understanding this bylaws debate is essential to 
understanding how its prospective members saw the organization both as a tool to 
improve their status and as an acknowledgement of their existing social and political 
standing. 
The bylaws debate raises questions about the nature of Soviet journalism, 
particularly its claims to represent “professionals” or embody a “profession.” While 
journalism had some attributes of a profession during the Stalin era, the Orgburo’s 
activities and the bylaws debate marked a period of “conscious professionalization” in 
which journalists throughout Soviet society reflected on their rights and responsibilities. 
Indeed, it is this reliance on discussion and participation that distinguished the formation 
of the Journalists’ Union from that of the other creative unions. They were brought into 
being in the 1930s to give the Soviet state greater control in the creative realm—a process 
in which writers merited special attention, though the period was one of broad cultural 
consolidation.38 In 1956, journalists had been under state control and supervision for 
many years, since newspapers had been essential mobilizing tools from the revolutionary 
period through Stalin’s industrialization campaigns and beyond.39 Rather than bringing 
                                                
38 Fitzpatrick, Cultural Front, 10–13. 
39 Lenoe, Closer to the Masses, 11–13. 
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journalists to heel, the Orgburo made some effort to determine how a creative union 
could meet journalists’ needs. The bylaws debate ensured that the Journalists’ Union 
would be both an organization and an argument about the profession’s value and 
meaning.40 
In presenting journalism as a profession, I expand upon existing efforts to study 
these occupational groups outside of the Anglo-American context and present Soviet 
social structures as comparable to those of other states. As Kirill Tomoff does in his study 
of the Composers’ Union, I define a “profession” as a group of individuals engaged in a 
type of specialized labor requiring expertise. Acknowledgement of expert status allows 
the group to set its own admissions standards to evaluate work performance. In most 
historical studies of professions, the recognized social and cultural significance of 
specialized labor is accompanied by material privilege and enhanced social standing.41 
The early years of the creative union fit many aspects of this framework: the resulting 
discussion and debate over bylaws, which occurred over several years, should be 
understood as an argument about Soviet journalists’ professional status, one where social 
and material privilege was particularly significant and where claims of agency were 
relatively limited—though not nonexistent. Additionally, journalists’ claims for greater 
standing and recognition explicitly stemmed from the Soviet understanding that “mind 
work” was more meaningful than other forms of labor. The development of professions is 
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Bolshevik Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2005): 8–11. 
41 Konrad Jarausch and Geoffrey Cocks, “Introduction” in German Professions: 1800-1950, ed. Konrad 
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  29 
closely associated with modern states, putting the Soviet Union on a similar 
developmental trajectory. While some journalism scholars are increasingly skeptical of 
the “professional” framework’s relevance, I see this critique as more applicable to the 
liberal democracies that dominate journalism studies than to the Soviet Union.42 The 
Journalists’ Union’s draft bylaws and the resulting discussion of them reflect many of the 
essential traits of a profession: an effort to “provide codes of conduct” organize a group 
of individuals performing similar work, and to define a socialist “service orientation.”43 
Other scholars have made similar arguments about journalism in socialist Eastern Europe, 
especially Poland. Though some “typical” traits of the journalism profession are missing 
from such cases, such as a distance from politics, I have found that Soviet journalists, like 
Polish ones, had “high levels of self-identification as professionals, and of loyalty to their 
profession.”44 
In this respect, my work departs somewhat from Thomas Remington’s contention 
that Soviet journalists’ priorities, especially at the raion-level, were predominantly 
shaped by Party objectives and pressures rather than a commitment to public service or 
“professional objectivity.” Remington further argues that the creation of the creative 
union failed to give journalists any significant power over the mass media’s function, 
though access to material privilege increased. In his view, the creative union’s formation 
only improved “self-articulation.” Remington’s analysis, due to lack of archival access, 
misses the historical uniqueness of this “self-articulation”: the consultative element of the 
Journalists’ Union was unique in the history of Soviet creative organizations. 
                                                
42 On professions and mind work, see Tomoff, Creative Union, 213. 
43 Zelizer, Taking Journalism Seriously, 32–35. 
44 Jane Leftwich Curry, Poland’s Journalists: Professionalism and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 14–23. 
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Remington’s view of professional standing also minimizes the extent to which material 
status was a key part of professional standing in a Soviet context. Perhaps most 
significantly, Remington’s reliance on objectivity as a professional trait misses Soviet 
journalism’s fundamental conceptual frame: Marxist-Leninist views of media work 
decried objectivity as incompatible with a materialist approach to the world. Remington’s 
approach, at base, is a search for “liberal subjects” in the Soviet media—his opening 
question concerned the potential for journalists to challenge the Party and promote 
reform. Such a search is doomed to failure and, I would argue, is an inappropriate starting 
point for a historically nuanced investigation of Soviet journalism. I argue that while the 
participants in the bylaws debate did not challenge the Party’s leading ideological role, 
they did discuss specific “professional values,” essentially arguing that their specialist 
status set them apart socially as well as materially.45  
In identifying journalists as “professionals,” I advance broader arguments about 
the Khrushchev regime’s early relationship to the creative intelligentsia: just as the 
regime renounced state terror in favor of persuasive methods, journalists were brought 
into a creative union through a process that involved dialogue along with centralized 
control. At the same time, my findings prove that journalists belong in the broader 
intellectual and cultural history of the 1960s: the participants in the bylaws debate 
promoted a vision of a stronger and more influential profession without rejecting Party 
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leadership, much as other intellectuals of the period sought renewal through a purified 
revolutionary ideology.46 
••• 
To understand precisely what Kraminov was arguing for in his memo to the 
Central Committee, it is crucial to understand the cultural and political status of creative 
unions in Soviet life. While there is a recent in-depth study of the Composers’ Union in 
the Stalin period, no such work exists to compare journalism to its closest counterpart—
literature. Despite this limitation, some aspects of Kirill Tomoff’s analysis of the creative 
union’s social and political function are pertinent to this study, since Tomoff positions 
creative unions in relationship to political and state institutions in the course of his 
analysis. Creative unions, in the Soviet context, were responsible for providing an 
“institutional venue” for creative discussions, as part of their mandate to develop the 
“professional mastery” of their members. As we will see in more detail in chapter five, 
all-Union creative seminars, usually focused on a particular genre or audience, were the 
main method used in the Journalists’ Union. Creative unions focused not only on 
“developing the socialist creativity of their members, but also in defending and 
representing their legal and economic interests.” A major source of authority for both the 
Writers’ and Composers’ Unions were their separate material support funds—Litfond and 
Muzfond, respectively, which provided assistance to needy members, subsidized travel 
and leisure, and provided subsidized housing and work spaces.47 The Journalists’ Union 
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was similarly dedicated to both the cultural and material well being of its members but 
faced significant logistical challenges in this area.  Zhurfond, the equivalent support 
system for the Journalists’ Union, was never formally established during the period of 
this study—elite and rank-and-file members of the creative union keenly felt this absence 
and routinely sought to remedy it. These self-conscious efforts at material improvement, 
together with genre discussions and debates about professional success, point to an 
important feature of creative work in the Soviet context: creative unions were self-
reflexive—in these officially recognized social bodies, members exchanged opinions 
about the meaning and value of their work and the direction the organization should take. 
Creative union membership conveyed less tangible forms of privilege, since these 
organizations were devoted explicitly to the development of the intelligentsia. The deep 
attachment to books, reading, and writing in Soviet society—and its close association 
with intelligentsia status—was often in evidence at creative union seminars and, as I will 
explain below, in journalists’ willingness to compare themselves to writers.48 A final 
distinguishing feature of creative unions was their involvement in international exchange 
and transnational organizations related to their area of expertise—the expansion of the 
Journalists’ Union’s international mandate is the main subject of chapter four.49 
Though trade unions and creative unions were distinct, the interrelationship 
between them forms a major theme of this work, in part because of journalism’s unique 
status in this area. Journalists were the only creative professionals who relied on a formal 
relationship with a trade union to compensate for their lack of an exclusive support fund. 
                                                
48 The most recent account is Tromly’s Making the Soviet Intelligentsia, 9–11. 
49 See “Mezhdunarodnaia deiatelnost’ tvorcheskikh soiuzov,” in Ts. A. Iampol’skaia et al., Tvorcheskie 
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The Trade Union for Cultural Workers (profsoiuz rabotnikov kul’turyi) was the body 
officially responsible for their material needs. Trade unions were distinct from creative 
ones in several important respects. They lacked any claims to exclusivity—a trade union 
was open to all employees of a given establishment. The trade union for cultural workers, 
then, might include both the editor-in-chief of a newspaper and the machinist who 
worked in his building. Trade unions were consequently much larger than creative 
ones—by the 1970s, some 98 percent of Soviet workers belonged to creative 
organizations, and some studies suggest there were as many as 2.5 million distinct “trade 
union groups.” Having said that, the Journalists’ Union was always significantly larger 
than the other creative unions. In 1959, there were about nineteen thousand members of 
the Journalists’ Union and only 4,801 members of the Writers’ Union. By 1977, the 
Journalists’ Union had 77,000 members, compared to 1,936 in the Composers’ Union and 
about 8,000 in the Writers’ Union. This difference in size, while often publicly celebrated 
as a sign of the profession’s social value, posed significant logistical challenges for the 
organization’s efforts to influence its members and set up Zhurfond.50   
Just as creative unions were distinct from trade unions, they should be considered 
separately from two other institutions—universities and, to a lesser extent, the ideological 
apparatus of the Communist Party. Though these distinctions are part of the history of 
other creative unions, journalism had a unique developmental trajectory. In contrast to the 
music field, which had an established pre-revolutionary history of conservatory programs 
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from which the overwhelming majority of creative union members graduated, not all 
Journalists’ Union members had higher education of any kind, and specialized journalism 
degrees were not available until after the war. As part of its commitment to professional 
development, the creative union frequently proposed reforms in journalism education, as 
we will see in chapters five and six. Tomoff argues that the legal and organizational 
separation between the government cultural apparatus and the Composers’ Union 
ultimately gave the latter group more influence over the music field. The situation for 
journalists was distinct, as the creative union always had very high levels of Party 
membership, and its first president, Pavel Satiukov, was a member of the Central 
Committee and close personal associate of Khrushchev.51 Whatever capacity to shape 
their field journalists enjoyed, then, stemmed from the officially recognized importance 
of their work rather than separation from the Party. 
••• 
 The creative union’s early organizational history had several distinct stages, all of 
which are crucial to properly contextualizing the professionalization process. With 
startling rapidity, the heads of the Central Committee’s Agitation and Propaganda 
department responded positively to Kraminov in late December of 1954, commenting 
that progressive journalists increasingly requested more contact with their Soviet 
counterparts. The question of parity with other socialist countries was explicitly raised: 
the other Eastern bloc nations all had separate journalists’ unions or special journalism 
sections in their trade unions. Capitalist countries tended to have “independent 
                                                
51 On the legal status of the Composers’ Union, see Tomoff, Creative Union, 26; More biographical data on 
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journalists’ unions,” and “progressive” journalists in Western Europe frequently 
coordinated leisure and professional activities. In contrast, the twenty-five thousand 
journalists in the Soviet Union “did not have their own independent organization, 
specially devoted to giving them assistance with their creative growth and perfection of 
their journalistic skills (masterstva).” The department heads echoed Kraminov’s 
contention that the “absence of such an independent organization…creates known 
difficulties in our influence on this stratum of the intelligentsia abroad…so that many 
undertakings in the area of international social relations are carried out without the 
participation of Soviet journalists.”52  As all of these comments demonstrate, both the 
MOJ and the planned creative union were meant to facilitate exchanges between Soviet 
journalists and media professionals of different nations, as well as Soviet participation in 
independent and “front” media organizations, all of which I refer to as “cultural 
diplomacy.” Though the term is the subject of intense debate, it is best understood, at 
root, to refer to “communication between governments and foreign people,” often 
designed to improve a nation’s image or status. The degree to which such efforts are an 
extension of state policy—and are or were carried out by state agencies—varies widely.53 
As part of their justification for supporting Kraminov’s proposal, the Agitation 
and Propaganda department heads discussed journalism’s historical development in the 
Soviet Union. From 1917 to 1935, journalists had a “central bureau” and trade union. 
From 1935 to 1953, they were briefly part of a larger organization for press workers and 
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printers and then became part of the Trade Union for Cultural Workers under the auspices 
of the all-USSR Central Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS) where they constituted the 
largest “stratum of the intelligentsia” but lacked their own section. To correct this 
imbalance, the Central Committee department heads concluded the memorandum with a 
proposal to create a separate journalists’ section in the trade union.54 The organization 
was needed due to the “quantitative and qualitative growth of the Soviet press,” and its 
responsibility for the “communist upbringing of Soviet workers.” These proposals 
introduced phrases that would become a near-constant refrain in seminars, articles, and 
public speeches about the Journalists’ Union’s goals for its members: to aid in the 
“ideological and theoretical sophistication” and “creative and professional mastery” of 
journalists. Again, the narrative was one of absence: no organization was devoted to this 
cause, and journalists lacked “the appropriate creative atmosphere” for their work.  Most 
sophisticated genres had “practically disappeared” from many newspapers. An undated 
draft Central Committee decree authorizing the organization’s creation also highlighted 
the detrimental effects on the ability of journalists to connect with their counterparts 
throughout the world.55 The decree explicitly referenced the drafting of bylaws and the 
creation of an Organizational Bureau and trade publication. The creative union’s print 
journal first appeared in the autumn of 1955, as the successor to Journalist.56 As part of 
its follow-up to these proposals, the VsTsSPS sent an organizational blueprint for the 
journalists’ section to the Central Committee in April of 1955. According to this 
proposed outline of its structure, the organization’s main goals were to train journalists to 
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assist in the ideological and moral “upbringing” of workers and in representing Soviet 
journalists abroad in the “international professional movement.” It was also expected to 
promote the “cultured leisure” of its members and oversee their working conditions 
through oversight of local branches. All-USSR Congresses were to be held every two 
years.57 By the spring of 1956, the organization had a separate Orgburo independent of 
the VTsSPS, though trade union relationships would structure much of the Orgburo’s 
early work and the subsequent bylaws debate. Although the reasons for the Journalists’ 
Union’s separation from the trade union body remain opaque, the brief period of closer 
association with the VTsSPS was not insignificant: the arrangements for an all-USSR and 
local structure, and many of the cultural and organizational missions, would retain much 
of their original function after the “journalists’ section” was transformed into an 
independent creative union.  
Though Kraminov and his supporters in the Agitation and Propaganda 
Department relied on a narrative of absence and potential Soviet decline as justification 
for a new journalists’ organization, it should be noted that their joint portrait of Soviet 
failure should be seen more as a lobbying effort than a reflection of Soviet reality. Soviet 
journalists were active participants in Stalinist industrialization, and as war 
correspondents, they had achieved high social status, all without a Journalists’ Union or 
even a section for journalists within a trade union structure. Journalists also worked 
abroad in the Stalin era: perhaps the most famous was Mikhail Koltsov, who became an 
especially active journalist after his Red Army service during the Civil War Era. He 
achieved particular fame as a satirist and political commentator. Before his execution on 
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espionage charges in 1940, Koltsov was an influential commentator on foreign affairs 
who maintained close ties with both the Comintern and the Secret Police—though he did 
this as a member of the Writers’ Union.58 Kraminov’s own work history as a foreign 
correspondent and ability to report on MOJ activities belied some of the more dramatic 
language about the Soviet Union’s international position.  In 1955, mot long after 
Kraminov penned his memo, a delegation of famous Soviet journalists visited the United 
States. The delegation was led by Boris Polevoi, well known for his reporting from the 
Nuremburg trials and as a secretary in the Writers’ Union. Polevoi published a volume of 
this visit, American Diaries, in which he paid homage to One-Story America, the famous 
work of the satirists Evgenii Petrov and Il’ia Ilf about their journey around the 1930s 
United States. Оther members of the delegation included Alexander Sofronov, a special 
correspondent for Ogonek, and Khrushchev’s son-in-law, Aleksei Adzhubei, who would 
eventually serve as editor of both Komsomol’skaia pravda and Izvestiia.59 Though 
foreign exchange and professional connections abroad would become a critical part of the 
Journalists’ Union’s function, exchange clearly took place prior to its establishment, 
despite the dismal picture Kraminov and his supporters presented. The language of these 
arguments, and their ultimate success, reveals as much about the importance Soviet elites 
attached to competitiveness with both socialist and capitalist print culture as it does about 
the actual status of journalists. Rather than treat the Journalists’ Union’s formation as a 
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single foundational moment, I see its development as part of an ongoing effort to reshape 
journalism’s purpose.   
 The creative union’s incubation period spanned several years and had distinct 
stages of development, which I will briefly describe here before describing the draft 
bylaws and unpacking the arguments journalists advanced about the nature of the new 
organization. In the spring and summer of 1956, the elite media managers who formed 
the creative union’s organizational bureau (Orgburo), held their first meetings and 
discussed their goals and objectives for the organization. These debates, and some 
consultation with the Central Committee, led Orgburo members to produce the 
organization’s draft bylaws and set up a basic organizational structure. The draft bylaws 
were first published in the creative union’s trade journal in August of 1957, and Orgburo 
members held some public discussions with rank-and-file members about the document 
around this time. Local branches of the creative union began their membership drives in 
the fall of 1957. In 1958, they took in more members and formalized their organizational 
structures, with a particular focus on preparations for local conferences. Following 
instructions from the all-Union Orgburo, local journalists commented on the draft 
bylaws. These conversations, which occurred both before and after local congresses the 
following year, involved open discussion of the possibilities the creative union offered 
for professional development and greater social and material prestige. These comments or 
proposed amendments to the draft document were subsequently sent to the Orgburo as it 
prepared a final version for discussion and ratification at the creative union’s first all-
Union Congress. After some scheduling setbacks, local conferences occurred in the 
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winter of 1959 and the all-Union Congress was held from November 11 to November 14 
of that year. These local and national events are the main subjects of chapter three.  
••• 
Kraminov’s memo and the Central Committee’s support for his initiative would 
be far from the last alteration in Soviet journalism’s institutional bases. The creative 
union’s Orgburo officially began its work in April of 1956 and continued until the body 
dissolved itself in 1959. Though some of the organization’s form and goals were 
inherited from its embryonic period under the auspices of the VTsSPS, the Orgburo’s 
early work would further address the new domestic and international responsibilities 
facing journalists, along with the profession’s evolution since the 1930s.60 The Orgburo’s 
official tasks were to draft bylaws, oversee membership, and conduct the first all-USSR 
Congress for the new creative union. In achieving these goals, the Orgburo would serve 
as a forum for a multi-year debate about the meaning of work as a “professional 
journalist.” 
 The career trajectories of the Orgburo members demonstrate that expertise in 
foreign affairs remained a central concern for the new organization, and that the new 
creative union was closely tied to state and Party institutions. The Orgburo’s chairman, 
Nikolai Grigor’evich Pal’gunov, was also head of the Soviet Union’s official wire 
service, TASS. А factory worker in his youth, Pal’gunov became a journalist in his native 
Iaroslavl’ and began his career at TASS in 1929. He completed journalism courses as an 
international specialist (zhurnalist mezhdunarodnik) and worked as a correspondent in 
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Iran, Finland, and France from 1929 to 1940. He was head of the press department of the 
People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and served as general director of TASS from 
1943 to 1960 and a secretary in the Journalists’ Union from 1959 until 1966. Kraminov, 
as befit his leading role in creating the organization, was also an Orgburo member. He 
served as editor of the Union’s foreign affairs journal Abroad (Za rubezhom). Prominent 
zhurnalist-mezhdunarodnik Iurii Аleksandrovich Zhukov had also served as a war 
correspondent, then as a foreign correspondent for Pravda. At the time of the Orgburo’s 
formation, he was headed the State Committee for Cultural Connections Abroad (GKKS) 
for the first few years of its existence. Thus, the Orgburo’s composition and the careers of 
its key figures demonstrate that journalism was expected to promote both international 
and domestic agendas.61  
Other Orgburo members, if less experienced in international matters, had 
similarly long careers in both bureaucracy and journalism. Maria Dmitrievna 
Ovsiainnikova, the only female member of the Orgburo, had been active in the Party 
since the Civil War. She worked as a teacher and eventually edited pedagogical journals, 
also serving as secretary and then as president of the trade union for press workers. 
During the war years, she served as secretary of the Party bureau of a battalion on the 
Western Front and as editor of several regimental newspapers. From 1945 to 1947 
Ovsiannikova was assistant to the head of Glavlit, the Soviet Union’s censorship body, 
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and editor of the journal Soviet Woman until her retirement.62 Dmitrii Petrovich Goriunov 
was editor of Komsomol’skaia pravda, the newspaper for the Communist Party’s Youth 
League (hereafter Komsomol), and would replace Pal’gunov as director of TASS. Boris 
Sergeievich Burkov worked as editor of Trud and then as the first head of the news 
agency Novosti.63 B. L. Leont’ev was a member of the editorial staff of the newspaper 
Literaturnaia gazeta and a specialist in foreign affairs.64 The Orgburo’s general secretary, 
P. P. Erofeev, was the first editor of the Russian Republic newspaper, Sovetskaia 
Rossiia.65 As Matthew Lenoe describes, the journalists of an earlier era had presided over 
the transition from “mass enlightenment” to “mass mobilization” for the industrialization 
campaigns, the Orgburo members in the 1950s were further shaped by war experiences 
and international travel, as befit the organization’s dual focus on domestic skill and 
cultural diplomacy.66 Though he is closely associated with journalistic reform under his 
father-in law, Aleksei Ivanovich Adzhubei, then an assistant editor at Komsomol’skaia 
pravda, did not take a major role in the creative union until after 1959.67 
••• 
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 As they began their work, the Orgburo’s members faced a number of interpretive 
challenges, as the Journalists’ Union had to find its place in the existing social and legal 
framework. At the first meeting in April 1956, Pal’gunov pointed out that because of the 
organization’s status as a creative union, the bylaws of the Writers’ Union, as well as 
those for composers and architects, were appropriate initial models. Legal studies of 
creative unions produced in the Soviet period demonstrate that all creative organizations 
were established in accordance with the Soviet civil code about social organizations. The 
very concept of “professional mastery” was a goal for all creative unions, and it featured 
frequently in Journalists’ Union discourse.68 While Pal’gunov stressed domestic 
comparisons, Boris Burkov pointed out that the bylaws of foreign Journalists’ Unions, 
particularly those from Eastern Europe, should be consulted as well. TASS 
correspondents abroad were tasked with sending copies of these bylaws to the Orgburo. 
Now, both international and internal models for creative organization could be taken into 
consideration, in light of the changed political landscape after the Second World War. 
Kraminov’s international vision of the organization had clearly prevailed by the spring of 
1956, since the Journalists’ Union—which at the time had no members—was already 
taking a leadership role in the planning and execution of an international journalists’ 
meeting in Helsinki that summer—a major event discussed in detail in my fourth 
chapter.69 
The Journalists’ Union’s status as a cultural diplomacy organization was 
determined early and never disputed. In contrast, its domestic functions would be a 
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subject of persistent debate. The primary task of the Orgburo’s April 1956 meeting was, 
in the words of Zhukov: “to determine what the Union should represent, whether it will 
be constructed as a creative organization or more closely resemble a trade Union. 
Decisions about the Union’s membership will be determined by its nature. Whether all 
journalists, including members of the editing bureau, literary workers, and members of 
the letters department will be members, or should only creative workers join it, that is, 
individuals who have experience with journalistic work, like editors, feature-writers, and 
satirists? Should members of the Union of Soviet Journalists simultaneously be members 
of one of the trade unions?”70 The potential overlap in functions between a trade union 
(profsoiuz) and a creative union (tvorcheskii soiuz) would prove to be a key issue in the 
Journalists’ Union’s development. In Soviet society, creative unions were more exclusive 
and traditionally had more privileges and social status—membership came with 
obligations as well as rights, and not all members of a creative profession were eligible 
for membership. Trade unions, in contrast, were open to all employees of a given type of 
institution: the trade union for cultural workers, for example, included engineers and 
machinists as well as artists, provided they worked in some cultural institution.71 The 
questions about membership suggest uncertainty about the organization’s status: whether 
it would be an inclusive organization based on employment status, or one rooted in more 
specific notions of achievement. 
Offering his own thoughts at the same Orgburo meeting, Dmitri Goriunov 
asserted that these questions of status and membership could not be answered until the 
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organization had set its “goals and tasks.” He saw these as “coordinating all possible 
means for the victory of communism, raising journalistic mastery, and cultivating the 
young upcoming journalists, and expanding ties with journalists from foreign countries, 
as well as the theoretical resolution of journalists’ creative problems.” Goriunov argued 
for an expansive definition of Union membership—that the organization should “unify all 
creative workers of newspapers, journals, radio, and publishing houses,” encompassing 
all major forms of mass media and other written work aimed at large audiences. Any 
aspiring member should work or have worked as either staff or a contributing author, and 
also have a work history and portfolio.72 It was clear to him that the Journalists’ Union 
would resemble other creative unions and be dedicated to specific “professional” tasks, 
rather than have the universalist approach of Soviet trade unions. The stress on the 
abstract notion of “professional mastery” and assisting in the maturation process of 
members may invite comparisons to the German professions and the concepts of Bildung 
and Beruf. In his introduction to the history and historiography of German 
professionalization, Konrad Jarausch describes Bildung—in this case, translated as the 
study of an abstract knowledge base—as crucial to the educational dimension of 
professionalization. Beruf, a Protestant term for “calling,” was later grafted on to the 
German term for professionals, akademimische Berufstanden, which encompassed only 
university-trained professionals. “Professional mastery” however, would prove a 
particularly malleable term, used as a placeholder for any number of activities or 
achievements. The more direct parallel to the German case is that Soviet elites also 
pursued “professionalization from above,” particularly in the early years of creative 
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unions. The debates about inclusivity and privilege suggest that Orgburo members were 
far from unanimous in their views of the profession.73 
One major point of contention in the Orgburo’s first debates was the amount of 
seniority required for membership: some argued for work experience of at least three 
years, while others thought that this requirement was too stringent as it would exclude 
young journalists. Ultimately, no specific time period was spelled out in the draft bylaws, 
leaving only a reference to “work experience.”74  B. L. Leont’ev asked whether 
membership would be open to freelancers, making the creative union “an organization of 
all journalists publishing their works in print and on the radio, regardless of their work 
status.” Pal’gunov argued that this was at odds with the organization’s goal of “instilling 
professional mastery in journalists working in print publications,” since it would require 
accepting all “journalists who publish.” In response, Leont’ev’s proposal was 
withdrawn.75 The defeat of this inclusive model demonstrates that the new creative union 
was envisioned as a somewhat selective organization. Ultimately, the Journalists’ 
Union’s overall structure closely resembled that of the other creative unions: it 
established commissions dedicated to creative matters, international exchange, 
membership, and the creation of the Union’s local branches, a committee to look into the 
organization’s legal status, and another committee tasked with creating Zhurfond, a 
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financial support fund for journalists similar to the ones for members of the Writers’ and 
Composers’ Unions.76 
In February of 1957, a period when the organization still existed on paper but as 
yet had not taken in any members, Pal’gunov reported on some obstacles to the 
Orgburo’s initial organizational plan. After consultation with the Central Committee, 
Pal’gunov was told that the organization was too large, both in its membership and the 
size of its apparat. None of these setbacks would prove decisive, as Pal’gunov noted that 
backing away from the new organization was “impossible… inside the USSR interest in 
the Union’s creation is exceptionally great, and the Orgburo of the Journalists’ Union has 
made a series of useful connections abroad.” To reduce expenses, Goriunov suggested 
that newspaper and journal staffs enter the creative union collectively, so that these 
groups could discuss “all creative questions.” This proposal was ultimately rejected, since 
it might offer membership to “people who lacked the basis to be called journalists.”77 
Even the harsh realities of planned economics could not alter the essential commitment of 
the Orgburo members to a more professional organization.  
However, these financial exigencies did prevent the establishment of Zhurfond, an 
episode that should be recounted briefly due to its long-term repercussions in the Union’s 
own history. Though the proponents of a creative Union found support for their proposals 
relatively quickly, the absence of a sustained and substantial material support base was a 
persistent complaint in the Union’s later years, one which elite journalists continually 
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promised to address, though no structure emerged during the period of this study.78 The 
Orgburo’s initial policies would have lasting consequences for the organization’s 
relationship to its members. The rejection of Goriunov’s collective model affirmed that 
membership in the Journalists’ Union would evaluate individual qualifications, as other 
creative unions did.  
••• 
The Journalists’ Union’s status as an all-USSR organization was apparent as early 
as the fall of 1956. The formation of local and republic chapters was a crucial stage in the 
organization’s development, as journalists first gained the opportunity to comment on the 
draft bylaws at this stage. The federal nature of the Soviet system was mirrored in the 
new creative union, though the Journalists’ Union’s structure and practices confirmed the 
superior status of journalists based in Moscow and Leningrad. In September of 1956, the 
Orgburo determined that each of the Union Republics—with the exception of the Russian 
Republic—would have a governing body with a secretariat. Below the republics, 
branches (otdelenie) of the Journalists’ Union would exist in oblasts, krais, and the 
Soviet Union’s autonomous republics (ASSRs).79 At the raion level, smaller “groups” of 
journalists would elect representatives to the relevant larger body; that is, if an oblast’ 
chapter existed, the raion groups would elect representatives to it. The Orgburo 
conducted a kind of census of the “creative cadres” in the Soviet Union in order to count 
the number of local journalists and determine the possible number of prospective 
                                                
78 Journalists from Moscow oblast’ complained about the absence of Zhurfond as late as 1966. See 
TsGAMO (Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Moskovskoi Oblasti) f. 7950, op. 1, d. 26, ll. 28–9. 
79 Oblast’ and krai’ lack precise English-language equivalents; the two terms are juridically and practically 
similar to what English speakers might call a region; the subunit is raion, most often translated as district. 
  49 
members.80 The leaders of local chapters formulated additional lists of possible members, 
ranging from editors and their assistants, genre specialists, content editors and those who 
worked in book publishing, as well as photojournalists and radio and television 
professionals. As early as 1956, draft proposals for the formulation of the Moscow and 
Leningrad departments were already circulating, a process closely matching the history of 
other creative unions, specifically the Composers’ Union. The early focus on establishing 
the creative union in major urban centers, and the slow progress of local organizations, 
was an enduring concern not only during the creative union’s incubation period, but in 
the entire period under study.81 Other urban centers would also have union branches, such 
as Kiev, Minsk, Riga, and “other major cities of the country.”82 The all-USSR Orgburo 
would later declare that the creative union officially came into being when local chapters 
began to form and take in members in the fall of 1957.83 
Throughout this study, my reference point for the activity and concerns of local 
chapters is most often Moscow oblast’. Because the local branches of the Union appear 
in the all-USSR records only sporadically, particularly after 1959, I selected a local 
branch of the organization in order to broaden my discussion of the union’s origins, as 
well as its evolution. I selected the Moscow district chapter not only for the accessibility 
of its archive, but also because the oblast’ journalists clearly saw themselves as distinct 
from their counterparts in the capital, despite their relative geographic proximity. The 
Moscow oblast’ branch formed in September of 1957, and its primary objective was 
incorporating members into its ranks. This task required oblast’ Orgburo members to 
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actively recruit members. They visited the area’s publications in teams, explaining the 
membership requirements and encouraging candidates to sign up, a process referred to as 
“explanatory work.”84  These efforts appear to have been fairly successful: one year after 
its establishment, its head, V. N. Golubev, the editor of The Moscow Propagandist, later 
renamed The Leninist Herald, submitted a report to Pal’gunov about his six hundred 
prospective members, out of one thousand viable candidates.85 As we will see in later 
chapters, the discrepancy between available candidates and actual members was due not 
only to problems with qualifications but local disinterest in the organization.  
The all-USSR Orgburo was frequently frustrated with the gradual approach of 
local branches—as part of their work, its members were sent to major cities or regions of 
the Soviet Union to monitor the progress of organizational development. At this stage, 
the all-USSR Orgburo approved all membership decisions of every lower branch. By 
March of 1958, Iaroslavl’s had only thirty members. In Gorky, the local branch was 
“passively confining itself to taking in new members.” Though some local groups lagged 
behind, there were also bright spots: the Leningrad branch was among the fastest to 
develop in the RSFSR—accepting two-hundred fifty members and setting up 
commissions for creative work, international connections, and the “quotidian” needs of 
journalists (byt).86 The commencement of creative work and establishment of hierarchies 
was considered a key sign of success: the Arkhangel’sk branch had apparently 
distinguished itself by conducting seminars, and the republic-level branch in Ukraine had 
found “qualified and experienced members” and begun to organize events for “raising 
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their professional and ideological level.” These included press conferences, journalists’ 
meetings with members of government ministries, national economic councils, city and 
district institutions, and interactions with other important “cultural and scientific actors.” 
Genre seminars were seen as particularly encouraging signs that local chapters were 
taking steps to “develop professional mastery”—the link between genre skill and 
professionalization would remain central to creative union activity throughout the period 
under study.87 At the all-USSR level, genre seminars on humor and satire as well as 
feature stories were also planned.88 
In 1958 the relationship between the Moscow Orgburo and local branches was 
becoming routinized in ways that firmly established the greater importance of the capital. 
Orgburo secretary P. P. Erofeev requested that the Union generate regular reports to send 
to all lower branches about “creative work, press conferences, lectures and the like.”89 
Since local chapters were beginning to conduct seminars, the Orgburo needed to create a 
“lecturers’ group” in its secretariat to address the “arising need for speeches from 
experienced Moscow journalists.”90 Visits from journalists who had been abroad were 
also considered part of “practical help to local organizations.”91 Apparently, some degree 
of “professional mastery” had already taken up residence in the Soviet capital, and in 
those who had been beyond the USSR’s borders. The all-USSR Orgburo acknowledged 
that some chapters of the new creative union were more important than others: an 
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Orgburo member was sent to Leningrad oblast’s first congress, since it was considered a 
“major organization.”92  
••• 
Before presenting and analyzing member comments on the document, I will 
briefly present the key points of the draft bylaws and point out which sections of it 
proved most significant in subsequent discussions. The first section, labeled “Goals and 
Tasks of the Creative Union,” specified that the Journalists’ Union of the USSR was a 
“creative organization of journalists,” open to professionals who worked in radio, print 
journalism, or publishing houses. Its first major goal was explicitly ideological: to “bring 
about the active participation of Soviet journalists in mobilizing workers’ strength for the 
victory of Communism in the Soviet Union.” Professional development, or the “raising of 
the ideological level and professional mastery of journalists, to develop their creative 
initiative,” was second to this national mission. The draft bylaws proclaimed the 
dominant position of workers in the Soviet state and that their social progress was a key 
aspect of any profession’s work. Clauses about “instilling in journalists…the spirit of 
fidelity to the motherland, and passing on the creative experience of the older generation 
to youth,”  portrayed both national and professional pride a part of the professional’s 
knowledge base. As in Jurgen Kocka’s formulation of professional development in the 
German case, Soviet creative union members were expected to take particular pride in 
“their work for society and the common weal,” even as they pursued a specialist 
knowledge base.93 Subsequent clauses further concretized the notion of professional 
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mastery, mentioning both “ties to the masses,” especially worker and peasants’ 
correspondents, and expertise in “style and genre” as key objectives. Genre work became 
much better organized in the years after the organization’s inaugural congress, as we will 
see in chapter five. Another point in this section was even more central to the 
organization’s operations and rank-and-file responses to it: the responsibility to 
“strengthen and increase ties with journalists abroad in the service of preserving peace in 
the world.” Elite journalists frequently traveled abroad, while rank-and-file journalists 
presented foreign travel as a privilege they were frequently denied. Cultural diplomacy 
activities were such a major part of creative union work that they feature as the main 
subject of chapter four. The creative union’s responsibility to “carry out a defense of 
journalists’ rights in accordance with the laws on labor, to actively resolve matters of 
journalists’ labor and salary,” was a responsibility that rank-and-file members took very 
seriously. Though the bylaws commentary contains few references to Soviet labor laws, 
many of the comments on the bylaws concerned material benefits and improvements to 
working conditions.94   
The next major section of the draft bylaws dealt with the rights and obligations of 
members, and the reciprocal obligations the creative union guaranteed to protect. These 
sections included one of the major topics of debate both within the all-Union Orgburo 
and in subsequent rank-and-file discussions—the criteria for membership, which bodies 
made membership decisions, and what was necessary to remain a member in good 
standing, as well as grounds for expulsion. The main criteria were status as a 
“professional journalist,” signified by an unspecified amount of “work history and 
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experience” (stazh i opyt) in publishing, print, radio, or an information agency. In 
addition to an application and letter of reference from their place of employment, 
prospective members should also present “published correspondence or articles, 
possessing independent significance.” The lack of specificity about these two points, and 
what should replace them, would be a major point of contestation even during the 
inaugural congress. The Journalists’ Union’s all-USSR presidium originally retained both 
the rights to review all new membership applications and make final decisions in 
expulsion cases. Members could be expelled for bylaws violation, commission of crimes, 
for severing ties with the profession, or not paying membership dues. To remain in good 
standing, members were obligated to follow the bylaws and pay dues, while endeavoring 
to “consistently raise their political and ideological level,” work to improve Soviet 
publications, and aid young journalists in their professional development. Members had 
the right to participate in the organization’s activities and to receive “all manner of help” 
from the organization when carrying out their professional duties.  Again, the insistence 
that journalists themselves could set standards for admission and expulsion confirms its 
professional status, as does the allusion to material “help.” The relative brevity of this 
section, and the nonspecific nature of this “help,” would be another major topic of 
discussion, with rank-and-file journalists seeking to expand these privileges.95  
 In addition to detailing standards for membership and philosophical goals and 
objectives, the draft bylaws also described the creative union’s organizational structure 
and the various committees or commissions that would “carry out its goals.” The creative 
union was responsible for the administration of the Central House of Journalists in 
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Moscow, frequently used for seminars and meeting space. Smaller houses could be set up 
in other urban centers. It also set up “creative commissions,” organized by genre, and a 
separate commission for cultural diplomacy. The creative union was the official 
representative body for all Soviet journalists at international events, and, as per 
Kraminov’s original vision, would oversee “the exchange of delegations with foreign 
journalists.” The bylaws officially established the creative union’s oversight of 
publications and any other public gatherings or events dedicated to “journalists’ exchange 
of work.” The Journalists’ Union was structurally similar to other creative unions, though 
its financial structure remained distinct. Its main governing body when all-USSR 
congresses were not held was the presidium of its executive board, which met monthly 
and had a secretariat to oversee routine operations. It was obligated to hold all-USSR 
Congresses once every four years (a rule that was routinely broken throughout its history) 
and plenums twice a year. In addition to its republican branches, the executive board 
could also create branches for each krai, oblast’, and autonomous republic, which would 
in turn elect governing bureaus at its conferences. These bodies were responsible for 
overseeing financial matters and overall policy adherence. Individual newspapers, 
information agencies, or publishing houses would elect an “authorized representative” to 
the oblast’, krai’, or city body—these members were responsible for collecting dues and 
keeping both the governing body and the rank-and-file members informed of each others’ 
activities.96  
The Union’s financial support was primarily from member dues, with some profit 
sharing from newspapers, reflecting the Orgburo’s inability to create and manage a 
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separate financial fund akin to those operated by the other creative unions.97 Like these, 
the Journalists’ Union was legally distinct from the both the Soviet state and the 
Communist Party. Though Kirill Tomoff makes much of this distinction as part of his 
argument that composers frequently maintained agency as musical experts, I have found 
little evidence that this juridical separation had much practical effect for the Journalists’ 
Union—largely because of its high levels of Party membership and close association with 
the Central Committee.98 
••• 
A lengthy discussion of the Journalists’ Union’s bylaws might, at first glance, 
seem like excessive attention to a text that had little relevance to the organization’s actual 
operations. Instead, the draft bylaws formed a major part of the all-USSR Orgburo’s 
domestic activities from its inception until November of 1959 and served as the basis for 
a national, perhaps even all-Soviet, conversation about what journalism was and what 
privileges and responsibilities accompanied journalistic work. I refer to this period as the 
bylaws debate to emphasize its contentious and multifaceted nature.  This is not to argue 
that Soviet journalism from earlier eras lacked professional attributes: “mass journalism” 
was recognized as socially significant work and came with some privileges, as did work 
as a war correspondent. Historicizing professions requires tracing their developmental 
trajectory, and I argue that the bylaws discussion was distinct stage, a moment in which 
journalists deliberately and consciously examined their role in Soviet society, and 
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advocated for many of the attributes scholars associate with the category of the 
“profession.”” Newspapers themselves have long been acknowledged as key to the 
development of nationalism in the European and Soviet contexts. Just as newspapers 
could create “imagined communities” among otherwise dissimilar readers, the draft 
bylaws encouraged journalists all over the Soviet Union to think of themselves as a 
unified group. In the absence of a continuous study of the profession from 1939–56, it is 
impossible to state with certainty when this professional consciousness emerged—for a 
brief time, however, the Journalists’ Union provided the forum for its articulation.99 In 
her study of Polish journalists, Jane Curry argues that the formation of professional 
associations, and a period of debate about standards for entry, is an essential 
professionalization stage.100  
 Analyzing the wide variety of comments, concerns and criticisms rank-and-file 
journalists submitted to the Orgburo requires addressing the methodological problem of 
interpreting opinions offered in a Soviet context. Stephen Kotkin’s framework in his 
study of Magnitogorsk offers one solution: while it is true that Soviet citizens had to learn 
to “speak Bolshevik” in order to achieve their social and political goals, they also had few 
other lexicons available. Though the Journalists’ Union was formed in a period of 
comparative openness to Western culture, thanks to events like the 1957 World Youth 
                                                
99 The definitive work on newspapers as forming national identity is Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, 3rd ed. (New York/London: Verso, 
2006); the importance of literacy and newspapers to the Soviet project of nation-making is discussed in 
detail in Terry Martin’s The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 
1923–1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). A definitive history of journalism and journalistic 
work in the non-Russian and particularly non-Slavic parts of the Soviet Union still awaits its historian—
though most of the organization’s key figures were based in Moscow and Russophone, if not ethnically 
Russian. Outside of the problem of center-periphery relations in the bylaws debate, I discuss non-Russian 
branches of the Journalists’ Union only in the context of all-Union activities that were conducted in 
Russian. 
100 Curry, Poland’s Journalists, 16–7. 
  58 
Festival, and the permeability of the Soviet Union’s new borderlands, most journalists 
who commented on the bylaws worked on local publications, a group that infrequently, 
as they themselves lamented, had the opportunity to travel abroad and so had little 
context for international comparisons.101  
 To extend Kotkin’s metaphor further, it would be surprising, to say the least, if 
journalists lacked fluency in the Bolshevik tongue, since newspapers themselves 
contributed to the Soviet political lexicon. Demographic data reveals close overlap 
between Party membership and membership in the Journalists’ Union.102 In some contrast 
to the Composers’ Union, Party members were strongly in the majority. At the time of 
the inaugural congress, about a third of the Soviet Union’s journalists belonged to the 
creative union—though this number would increase in subsequent years.103 Senior 
members of the Journalists’ Union also had close ties to the Central Committee, the 
cultural diplomacy apparatus, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Though the 
Journalists’ Union, like the other creative unions, was juridically distinct from the Party, 
its agency in media matters was closely linked to it, unlike the agency of composers, 
which depended in part on their sophisticated understanding of music theory, a skill set 
most political figures lacked.104  Comparison to the literary field reveals more 
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similarities: as of its 1959 congress, nearly seventy-six percent of the Writers’ Union 
membership consisted of members or candidate members of the Communist Party.105 
Though there is no study of the Writers’ Union analogous to Tomoff’s, these 
demographic data suggest that close association with the Party was more common for 
creative workers who produced written texts.  
Considering that journalists were so closely tied to the Party apparatus, how then 
are historians to determine whether journalists’ opinions on the draft bylaws are 
representative or express any sense of professional distinctiveness? In my discussion of 
journalists’ responses and critiques of the draft bylaws, I take a position similar to Susan 
Reid’s interpretation of Soviet comments on the American exhibition in Moscow in 1959. 
Namely, that the search for an untainted “authenticity” is less useful than determining 
which scripts or elements of official ideology historical subjects chose to employ. And, 
despite their high levels of Party membership, journalists did not have fixed access to the 
parameters of acceptable or unacceptable commentary: as many historians have pointed 
out, these parameters shifted as often under Khrushchev as they had under Stalin.106 
Though very little in the bylaws commentary could be considered subversive, journalists 
were also open about their dissatisfactions with the document—and, by extension, their 
social and material position. And, while participants criticized the document they were 
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offered, they also proposed substantive additions to it: some were ideological, while 
others lacked explicit references to Marxist doctrine and could be classified as 
“professional” concerns. Others point to a kind of Soviet social contract, where being a 
professional journalist meant reciprocal obligations on the part of state institutions—an 
extension of Vera Dunham’s “Big Deal” where the state promoted the cultured pursuit of 
material benefit as a means for increasing social stability in the postwar period.107 
The bylaws, like the Journalists’ Union itself, did not create Soviet journalism, 
but they were the impetus for the new, deliberate thinking about its meaning—with clear 
implications for professionalization. Though the aspirations journalists expressed may 
seem unrealistic, perhaps even utopian, in light of the structural and political limitations 
on professional agency in Soviet life, they should be understood as a product of their 
historical context. Most of the bylaws comments were generated in the early years of 
Khrushchev’s rule—a period of great optimism among intellectuals. In her analysis of 
Polish journalistic professionalization, Jane Curry posits that political and structural 
limitations may in fact “sharpen and make more urgent the move to 
professionalization.”108 Envisioning the bylaws commentary as an expression of both 
urgency and hope helps explain the ambitious scope of participants’ remarks. In the final 
analysis, the rank-and-file conversation about the document should be seen as the grass-
roots equivalent to the Orgburo meetings years earlier: an opportunity for journalists to 
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discuss, with relative frankness, their sense of professional identity and their hopes for 
increased social standing.  
••• 
The main discussions of the draft bylaws took place from late 1957 until the 
ratification of a final document at the creative union’s inaugural congress in November 
1959. In August of 1957, a draft of the document was published in the creative union’s 
trade journal.109 The Orgburo also sent copies to all the newly formed and incipient 
branches of the Journalists’ Union and requested that all feedback on the document be 
submitted by February of 1959.110 This process was not a formulaic gesture, as the 
responses were not only categorized and archived, they were discussed at the inaugural 
congress itself, the subject of chapter three. The records do not often include dates or 
name contributors. In the account that follows, I have supplied the geographic origin of 
comments in cases where this was specified. The Moscow oblast’ bylaws discussions 
occurred in the fall and winter of 1958, as local chapters prepared for their first 
conferences, and it seems likely that other comments originated around this time.111 In 
their efforts to define the profession and the goals of the creative union, Orgburo 
members and rank-and-file journalists devoted a great deal of time to questions of 
membership. These discussions generally concerned who could join the creative union, 
what categories of expertise defined membership, and which individuals or bodies had 
the right to make these decisions. While elites in Moscow had the first opportunity to 
consider these issues, rank-and-file journalists also weighed in during the subsequent 
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bylaws debate. Proponents of an inclusive creative union—at both the elite and grassroots 
levels—supported including worker and peasant correspondents, freelance journalists, 
and the less experienced. They viewed the organization as a means to develop members’ 
potential. Those who championed a more exclusive organization placed more stress on 
seniority and genre expertise, and frequently suggested closer scrutiny of written output 
and work histories—essentially, creative union membership was presented as a 
recognition of existing expertise rather than a means to cultivate it. Rank-and-file 
journalists devoted particular attention to the grounds for expulsion, with particular 
concerns about factual accuracy and writing standards that they felt the original document 
neglected—along with a sustained interest in the moral conduct of prospective members. 
Many of these proposals would have empowered local journalists to make more 
membership decisions than higher-level bodies. Membership questions touched on more 
than standards for entry or expulsion, however—both elites and rank-and-file members 
were acutely aware of the material dimension of Soviet professional status. The latter 
group expressed more dissatisfaction with trade unions and the more established material 
position of writers and composers, while elites were most concerned with the logistical 
challenges of funding such a large organization. Though the bulk of these issues were 
resolved only later—many remained topics of discussion well into the 1960s—they 
demonstrate the extent of professional consciousness at all levels of the journalism 
profession.  
The Orgburo and the local organizations often had sharply contrasting visions of 
the Union’s purpose and function, given that even Pal’gunov, the head of the 
organization, reported conducting “explanatory work” with journalists who were not 
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certain of the organization’s value. These first explanatory efforts saw elite figures 
defend their view of the creative union as a body that offered real possibilities for self-
improvement. Local comments, on the other hand, raised an issue that would become 
central to the later bylaws debate: the provision of material benefits and status.  
Pal’gunov held a special meeting devoted to the draft bylaws in September of 
1957—the first recorded public event of this type.  His audience was particularly 
concerned about the requirement that journalists should have written works of 
“independent significance,” since apparently many of those present had written a few 
short pieces. Other comments were more self-interested: journalists from Ivanovo wanted 
to know what “privileges and advantages” the Union would provide them, or asked that 
the organization “propagandize” itself, implying that its purposes were unclear.112 Other 
local proposals were franker still: a report from Tul’skaia oblast’ stated that, “among the 
journalists of the district there is not a particular wish to join the union.”113  Kaliningrad 
journalists hoped that the new creative union would also have its own trade union, 
claiming that the trade union for cultural workers  “…in many respects does not satisfy 
journalists.”114 This critique of trade unions and direct references to privilege demonstrate 
that many journalists embraced the creative union as a source of material benefit.  
The number of questions, concerns, and complaints apparently prompted 
Pal’gunov to launch into a lengthy defense of the creative union’s value: 
 
                                                
112 GARF f. 10124, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 118–9. 
113 Ibid., ll. 119–21. 
114 Ibid. 
  64 
What will the Journalists’ Union be and what advantages will its members 
receive? The Journalists’ Union has as its main goal the development of 
the initiative and raising the professional mastery of journalists, conveying 
and distributing the leading experiences of journalists, the union will carry 
out the ideological and professional growth of journalists, and the 
establishment of a publishing house will aid in the release of work by 
young talents…The Journalists’ Union has major goals in the realm of 
developing and strengthening ties with journalists from the peoples’ 
democracies and with journalists from capitalist countries. Trips abroad 
organized by the union play a major role in the development and 
strengthening of these ties. On these trips, together with workers from 
central press publications, representatives of the district-level press also 
take part. 
 
Pal’gunov also reiterated that there could be no overlap or combining of the 
organization with the existing trade union, and refused to allocate funds for Leningrad’s 
House of Journalists.115 Though the process of drafting bylaws, creating an organizational 
structure, and establishing relationships with local chapters in many respects mirrors that 
of the Composers’ Union and the other creative organizations established in the Stalin 
period, the effort here was unique. At least in the known literature on the other four 
creative unions, there is no directly analogous attempt to explain—and even, perhaps, 
defend—a creative union to its local representatives. Pal’gunov, like others before him, 
relied on arguments about professional development and cultural diplomacy in his vision 
of the union and its purpose, arguing that the projected publishing house would help the 
organization develop young talents. His claims that local journalists were fairly 
represented would be challenged throughout the bylaws debate. Though Pal’gunov’s 
response to these early complaints was relatively brief, it was only the opening salvo in a 
long conversation between the union’s leaders and rank-and-file members.  
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Indeed, defending the Journalists’ Union’s importance would prove to be an 
ongoing theme. An undated and unattributed draft speech for the Leningrad branch of the 
Journalists’ Union in the Orgburo files was heavily dedicated to the task of persuasion. 
The speaker argued that the new creative union “unites that group of the intelligentsia 
which works for the Soviet press…and perfects the quality of published materials.” In 
contrast to this elevated vision of the organization’s capabilities, the speaker also 
admitted to serious organizational weaknesses, the worst of which was that “among some 
journalists, there are still some comrades who need to have the Union’s meaning and 
significance explained to them.” As in other materials from this period of the bylaws 
debate, the organization was something to be argued for, explained, and defended. The 
description of different skeptical groups is particularly telling: even those who already 
received a membership card were among them, because they “lacked an internal 
understanding of why they had become members,” or saw membership as “an 
unnecessary formality… they joined the Union only because they feared being left 
behind. But having taken this step, such journalists did not find their place in the union, 
they did not even lift a finger. They criticize everything and everyone, beginning with the 
very foundations of the organization. They want everything handed to them on a platter.” 
The Journalists' Union was portrayed as something that should penetrate the 
consciousness of its members, and failure to celebrate its appearance was equated with 
laziness and social and political inertia. Indeed, these “unconscious” journalists had 
apparently “failed to grasp the simple truth that the Union was creative and independent, 
and a demanding approach to it is not appropriate for its goals and objectives. The Union 
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is absolutely necessary for us, if we wish to grow and perfect our journalistic work.”116 
The language here made these “demanding” journalists seem blind to the less tangible 
benefits of creative union membership and overly materialistic.  
••• 
After membership questions, the most frequently discussed clause of the draft 
bylaws concerned members’ rights and responsibilities. Journalists were deeply 
concerned both with defining the scope of their responsibilities and with formalizing the 
union’s obligations to its members. In this section, I focus on journalists’ expectations of 
the creative union—their expectations of themselves and their colleagues feature more 
prominently in my discussion of the moral qualities necessary for membership. Many 
journalists hoped the new organization would give them parity with other creative 
professionals, especially in material and social terms.  Since the bylaws served as a 
formal acknowledgement of professional status, journalists believed that their new status 
should convey the same set of advantages that their literary counterparts enjoyed. While 
membership debates were split between more inclusive and exclusive views of the 
organization, material support proposals displayed more consensus: all of the suggestions 
would have expanded the creative union’s social obligations. This range of obligations 
was diverse and comprehensive, from social insurance and support funds to foreign and 
domestic travel; proposals in the latter category were especially extensive, and I present 
several of them here.  
One amendment to the “goals of the Union” section stated that it should be 
concerned with members’ rights, whether that meant intellectual property, housing, labor, 
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“legal interests,” or “cultural and quotidian needs.”117  Even the requirement that Union 
members should pay dues was debated extensively, introducing questions of economic 
justice. There were multiple proposals that dues should be based on income, with some 
arguing that pensioners should pay reduced rates or be exempt.118 Other discussions of 
social support included explicit critique of existing structures, in particular of the Trade 
Union for Cultural Workers. A radio journalist from Astrakhan argued that the main 
function of the trade union was the payment of dues and that members could receive help 
if they found themselves unable to work. The new union, on the other hand, needed the 
means to send its members on “creative business trips.” 119 This proposal’s explicit 
contrast between inactivity as a precondition for trade union material help, and the more 
active and complex working conditions of journalists, used social value and professional 
status to demonstrate material need. Despite these complaints, journalists remained 
mostly dependent on the trade union for their material support over a decade after the 
creative union’s establishment.120 
 The clearest professional aspiration in commentary on the bylaws was both 
material and social: to achieve equivalent status and resources to that of the other creative 
unions. Several participants focused on the Writers’ Union as the most salient point of 
comparison. There were multiple proposals for the creation of a Zhurfond, which would 
be equivalent to Litfond and funded by a percentage of the authors’ earnings.121 One 
journalist from Astrakhan’ wrote: “It should be written in the bylaws that our 
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organization is a professional creative organization…in my opinion our union should be 
constructed exactly like the Writers’ Union and the Composers’ Union.” This view was 
shared by a TASS correspondent who argued: “it would be better if our union would 
receive greater independence, in the manner of the Writers’ Union and other creative 
unions, where, in essence, the function of a trade union and a creative union is 
combined.”122 Another journalist noted that the draft bylaws mentioned journalists as 
“subjects of the labor laws” but that there was no mention of journalists’ rights as 
“authors and as subjects of copyright law—this protection should be extended to 
journalists as well as writers.”123  Though most proposals stressed equality and parity 
with other institutions, one proposal from Belgorod oblast’ was particularly noteworthy, 
as its author stated that the Journalists’ Union should “have the right to recommend its 
members for membership in the Writers’ Union.” Though there was overlap between the 
two organizations, both in membership and in overall mission, this comment suggests 
that the two organizations were equivalent or perhaps even that the Journalists’ Union 
should serve as a gateway to its more prestigious literary counterpart.124 There were also 
numerous proposals advocating that the Union should have its own newspaper or reform 
its journal, some of which explicitly mentioned that the Writers’ Union had its own 
newspaper, Literaturnaia gazeta.125  
In some cases, comparison to other creative unions was made in more legalistic 
language, situating professional rights in an existing system of labor relationships. 
Several proposals urged the creative union to take an interest in copyright issues.  
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Various Ukrainian branches of the Union argued that the Zhurfond issue closely related 
to the overall problem of the Union’s relationship to “the labor conditions and everyday 
life needs of journalists, just as is written in the bylaws of the other creative unions.” 
They proposed a more explicit reference to the creative union’s defense of its members 
based on “the legal code on labor and copyright” and would have obligated the creative 
union to be similarly attentive to leisure, health, working conditions, and other “cultural 
and quotidian needs.”126 Georgian journalists advocated clarifying the “relationship 
between the journalists’ union and the trade unions,” while other proposals argued that 
journalists should have assistance according to all the laws affecting creative workers.127 
Other concerns were far more practical, as multiple local chapters proposed that the 
Journalists’ Union should offer housing help.128 While debates about standards for entry 
into the creative union concerned moral character and writerly skill, proposals about the 
effects of membership were focused on practical benefits and legal rights. These 
comments, together with the ones above about the Writers’ Union, demonstrate the 
importance of legal and social rights to journalists’ self-perception.  
Other assistance proposals focused more directly on leisure and travel, with the 
implication that these, too, would reduce inequality between creative groups in Soviet 
society. Amendments concerned with education, though less numerous than others, were 
similarly focused on the creative union’s capacity to develop its members’ potential, an 
issue that would become increasingly important after the inaugural congress. Soviet 
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tourism was often expected to be an edifying experience, physically or mentally. Bylaws 
comments reveal that rank-and-file journalists also presented travel as a valuable 
opportunity, and that they hoped the creative union would improve access to it.129 One 
proposed amendment would have had the creative union guarantee journalists the ability 
to travel once or twice a year, “according to their own wishes or if the district Orgburo 
deems it necessary.” Urging the availability of increased vacation time, journalists from 
Novosibirsk argued that travel and additional time off would “very much help 
understanding of the life and creative growth of journalists and the Soviet Journalists’ 
Union.” Journalists from Moscow oblast’ expressed similar views about the importance 
of travel: they argued for special funds to assist their “needy counterparts” and that the 
organization should “subsidize the creative travel of members” to allow them to master 
specific genres.130  
The history of the other creative unions demonstrates that professionals did 
consider access to leisure and travel beneficial to their creative output—especially writers 
and composers. Prokofiev and Khatchaturian both used Composers’ Union retreats at 
Ivanovo, and Pasternak was closely associated with his dacha at Peredelkino. As they 
envisioned more productive creative futures, journalists thought in similar terms.131 This 
language of material benefit and cultural uplift, which owed much to Soviet traditions of 
privilege and patronage, extended beyond the domestic realm: a journalist from Moscow 
oblast’ argued that, “it’s time to end the existing state of affairs that when the Soviet 
Union’s social ranks of journalists are represented in foreign exchange that it not be the 
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same narrow group of people like comrades Sofronov, Gribachev, Adzhubei and a few 
other people; it is not acceptable to give anyone a particular monopoly in this realm.”132  
Proposals from a 1958 gathering at Moscow’s Central House of Journalists included a 
similar grievance.133 In the years after the inaugural congress, creative union elites were 
continually compelled to respond to the issue of unequal access to foreign travel. 
Commenters also proposed that the new organization take a more active role in university 
journalism departments, since graduates were “as a rule not prepared for newspaper 
work.”134  The push for more specialized training that journalists themselves controlled 
was another area where rank-and-file journalists could envision their new creative union 
as an agent of greater professionalization.135 The final bylaws made no specific mention 
of either travel or higher education, but journalists’ expectations here were not 
unjustified—the organization’s work in both areas features prominently in later chapters. 
Iasen’ Nikolaevich Zasurskii, a renowned teacher and administrator in Moscow 
University’s Journalism department from 1956 to the present day, became active in both 
the creative union’s cultural diplomacy and its domestic work.136  
••• 
Though the proponents of the inclusive model for the creative union were the 
majority—and their vision was ultimately expressed in the final bylaws—other 
participants advocated greater selectivity. Several of these requirements would have 
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increased the responsibility of existing members to scrutinize potential candidates. These 
commenters were concerned that overly expansive standards would diminish their 
prestige and the organization’s stated commitment to quality writing.  Supporters of an 
exclusive model suggested that the criteria for membership be as strict as that for the 
Writers’ Union, or that the union offer “candidate membership.” The importance of 
reading and writing as an evaluative standard was clearest in a proposal that potential 
members should have to present their work for review ensure that it met the bylaw-
imposed standard of having “independent significance,” and “look through the lines to 
see if the person is a real journalist or not.”137 Other commentary on the importance of 
writing skill was more concerned with areas where the draft bylaws were too broad. A 
member conference at Moskovskii Komsomolets, the Moscow oblast’ Komsomol 
newspaper, argued against the clause which stated that those who worked in publishing 
houses could be potential members with a laconic formulation that stressed writing above 
all else: “It has long been known that a person who does not write is not a journalist.”138 
There were a variety of solutions offered to ensure that the Journalist’ Union properly 
screened prospective candidates. These included an interview process, “talking with 
people, finding out what a man does, what his plans are for the future.”139 Other 
proposals which called for a more personalized review process were more critical: “It is 
as easy to end up (popast’) in our Journalists’ Union as in the Red Cross Society, not only 
should a comrade be recommended by the newspaper, but also by senior journalists, who 
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should be present and explain why this person is worthy of membership.”140 The 
importance of recommendations from senior colleagues was echoed in multiple 
proposals. Though creative output and character concerns were mentioned most often, 
others referenced technical skills, such as photography or typing.141 Admissions debates 
also reflected the complex structure of the Soviet state: while the draft bylaws only gave 
the Moscow all-Union body the right to admit and expel members, rank-and-file 
journalists argued that they were more qualified to handle admissions than senior officials 
unfamiliar with the candidates. Many also argued that each newspaper or publication 
should be a “primary organization” of the creative union, below the oblast’ or krai 
chapter, to allow for more discussion of creative matters and greater local influence.142 
Despite the wide variety of views on membership criteria, the diversity of comments 
point to a coherent set of interests: all proposals for extra screening would have given 
senior journalists more access to information about their potential colleagues, just as 
appeals for more local initiative would have empowered organizations outside Moscow. 
The issue of primary organizations would come up again at the inaugural congress, and 
acquire new urgency in the creative union’s second decade, as we will see in chapter six.  
••• 
Despite the acknowledgement that the responsibility to join the new creative 
union was not something every journalist embraced, one of the fundamental critiques of 
the draft bylaws was its relative imprecision about eligibility requirements. The 
supporters of an inclusive model stressed the value of diverse experiences—especially 
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contributions from authors who had other work experience outside of the mass media. 
Some commenters were quite insistent that membership need not be restricted to those 
who held staff positions at a publication:  “nonprofessional journalists can work for 
publications…our organization is creative and to keep out our regularly contributing 
authors is not necessary.”143 In Moscow oblast’ and elsewhere, there were several 
proposals that asked the creative union to ensure that journalists who did not hold staff 
positions were still treated fairly.144 Others wanted to open membership to “older, 
experienced journalists who actively participate in the press, even if they do not currently 
work in periodical press publications.”  For these commenters, age and experience were 
positive contributions rather than obstacles.145 Journalists who were freelance, or not on 
staff, were in fact eligible for Journalists’ Union membership, though their applications 
sometimes included phrasing that distinguished them as “regular” contributors.146 Other 
members wanted to ensure that membership remained open to journalists who worked in 
“party, soviet and social organizations, and also those engaged in academic and teaching 
work, if these journalists have not ceased their creative activity and actively participate in 
the work of newspapers, journals, radio and television, and if they have the 
recommendation of a print publication and local organization of the Journalists’ 
Union.”147 The meaningful work of Soviet journalists could include a multitude of other 
socially responsible forms of employment, as long as they were also accompanied by 
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serious writing. 148 A similar proposal argued that journalists should not replicate the 
exclusive membership practices of the Writers’ Union, claiming that the Journalists’ 
Union was supposed to be “a more mass organization. It would be appropriate if we 
opened more widely, even now, the doors of our union to workers’ correspondents, who 
have an inclination toward our work and to those have barely been professional 
journalists for five minutes. This will be the right thing. Then we’ll have the opportunity 
to cultivate cadres.”149 The relationship between journalism and literature—and the way 
this relationship reflected social status—was a frequent discussion topic in the 
Journalists’ Union. This proposal was unique in its attitude to the Writers’ Union—as my 
discussion of material privilege will show, most journalists envied, rather than 
disparaged, the greater social prestige attached to belles-lettres. The positive attitude 
toward the legacies of journalism during industrialization was more common. This 
explicit proposal about the “cultivation of cadres” suggests that at least some proponents 
of the inclusive model saw the Journalists’ Union as an opportunity to open the 
profession to the less skilled.  
A particularly spirited defense of the inclusive policy appears in the draft speech 
from Leningrad. Some journalists supposedly asked whether the creative union should 
take “only leading journalists, to propose to the rest that they improve their 
performance?” In response, journalists were reminded that the organization was “a mass 
organization…We need journalists of different quality and different genres… there is no 
doubt that in embrace of the Union the creative growth of these people will be faster than 
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before.” Paradoxically, the solution for those who were skeptical about the Union’s 
suitability for the journalistic “masses” was membership, not exclusion.150  
The new creative union also confronted one of the legacies of “mass 
journalism”—the use of workers’ and peasants’ correspondents—that is, factory workers 
and peasants who wrote for newspapers and reported on the progress of particular 
campaigns or conditions in their workplace.151 In the draft bylaws, they were not listed as 
one of the groups eligible for membership—an omission the Orgburo would directly 
address. The official journal for these contributors, The Worker-Peasant Correspondent, 
published a long letter on the subject, which was discussed in an Orgburo meeting in 
April of 1958. The author, an M. Mamontov of Moscow, argued that the early view of the 
organization as limited to “professional journalists…is obviously incorrect.” Instead, the 
new creative union should have been open to those who “had not broken ties with their 
main profession—workers, collective farmers, engineers, doctors, economists and the 
like, who for a period of years systematically write articles about their specialty in 
institutional journals…in both form and content their work is often on a higher level than 
articles of some professional journalists.”  If this vision for the organization were not 
followed, it would become a “narrow caste of professionals.” The solution was to accept 
all those who “systematically publish original work…regardless of where they work.” 
Confronting this particular legacy of “mass journalism” put questions of exclusivity and 
elite status in particularly stark terms. Mamontov’s claim that the “nonprofessionals” 
could produce better work is not unexpected, given the veneration of ties to the “masses” 
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in Soviet culture and the privileging of workers. In this more inclusive vision, 
nonprofessionals still had skills the Union could help them develop, and professionals 
could in turn be helped by those who were their equals in union membership but not 
actually employed as full-time members of their profession.152  Similar proposals were 
filed in comments to the draft bylaws.153 The traditions of mass journalism decisively 
shaped the Journalists’ Union’s ultimate form, as the Orgburo ultimately decided to 
accept applications from those who “actively and continually for a number of years 
continue to produce qualified articles and feature stories in newspapers, journals and on 
the radio,” regardless of their employment status.154 The importance of connections to the 
“masses”—one of the main and enduring legacies of Stalinist journalism—complicated 
the professionalization project: in the Soviet context, to be a “professional” journalist 
could not be separated entirely from questions of class and support for workers.155 Rank-
and-file calls for an inclusive organization were more successful than the arguments for 
material support and social status—though both issues would remain subjects of debate 
into the 1960s  
••• 
Though much of the bylaws commentary was devoted to questions of creative 
output and employment status, other commenters were concerned with the personal 
qualities that their profession demanded. This emphasis on morals and ethics fits with the 
overall interest in morality and interior life that was characteristic of Khrushchev-era 
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social policy.156 Several commenters argued that the “journalist should be a person of 
high moral character” or “a model of conduct and moral relationships” and generally “be 
brave, principled and conscientious in fulfilling their duties.”  The responsibility to 
ensure that workers, worker and peasant correspondents, and young journalists had the 
proper ideological “upbringing” was a common theme.157 One commenter also protested 
readings of the document that put other concerns ahead of the ethical dimension: “as the 
bylaws are written, if you don’t pay your dues, you’re expelled. But if you behave 
outrageously and act up, or get drunk, but pay your dues, you could stay in. This is 
unfair.”158 The concern with justice and higher principles than mere money is not 
unexpected in a society that denigrated materialism and excess, at least in public.  
As the last comment suggests, questions of ethics and moral responsibility were 
often considered during discussions of the grounds for expulsion from the creative union. 
Being convicted for an “anti-social crime not befitting the calling of a Soviet journalist” 
was the only reference to morality and expulsion in the draft bylaws. These kinds of 
crimes could be wide-ranging, with unstable parameters, particularly if they fell under 
statutes against hooliganism or other matters relating to leisure and private life.159 Several 
journalists did call for a more professionally specific set of criteria. In one participant’s 
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words, “The formulation ‘crimes of an anti-social character’ should be expanded, after all 
we have our own particular crimes, plagiarism, for example. It should be written down 
that plagiarism in any form is punished in only one way: expulsion from the Union.”  In 
addition to plagiarism, others wanted the list expanded to include “slander, libel, and 
distortion of facts.”160 A proposal from Moscow oblast’ argued that the Union should 
have the right to disqualify journalists from membership for “serious violations of 
professional ethics.”161 As early as 1958, the Orgburo did expel journalists convicted of 
plagiarism, and warned others who failed to properly cite material.162 Even proposals that 
called for expansive and wide-ranging understandings of journalists’ responsibility relied 
on moral justifications, such as one from Latvia that essentially set up journalists as 
privileged investigators of crime and illegality. In the proposed addition, journalists 
would “have the right to conduct investigations and verifications of cases of socialist 
morality and persons living beyond their means, provided those persons had not yet been 
sentenced, and in consultation with the proper authorities, including the police, the Party, 
and the prosecutors’ office, with the exception of cases where the accused belonged to 
one of these organizations.” Apparently, this proposal would “immeasurably raise the 
role of journalists and the press overall, but such rights would only be given to 
completely morally upright journalists, non-drinkers and the generally morally 
worthy.”163 
The interest in more specific criteria for expulsion, including plagiarism, slander, 
and other offenses against facticity was specifically mentioned at the Journalists’ Union’s 
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first all-USSR Congress, suggesting that even the senior Orgburo members recognized 
the importance of a professional code of conduct.164 The Krasnoiarsk branch of the 
Journalists’ Union was interested in more information about expulsion cases as well, 
though with a greater emphasis on rehabilitation and clarification of procedure than 
punishment: 
It would be good to point out, at least briefly, what kinds of measures of 
discipline exist for union members who have committed some sort of 
crime. As written it turns out that a journalist can be expelled from the 
Union without any kind of prior measures being taken, such as discussion 
at a meeting, warnings, remarks and the like. It’s obviously necessary also, 
to show whether the Presidium’s decision is final or whether the expelled 
member can appeal to a higher body.165  
 
A similar proposal from Novosibirsk said that having only a single form of punishment 
was: “inappropriate. We need other measures of rehabilitation, such as censure or 
warnings about expulsion from the union.”166 This vision of the organization suggested 
that its disciplinary mechanisms needed to have clearer stages—this language and 
procedure also closely mirrored the Party’s practices, and those in place in newspaper 
editorial boards, demonstrating that Union members brought their prior institutional 
experiences into the new organization.167  
The criteria for membership and exclusion that rank-and-file journalists offered 
left the role of the Party and socialist ideology unquestioned and, in some cases, 
expanded upon it. Though the new creative Union rested on an ideological foundation, 
fidelity to Marxism-Leninism was not the only measure for success or failure. This is not 
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to say that terms like “slander” were not mobilized in ideological ways, especially during 
literary controversies.168 The range of comments above indicates that professional and 
ideological values overlapped but were not equivalent.  
••• 
The final version of the bylaws closely resembled the original draft, though with 
some important fine-tuning of ideological language, organizational goals, and 
membership requirements.  In the opening section on the organization’s objectives, the 
new document explicitly mentioned journalists who worked in television as potential 
members, and specifically mentioned the creative union’s goal to “actively participate in 
the education and re-education of journalism cadres,” which would be a significant 
priority beginning in 1962.  The concerns about moral and ethical conduct raised in the 
bylaws debate also appeared in the new document, as the creative union pledged to 
concern itself with “ethical violations…incorrect and careless use of facts,” and their 
mistaken interpretation. At the same time, the new document was more explicitly 
political as well as professional—the creative union was also dedicated to “struggle 
against bourgeois ideology and revisionism,” language which highlights both Cold War 
tensions and Khrushchev’s criticisms of his former allies. The organization’s obligations 
to workers’ and peasants’ correspondents were now more specific, as the creative union 
would “assist party organizations in arranging education for workers’ and peasants’ 
correspondents,” and maintain its ongoing commitment to letters from workers.169 The 
cultural diplomacy responsibilities remained largely unaltered, though the final bylaws 
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made more specific mention of the creative union’s relationship to the MOJ and its role 
as the representative of Soviet journalists to that body, and highlighted the importance of 
fostering exchange with journalists from socialist countries.170 
Though the section on membership would remain a subject of debate at the 
inaugural congress and in subsequent years, the final version of the document did clarify 
some of the requirements.  Similarly, the section on rights and responsibilities, while less 
comprehensive than bylaws participants hoped, decisively established the creative 
union’s material and cultural obligations to its members. Membership was explicitly open 
to any journalist “consistently contributing” to the mass media, provided the individual in 
question also possessed “a mastery of journalistics.” The reference to work of 
“independent significance” was removed and replaced with the statement that a 
prospective member had to present “published work.” Local bodies now had explicit 
discretion over membership decisions and expulsions, though expulsions had to be 
ratified by the all-Union governing board. Members of the creative union now had the 
explicit right to comment on the creative union’s activities with an eye to improving 
them—this would become a central feature of the organization’s plenums, as we will see 
in chapters five and six.  
As part of the creative union’s joint responsibility with the trade unions, members 
could expect “constant help” from the creative union as they carried out their work, and 
all of the “cultural and material-quotidian” services the organization had available. The 
description here is in some contrast to the expansive hopes for material gain expressed 
during the bylaws debate. Indeed, the reference to what the creative union had at its 
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disposal highlights an important problem: in the absence of Zhurfond, what the creative 
union had available rarely satisfied rank-and-file members, as we will see later.171 The 
creative union’s organizational structure also corresponded closely to that in the draft 
bylaws, merely clarifying the procedures for the creation of local organizations and the 
convocation of conferences. These clauses also confirmed the practice of electing a 
“designated representative” to oblast’ or republic level bodies from each publication or 
news agency, rather than establishing “primary organizations” made up of all journalists 
working in a particular place.172 This policy, like the final formulation on material 
benefits, went against the wishes of many participants in the bylaws debate. Both issues 
would be revisited in various forums in the decade to come, pointing to the continuous 
nature of the creative union’s effort to represent and support professional journalists.  
The establishment of a creative union for journalists under Khrushchev initially 
grew out of the new institutional needs that accompanied superpower status: a 
Journalists’ Union would strengthen the Soviet Union’s ability to influence foreign 
journalists, especially through the MOJ. Since it was founded on a dual mandate of 
cultural diplomacy and domestic professional development, the new creative union 
provided an unprecedented opportunity for journalists to think critically about their goals 
and needs: while the initial proposals came from media elites in the Orgburo, debates 
about the bylaws were ultimately a more “Soviet” process, with journalists from all over 
the country offering opinions about what the new creative union should be. This process, 
which did not occur with the formation of the other creative unions, provides a unique 
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opportunity to study not only the self-conception of journalists but also their views of 
Soviet society and social hierarchies. 
The contours of the bylaws debate, with their contested and multifaceted nature, 
offer productive insights into the Soviet vision of professionalization in the Khrushchev 
era. Journalists at all levels believed strongly in the social significance of their work—
and that an appropriate relationship to facts and writing were the cornerstones of their 
profession, which should structure both standards for entry and grounds for expulsion. 
The volume and variety of revisions to the draft bylaws reinforce the consultative aspect 
of journalistic professionalization, in contrast to that of other fields. More importantly, 
rank-and-file journalists were clearly willing and able to offer their own visions of the 
social and material security that was their due—to be a Soviet professional was to 
embrace a commitment to reflection and work toward higher ideals, as the use of moral 
language in discussions of membership status demonstrates. At the same time, 
professionalization had a distinctly practical dimension: participants expected material 
privileges and advantages as recognition for their mental labor. They also hoped that 
these advantages would reduce the perceived inequalities between creative professionals, 
especially the high stature of writers. The scope of these desires demonstrates that 
journalists shared in the spirit of optimism that gripped the Soviet intelligentsia in the 
1950s and 1960s.  
The contours of the bylaws debate offer a working definition of Soviet creative 
professionalism. Written output and moral character were essential to journalistic success 
and should serve as standards for entry into the creative union. Participants’ specific 
mention of slander and libel demonstrate that journalists had a strong sense of 
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professional ethics apart from ideology. The insistence on moral character as a 
membership criterion demonstrates the importance of public mission to journalists’ 
professional identity—these issues would become prominent themes of creative union 
work in later years. Additionally, bylaws debate participants accepted that creative 
organizations would provide material benefits and offer opportunities for professional 
advancement, such as education and training. The main disagreements concerned the 
extent of a creative union’s material obligations, and how strict membership standards 
should be. Supporters of Zhurfond and those who frequently referenced the Writers’ 
Union essentially argued that professional status imposed as many obligations on the 
creative union as it did on members. In expanding material benefits, education, and 
travel, the creative union would enable members to improve themselves and their quality 
of life. Those who concentrated on exclusive membership policies felt that creative union 
membership should recognize achievements rather than potential, and that the creative 
union should be closed to freelance journalists, worker and peasant correspondents, or 
any individual who lacked writerly skill. The victorious proponents of an inclusive 
model, like the supporters of Zhurfond, envisioned the creative union as a resource for 
the talented few. 
The all-USSR Journalists’ Congress, held in November of 1959, was the official 
and public conclusion to the Orgburo’s work, including ratification of the bylaws. 
Though it formally concluded the bylaws debate, the congress—discussed in chapter 
three—showcased unresolved tensions about journalists’ responsibilities and the creative 
union’s purpose which remained prominent in later years.  The creative union’s 
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formation period, then, is crucial to understanding journalists as social and political 
actors. 
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Chapter 2  
Reporting De-Stalinization: 1956 and Newsroom Values at Komsomol’skaia pravda 
 
While the Journalists’ Union was an important site for debates and discussions 
about the meaning of professional identity, especially during its incubation period, a full 
portrait of journalists’ institutional lives also requires extensive study of their workplaces. 
In this chapter, I focus on the staff members of Komsomol’skaia pravda, the official 
organ of the Communist Youth League or Komsomol (hereafter KP, as in previous 
chapters).   KP had an audience in the millions and aimed much of its coverage at 
younger readers.173 Several journalists who were active in the creative union had lengthy 
careers there, including Aleksei Adzhubei, Iurii Voronov, Dmitri Goriunov, and Boris 
Pankin. Goriunov was editor-in-chief from 1950 to 1957 and replaced by Adzhubei in the 
summer of that year. When Adzhubei was appointed editor-in-chief of Izvestiia, 
Voronov, who had been a senior editor for some years, was appointed editor-in-chief, a 
position he held until the summer of 1965. Many former KP staff have written at length 
about the unique work environment and their efforts to innovate under various editors. 
The paper had a complex institutional position, since it was supervised closely by the 
Komsomol Central Committee as well as the Communist Party’s Central Committee. In 
this chapter, I refer either to the Komsomol Central Committee or the Russian acronym, 
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TsKVLKSM, to prevent confusion with the Party apparatus.174  KP editorial meetings, or 
letuchki—I employ this term or the singular letuchka throughout the dissertation—are an 
invaluable source base. These gatherings offer a clearer window into the challenges 
journalists confronted after Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin’s personality cult at the 
CPSU’s Twentieth Congress in February 1956, an event known as the Secret Speech, 
though it soon became well known both globally and domestically.175 
 Historians have recently devoted more attention to the ways in which different 
social groups confronted de-Stalinization, and my case study points to journalists’ active 
participation in the reform project, especially during Party and editorial board debates.   
Khrushchev’s denunciation of the personality cult presented interpretive challenges for 
historians, and efforts to criticize Stalin’s wartime mistakes were particularly 
controversial. Stephen Bittner’s overview of cultural life in the Arbat has demonstrated 
that debates about reform often reflected generational divides, which only deepened when 
it became clear that the scope of the reform agenda was rarely clear-cut, a diversity of 
opinion which also features in Vladislav Zubok’s wide-ranging study of the intelligentsia 
after Stalin.  Uncertainty and debates about reform were not exclusive to intellectuals—
rather, ordinary citizens expressed confusion about amnesty and broader questions of 
culpability.176 Though previous studies of journalism have pointed to new opportunities 
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for media elites as the Party actively sought journalists’ help in shaping the “new socialist 
person,” my work points as much to conflict and uncertainty as increased harmony. The 
political importance of media work allowed journalists like Aleksei Adzhubei to rise to 
prominence, but these responsibilities also created opportunities for friction.177 
My work demonstrates the importance of 1956 as an interpretive crisis for 
journalists’ professional values, as they responded to domestic upheaval after the Secret 
Speech and foreign policy crises in Eastern Europe. While most KP staff felt a special 
responsibility to influence public culture, they heatedly debated the extent of their 
authority when criticism caused conflict with political officials. Journalists, for all of their 
proximity to the Party (and in KP’s case, the Komsomol), confronted many of the same 
issues as other members of the creative intelligentsia, since they had to both interpret and 
transmit policy at contentious moments. While the creative union was part of a national 
conversation about professional rights and responsibilities, its proximity to the Central 
Committee and long incubation period meant that many of the more intense debates 
about social reform took place in newspapers. In this chapter, as in the larger dissertation, 
I have adopted some approaches common to other journalism histories: the selection of a 
thematic period, choosing a specific organization to focus on, and tracing political change 
through print culture and professional development.178  
KP journalists had complex institutional lives and accrued material benefits from 
their work: they enjoyed relatively high salaries and other advantages vis-à-vis ordinary 
citizens, such as access to housing and consumer goods as well as influence with 
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officials. Many journalists managed to publish critical or theoretical works in the field, 
which served as a supplemental income source.179 The other key aspect of journalism as a 
profession, familiar from chapters one and two, is the importance of specialized and 
recognized expertise, which allows the group in question to set standards for entry and 
determine success and failure. For KP journalists, letuchki were a critical forum for 
discussing these kinds of professional issues. Held weekly, they were often devoted to 
specific content, though discussions often included evaluation of entire departments and 
assessments of recent trends. Though senior editors could use the meetings to discuss 
new policy directions, the staff member who acted as “weekly critic” (dezhurnyi kritik) 
often did the most to set the tone, tying the most recent coverage to the paper’s political 
and creative goals.180 In these records and others I employ in this chapter, journalists are 
usually identified with first name only and not by the department in which they worked—
where this information is available, I have supplied first names and specific positions.181  
To properly theorize this chapter, I draw extensively from the work of other 
journalism scholars, and from Barbie Zelizer’s incisive critical summary of academic 
approaches to the field.  In focusing on the letuchki, I draw on the long-established 
sociological practice of the newsroom ethnography. Much of this literature, in Barbie 
Zelizer’s words, examines how journalists  “decided what was newsworthy, how, and 
why,” and I follow KP journalists’ efforts to respond to the first year of de-Stalinization. 
These sociological approaches make journalism less mysterious by assuming that it was 
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produced by individuals pursuing particular objectives and needs. There are key priorities 
that drive an event becoming news—such as its relationship to elite individuals and 
nations. As they craft news stories, journalists are driven by “news values”—in the case 
of Americans, a commitment to monitoring the health of democracy or taking an interest 
in “responsible capitalism.” While American “news values” were essentially liberal and 
capitalist, KP’s newsroom was focused on socialist progress. At the same time, Zelizer’s 
characterization of cultural studies describes much of my own approach and the concerns 
of my protagonists. KP journalists functioned “not only as conveyors of information but 
also as producers of culture, who impart preference statements about what is good and 
bad, moral and amoral, and appropriate and inappropriate in the world.” Even when 
Soviet journalists made direct “preference statements” about an article or event, they 
revealed their assumptions about the nature of the press and Soviet society. KP journalists 
felt a strong responsibility to engage and inform young readers, or to criticize social ills, 
which became particularly challenging during periods of political tension.182  
Any serious attempt to analyze debate and dissent in a Soviet context must 
address the persistent historiographical questions about the nature of autonomy within 
state socialism—a comparative frame which expands the case study’s stakes and 
necessitates comparisons to other fields, including Soviet science. The search for agency 
and embryonic civil society has taken Soviet historians in a variety of directions, 
including the nature protection movement, which retained some authority even under 
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Stalin. As is now known, environmental experts were able to use their scientific expertise 
to defend their own interests, even in periods of profound political upheaval. These 
scientists, like composers, were more protected from official scrutiny due to the technical 
expertise their fields required.183 While journalists were less shielded from oversight, 
letuchki were an officially sanctioned site of sociability and debate.   
Though journalists often expressed a sense of inferiority toward writers, 
examining the letuchki as a space for sociability points to another distinction between 
journalism and literary activity. When Solzhenitsyn or Pasternak undertook controversial 
literary interventions, they did so as “lone individuals.”  KP journalists debated the merits 
of controversial articles with relative openness, and took diverse positions on social 
problems. The paper’s official overseers might have preferred that it serve as one of its 
“naked transmission belts of regime values,” following Douglas Weiner’s 
characterization of the totalitarian ideal of social activity. Instead, journalists used the 
letuchki to make their own value statements, though such efforts were seldom without 
consequences. When KP journalists stressed their role as investigators and the importance 
of “bravery” in the face of social ills, conflict with authority increased.184 There was one 
setting where journalists were more likely to recapitulate Party policy than to debate the 
nuances of genre politics or audience needs—the meetings of the newspaper’s 
Communist Party group. Though these meetings were not entirely free of debate, 
especially at heated moments in the de-Stalinization process, they were somewhat less 
contentious than the letuchki. The diversity of journalists’ institutional lives, like other 
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aspects of post-Stalin society, cannot be adequately described using the traditional 
distinction between “dissent” or “the state.”  Both Party meetings and letuchki were state-
sanctioned gatherings, but in the latter setting, journalists more freely aired their own 
anxieties and uncertainties about policy.185 
••• 
In this chapter, I discuss two major events in 1956 and their repercussions for 
journalists: Khrushchev’s denunciation of the personality cult in February of 1956, and 
the uprisings in Hungary and Poland eight months later.  At both points, journalists were 
responsible for presenting ideological issues to the public and negotiating a broader crisis 
of authority—one in which reading practices and the veracity and accessibility of 
information were of critical importance. 
Efforts to explain the Secret Speech to various members of the public included 
frank discussions of journalism and newspapers and their perceived failings under Stalin. 
One of the better-known Party activists tasked with such explanations was the historian 
Anna Pankratova, a longtime Party member who came back into political favor after 
Stalin’s death. Pankratova gave a series of talks explaining Khrushchev’s speech and its 
implications for Soviet history. She prepared a detailed report for the Central Committee, 
and these records provide key insight into “the dilemmas of de-Stalinization.” 
Pankratova’s audience was especially concerned with making sense of the recent past and 
assigning responsibility for recent excesses.186 As the full report has been analyzed in 
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other works, I present only the most pertinent comments here. Pankratova was asked to 
clarify a recent statement in Pravda that “our successes produced the cult of personality.” 
Others complained about press coverage of agriculture, or a lack of information about 
meat and bread prices for propagandists. One questioner even linked Stalinist excess to 
the hierarchical nature of the Soviet press, asking, “How to liquidate the cult of 
newspapers, especially Pravda and Izvestiia, which, although they present things 
incorrectly (vystupiat nepravil’no), you don’t prove it, they don’t correct themselves.”187 
For part of Pankratova’s audience, the Soviet mass media was in some way responsible 
for the recent ideological errors and broader social ills of Stalinism.  
At the first KP letuchka after Khrushchev’s speech, on March 5, traveling 
correspondent Solomon Garbuzov celebrated the new possibilities the new policies 
offered: “for us, workers on the ideological front, the Party congress is an event of the 
very greatest significance. We must reexamine a great deal and re-evaluate many values, 
reject many beliefs and customary forms, and find new ones.”188 Garbuzov embraced the 
Twentieth Congress as an opportunity which intensified professional responsibilities. 
Soviet society was a dynamic organism refreshed and energized by the new policies. KP 
journalists had to balance their support for positive renewal of Soviet traditions with their 
interest in a reform agenda. Garbuzov hoped the newspaper could become more 
“critical…I am not afraid of this word. We should show more of the difficulties which 
people undergo…what impedes fulfilling the five year plan, and not limit ourselves to 
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victorious reports.”189 His connection between criticism and courage would become a 
central theme for KP journalists in the coming months. This nervousness was partly 
founded in the reactions of KP’s target audience: some young people, particularly 
students or the intelligentsia, displayed “unbelievable skepticism…which is starting to 
corrode young souls.” The solution to this was an emphasis on heroism and romance 
(romantika) attached to daily accomplishments. Recent coverage of the Virgin Lands was 
lacking in this area: while it “would have been interesting” in the past, it was no longer 
sufficient after the Twentieth Congress because “it should be directed at the future, at 
tomorrow, better depicting the heroic feats of youth, about which Khrushchev spoke with 
gratitude at the Party Congress.”190 The problem of convincing and inspiring 
disenchanted youth clearly had particular resonance for KP journalists. Young people’s 
varying responses to the possibilities and limits of reform is a well-studied aspect of the 
period.191 What is striking here is the image of the young reader as suffering from a kind 
of spiritual crisis, and journalists’ unique responsibility to combat it.  
Other discussions of reader relationships concerned the Secret Speech itself, 
demonstrating as much anxiety about the new policies as confidence in reform. At the 
March 5 editorial meeting, a worker in the letters department named Babanov described a 
recent set of correspondence containing questions about the Twentieth Congress. In the 
letter, the reader pointed out the omnipresent discussion of personality cults in the mass 
media, including Pravda’s recent editorial about the dangers of personality cults to the 
ideological integrity of Marxism-Leninism. In discussions with colleagues, the letter 
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writer struggled to satisfactorily define the phenomenon. Diverse definitions tended to 
arise in conversations about the topic, as one person said,  “bosses, who conduct 
themselves arrogantly in society, that’s a personality cult. A known person comes, that is, 
a boss, and he never says hello, and absolutely, people, who want to show themselves 
better and more cultured than everyone else.” The reader then asked KP to address the 
problem in more depth. Other readers provided examples from books where Stalin 
himself spoke against personality cults, while permitting his own public adulation. 
Despite Marx, Engels, and Lenin having clear opinions about the problem, “for some 
reason there is silence about them.” This reader was particularly concerned with 
Politburo member Anastas Mikoian’s speech promising fidelity to Lenin, when Stalin 
himself had made a similar promise in 1924.192 
Babanov’s readers cited Pravda rather than KP, as the paper had confined itself to 
reprinting Pravda material on personality cults rather than producing original material.193 
The sense of confusion here is palpable: on the one hand, readers could conflate mere 
rudeness with the worst of Stalinist excess. On the other, they were well aware of the 
former importance of the Stalin cult and could express skepticism about a reform project 
directed by Stalin’s close associates, who had not properly explained the roots of past 
failures. Journalists had a direct responsibility to enlighten, and readers could, and did, 
cite the press as justification for their own confusion. In his detailed Begriffsgeschichte, 
D. M. Fel’dman explains that G. M. Malenkov was the first major political figure to use 
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the term “personality cult” after Stalin’s death, seeking a term that  unambiguously 
referred to Stalin’s self-aggrandizement but did not name him.194  
At a March 26 letuchka, Peter Bondarenko, the paper’s correspondent in 
Voronezh oblast’, described his own experience with reactions to the speech: “Now, 
when you go through the raions, the collective farms, and to institutions, there are a great 
may different conversations about the recent speech…a great many rumors, people 
understand these things differently.” While most people correctly apprehended the 
speech’s meaning, there were still “demagogues” who declared, “а foreman is also a 
person”—interpreting the policy as a challenge to all concentrated authority rather than 
just Stalin’s. These mistakes were caused when, after the speech was read, the agitators 
responsible did not “explain to people that they are wrong.”195 Journalists struggled to 
control reactions to the new policies and ensure they were expressed in ideologically 
appropriate ways. The questioning of dictatorial rule could threaten social stability, and 
authority figures—journalists included—had a responsibility to limit the possible 
meanings of the new policies, rather than allow them to multiply.  On the whole, 
Bondarenko viewed the shift as full of potential for journalists, as Khrushchev’s policies 
had increased popular intolerance for dishonest bureaucrats, which might inspire his 
colleagues to “develop the struggle with such people…to examine more harshly and more 
bravely, despite rank and position.”196 The renewal of critical capacity was celebrated as 
an unqualified good, despite his earlier reservations about the presence of “demagogues.” 
Despite these calls for a substantive intervention in the debate about the meaning of the 
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personality cult, KP’s main publication on the matter was its earlier reprint of Pravda’s 
editorial.  
••• 
A newspaper case study allows for examination of journalists both as editorial 
board members and as members of the Communist Party. Where the March 5 letuchka—
and those after it—featured some open acknowledgement of de-Stalinization’s 
challenges, the Party meetings were somewhat more formulaic and concentrated on 
journalists’ responsibilities to improve themselves in response to the new policies. On 
March 14, 1956, the Party meeting was dedicated to the “results of the Twentieth Party 
Congress and the objectives of the editorial board’s Communists.” While Goriunov’s 
speech was not preserved, the responses to his remarks remain on record. Sergei 
Gus’kov, a member of the paper’s Komsomol department, openly denounced Stalinist 
journalism: he called the personality cult a “restraining phenomenon” which had 
particularly deleterious effects on the press.  Under Stalin, newspapers were “put out for 
the leadership, for a narrow circle of persons, maybe even for one person.” But not all of 
the past was suspect: Solomon Garbuzov defended the ongoing relevance of KP’s work 
from the 1920s and early 1930s. This description of newspapers as rhetorically devoted to 
the masses but actually directed at the leadership is reminiscent of Matthew Lenoe’s 
conclusions about the impact of limited paper supply on Stalinist newspapers, 
specifically, that journalists communicated more with managerial elites more than the 
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wider public.197 At the same time, Gus’kov was free to criticize Stalin’s personal 
influence on newspaper content.  
The paper’s mission to reach youth was a major discussion topic during the rest of 
the March 14 meeting, along with the volume and type of reader correspondence. 
Gus’kov advocated an expanded effort to engage youth in “active struggle.” Coverage of 
construction projects was lacking, as was a strong defense of young people’s rights; a 
large volume of the paper’s correspondence concerned employment or improper 
dismissal from jobs. Letters themselves took up over half the workday of more qualified 
staff members, which left little time to consider new content.198The problem of high 
correspondence volume and its effects on work quality would become a key theme at 
Journalists’ Union seminars. In a related comment, editorial board member Grigorii 
Osheverov was unsatisfied with the number of published letters, especially since many of 
them touched on problems of “violations of revolutionary legality.” The newspaper 
needed to be more “collectivist” as well as “democratic.” The latter goal would be 
accomplished through readers’ conferences.199 Gus’kov was particularly concerned with 
an increase in youth misbehavior in some areas of Moscow and growing reader concerns 
with cases of “economic mismanagement.”200  What is particularly striking here is the 
limited attention to Stalinist excess or the complexities of the recent past—after a formal 
denunciation of the personality cult, Gus’kov could return to broader social objectives. 
The cultivation of reader relationships would allow journalists to continue their struggle 
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against social ills. While this investigative role would become controversial later in the 
year, at this point, it was presented as an unqualified good.  
Some remarks at the March 14 meeting were more inflammatory: Valentin Kitain, 
of the information department, complained that a recent letter on youth issues in the 
Komsomol Central Committee had been “closed”—rather than available for publication 
or wide distribution—which “impeded the conduct of a struggle with hooliganism, 
openly and loudly.” Problems of censorship were clearly viewed as an impediment to 
journalism’s didactic mission, a theme which I will revisit in chapter five.201 Aleksei 
Adzhubei, then an assistant editor, was concerned with KP’s “pettiness of material.” In 
his view, not all of the newspapers’ weaknesses could be blamed on Stalin and his 
personality cult, and the newspaper should concentrate on increasing its “collectivism in 
work on material…and general interest.”202  Adzhubei is often closely identified with the 
renewal of journalism after 1953, though his statements here were formulaic and general 
rather than radical prescriptions for improvement.  
Ekaterina Shatskaia, who worked in the department of students and young 
pioneers, was concerned with the quality of Party work itself, arguing for reform on the 
micro-level to accompany the recent national changes. Most disturbingly, Party work 
lacked authenticity: “We still do not speak openly about what worries us, we speak about 
this not at party meetings, but in the corridors. But now the time has come for brave 
utterances, we need not be afraid to criticize.”203 Shatskaia clearly believed in the 
importance of collegiality and sociability, but Party meetings were somehow devoid of 
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substance compared to less official interactions. The limited value of such official events 
to individuals’ social lives is familiar from memoir literature and interviews about the 
late Soviet experience. Anthropologist Aleksei Yurchak describes how ideology became 
increasingly “performative” rather than “constative,” after Stalin’s death, though most of 
his research subjects grew up in the 1970s rather than in the early years of de-
Stalinization. In practice, merely referring to ideological work could serve as cover for 
less orthodox pursuits, and people increasingly felt that their authentic lives were outside 
of official spaces. In one example, students routinely skipped class by claiming 
Komsomol responsibilities.204 While it would be ahistorical to extend Yurchak’s 
framework into the late 1950s, his discourse analysis does provide a useful way of 
comparing Party meetings to letuchki: Party meetings were more about performance of 
ideological doctrine, while letuchki provided spaces for journalists to openly discuss the 
ways in which their official lexicon was in flux after the Twentieth Congress. Goriunov 
advocated greater “openness” in his concluding remarks at the March 14th meeting, which 
he believed would improve both Party work and newspaper content.205 This lent official 
credibility to Shatskaia’s hopes for a rejuvenated critical atmosphere, though the value of 
such open discussion would become a subject of heated debate later in the year.  
After the final remarks, members of the Party group voted on a formal resolution 
responding to the Twentieth Congress. In this resolution, ideology and professional skill 
were directly linked: “it is the obligation of every communist to perfectly know his work, 
to deeply study the questions which he puts on the pages of the newspaper, to raise his 
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professional mastery.” The presence of a study group and “creative meetings” indicated 
some progress, though the events were infrequent. Members were exhorted to conduct 
more intensive study of foreign languages and camera work—attendance and preparation 
for such classes was poor. The Party group should pay more attention to the leisure and 
everyday life of its members.206 The decisions were almost entirely affirmative: 
approving the change in Party policy and making notes about the necessary changes to 
content. The use of “professional mastery” proves that this term appeared in a variety of 
contexts when journalists spoke about their obligations and practices. Many of these 
prescriptions for improvement, especially leisure, language training, and formal study of 
professional practice, would become central to the creative union’s domestic mandate in 
later years, as I will show in chapter five. Their importance at KP as early as 1956 
demonstrates that journalists’ workplaces generated practices and professional values 
which later became part of the bylaws debate.  
••• 
In the weeks and months after the Twentieth Congress, KP journalists became 
increasingly anxious that their coverage had become too negative, even as they continued 
to celebrate the Party’s new direction. Most editorial board members agreed that 
successful journalism work required an enduring commitment to facts, and stressed the 
importance of truth telling to exposing and correcting social weaknesses. What was 
unclear—and would remain so, until a definitive rebuke from the Komsomol at the end of 
1956—was the precise balance between criticism and more affirmative coverage that 
focused on social progress. The terms of debate reveal clear intersections between 
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journalism and literature, particularly the dominant conventions of the socialist realist 
novel—a return to genre conventions was often invoked as the solution to too much 
negativity. 
At a letuchka on March 19, Il’ia Shatunovskii, the paper’s well-known 
feuilletonist, took a distinctly celebratory tone in his opening remarks on the Twentieth 
Congress but expressed concern about the paper’s recent direction.  He noted all of the 
“great changes” in the newspaper, which he attributed to the Twentieth Congress and its 
new policy directions, which restored Leninism and recognized the “collective wisdom” 
of the Party and the Soviet people. Aside from this formulaic celebration of doctrine and 
the relationship between the Party and the masses, Shatunovskii further commented on 
the professional implications of policy: “the role of our newspaper, as a collective organ, 
where thousands and thousands of people can heatedly discuss various question, draw 
conclusions, exchange opinions….in struggling to bring the decisions of the party 
congress to life, we should not allow even the smallest falsehood, to instill in youth a 
spirit of truth.” To do this, Shatunovskii argued, was to “teach youth, and all our readers, 
to critically think about a phenomenon, to themselves arrive at the correct and important 
thoughts and conclusions.”207 Shatunovskii invoked several popular discourses about 
Soviet young people: their capacity to reason and their status as living symbols of 
ideological growth. The needs of young people produced their own professional 
responsibilities—an unwavering commitment to factual accuracy and unambiguous 
analysis of social life.  During the Hungarian crisis, his colleagues felt burdened by this 
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responsibility, and would become particularly anxious about lasting consequences 
stemming from failures to reach young audiences.208 
Shatunovskii’s portrayal of the newspaper as a site for debate and critical thought 
was particularly common in discussions of reader letters and management of reader 
response, as we will see in chapter five. Though he applauded the “bravery” evident from 
the growth of criticism, Shatunovskii claimed that Soviet journalists could not 
responsibly “embellish” reality; rather, they should “keep in mind the great significance 
of a positive example for our youths’ upbringing, for the formation of their 
worldview.”209 The balance between the newspapers’ critical mission and mission of 
didactic uplift would remain an issue in later years: KP journalists, particularly future 
editor Iurii Voronov, expounded on this topic at creative union seminars. A more 
successful article allowed the newspaper to continue to “discipline bureaucrats” and still 
contained “the image of a person, who struggles for this. I repeat, we should craft our 
critical materials on a high literary level…in articles of a critical type we do not pay 
attention to form.” He did approve of the paper’s recent focus on questions of youth 
leisure.210   
Shatunovskii was not known as a champion of the changes in journalism under 
Khrushchev—other colleagues painted him as unpleasantly ideologically rigid.211 Given 
this fact, his support for disciplining bureaucrats demonstrates the extent to which 
criticism was a new part of official policy, which some KP journalists would embrace 
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with more enthusiasm than others. Shatunovskii’s concern for the proper language and 
form in critical materials was not his only meditation on journalism’s “literary” 
qualities—he lamented the absence of the “positive hero” from KP’s coverage. In doing 
so, he evoked one of the socialist realist novel’s main conventions—production novels 
depicted the development of such “positive heroes” as they struggled to complete a 
particular task.212 In his view, the absence of such heroes made it difficult for youth to 
know exactly whom they were to emulate. More recent rubrics, unlike past successes, 
tended to describe “initiatives, more than people themselves.”  Depictions of productive 
innovation were successful, as far as they went, but did not depict “spiritual qualities.” 
Shatunovskii presented the ocherk, sometimes translated as a feature story, as essential to 
this project and criticized his colleagues in the editorial board for neglecting the genre, 
including Adzhubei.213 Shatunovskii clearly regarded genre traditions as a stabilizing 
influence for the paper’s target audience.   
A TsKVLKSM report on newspaper work contains many of the same themes as 
Shatunovskii’s address, though its imprecise dating makes it difficult to determine 
whether Shatunovskii was echoing official Komsomol concerns or anticipating them. 
Rather than reprinting the materials of other newspapers, the Komsomol leadership urged 
KP to produce original material on the personality cult. It was more important than ever 
for the newspaper to discuss problems of nationalism and “cosmopolitanism” as more 
foreigners were entering the Soviet Union and Soviet citizens were traveling abroad.  
This same report highlights the growing attachment to moral questions, and changing 
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notions of Soviet personhood. While hard work was an essential Soviet value, qualities 
like honesty, love for family, and respect for women and elders, among others, tended to 
be depicted “shallowly” in newspapers. A focus on production plans obscured questions 
about young people’s thoughts and feelings. Friendship among Komsomol members was 
not depicted enough. Foreign influence was portrayed as a threat to Soviet identity, while 
reference to “cosmopolitanism” evoked postwar Stalinist xenophobia, demonstrating the 
clear limits of openness to the outside world.214 This report points to differing views on 
foreign contact across Soviet organizations—while creative union members would be 
expected to pursue cross-cultural contacts, their readers were considered more vulnerable. 
Indeed, as I discuss in chapter four, cultural diplomacy was an anxious process even 
when it involved professionals who were presumed to be reliable. Shatunovskii’s 
assessment of genre, together with Komsomol policy, demonstrates a growing interest in 
subjectivity: the production of evolved persons now mattered as much as factory output. 
The development of the ocherk and the proper approach to moral and spiritual matters, 
here closely identified with the Twentieth Congress, became an enduring theme of 
creative union work, as I will discuss in chapter five.  
Аt a letuchka on March 26, 1956, a staff member named Sechin discussed recent 
examples of “positive heroes” in KP, which resulted in a lengthy conversation about 
genre and the nature of successful stories. He praised a recent piece by ocherkist Elena 
Rusa’kova as a meditation on heroism even if it purported to be a book review. The 
article’s protagonist was particularly inspirational, and might become as important to 
youth as Pavel Korchagin, the protagonist in the Socialist Realist classic, How the Steel 
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Was Tempered. In short, the “review” was akin to an “excellent ocherk about the young 
Soviet person.” Allan Starodub, a senior member of the information department, shared 
this assessment, describing Rusakova’s particular success in her “direct address to a 
young reader…to our young people.”215 
Rusakova’s article, titled, “Sergei Chekmarev, a Person” appeared on March 24, 
and described his poetry and diaries, previously published in the literary journal Novyi 
Mir. The piece opened with a meditation on the difficulty of writing about a “beautiful 
person,” particularly after his death. But though words might fail a reviewer, the work 
itself made it so that you “feel a friend is standing next to you, who you have known and 
who has been dear to you for a long time, and from whom you will never be parted.” 
Rousakova encouraged the reader to imagine Sergei’s Moscow childhood: eating his 
breakfast porridge, going to school with friends, and especially overjoyed at the chance to 
take part in demonstrations—even enjoying lectures on international affairs. Though the 
diary does not state this directly, the author imagined Sergei particularly stricken with 
grief for Lenin, and finding his poetic calling precisely in response to this great national 
tragedy.216 
 The young poet went on to study in a special course on cattle and meat raising but 
was inspired by life itself for his subject matter—he studied hard and edited his student 
newspaper. Еven unrequited love did not diminish his dedication to work, as he left his 
sweetheart for a career helping collective farm workers with their cattle. On assignment, 
he was tireless even in bad weather and dedicated to political work. He overcame small 
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setbacks: when assigned to teach a course for local farmers, he at first resorted to 
“trickery” and made sure a senior colleague took the hardest questions but soon grew 
more confident. Though he strove for excellence, this was not out of “conceit,” which he 
“detested,” and instead he acted out of obligation to others. Unsurprisingly, the local 
villain, a kulak who had caused the death of one of his farm hands, was one of Sergei’s 
adversaries. Sergei, despite being a Muscovite and more educated than most of those 
around him, genuinely loved his life and his community and did not experience 
“boredom” or think himself “above others,” and continued to write his poetry, though 
such boredom or ennui was a common experience. While some young writers believed 
working on a small circulation newspaper would hamper creativity, Sergei’s life showed 
otherwise. It was not those with a “petty soul” who grew as artists, but those who 
“participated in life, not as an observer, but directly in the moment.” They then acquired 
the “creative tone that is called uniqueness.” Sergei’s tragic death in 1933—it is unclear 
whether he suffered an accident or was murdered by an enemy—put an end to his 
promising career, and Rusakova mourned the loss of such an exemplary Communist.217  
 It is not difficult to understand why Rusakova’s article received praise: she 
described not only Sergei’s labors but also his “internal world.” The reader was openly 
encouraged to identify with Sergei and imagine him as a participant in the reading 
experience. Sergei was continually contrasted with those around him, whether those are 
archetypes, like a young writer who does not labor as Sergei did, or the collective farmer 
who does harm where he did good. Sergei overcame his own fears of teaching, and the 
pain of unrequited love, to become an exemplary member of his community—small 
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moments of personal growth likely meant to evoke the struggles of the “positive hero.”  
Many of Sergei’s attributes—his humility, his love for labor and art in equal measure, 
and his ability to put work ahead of a personal life—were the exact traits aspired to by 
Stalin-era diarists who were inspired to “work on themselves” and embody the new 
Soviet person. Sergei’s participation in mourning for Lenin and collectivization 
effectively “wrote him in” to important periods of the revolutionary past, as a person with 
deep connections to these significant traditions. Though diarists had done this for 
themselves, attempting to give their identity documents greater historical depth, 
Rusakova undertook this work for the dead Sergei.218 The young man was remarkable 
less for his distinctiveness than his embodiment of the Soviet enlightenment project—the 
search for inspirational examples of socialist personhood and social progress, a cultural 
value first developed under Stalin, remained a key newsroom value in 1956.  
 Other authors did not make use of the same opportunities Rusakova had. At the 
March 26 letuchka, Starodub pointed out KP had written only a typical response to a 
recent film depicting a young hooligan’s struggles with the law and self-improvement, 
and exhorted his colleagues to make more of an effort to review films, plays, and books, 
and suggested soliciting reviews from readers. Traveling correspondent Vladimir 
Chachin returned to the problem of the positive hero, noting, “the “hero of our times, of 
1956, is not in the newspaper. Who should this hero be? First of all the working class, our 
builders and our Komsomol leaders.” Chachin had investigated a recent incident in 
Bratsk, a Siberian city, in which a Komsomol brigade leader had been murdered by 
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hooligans, and he considered it a particularly suitable subject for a story.219 Starodub’s 
arguments tied the issue of competitiveness to a broader set of journalistic values: KP’s 
pursuit of its target audience and ability to write about topics they found relevant—in the 
case of Ozerov’s film, KP had missed an opportunity to discuss a “newsworthy” cultural 
event. At the same time, the references to literature reinforce the close association 
between creative fields—many “production novels” featured the martyrdom or heroic 
sacrifice of a hero to fulfill a central task, just as Chachin’s story did.220 
••• 
 Unrest in Eastern Europe during the fall of 1956 was a major foreign policy 
challenge for the Khrushchev regime, and KP journalists found themselves particularly 
disoriented, not only due to the rapid political developments there but their lack of access 
to reliable information. In late October 1956, inspired by the recent governmental change 
in Poland, Hungarians advocated for the replacement of hardliner Erno Gero with the 
moderate reformer Imre Nagy. The early Budapest demonstrations included open 
gestures of defiance against Stalinism, including toppling of statues and demonstrations 
in which protestors quickly took control. The Soviet leadership, specifically the members 
of the Central Committee’s presidium, voted in favor of armed intervention. The entry of 
Soviet troops into Hungary resulted in further deaths and an ongoing crisis. Khrushchev 
was momentarily prepared to begin negotiations, but a major attack on Party headquarters 
in Budapest contributed to a  “crisis of confidence” and decision to end the rebellion 
through force. William Taubman’s account emphasizes Khrushchev’s sleeplessness, 
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anxiety, and repeated efforts to ask colleagues for advice. On November 5, 1956, Soviet 
troops decisively ended the uprising, and more than twenty thousand Hungarians were 
killed.221 Since Khrushchev himself vacillated as to his course of action, the tumult at the 
November 5 letuchka is unsurprising. Though the initial conversations in the editorial 
board focused on the Hungarian events, the unrest there served as a catalyst for 
discussions of Soviet society’s response to the Twentieth Congress, the competitiveness 
and timeliness of Soviet media, and the proper place of criticism.  Just as the creative 
union was formed in response to international needs and became a forum for larger 
debates about professional rights and privileges, the Hungarian events forced KP 
journalists to evaluate their response to domestic social questions.  
 Vassili Khomus’kov, a sports journalist, began his weekly review with a thorough 
critique of the newspaper’s foreign affairs department. Though Hungarian events had 
“begun to take up more space in the newspaper,” the coverage itself was “badly, if not to 
say abominably, depicted. And I am not afraid to say that we have put Komsomol’skaia 
pravda and its materials in an awkward position before readers…we have generated 
doubts.” The papers had accurately described the initial tumult but informed readers 
improvements were visible, which was an outright contradiction of Pravda’s description 
“that the reckless scheme had not failed, but that events continued to develop.”222 
Khomus’kov’s comments point to the informational hierarchy of media work: KP 
journalists had made a serious error in contradicting the nation’s flagship publication. His 
critiques were borne out by evidence: on October 27, the only pieces on Hungary were 
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reprinted TASS reports announcing the defeat of “counterrevolutionary” forces.223 In an 
impassioned appeal to audience needs, Khomus’kov stated, “it is easy to write empty 
TASS-like informational pieces about events, worrying not only to youth but to our 
whole people, but about such controversial events we do not have the right.” KP had 
simply reprinted Pravda’s response to Polish events, which either demonstrated KP’s 
incompetence in foreign affairs, or a need for the editors to ask TASS directly for better 
material.224 Khomus’kov clearly considered his publication’s reliance on Pravda 
embarrassing, and appealed to the paper’s authority figures to address imbalances. The 
evocation of readers’ rights attests not only to the depth of professional obligation but 
also the profound sense of failure. 
 KP’s network of subscribers was considered particularly vulnerable in light of the 
increased propaganda pressures in the Cold War. Reminding his colleagues of KP’s 
subscriber network of more than two million, Khomus’kov stated: 
To consider the reader, his tastes, interests, ethical undertaking (zakonnie 
stremleniia) is necessary…It’s impossible to devote only five lines to the 
Hungarian events, when the situation is so fraught. Why can we not give a 
correct evaluation of events with our conclusions? It is no secret that in the 
editorial board people are asking each other, what’s going in Hungary? 
What events are there? We tried to hush them. These kinds of errors are 
dangerous. There, where our correct propaganda does not reach, there are 
no empty places. In these places there is the kind of propaganda that is 
extremely disadvantageous for us.225   
 
Readers were now seen as complex beings, with triumphs beyond the realm of labor, but 
while taking these subjective developments into account, KP journalists had to confront 
an expanded media universe, in which their audience might turn to foreign sources if 
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their own work was less than compelling. Journalists did not always have more 
information than the public they sought to enlighten; Khomuskov’s disapproving tone 
suggests that he viewed such hallway conversations as journalists indulging in rumor 
rather than professional fact finding. Journalism’s preoccupation with facts and 
conveying the “truth” was particularly challenging in a Soviet context, where information 
was tightly controlled.  
 In his remarks at the November 5 letuchka, Allan Starodub was equally concerned 
about foreign broadcasting, especially the Voice of America’s presence in Novosibirsk, 
and the BBC’s “broadcasting so called ‘objective information.’” While some VOA 
programming was crude, other pieces were “intelligent, and one needs to delve into them 
deeply in order to refute them…why do we not speak out about the unmasking of these 
programs Our people, especially young people, listen to them.”226  Starodub’s comments 
present foreign media influence as a truly national problem for Soviet media managers, 
since he presented evidence from outside the capital. His mocking of “objectivity” would 
become an increasingly common critique of the media in Western democracies, as I 
discuss in chapter four. Rostov correspondent Boris Ivanov, responding to Starodub, saw 
a need for  “wide-ranging…and reliable information” aimed at Soviet audiences, rather 
than focusing exclusively on refuting foreign media.227 These exchanges further 
demonstrate the domestic implications of international events: foreign media was 
dangerous not only because it was ideologically false but also because it could undermine 
public trust. The contrast between the anxieties here and those from the creative union’s 
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Orgburo is particularly instructive: though all the members of the Orgburo were senior 
journalists, what we might term media managers, their responsibilities did not involve 
this kind of day-to-day debate about the meaning of events. As we will see in chapter 
four, when the Journalists’ Union’s Orgburo responded to the Hungarian crisis, there was 
no substantive mention of domestic news making. Instead, media elites concentrated 
much more on the uprising’s implications for cultural diplomacy. At this early stage, 
journalists’ efforts to grapple with the more serious complexities and tensions of the 
Khrushchev era still took place in the newsroom rather than the creative union.  
••• 
 The rest of Khomus’kov’s weekly review at the November 5 letuchka involved 
another kind of authority crisis: the extent to which journalists could or should provide 
negative information about Party and state officials.  He was particularly concerned with 
the article, “At Luzhniki Everything Ought to be Beautiful,” devoted to the problematic 
conditions at Moscow’s Luzhniki sports stadium. The October 23 article described 
Luzhniki as an important achievement and hopes for a future Olympics there. Though the 
stadium was of an impressive size, the article’s authors sarcastically lamented the neglect 
of “minor details” such as suitable tennis courts and football fields. In October, the 
football field closely resembled a “marsh,” and it was doubtful a match between the FRG 
and the Soviet Union could take place there: repairs had required six days of intense 
work. Тhe problem was an overly “experimental” drainage design, chosen by the State 
Committee for Physical Culture and Sport. Their chair, Romanov, had ignored a letter 
about the unsuitable playing conditions at the stadium, and others simply claimed, 
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“nothing terrible had happened,” which the authors characterized as “indifference to 
athletes’ needs.”228  
 Khomus’kov stated, “I consider it my duty to inform the collective about the 
events developing from the publication of this article, as they shed light on the 
relationship to our critical materials on the part of certain bureaucrats, some of whom 
occupy high-ranking posts.” At a recent press conference for both Soviet and foreign 
journalists, the head of the national committee for Physical Culture, Romanov, who 
featured in the article, had been put in an awkward position. An American journalist had 
asked about the possibility of holding the 1964 Olympic Games in Moscow, and 
Romanov had responded in the affirmative and praised the new sports facilities. In 
response, another journalist asked how Romanov felt about KP’s article, presumably well 
aware of the stark contrast between his outlook and the paper’s position. Romanov was 
described as “hedging” and defending his earlier remarks. The tension intensified, as 
another journalist asked whether Romanov believed the newspaper had “lied, or 
slandered.” Romanov, “understanding that it was impossible for him to heap offense on 
the newspaper, that there were representatives of the Soviet press there, began to state 
that at Luzhniki everything is fine, but KP wishes it were excellent, it’s the conflict of the 
good with the excellent.”229     
 Strikingly, though foreigners were present at the press conference, it was Soviet 
journalists who made Romanov’s position most difficult. This view of events suggests 
that while officials were in a superior position, they too hesitated to create an adversarial 
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relationship between the state and the mass media. This is in some contrast to episodes 
discussed in chapter four, where creative union leaders were primarily anxious about 
foreign reactions to Soviet initiatives. Privately, Romanov expressed significant 
disapproval—he asked why he had not been informed in advance about the article, and 
spoke with both Goriunov and Adzhubei about it. Khomus’kov was careful to stress the 
ongoing nature of the problem: these kinds of stories and issues were occurring “in many 
departments with highly ranked and lower ranked bosses, who we are criticizing to some 
extent, and who are concerned not with the essence of the question, not with the effort to 
make things as good as possible, but only with living peacefully. Incidentally, the 
Committee did not send reactions to the article to us. We must critically and seriously 
speak out in the newspaper with our materials and carry out active measures toward the 
people we criticize.”230 Khomus’kov demonstrated that KP journalists—and not just 
Adzhubei, however closely he is associated with changing standards—felt obligated, if 
not always empowered, to criticize the mistakes of authorities for the sake of social 
improvement. The official reaction to the piece, in addition to confirming the limits on 
journalistic autonomy, reinforces Mark Hopkins’ point that in the Soviet media system, 
Party and state officials could function like senior management in a media corporation, 
alert to controversies and seeking to assert “social control” through indirect means, even 
as official censorship structures remained in place.231  
In his response to Khomus’kov’s weekly review from November 5, editorial 
board member Sokolov evinced no particular fondness for bureaucrats but expressed 
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concern that, “we ourselves often provide fodder for conversations, by publishing some 
so-called controversial articles. When we begin to cast stones at one or another 
bureaucrat, a person, possibly occupying a high post, we set fire to unhealthy passions 
around the higher-ups and those below them.” 232 Unbalanced criticism was rooted in the 
wrong kind of “class struggle” between officialdom and citizens.233 Romanov was not the 
only official to feature prominently in recent weeks: KP had singled out the children of 
Foreign Trade Minister Kabanov, who were engaged in criminal dealings. Тhe article, 
“Once More On Mold,” written by Shatunovskii and Starodub, received a great deal of 
reader response—five hundred readers had written about the case, praising the 
newspaper’s decision to cover the subject and encouraging the paper to “more sharply 
pose the question about the responsibility of parents for the upbringing of their 
children.”234  Despite this curiosity, it was unlikely there would be serious consequences 
for the wrongdoers, which amounted to the newspaper “giving rise to unhealthy 
conversations.” If his colleagues were prepared to print contentious articles, “let them 
also have the bravery to ask Comrade Bulganin how the Council of Ministers reacts to 
this Minister, but if we are not brave enough, we need not print the article, so as not to 
enflame passions.”235 These examples demonstrate that as clashes with authority 
increased, so did journalists’ anxiety. These kinds of debates were less prominent in the 
Journalists’ Union, even after its inaugural congress, when creative seminars became 
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more sophisticated. “Courage” was clearly part of how journalists defined their 
professional success in settings more distant from official scrutiny.236  
Boris Pankin was more concerned about limits on creativity than with avoiding 
controversy, including those set by journalists’ own fears. “There are other matters where 
no one blocks us from speaking out and we put up limits for ourselves. In our heads there 
is an editor or a censor, who says, ‘this is not allowed, don’t print this.’”  In connection 
with recent corruption cases like Kabanov’s, he complained that the coverage did not 
reflect the widespread nature of such criminality. Pankin had felt like “Don Quixote” in 
championing this view, though he was now supported by phone calls from readers asking 
about the lack of follow-through. The Komsomol Central Committee, particularly First 
Minister Shelepin, “often interferes with our bravery,” and the Komsomol Secretary had 
similarly restricted the Kabanov story.237 Pankin was, as we will see later in this chapter, 
particularly willing to criticize elites in the name of social improvement. While others 
invoked reader response as a possible sign of social disorder, Pankin used it to vindicate 
himself. His reference to a kind of “internal censor,” along with Shelepin’s interference, 
points to a central tension in assessing journalistic agency. While it is clear which 
articles, or international incidents, merited official scrutiny, it is impossible for any 
historian to ascertain when a journalist might have exercised restraint prior to publication. 
The repeated references to “bravery” in clashes with officialdom, combined with 
Pankin’s reference to inner turmoil, demonstrate that criticism of authority was both vital 
to journalists’ sense of success and potentially destabilizing.  
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••• 
 Debates about the value of criticism became particularly heated at the November 
19 letuchka, in part due to a lengthy and pessimistic speech by propaganda department 
assistant Vadim Komolov, in his capacity as weekly critic. Komolov was disturbed by the 
paper’s lack of a clear “political line,” which could have severe consequences: 
I believe that the state of our collective…expresses, in a sense, what is 
happening in the social life of our society…in the life of our country, and 
importantly, in my view, in peoples’ minds, very great shifts are 
occurring. Another matter, that might be connected with the practical 
liquidation of the remnants of the personality cult; we did not always act 
intelligently, therefore something is spilling over in a not entirely correct 
and acceptable form…I am certain that this process is logical, necessary, 
and a colossal service on the part of the Party, to have willingly begun a 
decisive struggle with bureaucratism, and raised a great many questions 
which have long worried millions of people.238 
 
 Though he clearly felt obligated to praise the Party’s new direction, Komolov 
presented the Twentieth Congress as a disorienting challenge for all of Soviet society, 
with specific repercussions for journalists’ public responsibilities. For him, de-
Stalinization required questioning existing values and priorities—a shift in subjectivity as 
much as policy.  His claim that KP’s efforts to grapple with the new reality were “spilling 
over” rather than being channeled emphasized the newspaper’s lack of control in contrast 
to the Party’s role as a benign and enlightened guiding force.   
 Komolov’s greatest concern was the danger of criticism, which he connected not 
only to the newspaper’s stability but also to social unrest as a whole.  He reminded his 
colleagues to be:  
a responsible collective…if we begin to speak about our editorial life, we 
find a series of leftist tendencies…It’s not important to us now whether 
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something is published or not. We should be interested in the internal 
intensity of our comrades, to say something sharp to ministers, to thieving 
bureaucrats…it seems to me that many comrades have grouped 
themselves around this line.239 
 
Where in earlier weeks, journalists like Pankin had portrayed criticism as valuable—
though difficult to sustain in the face of political opposition or indifference—Komolov 
viewed it as almost unprofessional, particularly when some individuals prioritized 
critique over publication. The characterization of his own colleagues as “leftists” was an 
inflammatory rhetorical move: in Soviet political discourse, characterizing opponents as 
“leftists” or “rightists” was to portray them as deviants.240  
 Komolov was emphatic about the political and professional consequences of the 
paper’s more critical direction: 
At the last letuchka this line practically became the main one…We 
decided to invite the secretary of the Central Committee here, to speak 
honestly and openly with him. There is internal dissatisfaction with Iurii 
Petrovich, who removes materials…this is not the path which can lead the 
newspaper in the necessary direction and which will truly give us the 
opportunity to pointedly (po-ostromu) pose questions in our newspaper. I 
wish to emphasize that I completely support this wish of my comrades, 
subjectively, because it expresses…the progressive wish of people to 
begin to speak out pointedly…it is in its spirit absolutely correct, but in 
reality it is pseudo-revolutionary, because it is superficial and can satisfy 
only the petty-bourgeois and philistines, and not true critics of all our 
insufficiencies.241  
 
Komolov presented the November 5 meeting as a defining moment: the critique of 
Voronov and the Komsomol leadership was a disturbing inversion of existing hierarchies. 
While he claimed to understand what drove his bolder colleagues—calling them 
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progressive instead of “leftist”—he plainly considered them fundamentally impractical 
and misguided. Though Komolov evoked the Twentieth Congress in referencing the 
“remnants of the personality cult,” his assessment of recent trends as “philistine” drew on 
older discourses: in the Russian and Soviet context the struggle took on a particular 
meaning—avoiding philistinism was essential to escaping European degeneration. Before 
the October Revolution, the intelligentsia viewed itself as the social group most capable 
of staving off this process—cultural consolidation under the Bolsheviks changed the 
terms of debate. Though many of the revolutionaries themselves could have been 
considered “bourgeois,” they deployed the term to describe their intellectual opponents.  
Stalin himself had used this language of degeneration to describe dangers facing the Party 
in the late 1920s.242  Komolov positioned his colleagues as poised on the brink of 
degeneration if they continued to insist on criticism at the expense of other concerns.  
 It would be fundamentally inaccurate, however, to portray Komolov as an 
apologist for Stalinism. He openly disapproved of colleagues who advocated a return to 
past practices: 
I am deeply convinced that if we employ the method of turning the screws, 
which was compromised long ago, if we take this line as an order from the 
Party…we will be making the most terrible mistake. In my view such a 
rightist line is more terrible than any kind of leftist mistake…why?  The 
fact is that such an understandable line goes directly against the internal 
dialectic which the struggle with the remnants of the personality cult is 
undergoing. It is impossible now, after the Twentieth Congress of the 
party…to act with the old methods, to stigmatize, to condemn, to obstruct, 
to stick on labels.243 
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However afraid of “leftist” approaches Komolov might have been, to reject the Twentieth 
Congress was the more profound error, since it represented a clear rejection of historical 
logic and misinterpreted the Party’s position. Komolov’s main anxieties were about his 
colleagues and not about policy itself, as evidenced by his positive statements about the 
Party’s decisions. Though he referred to separate ideological “camps” at the newspaper, 
he distinguished this from Stalinism’s more brutal ascription processes—implicitly 
rejecting ideological purges or violence as “compromised.” Before the meeting ended, 
Komolov spoke again and clarified that he had not meant for the terms to apply to 
individuals—a gesture which points as much to the complex history of applying political 
labels in the Soviet context as it does to his personal repentance.244 
 There were a variety of responses to Komolov’s claims and anxieties, pointing to 
the diversity of opinion within the editorial board. Boris Pankin took issue with the right-
left characterization, claiming that, “if one drew a diagram…it would be an entire series 
of sharp turns, strange, incomprehensible jumps up and down, and the like. We are 
currently experiencing a downward fall.” In reference to critical materials, Pankin noted 
that at the previous meeting, Voronov seemingly supported a strident approach to social 
questions, but articles about students were withdrawn from the paper. Though Voronov 
was not editor in chief at this point—he assumed the position in 1959—his status as a 
senior editor apparently gave him some influence over publication. Pankin described 
himself as “personally bewildered” about which approach to take, arguing that “tactical 
shifts” about criticism should be comprehensible. “Today we speak about criticism, and 
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tomorrow we withdraw it without any explanation.” These inconsistencies were 
damaging the newspapers’ standing with Soviet youth. While there was certainly a “left 
or demagogical wave, on the other hand, there are people who want to think, to look at 
things independently.” Pankin believed that most readers were well intentioned and was 
afraid that if more conservative voices prevailed,  “good Soviet people” would be 
mischaracterized and criticism would disappear from the paper.245 In this view, criticism 
was fundamental to journalism’s public mission: in arguing for a clear policy on its use, 
he positioned himself as a defender of an intellectual and reflective Soviet public. At the 
same time, his statements about uncertainty demonstrate that even those to the “left” of 
Komolov were disoriented by recent developments.  
 While his more anxious colleagues supported class-based ascription, Pankin 
argued that an overly cautious approach to criticism would wrongly condemn the 
innocent readers who wished to understand their world. His arguments, then, link 
“critical literacy” to the production of an informed Soviet public. This connection 
between reading practices and citizenship, most clearly articulated in Jurgen Habermas’ 
concept of the public sphere, is a subject of significant debate in journalism studies, 
especially for political scientists. While some scholars embraced Habermas’s conception 
as important to evaluating journalistic success and failure, to others, as Barbie Zelizer 
writes in her overview of political science scholarship, “the abstract nature of Habermas’s 
views made them difficult to apply to journalism in concrete ways.” As part of this trend, 
communications scholar John Downing lamented that the imprecision of the terms “civil 
society” and  “public sphere” made them particularly difficult to apply to the 
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democratizing states of Eastern Europe, including post-Soviet Russia. Debate about these 
terms and their utility has long persisted among scholars of both imperial and Soviet 
Russia—in her study of the press in the late nineteenth century, Louis McReynolds 
argues that the new popular press did in fact contribute to the emergence of a civil society 
and public sphere.246 The difference between McReynolds’ subjects and my own is not 
only chronological but ideological—while Habermasian approaches to reading and public 
opinion assume the cultivation of democratic and liberal subjects, Pankin’s optimism 
about the Soviet public assumed the presence of informed socialist readers. As he sought 
to reassure his colleagues, Pankin presented criticism as a tool that cultivated Soviet 
values rather than endangering them.   
 Supporters of Pankin, such as Natalia Aleksandrova, searched for less 
inflammatory moral categories that would clarify the paper’s position:  
We should say very thoughtfully what all these clamorous phrases are 
worth, and on the other hand we should make note of a very important 
theme, answering people’s questions, what they are thinking about. Why 
should we be afraid of discussion?…we should have a very clear line, 
about which questions we should speak out about, where we should 
criticize students, where we should support them. In this respect Pankin 
was right.247 
 
Aleksandrova’s distinction between the “demagogue” and the “student” would become 
increasingly important as journalists turned their attention to university politics and the 
reception of literary texts.  
 The problem of criticism and moral evaluation became more acute during the 
remainder of the November 19 meeting, as the editorial board moved beyond initial 
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Komolov’s remarks into a heated discussion of student unrest at Moscow University. 
Vladimir Chachin felt that journalists were more than able to deal with the problem of 
students but that policy discussions were beyond their purview.  Journalists could reform 
youth because they had more practical experience than university professors. Real 
discussions of social issues and policy should come from the Central Committee, with 
journalists as committed assistants.248 Even as he defended professional experience over 
academic credentials, Chachin’s emphasis on the Central Committee as the proper site for 
discussion maintained existing hierarchies of authority. Gus’kov agreed with Komolov’s 
view of the newspaper’s “political line” and criticized his colleagues who blamed 
authorities when their work was not published. He believed that the problems with 
student life were explained by a lack of workers and collective farmers among the student 
body, and that there should be “more workers’ children, from production, and from the 
collective farms” in universities. “Еxplanatory work” would correct some problems, and 
it would not be inappropriate if some segment of the students withdrew from their 
studies.249  Gus’kov’s characterization of students relied on the central trait of the 
Marxist-Leninist state: its use of class categories to identify sources of reliability and 
danger. The suggestions here amount not only to “ascribing class” but also to a potential 
purge of the student body.250 Though newer scholarship points to a great diversity of 
student opinion about de-Stalinization, these views indicate that some KP journalists saw 
                                                
248 RGASPI 98-M, op. 1, d. 177, l. 65. 
249 RGASPI 98-M, op. 1, d. 177, ll. 71–4. 
250 On workers and ascription, see Fitzpatrick, “Ascribing Class”  
  126 
students as an “essentially oppositional group”—a viewpoint which would come to 
dominate the historical literature on higher education under Khrushchev.251  
 As they considered the ideological reliability of students, KP journalists also 
discussed recent proposals to restructure university admissions on a class basis, as a 
means to prevent future unorthodox behavior. KP sociologist Boris Grushin claimed that 
the majority of students “were very healthy” and stated that the proposals for a class-
based approach to student admissions would not be a “panacea for all ills.” Worker 
students would not hesitate to speak out against bad faculty members, and university 
problems pre-dated events in Hungary.252 Grushin placed student unrest in the context of 
existing social ills, rather than blaming foreign problems for infecting a previously 
healthy body politic. Endorsing Grushin’s less militant approach to student issues, Valerii 
Ganiushkin took a different approach, claiming that upheaval was national: “in the 
working class such processes of re-evaluation of values are happening, not with such 
deep feeling as in the subset of students we call demagogues. It seems to me, that we 
must write about and touch on these controversial things that are happening in the 
workers’ environment.”253 This corrective demonstrates a more nuanced understanding of 
Soviet society—while the dominant position of workers was unquestioned, Ganiushkin 
argued that the social changes after the Twentieth Congress were so far reaching that not 
even the most traditionally reliable group remained immune. Though it is unlikely 
Ganiushkin meant to evoke German philosopher Friederich Nietzsche, his values-based 
language presented Party policy itself as the source of uncertainty and unpredictability—
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a frank assessment that few other colleagues would make. In later years, the Party did 
introduce class-based admissions quotas at universities along with requiring Komsomol 
membership.254 
••• 
 Further discussions about youth reliability, at both the November 5 and November 
19 letuchki, were closely tied to reading practices and the reception of texts—specifically, 
the challenges posed by students’ reading of both Soviet ideology and Vladimir 
Dudintsev’s novel, Not by Bread Alone. The novel depicts the struggle of a young 
engineer, Lopatkin, who has invented a superior mining method but is opposed by older 
superiors and arrested under false pretenses. Though he becomes a successful inventor, 
the bureaucrats who oppose him remain in power and he resolves to fight them rather 
than pursue fame.255 In his case study of Novyi Mir, the journal where Dudintsev’s work 
was published, Denis Kozlov indicates that readers reacted strongly to the novel, either 
supporting it or seeing it as threatening to the revolutionary legacy. The novel served as a 
central cultural touchstone for discussions of reform and social ills, though readers 
continued to draw on Stalinist moral categories in their responses.  The majority viewed 
the novel in starkly positive or negative terms, “as a battle between mechanistically 
defined forces of good and evil.” Though Kozlov makes note of editorial debates about 
the novel at Izvestiia and Literaturnaia gazeta, KP is absent from his evaluation.256 In his 
investigation of Soviet universities, Benjamin Tromly points out that taking a position on 
Dudintsev’s text became an important political and philosophical act for students: “taking 
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the side of Dudintsev rhetorically was also a way to make a statement about oneself.” In 
their own stances on the novel, KP journalists betrayed their own anxieties not only about 
the novel but also their responsibility to mitigate any damage to the Soviet body politic 
that resulted from it.257 
 On November 5, the same meeting that involved heated discussion of Hungary, a 
journalist named Sokolov admitted that the art and literature department had failed to 
appreciate the publication of the novel as a cultural event, and,  “It was now obvious that 
“we should come out with a publisistika article on the thoughts that are lavishly laid out 
in this novel.” He argued that the newspaper leadership had hesitated to do this, singling 
out Goriunov and Adzhubei. Only an article in Trud, VsTSPS newspaper, had motivated 
them to take a more active stance. This case, he argued, was a clear cut sign of KP  
“refusing a conversation on a controversial subject…”258 In this version of events, 
Adzhubei and Goriunov failed to display real leadership, exercising the “internal 
censorship” Boris Nankin mentioned during his criticisms of Voronov. The omission is 
particularly interesting given that Dudintsev had previously been a correspondent for the 
paper, where he had reported on scientific subjects similar to Lopatkin’s exploits.259 As 
discussion of the novel occupied more time at both editorial board and Party meetings, 
several journalists reflected on this past association, in ways that demonstrate the fraught 
nature of the novel’s reception in light of the Hungarian crisis.  
 The November 19 letuchka whеre Komolov vented his feelings about criticism 
also featured intense discussion of Not By Bread Alone. Komolov was concerned that 
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when it came to the novel or “other topics which worry students, it is possible that we 
will not be up to this task. This is a real danger.” Describing a recent discussion at 
MGU’s department of Marxism-Leninism which had gone awry, he argued that debate 
provoked disorder because  “we for many years have not been taught to really defend the 
party line.” If there were no “discussion clubs” or other forms, journalists courted the 
larger risk that “these demagogues will become heroes of the leftist crowd.” 
Condemnation of the unhealthy would ideally come from the public rather than the 
newspaper or the Party. Komolov felt that closer collaboration, including with the 
Komsomol Central Committee, would result in a series of “biting and important 
pieces.”260 Komolov’s sense that a proper response to Not By Bread Alone was an 
important test for his colleagues reflects not only longstanding Russian and Soviet views 
about the value of literature but also the novel’s fraught political fate in the autumn of 
1956, as discussed in detail in Vladislav Zubok’s study of the postwar intelligentsia. 
Konstantin Simonov, one of Dudintsev’s early champions, was forced to withdraw his 
support for the text when it became apparent it was too controversial in light of 
Hungarian events. Student arrests and expulsions would follow throughout November 
and December of 1956.261 As later discussions will show, Komolov’s colleagues shared 
his concern about the text’s destabilizing power.  
 Though he noted that “contradictions” would arise in the aftermath of the 
Twentieth Congress, Kotenko was still alarmed by recent social developments. His 
remarks at the November 20 meeting centered around dangerous political opinions that 
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were voiced during discussions of Dudintsev’s novel. He claimed that at one recent 
event, a young man had cited Lenin’s claims that the dictatorship of the proletariat was an 
evolving phenomenon and that recent events showed it was time for political change. 
Kotenko considered this “an attack on the very foundations of the revolution.”  In 
explaining these phenomena, Kotenko blamed “influence from abroad,” and directly 
accused Grushin of ignoring this.  For all his doubts about students, Kotenko showed 
great sympathy for “our poor acquaintance, who is very upset and suffers most of all,” 
though he considered the novel as original less for its literary achievements and more for 
its “bravery in phrasing the question.” He felt that the excessive focus on Dudintsev “cast 
aside” the similar efforts of writers like Ovechkin and Tendriakov.262 Where the less 
alarmist members of the editorial board argued that the tensions in Soviet society were of 
long duration, others fell back on more prevalent traditions of xenophobia. 
 What is striking about this discussion of Dudintsev is the lack of attention to the 
plot, themes, or characters—while it is difficult to imagine (if equally difficult to prove) 
that none of those present at the meeting had read the novel, it is clear from this 
discussion that its content was now almost irrelevant in light of the controversy. The 
greater concern, for Kotenko and others, was not Dudintsev personally, or even the value 
of his text—but rather that the novel somehow created space for broader critique of the 
Soviet project. Kotenko even attempted to argue that the novel was nothing remarkable 
and that Dudintsev’s work should be considered in comparison to earlier efforts—as if to 
deprive the novel of any real analytical power, however strongly some members of 
society had reacted to it. Kotenko’s claims demonstrate that even as Soviet journalists 
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shaped public culture, they were also bound by its enduring tropes and categories: his 
fears of foreign contamination drew on much older political traditions, as Komolov had 
in invoking “right” and “left” factions at the paper. Though both journalists were striving 
to contribute to an invigorated Soviet project, they relied on stark moral categories, much 
like the novel’s other readers.263 Despite his xenophobia, Kotenko even referred to 
Dudintsev with sympathy and also called him “brave,” even as he sought to downplay his 
novel’s significance. Dudintsev’s work was inspired by real events, and Kotenko’s 
description of him was the same epithet ascribed to all journalists who campaigned for 
social reform in the face of official opposition. Kotenko reserved his sharpest criticism 
for the novel’s readers, showing some sympathy for the author and acknowledging that 
he possessed an important professional quality. This relatively measured approach to both 
the author and novel is something of a departure, perhaps due to Dudintsev’s history at 
the paper.  
 Voronov’s concluding remarks represented not only his views on what to do 
about the perceived crisis among Soviet students but also the problems of criticism and 
Dudintsev’s novel—demonstrating that all of these issues were related to the larger 
problem of how to make sense of the new politics. Voronov argued for a middle ground 
towards students, insisting that while sharp criticism of some views was necessary, it was 
also important to engage in “patient explanations.” Voronov argued that the problems in 
higher education could be explained both by class background and also а generally 
diminished Party presence.  In closing, Voronov noted that not all the discussions of Not 
By Bread Alone were adequate ones—he considered it “very telling” that Dudintsev had 
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personally appealed to the Komsomol, asking him to “speak out in KP against his ‘so 
called defenders.’” Voronov’s closing remarks here demonstrate a consistent 
unwillingness to commit to one camp or the other inside the editorial board, though he 
would later take sharply critical stances at great personal cost during his tenure as editor-
in-chief. His reliance on class-based explanations for unrest glossed over the possibility 
that official policy had provoked dissatisfaction among young people.264 Voronov’s 
assessment of Dudintsev’s other supporters clearly reflects the unpopularity of 
liberalization and criticism at that particular moment—problems that would only 
intensify in the months to come, as the Party and the Komsomol responded not only to 
the Hungarian events but also to a controversial article by Boris Pankin on youth leisure 
issues.  
••• 
 The Komsomol Central Committee, as one of KP’s major supervisory bodies, 
presented its own views on the Hungarian events and students’ ideological health. Many 
of the concerns raised in this November 1956 report would take on new urgency in the 
months to come, as the paper continued to take controversial stances. The TsKVLKSM 
rebuked KP for failing to publish recent Party decrees on the struggle with bureaucratism. 
KP’s work on the personality cult was another major concern, especially among Soviet 
youth: 
Among some young people, especially students, an incorrect opinion is 
developing. As though the Party and the Central Committee undertook 
nothing in this policy, and if they are undertaking them now, this is the 
result of pressure from below or from outside—this last view has in mind 
the events in Hungary and Poland. There is an attempt among youth to 
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exaggerate the significance of the events in Poland…a view toward 
following their example in some matters.265  
 
This foreign focus was “muffling” the extent of Soviet efforts to improve society. 
According to the Central Committee, these disturbing tendencies would not exist if KP 
had “in a timely manner conducted active propagandizing of the Twentieth Congress’ 
decisions…not remaining silent, but showing how fruitfully the decisions of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union аre developing the recovery of social life in our 
country.”266 If Soviet youth found the official approach to de-Stalinization unsatisfactory, 
it was journalists’ responsibility to correct—prescriptions that present the newspaper as a 
tool for presenting policy as much as a means for shaping personhood. As some KP 
journalists had, the Komsomol Central Committee associated foreign events with de-
Stalinization’s domestic reception. If the newspaper did not educate audiences correctly, 
foreign revolutions might spread and damage the reform project, especially since young 
people were already undervaluing the Party’s accomplishments in this area. Though the 
portrayal of the Party as “reactive” on questions of reform may well have been more 
accurate, officials preferred to emphasize their own leadership of historical forces.  
 Boris Pankin’s article, “How the Torch Was Snuffed Out,” about a youth club in 
the city of Kaluga, was considered even by its champions to be a departure from 
journalism tradition, and its publication resulted in serious criticism from the Komsomol. 
The story proves to reveal much about the political reception of professional values as the 
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nature of criticism under Khrushchev.267 Pankin was eventually to become KP’s editor 
and an active figure in the Journalists’ Union, but at the time of his article, he was a 
recent university graduate. His story concerned a youth club in the district of Kaluga, 
about a hundred miles southwest of Moscow. Inspired by movements in other major 
cities to improve leisure conditions, the local Kaluga newspaper had encouraged 
Komsomol members to start a youth club. When local bureaucrats were slow to respond, 
young people seized the opportunity and assumed that the authorities had “trust” in them.  
Pankin interviewed a sympathetic young worker, who studied in the evenings and was 
interested in the outdoors. He had seen a poster promoting the new Kaluga Torch youth 
club, and expressed confidence that boxing training would make him well able to cope 
with any “hooligans” who might attend. Despite the obvious need for youth 
entertainment, the local Komsomol had shut down the club, citing “too much 
independence” on the part of the club’s founders. Аs it turned out, the Komsomol 
authorities had merely been waiting for the Kaluga obkom to express disapproval of the 
enterprise. Though he had met none of the participants, party secretary Pavlov 
characterized the club as a site for “bad influence.” Pankin accused the local authorities 
of “cowardice.” Pankin’s story pitted young heroes who were eager to improve their 
community against local authorities who ignored their positive effects out of a reflexive 
fear of change—a more emotionally appealing story than the earlier critical piece about 
Luzhniki. 
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 Pankin described his original inspiration for the story in his memoirs. He had 
acted on reports from future poet and bard-musician Bulat Okudzhava, who was working 
as a schoolteacher in Kaluga. In the story’s original version, Pankin had followed 
standard protocol and not named the officials implicated in the club’s closure. It was 
more common to use coded phrasing, such as “senior comrades,” or to use names but not 
rank—this was done to avoid tension between the Party and the Komsomol, which 
Pankin described as “the worst sin on earth.”  This “sin” was magnified in Pankin’s case, 
since his story involved the head of an oblast’ party in a major urban center.  When 
Goriunov told him to “call them all by their names” Pankin was in shock, since he had 
expected the story to remain unpublished.268 Pankin’s comments further illustrate KP’s 
delicate political position—its responsibility to defend youth interests without 
antagonizing authorities, especially Party officials. Pankin reflected on the Khrushchev 
era as a whole as he recalled the article’s reception: great potential for social tumult was 
well underway before 1956 and only intensified when Khrushchev personally embraced a 
reform agenda. Invoking Ehrenburg’s classic “Thaw” metaphor, Pankin described 
recurring “freezes” throughout the period and connected the metaphor to a popular 
Russian folktale when he called the Kaluga authorities “Father Frosts” (dedy morozy). 
Pankin both embraced the Thaw metaphor and noted its limitations; his description of the 
Kaluga crisis emphasized the importance of local recalcitrance despite Khrushchev’s 
personal enthusiasms.269   
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 Pankin’s piece was generally well-received by colleagues. At the December 17 
letuchka, critic Natella Lordkipanidze of the literature department described it as some of 
the weeks’ best material because Pankin had done more to “work out everything 
completely and tell the reader about everything. Sometimes it happens that a person goes 
to the localities, sees some kind of defect, everything is clear to him, but when he sits 
down with his pen, he doesn’t have the strength to describe things, the ability to think and 
to rethink, the author doesn’t do this.” Pankin’s piece was the only one to criticize the 
local party secretary and “explain what the problem is, to put a dot on the ‘i.’”270 Pankin 
was singled out not only for his investigative ability but also for thoroughness and critical 
risk taking, though he had done so only with Goriunov’s support. Approval of the article 
was not limited to the letuchka: the editorial board later formally recognized the work as 
among the best published that month.271   
••• 
 Literary controversies and the Hungarian crisis were major discussion topics at 
KP Party meetings, with members expressing more intense fears of foreign influence and 
disdain for intellectuals. Even as they affirmed Party policy, KP journalists remained 
frustrated about their inability to maintain a clear understanding of domestic and 
international events. Though these gatherings took place after the publication of Pankin’s 
article—which appeared on December 9—discussions of criticism did not mention it 
specifically, as official censure from the Komsomol did not occur until January. The 
general tone of these events, however, points to increasing anxiety about the proper place 
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of criticism and an intensified ideological rigidity. On December 16, 1956, Ekaterina 
Shatskaia delivered the review report (otchetnyi doklad) and focused on the “ideological 
struggle,” both the particular challenges in Hungary and “slander” in the foreign press in 
the aftermath of the Soviet invasion. Along with these foreign challenges, Shatskaia was 
also concerned about the consequences of domestic de-Stalinization. Letters continued to 
come in about the nature of the personality cult, and the policy needed more explanation: 
“the widely used term ‘Stalinism’ in the West, is an effort to present the personality cult 
as the outgrowth of an entire system.” While the party had “bravely” introduced the issue 
of the personality cult, well aware that ideological enemies would attempt to exploit it, 
further attacks could not continue.272 Shatskaia raised practical concerns as well. Travel 
demands on senior journalists were detrimental to newspaper content, since people like 
Voronov and Shatunovskii had less time to address “internal themes.”273 As the creative 
union would, KP journalists clearly struggled to balance domestic audience needs with 
the pressures of superpower status and cultural diplomacy. Controlling the concept of 
“Stalinism” highlights the central tension of Khrushchev’s reform agenda: how to 
condemn Stalin’s greatest excesses while maintaining the Soviet system’s overall 
integrity.  
 In his response to Shatskaia’s report, Goriunov argued that there was a “notable 
liveliness” in creative materials due to Party policies that prompted a “critical re-
evaluation of many premises.” But this optimism was limited, since capitalist forces were 
“organizing counter-revolutionary declarations and attacks on socialist countries.” 
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Intellectuals such as Konstantin Simonov, Evgenii Evtushenko, and Ol’ga Bergolt’ts 
were said to have  “caught onto the [anti-Soviet] mood of the West.  
In a lengthier discussion of Dudintsev’s novel, Goriunov declared: 
To simply reject it outright is impossible. But the author clearly 
оverreached. His good hero is too isolated. Drozdov and others are 
depicted in a lively way, the positive is depicted weakly. We cannot look 
at this novel and evaluate it separately from the political situation. Now 
Dudintsev’s novel has become a banner in the hands of demagogues and 
nihilists…criticism must strengthen us, and not weaken us.274 
 
Goriunov connected domestic literary politics and imperial governance struggles, while 
the evaluation of Dudintsev’s novel presented Lopatkin as a positive hero who lacked 
social support and thus was overshadowed by Drozdov. The writer Konstantin 
Paustovskii had reached a similar conclusion earlier in the fall: Dudintsev’s great success 
was forcing his audience to confront that the Soviet Union “had many Drozdovs.” Other 
analyses point out that while the novel follows much of socialist realism’s genre 
conventions, Lopatkin was guided more by individual mentors than the Party.275  
 In his reaction to Goriunov’s analysis at the December 16 Party meeting, foreign 
correspondent Kamil’ Devet’iarov pointed out the novel’s shifting reception: at earlier 
editorial meetings and planning sessions, Goriunov had “generally highly valued 
Dudintsev’s novel.” According to the stenographic record, Goriunov interrupted to deny 
this but said nothing else. Devet’iarov averred that though he found uses of the novel by 
“demagogues” distressing “as a patriot and as a Communist,” he regarded Dudintsev as a 
victim of bad timing, declaring, “the novel has not a few literary qualities, but the tragedy 
of the author and his work is that in the current circumstances the novel does not work to 
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our advantage. I think that if Dudintsev’s work had appeared at another time, for 
example, a little earlier, it would have been received differently.”276 Devet’iarov’s 
remarks point to the complexity of Goriunov’s position as editor and his responsibility to 
track political paradigm shifts—though he was now obligated to condemn Dudintsev, he 
had previously shown enthusiasm about the work. Though he defended his own 
ideological credentials, Deviat’iarov offered a careful defense of the text: it was 
dangerous only when juxtaposed with recent external events, rather than on its own 
terms.  
 The December 16 meeting eventually featured more substantive critiques of KP 
as a organization: Khomus’kov declared that keeping up with reader letters left the staff 
“оverburdened” and their inability to pay proper attention to correspondence might result 
in “readers losing trust in the newspaper.” Literary secretary Sof’ia Finger claimed that 
journalists were poorly informed about events abroad, a state of affairs Goriunov had 
done little to remedy since he had not spoken enough about his recent trip to Poland. 
While the editorial board was supposed to be a “creative organization,” it was starting to 
resemble “an office.” Starodub felt strongly that it was “not acceptable for a journalist to 
turn into a bureaucrat, who should wait out the clock” (otsizhivat’ ot sikh do sikh). In 
support of these assertions, Allan Starodub argued that, “journalists should be well 
informed, but we know everything based on the newspapers.” The local raikom only 
invited journalists to meetings sporadically, rather than according to clearly discernible 
procedures.277 Starodub and Finger’s arguments reinforce the importance of knowledge 
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and information to journalists’ self-concept: their own leaders and Party institutions had 
failed them in this regard, which resulted in feelings of powerlessness.  At the same time, 
in detailing the large number of tasks journalists were expected to perform, Khomus’kov 
and Finger linked their busy schedules to the health of society and, presumably, to the 
health of a profession, since bureaucracy endangered the vitality key to journalistic work.  
 Aleksei Adzhubei acknowledged that recent events had been  “a serious trial for 
workers on the ideological front.” Adzhubei had recently returned from Australia and 
contributed further to the xenophobic atmosphere by describing enhanced anti-Soviet 
activity there.  Adzhubei underscored the value of “timeliness” (operativnosti), 
expressing concern that “we frequently delay counterpropaganda.” Despite the Marxist-
Leninist basis of Soviet journalism, bourgeois journalists were frequently more effective. 
Adzhubei called for greater student participation in the newspaper, so that their 
ideological guidance could be more closely supervised.278 Adzhubei’s language here was 
stridently polarized, presenting the outside world as continually prepared to attack the 
Soviet Union. His comments about timeliness, like those at the November 5 letuchka, 
demonstrate the increased political weight of this particular newsroom value during 
political crises.279 
 The Party meeting’s closing resolutions affirmed the close links between domestic 
professionalism and international events. The problems in literature and art were 
remarked upon at some length, particularly the “extreme polemics” that suggested that 
real literature had ceased to flourish in the 1930s, which cast the entirety of socialist 
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realist doctrine into doubt. The literature and art department had remained “mute” on 
these matters. Though a recent and problematic issue of Novyi Mir had received some 
attention, efforts needed to be more consistent. The newspaper had failed to lead a 
significant discussion about Dudintsev’s novel, despite the fact that “discussions are 
happening in factories and student auditoriums, conversations, and we are not helping 
youth to correctly understand this work.” The student department had failed to support 
these young people in their demands for healthy educational reform, and “demagogues” 
were insufficiently criticized.280 The references to Novyi Mir underscore the journal’s 
growing significance and its identification with controversies. Where KP journalists had 
heatedly debated the distinctions between “demagogues” and healthy young people in the 
letuchki, the Party meeting treated these terms as fixed and knowable categories.   
 At the last party meeting of 1956, held on December 25, members discussed a 
recent letter from the Central Committee entitled, “On The Strengthening of Party 
Organizations Among the Masses And the Crossing Incursions of Anti-Soviet Enemy 
Elements.” The letter, essentially the Presidium’s official response to the Hungarian 
events, described the need for intensified Party activity in response to recent foreign 
events and ongoing ideological attacks against the Soviet Union and the need to defend 
Socialist Realism.281 The letter’s militant tone was approved and embraced by several 
Party members at KP’s meeting, prompting Tovia Karel’shteina to remember the 
newspaper’s struggles against Trotskyites in the 1930s. She saw the most recent Central 
Committee letter as an important educational opportunity for the younger generation, 
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unfamiliar with these struggles and those with the kulaks and SRs. Adzhubei discussed 
his recent meeting with students at the Moscow Energy Institute, who had expressed 
pride in Soviet performance at the Melbourne Olympics. Referring to a recent incident in 
which a letter from these students had found its way to the BBC and claiming that 
students did not understand the grave mistake this represented, Adzhubei reminded his 
colleagues of the need to conduct more “upbringing” among youth. “It is necessary to 
show in the newspaper, how to unmask scoundrels, how to fight them.”282 Where Party 
meetings earlier in the year had celebrated the achievements of the Twentieth Congress, 
the December meeting featured Stalinist tropes and increased xenophobia. 
Karel’shteina’s references to the 1930s point to the endurance of Stalinist political 
culture, as do Adzhubei’s use of a “mask” metaphor.283 Proper evaluation of the 
Hungarian events, then, required some embrace of the past—especially the search for 
hidden enemies. The search for the positive hero that spring had been focused on finding 
and celebrating the best in Soviet society. Now, with mounting fears of foreign and 
domestic unrest, heroism meant an unflinching willingness to purge the body politic. 
Adzhubei’s vision of a re-educated youth emphasized hostility to foreign influence as 
part of socialist personhood, where Rusakova had focused on the cultivation of domestic 
virtues in her profile of the young poet Sergei. As we will see in chapter five, the 
eradication of dangerous trends and cultivation of a new, healthier vision of the Soviet 
self was an important part of journalism’s public mission, one which Adzhubei embraced 
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with some enthusiasm. His harsher tone here only underscores the deep sense of crisis as 
KP journalists sought to make sense of recent upheavals.  
 Garbuzov’s response to the letter returned to the problem of timely information 
and access that had featured so prominently during the Hungarian crisis. In order to 
conduct effective counterpropaganda, journalists needed current access to “white TASS” 
bulletins—news items reserved for senior officials and privileged elites. Garbuzov was 
careful to claim that, “we need to know about dangerous utterances not because they are 
interesting for us, like Philistines, but in order to provide resistance, refutation.” Kotenko 
felt KP journalists needed to make more of an effort to “quote demagogues…I am of 
course not talking about counterrevolutionary sayings,” and to take a more active role in 
debates, rather than merely evaluating phenomena.284 What is most notable here is the 
cautious approach to unorthodox information sources, both foreign and domestic—both 
men claimed that professional duty obligated them to access and even recapitulate 
otherwise unacceptable ideas. Il’ia Shatunovskii’s reading of the letter tied its lessons to 
the problem of criticism, arguing that with “unqualified” efforts in this area, “we give 
fodder to enemies and to demagogues.” He urged a critical stance toward those who 
“bowed and scraped before the West” and criticized articles which took the “tourists’ 
gaze” rather than more serious critical views of foreign cultures, evoking the anti-
Westernism of the Zhdanovschina.285 Attacks on criticism and xenophobia were mutually 
reinforcing tendencies, as they had been during the November debates about criticism 
and the Hungarian crisis.  
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 For his part, editor-in-chief Goriunov argued that the problem with 
counterpropaganda was not so much informational access as a tendency toward 
“footdragging…or a lack of political acuity,” and called for a return of the positive hero. 
He defended an ideological approach to information, claiming, “we must not give way to 
facts…we often look at facts from a small point of view, and not from the “state point of 
view.” Small deficiencies should not prevent journalists from producing positive 
material.286 These prescriptions strongly evoke the dialectics of the master plot. Minor 
insufficiencies could no longer be allowed to obscure a focus on the radiant future that 
lay within all aspects of Soviet reality. Facticity as a journalistic value—so important in a 
defense of criticism—was best subordinated to political and ideological concerns. This 
shift, while clearly attributable to international events, was likely related to the fallout 
from Pankin’s article as well.  
••• 
 Extensive negative official responses to the “Torch” article forced KP journalists 
to re-evaluate their approach to tendentious political issues, demonstrating the ongoing 
consequences of earlier upheavals. At a January 1957 letuchka, Goriunov described sharp 
critiques of Pankin’s work and the paper as a whole, comments that were “sufficiently 
sharp…that recently the newspaper writes about the negative more clearly than about the 
positive.” Plenum records indicate that the article about Kabanov’s children, “Once More 
on Mold,” was also mentioned. The newspaper was further criticized for not taking an 
“offensive position” toward the capitalist world and neglecting the efforts to improve 
popular living standards after the Twentieth Congress. KP continually failed to 
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sufficiently celebrate the revolutionary past, which was critical if young people were to 
properly contextualize the Soviet Union’s accomplishments.287  In improperly balancing 
positivity and criticism, KP had failed its young audience. The paper was also criticized 
for its foreign content, and Goriunov declared, “It seems to me that this reproach is fair, 
because often empty and thoughtless materials about foreign life appear. In conjunction 
with the growth of Soviet tourism, ‘fluff articles’ lacking a class-based approach have 
appeared.” 288 In this argument, the presence of actual foreigners somehow obstructed the 
proper ideological evaluation of the outside world.  
 Pankin’s article was singled out for special criticism. In the official view, the 
editorial board had “poured oil with this article, at a time when in many institutions of 
higher learning (vuzakh), demagogues were speaking out. We should ponder this. But the 
material does not strike me as misguided (oshibochnim). But I understand comrades who 
are obligated to inform about the circumstances in which one or another critical item is 
published.”289 The use of “demagoguery” effectively conveys the extent of professional 
failure: rather than enlightening or informing youth, Pankin had supported young 
deviants and their destructive impulses. While he acknowledged the views of his 
ideological superiors, Goriunov did not repudiate the decision to publish.  This 
conciliatory note was not his last word on the matter; he considered it “nonsense” for 
people to argue that criticism had degenerated into “carping.” He further defended 
journalism’s social mission, declaring, “newspapers have always had the obligation to 
reveal problems and help to correct them. But the fact that there is such boasting, 
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superficial criticism, ending in a brawl, it’s true that we must dispense with this.”290  
Goriunov clearly maintained a steadfast belief in criticism as a journalistic value, even at 
a time that required admitting fault and the value of balance. Аt a letuchka in the spring 
of 1957, Goriunov reiterated that plenum participants had “unfairly” criticized the article, 
particularly in claiming that the newspaper had “paid tribute to sensationalism.” The 
Kaluga authorities had “allowed overcaution…and it was necessary to correct this.”291 
The language here reinforces the extent of Pankin’s—and Goriunov’s—transgression: 
sensationalism was a frequent critique of “bourgeois” journalism, suggesting Pankin had 
followed foreign rather than Soviet values. 
 Pankin’s article remained a subject of controversy in later months. On March 9, 
1957, Kaluga Komsomol secretary, O. Sazonova, wrote to Komsomol All-Union 
Secretary Aleksandr Shelepin to complain that some of Pankin’s assertions “are incorrect 
and do not reflect reality.” In particular, Pankin mischaracterized the attitude toward the 
club as “negative,” and his critique of the work methods in Kaluga was unfair. Even 
worse, though steps had been taken to correct matters, KP had not reported on them, 
despite urgings at the recent Komsomol plenum. A recent article revisiting the issue listed 
only recent measures, which the Kaluga authorities viewed as an effort to “show the 
obkom and the gorkom in an incorrect light,” an assertion readers in Kaluga ostensibly 
supported. Goriunov had clearly failed to take into account the criticisms from the 
Komsomol plenum. As for Pankin, while he had “objectively described the errors” 
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involved, he privileged the perspective of the club’s “initiators.”292 While Kaluga leaders 
were forced to admit their initial error, Pankin could still be accused of exaggeration. 
While Sazonova did not challenge the initial assessment, she argued that the follow-up 
had distorted matters by ignoring recent developments.293 Pankin had further disregarded 
traditional hierarchies of authority and reliability, in trusting the youths of Kaluga more 
than Party and Komsomol officials. Pankin’s failures related to a journalistic value that 
was frequently at issue during 1956. As we saw earlier, Adzhubei’s concern about 
timeliness was expressed in terms of competitiveness with foreign media. In Pankin’s 
case, he had equal responsibility to closely monitor the domestic situation in Kaluga to 
ensure his reporting remained accurate.  
 A TsKVLKSM memo from May of 1957 showcased KP’s diminished status in 
the eyes of Komsomol officials after the Kaluga controversy. While criticism was 
obviously important, since “youth expect help from their newspaper…in their struggle 
with all that impedes their normal work and living,” an excess of criticism could “lead the 
reader to incorrect conclusions.” In the last four months of 1956, the newspaper had 
written twice as much material about negative incidents as about positive achievements. 
Citing recent foreign interest in stiliagi including their being christened “Russian teddy 
boys,” the same Komsomol report accused the newspaper of encouraging “slander of 
Soviet youth” by publishing too many critical materials.294 The report’s timing, together 
with the previous controversies, suggests the increased importance of any imbalance 
between celebratory and critical material after the troubling events in Eastern Europe. 
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The attention to “style-chasing” in the foreign press is well known to historians of youth 
culture, as is its official condemnation as a sign of moral decay and masculinity in 
crisis.295 Journalists’ increased negative focus had not only damaged Soviet youth but 
also focused international attention on a deviant minority rather than successful 
achievements.   
 However much KP journalists prized criticism, their Komsomol media managers 
clearly felt journalists had failed in their political duty to guide readers. The mention of 
stiliagi reveals an acute sensitivity to the Soviet Union’s foreign standing. While 
international responsibilities could stimulate institutional restructuring—as in the creation 
of the Journalists’ Union—foreign policy setbacks could also curtail domestic journalism 
efforts. Adzhubei succeeded Goriunov as editor-in-chief only months after the Pankin 
controversy. Though he is closely associated with journalistic innovation at Izvestiia, his 
colleagues lamented the absence of strident critique during his editorship.296 The Kaluga 
episode was clearly a setback, though nothing like a “re-Stalinization” of the paper: 
Pankin was not fired or disciplined, while Goriunov retained his senior posts in the 
Journalists’ Union and was promoted to TASS director not long after.  
••• 
 Examining 1956 through KP letuchki and party gatherings demonstrates that de-
Stalinization was an interpretive crisis for journalists as they sought to communicate with 
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and shape the Soviet public. KP journalists were forced to confront not only the reception 
of political texts, like Khrushchev’s denunciation of the personality cults, but also the 
reception of their own work, with its increasingly critical stance toward corruption and 
bureaucracy. Discussions of criticism and the Hungarian events demonstrate how much 
Soviet journalists prized factual accuracy and “bravery” in the face of official resistance. 
Conveying and controlling information was now more challenging, as KP journalists 
confronted both domestic censorship and increased broadcasting from foreign news 
agencies. The Komolov episode serves as a crucial reminder of the diverse array of 
possible responses to reform.297  
 Though they worked in particularly tense political circumstances—especially as 
the uprising in Hungary unfolded—KP journalists’ principal objectives and goals overlap 
somewhat with our understanding of journalism culture in other contexts, including 
Western democracies. KP journalists had essential goals familiar from communications 
scholarship on newsmaking and newsrooms: they saw themselves as dedicated 
investigators with a clear social mission.298 This comparison of KP to other news cultures 
is not meant to elide or obscure a fundamental distinction: KP journalists’ interest in the 
cultivation of an informed socialist public rather than a liberal one. Rusakova’s profile of 
Sergei Chekmarev brings this home—though the young man was held up as an 
exemplary individual, his dedication was meant to inspire a wider audience to work for 
the good of a collective. More critical pieces, like those attacking bureaucrats, were 
designed to bring about a better future by correcting existing deficits. Though there was 
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essential agreement about journalists’ commitment to a socialist utopia, de-Stalinization 
gave rise to increasing debates about how to achieve it: through strident criticism, as 
Pankin and Goriunov sometimes advocated, or through the cautionary approach of 
Komolov and his supporters. The idea of the newsroom as a source of “social control” is 
especially useful here. Sociologists argue that journalists form their behaviors based on 
approval from colleagues or superiors at least as much as from their belief in abstract 
values like objectivity. The role of peer influence was particularly disturbing to Komolov 
and his supporters as they felt the editorial board was drifting from Party guidance.299 
 At the same time, the ultimate resolution to this issue points to another difference 
between Soviet journalists and their Western counterparts—there were more 
opportunities for proponents of more relaxed newsroom values to be disciplined, given 
the close relationship between KP and the Komsomol. Though I have repeatedly 
emphasized the extent to which journalists felt some inferiority vis-à-vis writers, they 
were active participants in literary controversies, particularly the uproar after Novyi Mir’s 
publication of Not By Bread Alone. Journalists who took critical positions or championed 
reform could find support from colleagues at letuchki, even at moments of increased 
anxiety. This was in some contrast to the more procedurally rigid atmosphere of Party 
meetings.300 At the same time, the response to Pankin’s article reinforces that journalism 
was more legible to authority figures than other kinds of creative work, which, combined 
with its political importance, made political intervention more likely.301 As others have 
noted, while Adzhubei oversaw the paper’s coverage 1957 World Youth Festival, his 
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editorship was characterized by a more cautious approach to criticism than Goriunov had 
taken.302 The consequences of the Kaluga Torch article, like the reception of Not By 
Bread Alone, demonstrate the constant interactions between foreign and domestic 
politics. 
 KP’s relationship to the Journalists’ Union is a more central theme in later 
chapters, though the editorial board did respond to aspects of the conscious 
professionalization process. Iurii Voronov’s editorship featured the only significant 
mention of the creative union during a letuchka: the organization’s formation was 
heralded as nationally significant, and the weekly critic quoted Khrushchev’s 
characterization of journalists as “the party’s lieutenants.”303  KP would undertake more 
critical campaigns under Voronov, with more serious consequences. The continually 
fraught relationship between newsroom values and ideological goals proves that while 
Soviet journalists were “conscious professionals,” they were as vulnerable as other 
intellectuals to political interventions and sudden paradigm shifts.  
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Chapter 3 
The Party’s Lieutenants: The Public Establishment of the Journalists’ Union 
  
 1959 marked a turning point in the Journalists’ Union’s development: all local 
chapters held their first congresses in February and March, and the first all-USSR 
Congress was held that November: this marked the achievement of the Orgburo’s initial 
mandate—congress preparation specifically involved finalizing the Journalists’ Union’s 
structure. This was also the concluding stage of the bylaws debate, as the final version 
was ratified at the end of the congress. This is not to suggest, however, that any of the 
inaugural events resulted in a consensus on all of the issues raised in earlier debates: 
differing visions of the organization were readily apparent, at both the Moscow oblast’ 
conference and the all-USSR one which followed it. The main unresolved issues were 
still those of membership and social standing, whether the Journalists’ Union’s own 
standards were sufficiently high and would result in equal professional status with 
writers. The public gatherings were, in part, a celebration of professionalization. But the 
celebration was afflicted with a central tension: journalists viewed their creative union as 
an achievement, yet continually expressed doubts as to whether the organization was 
sufficiently exclusive in its membership standards. Though they had the same ideological 
and political responsibilities as their central newspaper counterparts, oblast’ journalists 
were less celebratory and more critical about the advent of the new organization. In the 
analysis that follows, I describe the main issues at both the all-Union Congress and the 
oblast’ conference, and their implications for the professionalization project. This 
meeting suggests that rank-and-file journalists had yet to embrace the organization and 
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that material concerns were a major basis for their dissatisfaction with it. The two 
gatherings were distinct in scale as well as in tone: local journalists continued to focus on 
what the Journalists’ Union should do for them, while the all-USSR Congress was a 
larger scale elaboration of journalists’ global and domestic responsibilities. Though both 
meetings acknowledged the organization’s remaining imperfections, the inaugural 
Congress was more focused on an idealized vision of journalism and the Soviet reading 
public.  
 While the oblast’ conference, like much of the bylaws commentary, focused on 
the Journalists’ Union as a domestic body, the all-USSR Congress in Moscow celebrated 
Soviet superpower status as well. The superiority of socialist journalism to its 
“bourgeois” variant was a central theme there, along with Khrushchev’s foreign policy 
and his recent successful trip to the United States. Speeches from senior journalists, 
together with demographic data, highlight one of the Journalists’ Union’s distinguishing 
features: the active role of senior Communist Party members in the organization’s 
hierarchy, and the high percentage of party members in the organization as a whole. 
Khrushchev himself spoke at a reception for congress participants in the Kremlin, 
acknowledging the dual mandate of the organization and journalism’s essential 
contribution to the party’s work. His participation, and that of other senior media 
managers, underscores the close relationship between the creative union and political 
leaders, further complicating any attempt to discuss journalists as independent from the 
Party.  
 The more celebratory aspects of the all-USSR Congress included a keen 
awareness of the Soviet Union’s progress since the revolutionary period: the 
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organization’s leaders readily acknowledged the ways in which Soviet newspapers and 
their readers had evolved. Part of public professionalization was an explicit 
acknowledgement that “mass journalism” was the product of another era. The popularity 
of new genres, and the frequent references to a new “contemporary reader” suggest that 
one of the positive effects of articulating a new professional identity for journalists was to 
meet the challenges of a more literate and sophisticated public, and perhaps to bring that 
public into being. The practical realities of reaching an audience had changed from the 
Stalin era, and the reader’s role as both consumer and creator of newspaper content was 
also given a new emphasis.304 
 The relationship between journalism and literature was another major theme of 
the inaugural congress. Even creative union elites like Aleksei Adzhubei found 
themselves acknowledging, implicitly or explicitly, that belles-lettres had a higher social 
and cultural status in Soviet life. Adzhubei, and others, clearly felt that journalists 
belonged to the creative intelligentsia—with its attendant focus on reading and writing as 
political and social practices. Congress participants argued that distinctive aspects of 
journalistic writing served a crucial social function, no less meaningful than that of 
literature. The ocherk, as a descriptive story devoted to individual growth, was 
considered particularly important. For congress participants, journalism’s relationship to 
its distinctive traditions and the literary heritage was a vital professional question rather 
than an abstract discussion.  
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 The public inauguration of the Journalists’ Union was in many ways an extension 
and elaboration of the deliberate and self-reflective professionalization that the Orgburo 
had begun in 1956. The shape of the creative union’s domestic mandate was contested in 
various ways—the events at inaugural congress suggest that some aspects of this 
contestation proved easier to solve than others. Journalists could, and did, engage in 
cultural diplomacy, and they could recruit members, however reluctant, to give the new 
organization a domestic base. Debates about who was a “professional” would prove 
harder to resolve. Though all speeches at the inaugural congress were triumphalist in 
tone, they revealed the tensions and ambiguities in the Soviet media institutions along 
with their achievements.  
••• 
 While they had been overseeing the preliminary discussions of the bylaws, the 
Orgburo members had finalized the Journalists’ Union’s structure and prepared for the 
first Congress of the Journalists’ Union of the Soviet Union. Their decisions regarding 
structure demonstrate how the Orgburo sought to ensure that the creative union achieved 
both its domestic and international goals. Many of their decisions reveal efforts to 
strengthen the autonomy and agency of the Journalists’ Union, especially financially, 
while still demonstrating the centrality of Party directives to the organization’s activities. 
The earliest form of the organization envisioned commissions on creative work, 
international connections, information organs, military and sport reporting, publication 
work, and a commission for labor and everyday life issues. These commissions were 
intended to avoid duplication of the work of local organizations, which were primarily 
organized around genre-based sections. The Orgburo members debated whether this 
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number and articulation of commissions was sufficient—some wanted to add a 
commission for journalists writing on cultural matters, for instance. Kraminov, on the 
other hand, protested that organization could be broken down essentially into creative 
work, international connections, publishing, and labor and daily life—genre should be 
reserved for the local organizations alone. Kraminov argued that “special effort” should 
be made to improve the “material and everyday life state of journalists”—a view the 
other members supported. Ultimately, Pal’gunov supported the four-commission view. 
By April of 1958, the Orgburo transformed itself into a Secretariat, which would be the 
“executive body” of the new organization and resolve day-to-day issues; more 
“principled matters” would still be settled by the Orgburo.305 The Journalists’ Union’s 
first plenum was originally scheduled for March of 1959 and discussed the Union’s goals 
after the Twenty-First Party Congress, the work of lecture groups, the Central Journalists’ 
House in Moscow, and the attendance of Orgburo members at republic-level congresses. 
Throughout this study, most plenums involved the participation of senior members of the 
organization: its president, secretaries, and senior members of various commissions.  Its 
members also prepared reports on the initial membership data and labor and daily life 
issues.306  The Union also increased the number of creative sections that reported to the 
creative commission to include radio journalists, a local press section, and a section for 
work with workers’ and peasants’ correspondents.307 
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 Though local journalists were frequently critical of the all-USSR body’s attention 
to their material needs, the newly formed secretariat did undertake some preliminary 
measures in this area before the local congresses. They ensured that journalists would be 
compensated at the same rate as writers, composers, and artists for delivery of speeches, 
and Pal’gunov petitioned the Council of Ministers to rule that a Sovnarkom decree from 
1930 about additional housing for other creative workers should apply to journalists as 
well. It is apparent even from brief descriptions of these meetings that dues were rarely 
considered sufficient to cover both the union’s international obligations and its domestic 
work—there were preliminary proposals to ensure that the royalties from publications 
staffed by journalists went to the Journalists’ Union rather than the Writers’ Union, which 
would reduce the Union’s “abnormal” dependence on the state budget, though the 
outcome of these proposals awaits a more systematic study of creative unions and the 
state economy in the postwar era. The Journalists’ Union continually struggled to 
establish its equality with other creative unions, and dissatisfaction with this perceived 
lack of parity existed at all levels of the organization.308 
 The Orgburo also spent a great deal of time on the scheduling and planning of the 
Journalists’ Union’s first congress. This was originally scheduled for as early as the fall 
of 1958, but the event was pushed back multiple times and ultimately did not occur until 
November 1959. Many of these schedule changes were implemented to avoid conflict 
with other events: the sixth session of the Supreme Soviet, the Soviet Union’s central 
legislative body, in March of 1959, and again when a Party plenum was held in October 
of that year. The major Secretariat meeting for planning the congress took place in 
                                                
308 GARF f. 10124, op. 1, d. 11, ll.126–8, 482. 
  158 
January of 1959. Pal’gunov, Goriunov, and Kraminov jointly drafted a speech, 
“Concerning the Activities and Goals of the Journalists’ Union of the Soviet Union.” P. 
P. Erofeev reported that branch conferences and republican congresses were proceeding 
successfully, and included discussions of journalists’ goals in light of the Twenty-First 
Party Congress and their responsibility to propagandize the CPSU’s most recent set of 
goals. By April of 1959, congresses had occurred in twelve union republics, and in sixty-
nine krai and oblast’ of the RSFSR, with the rest to occur by the second half of April.  
Underscoring the close ties between the party and the new creative union, the Orgburo 
reported that party secretaries had taken part in these events.309  
 The Moscow oblast’ journalists’ conference, held in February of 1959, is my 
main source for understanding how the Journalists’ Union took shape outside of its all-
USSR Orgburo. Local conferences were centrally directed and their content determined 
in advance—the all-USSR Orgburo provided the blueprint for the structure of a local 
conference as early as 1958: chapters were to report on their work, discuss the bylaws, 
hold elections to their central bodies, and also elect representatives to the republic level 
congress and the all-USSR Congress, a structure which Moscow oblast conference 
closely mirrors.310 Perhaps most significant, however, are the speeches of journalists 
themselves about their hopes for the new creative union, particularly because these hopes 
were largely unmet. Local journalists were more frank in admitting that whatever 
“professional mastery” was, they did not possess it to the degree that their counterparts at 
central newspapers did, and argued that the Journalists’ Union should provide them with 
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more opportunities to grow and develop. Many of their criticisms were more direct 
formulations of grievances from the bylaws debate, with a particular stress on the poor 
quality of creative development opportunities, inconsistent material help, and unequal 
access to resources, especially foreign travel and leisure.  
 Once all present at the March 1959 Moscow oblast’ conference had been 
reminded of their ideological and political responsibilities to the goals of the Party and 
the planned economy, Pankratov, the oblast’ party secretary, spoke in more detail about 
the Journalists’ Union, and the need to improve newspaper content to better “form public 
opinion.”311 Journalists were expected to use particular genres in service to this objective: 
“the reader expects from you, comrade journalists, quality examples of literary mastery, 
smart publisistika, articles, correspondence pieces, good feuilletons and feature stories, 
deep in content and sharp in form.”312 Ideally, even newspaper editors would not lose 
their connection to writing, so that their leadership would not have a “purely 
administrative character, just as rank and file journalists were to avoid becoming 
“apolitical everymen” who lacked the necessary theoretical appreciation of Marxism-
Leninism.313 At creative union gatherings,“ professional mastery” was often employed as 
shorthand for expertise in a particular genre, or the ability to produce pieces that readers 
would enjoy—this became increasingly common after the inaugural congress. The 
content of more detailed criticism of local newspapers reveals that the particular 
Khrushchev-era focus on the socialist person was now passed on to the creative union. 
The newspaper was likened to a “beautiful garden” with a clear theme, content, and а 
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lack of “monotony.” The “person, cultivator of riches on earth, should have a central 
place in this garden.” Though oblast’-level journalists frequently complained that they 
lacked the same material privileges as their more prominent counterparts in authoritative 
publications, they were held to similar standards of creativity.314  
 At its inaugural conference in March of 1959, the Moscow oblast’ chapter had 
433 members, represented by 130 delegates. P. P. Erofeev was the all-USSR Orgburo 
member in attendance, and Komsomol and Party secretaries also attended. In an 
acknowledgment of the Party’s authority, the Central Committee was symbolically 
elected to the conference presidium. The organization’s development was the major 
theme of the opening address: V. N. Golubev, the branch president, celebrated the 
Union’s creation as a sign of the “unceasing concern” of the Party. Golubev described the 
local Orgburo’s main accomplishments, focusing on membership work. The available 
demographic data reveals the prevalence of close ties to the Party and the Komsomol, and 
notable gender imbalance. Only twenty percent of the members were women, and only 
thirty percent were without party affiliation. The Orgburo’s other successes were 
primarily in the material realm: determining the average salary level for journalists and 
providing them with funds in case of leave from work, illness, or retirement. Accounts of 
organizational successes were usually quantitative in nature and often described more 
mundane activities, such as the fact that “many oblast’ newspaper workers” had visited 
their less established counterparts at raion newspapers for “seminars, consultations, 
reviews of newspapers, and the like.” The local conference, more than its all-USSR 
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counterpart, reveals that the new creative union developed gradually, despite the lofty 
expectations laid upon it.315  
 The most productive and revealing aspect of the oblast’ conference were the later 
speeches, after the official celebratory program of the Party and the Orgburo had been 
presented. The speaker assigned to go over the bylaws discussion brought up many of the 
same issues which featured in the national comments, particularly the importance of 
economic and material questions. The speech touched on the question of membership 
dues but also stressed the appropriateness of amending the bylaws to reflect the union’s 
responsibility for matters of housing and working conditions and for assistance in 
meeting journalists’ “cultural and quotidian needs.” There was also particular interest in 
making the bylaws more “concrete” vis-à-vis the organization’s obligations to local 
journalists. This summation of complaints and aspirations in a public forum suggests that 
it was considered entirely appropriate for journalists to be concerned with questions of 
equality of status and material support. Discussions at the oblast’ conference also 
provided significant elaboration on the issue of membership. One speaker was more 
openly critical of the draft bylaws, particularly the requirement that an individual should 
have attained a certain number of years of work (stazh) to be eligible for membership. 
“You can work a lot and not turn out to be a journalist. If, instead, the Union made it a 
question of skill level (uroven’) they would then create a ‘stimulus for journalists’ and 
they would also place more ‘demands on themselves.’”316  
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 In this vision of the organization, expertise was not a function of seniority but 
more a matter of will and self-discipline. The same speaker devoted even more attention 
to questions of parity with other creative professionals: 
In another paragraph [of the bylaws], there is a great deal said about what 
the journalists should do, but not about their rights. They have the right to 
be selected, to participate in elections and be present when their expulsion 
is discussed. At the same time, we have creative unions for composers, 
artists, writers, and the like. Of course, one can argue how much our union 
is’ creative’ compared with theirs, but it seems to me that people of 
creative labor have a right to additional living space. Obviously a 
journalist who occasionally cannot work at the office, when there are five 
or six people in the room, when there’s smoke, needs additional living 
space. It seems to me that we should also talk about leave from work, so 
that comrades might at least receive creative leave, because for some 
comrades there is very little time for creative labor.317 
 
 This speech brings member concerns about their creative union’s “junior” status 
relative to other fields into sharp relief—the very status of journalistic work as “creative” 
was uncertain. Though this may be read as a rhetorical gesture, acknowledging the 
privileged position of writers (and secondarily, composers, and artists), the relative lack 
of codified material privilege highlights real disparities along with the practical realities 
of Soviet life. The evocative description of the newsroom as crowded and smoky makes 
the case for an inextricable link between a materially privileged private life and 
successful creative labor. Access to time off was similarly framed as key to productivity. 
The fact that this critical approach to the draft bylaws took place in a public forum 
suggests that journalists did indeed have some rights guaranteed by the bylaws or not—
the right to critique their creative union and offer suggestions for its improvement. 
Several speakers expressed hope that the “young creative organization” would participate 
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in discussions about royalties, labor conditions, and “the establishment of funds for 
helping journalists.” One speaker explicitly called out the head of the oblast’ party 
committee for his lack of attention to differing salaries from raion to raion, and 
complained that local newspapers could not retain university graduates because they were 
unable to offer competitive salaries.318 The director of the oblast’ publishing house even 
critiqued the Union for taking too long to “gestate,” even longer than an elephant or a 
human, leading to a lengthy neglect of journalists’ material needs.319  
 In addition to their expectations of material assistance, oblast’ and raion 
journalists were also quite frank about their vision of an ideal relationship with visiting 
consultants from higher-level publications and with the all-USSR organization. The 
editor of The Podol’sk Worker admitted openly that very few of his colleagues had joined 
the Union at first, and though this “did them no credit,” he mentioned it anyway, which 
made many participants laugh. He complained particularly that “not one journalist” from 
the capital had stopped by a raion newspaper, or if they had, it was for purely “utilitarian 
purposes…give me a topic, give me someone’s address.” These journalists should be 
more sympathetic and offer help—the Orgburo should assign these trips to members and 
give them concrete topics to discuss.320  
 Other raion-level newspapers complained that they were simply not getting 
sufficient attention or that seminars mostly consisted of journalists sitting and “chit-
chatting.” This was particularly disappointing to journalists who hoped they would be 
able to use the new organization to “raise their mastery.” Similar critiques were leveled at 
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the content of activities at the Central House of Journalists in Moscow, which were said 
to consist of lectures or film series that were never relevant to a non-Moscow audience.321  
Other speakers were far more concerned with the logistical problem of reaching more 
distant journalists—seminars were always held in Moscow, and it was difficult for local 
journalists to take time off and participate, since they had to be “jacks of all trades” and 
constantly produce material in various genres. They advocated that lectures or work 
evaluations take place on a rotating basis.322 The monopoly “major” journalists exercised 
over foreign travel was brought up again.323 The assistant editor of the oblast’ newspaper, 
The Leninist Banner, judged the criticisms of the oblast’ organization to be fair in many 
cases and agreed to create a visiting lecturers’ group on the model of the central Orgburo. 
But he also went on the offensive, noting that many of those journalists who accused the 
Journalists’ Union of neglecting their needs had been slow to join it.324 This local 
window into the organization suggests that journalists may indeed have had unmet 
expectations but that their relationship to the Journalists’ Union was far more utilitarian 
than the elevated language of “professional mastery” suggested. While journalism was 
acknowledged as central to the Soviet Union’s governance, its creative union had yet to 
acquire the prestige associated with literary writing.  
 P. P. Erofeev did not limit himself to symbolically representing the all-Union 
Orgburo at the oblast’ meeting: he delivered a lengthy address and made a particular 
effort to resolve local concerns. Though his responses to the criticisms leveled at the 
organization were largely cosmetic, his speech does provide a useful sense of what 
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expectations the all-USSR body felt it could actually meet. Erofeev’s responses are 
surprisingly revealing about the Journalists’ Union’s ongoing challenges in fulfilling its 
domestic mandate. The oblast’ journalists hoped the new organization would bestow 
professional privilege and allow them to attain specialized knowledge. Erofeev 
acknowledged the legitimacy of these desires but cautioned that they would be unlikely 
to materialize quickly. His response to the complaint that it took a year and a half for a 
conference to occur compared journalists to their creative counterparts once again, but 
this time in order to stress their rapid development: the Artists’ Union had taken over a 
decade to convene its first congress, as had the Composers’ Union. Erofeev admitted that 
the new organization might have been too enthusiastic in its initial review of 
applications—its 18,000 members included people whom “it is difficult to call 
journalists… sometimes they have written things, sometimes they are respected and 
known authors, but not journalists…but all those we have taken in, we are obligated to 
educate them to be real Soviet journalists.” Exactly what this “realness” would consist of 
was never specified, and the complaint that membership was too inclusive was persistent, 
resulting in an amendment of the bylaws in 1966.325 Erofeev also took some steps to 
defend the practice of sending primarily elite journalists abroad, essentially privileging 
expertise over egalitarianism: it would be preferable to send someone to Spain who had 
been before and had experience, to ensure that the best work was produced. He did claim 
that local journalists were also sent on trips but did not provide specific examples. 
Instead, he focused attention on the near-completion of a leisure resort that was under 
construction in Varna and on the positive work of Soviet journalists abroad through the 
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MOJ.326 Local journalists were thus encouraged to take pride in their organization’s 
international reach, even if they did not participate in it directly or directly benefit. As we 
saw in chapter one, the sheer size of the Soviet mass media presented challenges to 
professionalization that distinguish it from the other “creative professions.” 
 Though he did not respond to specific criticisms of the content of professional 
seminars available to oblast’ journalists, Erofeev proposed that the Orgburo schedule 
lectures at the Journalists’ House in Moscow in advance, rather than wait for demand 
from below and risk that lecturers were unavailable. He presented the trade union as the 
most likely source of material support for journalists, citing the Union’s lack of an 
“independent financial base.” All-union Orgburo members had long been aware of this 
problem—to explain ongoing organizational challenges, Erofeev provided this 
information to oblast’ journalists. Journalists in Cheliabinsk had gotten funds for a 
lecture series from the trade union, and the Moscow oblast’ journalists were encouraged 
to exploit this same resource. Erofeev also engaged directly with the problem of 
professional rights—he admitted that the bylaws needed to be fine-tuned but argued that 
it was not fair for journalists to think solely in terms of what they might receive from 
membership, suggesting that they should appeal to the local party committee concerning 
issues of everyday life, housing, and material support. Firmly asserting the professional 
rather than material focus of the Orgburo’s work, Erofeev declared, “We are the heads of 
newspapers. We cannot resolve this matter!”, although he did promise “other kinds of 
help” as well—a vague formulation which seemed calculated to reassure his audience 
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with platitudes, in the absence of concrete plans or financial resources.327  Erofeev 
presented a more “conservative” interpretation of what a creative union could provide—
housing issues were beyond the new organization’s scope, especially since its leaders 
were experts in creative tasks only. His remarks reflect the key distinction between the 
Journalists’ Union and other creative unions—the former’s shared jurisdiction with a 
larger trade union, which compensated for its lack of an independent financial fund.  
 The oblast’ conference demonstrates that the Journalists’ Union’s contested 
nature extended well into its “established” phase. Though party leaders and senior 
journalists all agreed on their profession’s social and political importance, there was far 
less certainty that the new creative union was truly helping journalists achieve their goals, 
with some indications that rank and file journalists did not yet see the organization as 
completely necessary. Whatever doubts they may have had about the Journalists’ Union’s 
effectiveness, it is clear that Moscow oblast’ journalists felt that their profession entitled 
them to a certain standard of living and that they should not be ignored by their more 
privileged colleagues. On the local level, “professional mastery” partly functioned as 
shorthand for material and social privilege and professional skill, many of the attributes 
frequently addressed under the rubric of “professionalization.” However flexible their use 
of this term, oblast’ journalists clearly articulated a more expanded and powerful version 
of their creative union, like other participants in the earlier bylaws debate. 
••• 
 After numerous delays, the all-USSR Journalists’ Congress took place in 
November of 1959. The event’s timing makes it a particularly useful snapshot of the 
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Khrushchev era: much of the proceedings were devoted to the economy, the successful 
overcoming of the Stalin cult, and achievements in diplomacy. As they celebrated 
Khrushchev’s recent trip to the United States that October, participants were also 
reminded of the importance of professional ties with colleagues and competition with 
“bourgeois” journalism.  
 The congress’s timing, three years into the Khrushchev “Thaw,” raises the 
question of journalists’ professional agency and the extent of continuity with Stalinist 
cultural politics. While the formation of a creative union for writers was partly intended 
to increase Party control over cultural output, studies of the music profession have argued 
that even under Stalin, the nature of musical expertise afforded the Composers’ Union 
agency even in moments of particular xenophobia and cultural restrictiveness, since Party 
elites depended partly on musicians themselves to set the terms of discussion and 
debate.328 The Central Committee’s prominence in the proceedings, and the 
overwhelming number of party members among the delegates (and in the Journalists’ 
Union as a whole), makes questions of professional expertise more complicated than for 
the music field. While it is true that senior political figures felt not only qualified but also 
obligated to discuss newspaper content and encourage editors to pursue certain topics, it 
is difficult to discuss these two groups in isolation or even to treat them as distinct: 
Adzhubei’s personal relationship to Khrushchev is only one example of a longstanding 
pattern—Lenin’s sister Maria and leading Bolshevik theorist Nikolai Bukharin feature 
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prominently in the history of the early Soviet press.329 The all-USSR congress, like the 
bylaws debates that preceded it, demonstrates that journalists used the formation of a 
creative union to discuss their responsibilities in the current ideological climate, one 
which some historians have characterized as an ideological “void” that journalists were 
uniquely positioned to fill with content of their own.330 Most of the speakers were acutely 
aware of questions of change and continuity: Leninist traditions served as a rhetorical 
touchstone to a revolutionary past, yet presenters also acknowledged the Soviet Union’s 
complex political and social evolution since that time. In the end, the congress was a 
moment of resolution for organizational and procedural questions but left other more 
fundamental tensions unresolved.  
 Rather than recount the entire event, I have concentrated on some of the more 
analytically rich speeches from the congress, usually those from senior members of the 
media establishment or the Party. The speeches highlight the creative union’s dual 
mandate, as most of the participants confined themselves either to foreign or domestic 
aspects of journalism work. On the domestic side, P. P. Erofeev and Pravda editor Pavel 
Satiukov represented the creative union’s governing board and discussed the 
organization’s recent accomplishments, most notably its membership drives and the 
culmination of the bylaws debate. Aleksei Adzhubei, who by this time had left KP for 
Izvestiia, concerned himself with the literary and moral dimensions of 
professionalization, while M. S. Kurtynin, head of the creative union’s Leningrad branch, 
focused on genre. Boris Polevoi and Aleksei Surkov, representing the Writers’ Union, 
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provided further reflections on the relationship between journalism and belles-lettres. M. 
G. Semenov, the editor of satire journal Krokodil (The Crocodile), and KP editor Iurii 
Voronov concerned themselves with reader relationships and how to use genre to reach 
audiences, as did Central Committee member Leonid Il’ichev, representing the Agitation 
and Propaganda department. As befit their status as senior creative union members, both 
Satiukov and Erofeev, with further input from Iurii Zhukov, discussed Soviet 
journalism’s mission in the context of the Cold War—a topic which Il’ichev also 
addressed. Khrushchev himself closed the congress with a speech entitled, “The Soviet 
Press Ought to Be The Strongest and Most Militant,” in which he celebrated the 
relationship between journalism and the Party while presenting both domestic and 
international policy objectives.  
 Though they addressed distinct topics and represented different aspects of 
journalistic and political work, the above participants touched on a few key issues, 
though often from contrasting viewpoints or in ways that highlighted ongoing tensions. 
While Satiukov and Erofeev both celebrated the creative union’s establishment, they 
acknowledged organizational imperfections and unmet aspirations from the bylaws 
debate. Similar contrasts emerged in conversations about genre, readership, and 
journalism’s social status. Where Safronov and Polevoi celebrated the relationship 
between journalism and literature as fruitful and beneficial to both creative fields, 
Adzhubei took a more critical stance toward literature, expressing concerns that 
journalists regarded their own work as less prestigious and neglected the rich heritage of 
early journalism and defending journalism’s artistic worth. Voronov and Il’ichev took 
generally optimistic stances in their remarks on social progress and the new demands to 
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reach sophisticated readers, as did Kurtynin, who saw genre work as key to the creative 
union’s future growth. In contrast, Semenov was skeptical about reader tastes, 
particularly about satire being misinterpreted or misused.  
 Attitudes toward foreign policy and peaceful coexistence were similarly diverse. 
Khrushchev, as befit his role as Soviet leader, was optimistic about the fruits of peaceful 
coexistence, while maintaining a tone of contempt and hostility for certain ideological 
enemies, especially West Germany and other “imperialists.”  Both Zhukov and Il’ichev 
were concerned that peaceful coexistence not compromise Soviet values, especially given 
the growth of foreign propaganda towards Soviet audiences. Satiukov, though equally 
critical of imperialism, took a slightly more celebratory tone as he addressed the 
successful work of the MOJ and the overall decline of “bourgeois” journalism. The 
speeches at the inaugural congress highlight an important distinction between public 
professionalization and the more private newsroom setting: unlike in the KP letuchki, 
where staff members could admit to uncertainty or dissatisfaction with authority, all 
creative union members who presented at the event generally supported Khrushchev’s 
positive portrayal of the relationship between journalists and officials. This relative 
consensus is understandable given the setting and the political profile of key participants. 
Like KP journalists, however, congress delegates still confronted tensions and 
ambiguities in the cultural sphere— especially in their discussions of the creative union’s 
membership statutes and the relationship between journalism and literature.  
*** 
 The opening of the inaugural congress on November 12 was recognized as a 
nationally significant event, especially through articles in the central press.  The media 
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coverage placed journalism at the center of all aspects of the Soviet project—and the 
creative union as a critical part of its continued development. It seems far from 
coincidental that Orgburo member L. I. Leont’ev was awarded the Order of the Red 
Banner of Labor on November 10, just before the congress opening. Literaturnaia 
gazeta’s extensive coverage of the proceedings included pieces by Boris Polevoi and 
Anatolii Safronov, both of whom had been members of a journalists’ delegation to the 
United States three years prior. Polevoi compared journalists to the “military 
intelligence” of the literary community, always at the forefront of major phenomena in 
Soviet society, with their “hands on the pulse of the people.” He argued that in the West, 
journalism was viewed as a “dirty profession” as exemplified by Guy de Maupassant’s 
Bel Ami. The novel’s protagonist is overwhelmingly ambitious and engages in a series of 
love affairs to advance his career, never displaying remorse for his behavior. In contrast, 
for Soviet writers, the journalist was their “friend and brother.” The exact nature of the 
relationship between journalists and writers, and the importance of superiority to the 
“bourgeois” journalist would form a major part of the public celebration of the 
Journalists’ Union. Safronov continued the military metaphor, likening journalists to 
soldiers. He highlighted the celebratory nature of the Congress events, and that the hall 
was filled with journalists of all ethnicities and backgrounds. Pravda’s editorial 
emphasized the centrality of newspapers to the people’s everyday life (narodnyi byt’), 
and the creative union’s new responsibility to ensure that content always improved and 
remained faithful to the best Leninist traditions. Izvestiia’s unsigned editorial put even 
more emphasis on the “spiritual” bond of Soviet people with the mass media, and the 
importance newspapers had played during Khrushchev’s visit to the United States. The 
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Journalists’ Union was a sign of professional growth and the Party’s appreciation of their 
work.331  
 The opening proceedings, though largely ceremonial in nature, also provide key 
insight into the significance of the new organization. Politburo members, particularly 
hose who had supported Khrushchev in the “anti-Party” coup of 1957, were present at the 
events. These included notable figures such as L. I. Brezhnev, K. E. Voroshilov, A. M. 
Mikoian, M. A. Suslov, and E. A. Furtseva. All of the longstanding members of the 
creative union’s Orgburo were elected to the Congress’ Presidium, along with the heads 
of all Republic-level Union branches. The addition of journalists who were not as active 
in the Orgburo itself demonstrates a greater inclusion of those closely associated with 
Khrushchev personally and a more sophisticated press in general: Khrushchev’s son-in-
law, Aleksei Adzhubei, now editor of Izvestiia, his close colleague and replacement at 
Komsomol’skaia pravda, Iurii Voronov, and Pavel Satiukov, the editor of Pravda were 
all elected to the Congress Presidium and to leadership positions in the new governing 
board. Several secretaries in the Writers’ Union were also elected to the Presidium, 
including Konstantin Fedin (then head of that body), Alexander Tvardovskii, editor of 
Novyi Mir, the journal most closely associated with the “Thaw” in literature, and Mikhail 
Sholokhov, the writer of the Cossack-themed epic The Quiet Don. The film director 
Sergei Gerasimov, who would win a Moscow Film Festival prize for his 1967 film, The 
Journalist, represented his profession. Senior members of the Komsomol, the head of the 
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all-USSR Council for Trade Unions, and the head of the Central Committee’s Agitation 
and Propaganda Department, Leonid Il’ichev were included as well. In a move which 
highlights the creative union’s close ties to the diplomatic establishment, М. А. 
Кharlamov, head of the Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was elected 
to the Congress Presidium and also became a member of the Union’s executive board.332 
 The first addresses to the congress stressed both continuity with Bolshevik 
tradition and the revolutionary accomplishments of the Khrushchev era, while 
reaffirming the importance of a close connection between print professionals and the 
Party leadership. The opening speaker was Viacheslav Karpinskii, an Old Bolshevik and 
the first editor of the newspaper for peasants, Bednota, who had been a close associate of 
Lenin’s. Though Karpinskii was presumably selected to speak due to his own impeccable 
revolutionary pedigree, his son Len was also politically active in the years after the 
Twentieth Congress: he had headed the Komsomol’s Agitation and Propaganda 
Department and worked at Pravda beginning in 1962.333 Karpinskii’s rhetorical goal was 
mainly to celebrate the new organization’s mandate and to remind his audience of 
Lenin’s legacy as the “first Bolshevik journalist.” The first substantive speech fell to 
Satiukov, who spoke on the theme of “Soviet Journalists—Seasoned Assistants of the 
Communist Party.” In keeping with his speech’s title, Satiukov was effusive in his 
gratitude to the Central Committee for sending special greetings to the delegates. Where 
Karpinskii had celebrated the Leninist press, Satiukov expanded his laudatory reach to 
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include the “mass journalism” of the 1930s, with its reliance on workers’ and peasants’ 
correspondents and journalists’ wartime contributions. Satiukov was the first, though far 
from the last, to celebrate Khrushchev’s recent trip to the United States and the approving 
letters received from Soviet citizens. His catalogue of important subjects for journalists 
was tied to policy issues: economic matters, particularly improvements in housing, and 
the influence of literature and art on workers.334 
••• 
 The bylaws and their ratification were, of course, a major topic on the Congress 
agenda.  Though most of the journalists present celebrated the All-USSR Congress as a 
watershed event, it may more properly be seen as the closing arguments in the three-year-
long “case” for a particular vision of the new creative union—an attempt to provide final 
answers to the main questions of professionalization, and to prove that the new creative 
union had found its proper form, and place in the Soviet institutional landscape. These 
speeches also provided the most useful empirical data for comparing the Journalists’ 
Union to existing organizations. As reported by Satiukov, seventy-seven percent of the 
Journalists’ Union’s 23,000 members held full or candidate membership in the 
Communist Party—a figure which is much higher than for other creative unions, as far as 
can be determined from available data, and which suggests that the rhetorical habit of 
referring to journalists as the Party’s “lieutenants” or “assistants” should be taken 
seriously. Indeed, both P. A. Satiukov and A. I. Adzhubei were members of the Central 
Committee and took an active part in its deliberations. Demographic data on creative 
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union members’ educational levels demonstrated that the increasing literacy and 
sophistication of the Soviet public was also apparent in the journalism profession: 
seventy percent had some form of higher education, with the remainder having at least 
partially completed secondary school. One figure, however, somewhat discomfited even 
the otherwise celebratory Satiukov: women made up only twelve percent of the 
Journalists’ Union’s membership. To make up for this imbalance, he discussed at length 
the role of women in the revolutionary press, especially Lenin’s wife Nadezhda 
Krupskaia, his sister Maria Ulianova, and the Old Bolshevik Comintern Activist Elena 
Stasova. Along with Orgburo member Maria Oviasinnikova, editors of journals for 
women such as Krestianka and Rabotnitsa were singled out as heirs to this tradition, 
along with prominent Izvestiia columnists Liubov’ Ivanova and Tatiana Tess.335 While 
the relative under-representation of women in journalism (and their status in creative 
unions overall) remains a topic for further research, my findings suggest that women 
were influential in some aspects of the Union’s activities, especially in the years after the 
inaugural congress. Both Tatiana Tess and Liubov Ivanova feature prominently in chapter 
five.  
 In his address to the congress, P. P. Erofeev focused on the bylaws debate and its 
results as one of the new creative union’s more impressive accomplishments. He 
reminded his audience that the bylaws were the “law of the Journalists’ Union’s internal 
life, and are adopted to clearly and precisely define its goals.” Though, as I have noted 
previously, legal scholars do not consider such documents to have had the force of law, 
they have nevertheless been analyzed at some length in various branches of legal 
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literature.336 Erofeev presented creative unions as integral to social life. He affirmed 
Maksim Gorky’s argument that just as the Writers’ Union was supposed to represent the 
“interests of literature as a whole” rather than those of individual writers or a small group 
of intellectuals, so too was the Journalists’ Union responsible for “journalism as a 
whole.” This example suggests an affinity and shared responsibility between one of the 
Soviet Union’s more established and elite creative unions and its newest member—
perhaps an attempt to convey authority it did not yet possess. Though other speakers 
would stress the distinctions and possible tensions between “literature” and journalism, 
Erofeev was more concerned with confirming that “purely professional interests” would 
remain the responsibility of the trade union for cultural workers, to ensure that the 
Journalists’ Union would embrace its broader cultural mission.337 This vision of the 
Journalists’ Union as purely “creative” was, as we have seen, not entirely popular with 
some rank-and-file members, and thus might be read as a conservative gesture designed 
to defend existing organizational structures. 
 In order to demonstrate that the Journalists’ Union had made some strides in its 
creative work, Erofeev discussed some successful seminars and exhibits and a pending 
contest for the best feature story about “people of the seven year plan.” He demonstrated 
a growing commitment to what might be called “professional development,” describing 
how Journalists’ Union members were increasingly seeking letters of reference from their 
colleagues in the organization as they applied to educational institutions and the 
Orgburo’s greater involvement in university admissions decisions. Though he defended 
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the existing distinctions between trade and creative unions, Erofeev also lauded the 
changes in the bylaws that reflected the joint relationship between the creative union and 
the trade union and the “significantly expanded clause” on the rights and responsibilities 
that membership conferred. As local journalists had advocated, district level 
organizations could now take in members without confirmation from Moscow, though 
the central body retained the final say in expulsion cases. The argument that each 
publication should have a “primary” branch was decisively rejected, with Erofeev 
defending the existing practice that each publication could elect a representative to the 
higher body.338  
 Erofeev claimed that amendments in the bylaws which emerged during the 
drafting and critique process were more consistent with Soviet society’s democratic 
nature—for the historian, they confirm that the process of bylaws construction was not 
one sided or “totalitarian” and that media elites took an active, if not always consistent, 
interest in the views of rank-and-file journalists. The discussions about membership 
criteria confirm that the commentaries on the draft bylaws were read and studied, as 
Erofeev noted that “heated debates” had taken place about this particular clause. He 
essentially summed up the “inclusive” and “exclusive” membership models, and argued 
that the victory of the “inclusive” model was not cause for significant concern: Erofeev 
assured his audience that the Journalists’ Union would not “lose its creative character and 
by being оpen to those people who had written only a few brief news items by chance,” 
since its members were only one-third of the sixty thousand journalists who currently 
worked in the entire Soviet Union. The tension over inclusion of workers’ and peasants’ 
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correspondents was also addressed at some length, since apparently the decisive factor 
was not “who works where, but how each wields mastery of language and proves himself 
in his capacity as a journalist.” Though most participants in the bylaws debate supported 
an inclusive membership policy which would embrace workers’ and peasants’ 
correspondents, Erofeev’s defensive stance suggests that some journalists felt that 
professional privilege outweighed other concerns. In a different argument for high 
standards, the editor of a multi-circulation daily newspaper from Gorky reaffirmed that 
the Journalists’ Union should only accept “worthy people” as members, not those 
“skimmers” who were only after monetary gain and a membership card. The creative 
opposite of a “skimmer” was apparently the “activist,” who regularly composed work in 
his area of expertise and produced “qualified articles.”339 Erofeev apparently felt some 
need to argue that relative inclusiveness did not diminish the importance of membership. 
The legacies of mass journalism complicated the new creative union’s “professional” 
mandate and required attention to output and frequency of contribution rather than a 
specific level of professional attainment. Fidelity to existing practices, both those of mass 
journalism and the elite history of other creative unions was not without its tensions, even 
at a moment that essentially closed the bylaws debate. The implication that some 
journalists regarded the creative union as a source of money rather than a real 
commitment would become a recurring theme in later years. The inclusion of workers’ 
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and peasants’ correspondents remained a contentious issue as well, as we will see in 
chapters five and six.   
••• 
 Perhaps as a reflection of the complex nature of its international activities—which 
were conducted together with a whole series of governmental organizations as well as the 
Central Committee—most of the prominent journalists who spoke at the congress 
addressed domestic issues, especially the nature of journalistic expertise and social 
standing. M. S. Kurtynin, the head of the Journalists’ Union’s Leningrad branch, focused 
particularly on the importance of genre as a signifier of professional achievement. He 
also suggested that the Journalists’ Union undertake more publishing projects and 
improve its trade journal to better provide examples of the superior work. The ideals and 
aspirations in some of the speeches were often as relevant as concrete proposals: 
Kurtynin’s claims about the importance of  “observation…the ability to look at the 
essence of events, and find the most significant and interesting phenomena in social life” 
was a theme taken up at length by Aleksei Adzhubei, then editor of Izvestiia.340 Adzhubei 
reiterated that the “ability to see thoughtfully and clearly…this means one is a master of 
his work.”341 
 Though he shared Kurtynin’s interest in increased creative activity, Adzhubei 
reflected more deeply on the social value of reading. He opened his address by quoting an 
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American journalist who averred that Russian toilet paper was of poor quality because 
the paper budget was all spent on books and notebook paper—an expression of “concern 
about the people’s spiritual outlook.” Adzhubei called these words “fair,” and expressed 
his deep pride that Soviet press workers served “the most comradely reader in the world.” 
Adzhubei lamented that despite recent successes, “we rarely think about the journalists’ 
‘kitchen,’ about our profession,” and agreed with Kurtynin that this issue needed more 
attention.342 Adzhubei’s deep pride in the place of reading and writing in Soviet culture 
serves as an important reminder that journalists, as members of a creative profession, 
were also committed to enduring values of the intelligentsia—reading and writing was 
often central to intelligentsia self-presentation, especially in the postwar period.343  
 Interest in genre was important to creative members not only as a means to reach 
a more sophisticated professional status but also to engage with audiences and form their 
consciousness. Concern with reader tastes and interests was not unique to Khrushchev-
era journalism: the discipline of “reader studies,” particularly prominent during the 
1920s, was simultaneously engaged in determining public tastes and shaping them. These 
efforts to shape an “ideal reader,” and to create literature and newspapers in response to 
expressed interests, declined somewhat during industrialization, as newspapers became 
far more focused on mobilizing Party and industrial workers rather than the “masses” 
they purported to serve. The renewed interest in readers—particularly as objects of 
sociological study—points to significant changes in professional objectives between 
Stalinist and Khrushchev-era journalism.  At the same time, the views of the reader 
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expressed by creative union leaders were perhaps more reflective of the hopes and 
anxieties of journalists themselves than of the actual reading public. I introduce these 
themes here to suggest that the creative union was persistently engaged in efforts to shape 
the socialist person, even before its domestic work was well organized and consistent, 
and point to important thematic continuities between the inaugural congress and later 
years.344 
 Kurtynin’s interest in genre and the selection of appropriate topics was shared by 
Krokodil editor Semenov, though, as befit the latter’s interest in satire and social ills, he 
drew more pessimistic conclusions. Semonov reminded his audience that Soviet satire 
had not been and never could be “apolitical,” citing a recent Khrushchev speech as 
support.  The problem came with appropriate choice of subject: too often, he claimed, 
journalists argued that particularly bloody or violent crimes were the perfect subjects for 
a feuilleton.  But these grisly stories lacked the necessary “moral and ethical” dimension 
to truly engage audiences. Semenov’s critique here came close to accusing some satirists 
of “sensationalism” without content—a common accusation leveled at “bourgeois” 
journalists, suggesting that failed Soviet journalism could resemble its ideological 
opposite. While he was certain that a greater focus on morality and ethics could remedy 
this problem, he provided no examples that substantively defined the boundary between 
wholesome entertainment and sensationalism.345  
 In contrast to Semenov’s anxieties, Iurii Voronov, Adzhubei’s successor at 
Komsomol’skaia pravda, celebrated the Soviet Union’s superpower status and the 
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increase in responsibilities that accompanied it—drawing a sharp contrast to the period 
when foreign correspondents had less to report, or capitalist politicians debated whether 
to grant the Soviet Union diplomatic recognition.  Just as the international environment 
had changed, so had the Soviet reader: In 1950, Komsomol’skaia pravda had received 
50,000 reader letters. Five years later that number had increased to 80,000, and in 1958, 
188,000, with the figure set to increase in 1959. Though he saw these quantitative 
increases as clear indicators of social progress, Voronov was equally careful to 
demonstrate that the correspondence had undergone more fundamental changes: readers 
addressed the editors “more openly, as a friend.” This tonal shift allowed journalists to 
write more on “moral and ethical themes” which readers were especially fond of. In the 
revolutionary period, KP’s readers had been preoccupied with the moral appropriateness 
of wearing necktie. As proof of growing sophistication, Voronov described a recent 
popular story concerning  “the spiritual world of the contemporary person.”  Both 
Semenov and Voronov presented the moral and ethical dimension as essential to truly 
reaching audiences—the creative union’s genre seminars would also reflect this 
preoccupation, as we will see in chapter five.346 While Voronov presented reader 
relationships as an unqualified good, Semenov was more skeptical. Improving satire was 
not limited to self-discipline and choice of subject, however: journalists also had to deal 
with the “demanding” attitude of the public toward satirical publications—including a 
hypothetical reader who called Krokodil before his plumber when his water was out. 
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Even the near-sacred relationship between journalists and readers could serve as a target 
for mockery.347  
 These two views of reader relationships and correspondence serve as important 
reminders that the carefully crafted public messages for journalists could contain 
ambiguities and contradictions, especially when it came to the different ways of 
“constructing” the new Soviet reader. Semenov’s public was needy and confused, in need 
of careful management and equally careful choice of topics. Voronov’s younger 
readership had transcended the more mundane questions of the revolutionary period and 
attained real sophistication in its tastes, and he celebrated the growth in reader letters 
without reservation or qualification. Problems of archival access to reader letters prevent 
historians from definitively proving which editor was “right”—indeed, the more 
interesting issue may well be that two prominent and politically reliable newspaper 
editors could maintain and promote such distinct visions of the same audience. Though 
all speakers at the congress agreed that a connection with the “masses” was essential to 
their work, there was no consistent vision of who those masses were. What is 
unambiguous is the vision of professional responsibility each editor espoused: whether 
readers were enlightened or materialistic, the committed journalist would seek out 
opportunities to influence their tastes.  
 Adzhubei’s reflections on reader engagement were more focused on professional 
failures than problems of public taste: he was disturbed that journalists could fail to 
appreciate the deeper philosophical implications of the news items they produced, 
especially their ability to engage reader emotions. His attention to the specifics of the 
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journalistic writing, which included not only examples of improvements to inspire his 
audience but also areas of potential improvement, indirectly points to distinctions 
between journalistic practices and literary ones—a theme he would take up at great 
length. Adzhubei wanted to provide an “example of how we often miss facts that are 
important for a journalist.”  One day, a short correspondence piece passed his desk about 
a woman who had excelled at harvesting sugar beets in Kyrgyzstan. While the piece 
described the physical conditions in the fields and the traits of the individuals involved, 
“the piece was not touching, there was no portrait of a person, we did not know what this 
woman is thinking, why she enjoys success.” As it turned out, the woman in question was 
a war widow who had survived her husband’s tragic death and found solace in her 
work—a story which could have truly inspired readers.  Adzhubei assured his audience 
that the majority of them could “reach a universal truth,” which would allow them to “lift 
up hundreds of people to the very best, to feats for the glory of communism.” They would 
do this for readers like the collective farmer who said, “the newspaper for me is an 
academy, I meet all sorts of people there, from the man of state to our simple worker.”348  
 Though he did not explicitly invoke the genre, Adzhubei clearly shared 
Voronov’s interest in moral and ethical issues, as he urged his colleagues to look for the 
deeper resonance behind each story. His interest in the laboring war widow points to the 
specificity of journalism—the capacity to inspire readers by introducing readers to real 
individuals they could relate to and be inspired by.  His reflections on heroism added 
another dimension to the professional interest in facts, as well, since an individual’s 
motivation and personal history was as crucial to grasping the real meaning of an event as 
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a biography or description of working conditions. In quoting the farm worker who called 
the newspaper his “academy” which introduced him to the nation, Adzhubei encouraged 
his colleagues to remember their responsibility to create a sense of common identity in 
readers.349 Adzhubei’s interest in emotions and the individual’s internal world would 
continue, as he was essentially the keynote speaker at a creative seminar on genre in 
1964.  
 Concern with readers was not limited to newspaper editors. Leonid Il’ichev, the 
head of the Central Committee’s Agitation and Propaganda Department, spoke at length 
about audience needs during his address to the congress.  His presence and participation 
serves as an important reminder that in the Soviet Union, reader issues were not only a 
professional concern but also a matter of policy. Il’ichev reminded his audience that 
journalists were “first and foremost social and political actors.” He also drew the most 
explicit contrast between Stalinist journalism and contemporary needs.  His vision of 
party and propaganda work that was “mass” and “popular” in character was meant to be a 
departure from past practices by reaching a more socially diverse audience. In earlier 
periods, “the main forms of party enlightenment were directed primarily at party 
members, candidate members, the non-party aktiv, and the intelligentsia…life itself 
shows us that it is past time to expand the scope of propaganda, so that it reached every 
worker, every collective farmer, every intellectual…in a word, the matter is not 
ideological work directed at a comparatively small group of the population, but the entire 
Soviet people.”350 Where planned economics had once forced journalists during the NEP 
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and industrialization to direct their content toward party activists, the new journalism 
would be far more catholic in its approach.351 Il’ichev expressed concern that “bourgeois” 
sociologists were devoting more attention to the cultural development of workers, their 
relationships with each other, and their productivity than socialist experts were. He 
considered the growth of moral and ethical themes in journalism a generally positive 
development, but he argued that questions of theory and social science were equally 
deserving of attention—essentially arguing that both scientific and emotional approaches 
to the reader were necessary. The evolution of social science in this period is most closely 
associated with sociologist Boris Grushin’s Institute for Public Opinion, under the 
auspices of Komsomol’skaia pravda. ll’ichev’s speech here indicates that the “scientific” 
approach to social matters had widespread support in the Party352 In part due to the 
prominence of KP journalists in the creative union leadership, sociological study of 
newspaper readers would become a crucial theme for the organization’s domestic 
creative work in later years, as I will address in more detail in chapters five and six. 
••• 
 Though participants in the inaugural Congress discussed diverse paths to audience 
engagement, it is clear that media managers like Il’ichev and editors like Voronov and 
Adzhubei agreed that journalists’ professional success depended on diversifying their 
approaches to readers and understanding their needs. While it was obvious that 
journalistic skill depended on the written word—both producing it and interpreting the 
work of readers—creative union members had to confront the immense cultural prestige 
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of literature in Russian traditions and the historically close links between belles-lettres 
and newspaper work. Aleksei Adzhubei regarded this issue as a significant obstacle to 
professionalization, as he felt that journalists’ sense of inferiority held them back from 
attaining excellence. His defense of journalism contrasted sharply with the positions 
taken by Writers’ Union secretaries Boris Polevoi and Aleksei Surkov, who focused on 
the potential for collaboration and mutual enrichment. Beginning his reflections on 
professional recognition, Adzhubei remarked that, “We rarely name those real 
newspapermen (gazetchikov) who spend their whole life on the newspaper, who 
sometimes sit editing other people’s work for sixteen to eighteen hours a day.” This 
desire to see the hard work of some journalists acknowledged, however, did not mean the 
loss of humility. Adzhubei envisioned a newspaper where people “celebrated the success 
of others, and were proud that the newspaper was completed, even though perhaps their 
own name is not in print.” While modesty was a laudable personal quality in individual 
journalists, Adzhubei considered the profession as a whole to be undervalued. His vision 
of conscious professionalization was, more explicitly than most, a call for journalists to 
recover their self-respect. He railed against the prevailing view that “any person with a 
pen in his hand can be a journalist…we must propagandize the idea that journalism is a 
creative profession, a calling. To be a journalist one must have particular qualities, and 
work long and hard.” This was a matter of more than composition and wording; it was a 
serious time commitment to which journalists could devote years of their lives to create a 
journalism which “helps our great cause, supports it, and stands up for it.” In an 
interesting choice for a journalist closely associated with departure from Stalinist 
traditions, Adzhubei argued that this kind of journalism was visible in 1930s 
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Komsomol’skaia pravda’s coverage of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station construction 
project.353  
 Adzhubei’s vision of the profession as a “calling” evokes the nineteenth-century 
view of socially responsible literature promoted by Vissarion Belinskii and should be 
read as an argument that journalism was deserving of equal respect. Though Adzhubei 
was one of the champions of a politically engaged critical journalism, especially the 
genre of publisistika, his renewal vision here also relied on the traditions of the first Five 
Year Plan. Aleksei Alexandrovich Surkov, secretary in the Writers’ Union and director of 
the Gorky Institute for World Literature, supported Adzhubei’s sense of professional 
pride. Surkov himself had worked as a journalist in the 1920s after his demobilization 
from the Civil War and later as a war correspondent. Any claims that work in newspapers 
was somehow inferior were not to be tolerated, especially given that writers like Pushkin, 
Belinsky, and Nekrasov had been journalists, and that Gorky and Maiakovskii had always 
maintained their relationships with newspaper work. He hoped that the new creative 
union would learn from the mistakes of its literary predecessor.354    
 As he continued his defense of the profession, Adzhubei argued against the view 
prevalent among young journalists that journalism was a path to “real literature,” and 
insisted to great applause that, “newspaper art is no less complicated and responsible than 
belles-lettres.  I very much respect the writers in the Congress’ presidium, but I also 
respect the newspapermen who want to be newspapermen and who do not think that 
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journalism is the first step to becoming a ‘real writer.’”355 The writer and former war 
correspondent Boris Polevoi sought affinities between the two creative fields, where 
Adzhubei had drawn clear lines.  Polevoi argued that while it was an “axiom” that 
newspaper work was good training for literature, newspaper editors should consider 
literature “absolutely necessary for newspapers, especially the genuine, cultured Soviet 
newspaper of the builder of communism.” Both Adzhubei’s approval of Gorky’s 
journalism, as well as secondary literature on journalism during industrialization, indicate 
that Polevoi was correct to point out a history of fertile cooperation between the two 
cultural fields. The history and possibility of cooperation, however, did not erase 
rivalries: V. S. Plaksin, a delegate from Gorky, complained that few writers were truly 
familiar with journalists and knew them only through “hearsay.” Even worse, some 
cultural works, plays, and stories “portrayed journalists as caricatures…as superficial 
people.” The new creative union’s responsibility to make connections between 
institutions, writing practices, and professional roles was clearly a tension for Polevoi, as 
well—he reminded all those present that he attended the conference “not as a guest, but 
as a delegate,” and that there were newspaper pieces he had written during the war he 
was just as proud of as his novels.  In arguing for its own relevance, the new creative 
union had to contend with established cultural traditions and practices both within and 
outside Soviet newspapers. Even today, many members of the Journalists’ Union of the 
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Russian Federation also belong to its Writers’ Union—demonstrating that Adzhubei’s 
vision of separateness and superiority would prove difficult to realize.356  
 While he addressed journalism’s historical relationship to literature, Adzhubei’s 
speech was also devoted to issues of continuity and change in journalistic practice. 
Adzhubei celebrated observational nuance as a hallmark of the new press environment: 
“more and more in our material, there is the viewpoint of a particular journalist, and not 
some sort of general journalist. We are not afraid to say, ‘I thought, I saw, I encountered.’ 
There was a period in journalism, when this was not еncouraged.” Adzhubei is most 
closely associated with the recovery of distinctive authorial voices, and his own words 
here read as a subtle celebration of a less Stalinized press.357 His closing example of how 
best to depict the lives of laboring people and be true to the view of a simple farm worker 
who saw the newspaper as his “academy” suggests a more complex relationship to both 
literature and the recent past. Maksim Gorky’s feature stories about Dneprostroi and the 
canal there were his main solution to the inability of contemporary journalism to depict 
the world of labor.358 Even for Adzhubei, the canonical father of socialist realism was a 
revered figure. What is most striking about Adzhubei’s speech, however, is how closely 
he linked a renewed journalism to a new vision of cultural achievement, one where 
journalists embraced their distinctiveness. Both his celebration of the “I” and his call to 
arms encouraged journalists to see themselves as possessors of specific skills and worthy 
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of respect—making him one of the more striking elite voices in favor of a new kind of 
professional standing in the context of the new creative union.  
 Adzhubei is often considered an instrumental figure to the founding of the 
Journalists’ Union due to his prominence as an editor and close relationship to 
Khrushchev. And, though he was not a member of the Orgburo, his speech here, more 
than many others, indicates that the Journalists’ Union was not so much an attempt to 
create or re-define a profession as it was an attempt to advance a particular argument 
about journalism’s meaning and social function. His speech reads as an answer to those 
rank-and file-journalists who sought parity with the Writers’ Union—though his 
argument was less about material advantage and support and more about moral and social 
value. Adzhubei, as both a journalist and political figure, was no doubt well aware of the 
social and political weight attached to literature and thus aware of the legacy he claimed 
for his own profession. In his interpretation, journalism work required skill and a social 
conscience, and young professionals should not regard their work as inferior to belles-
lettres. 
••• 
 Though I have thus far concentrated on domestic considerations, the all-USSR 
Congress also addressed the global responsibilities of journalism as a whole—a topic 
mostly relevant to the senior journalists who held important bureaucratic positions in 
addition to their status at newspapers. Overall, the speeches on international affairs 
revealed the close relationship between journalism and foreign policy—both the 
responsibility of journalists to interpret and understand it and the influence of Cold War 
politics on standards of journalistic success and failure. Pavel Satiukov’s remarks 
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highlighted the importance of ideological struggle with “bourgeois” worldviews to the 
self-definition of Soviet journalism. Clearly, the Cold War gave new weight to this 
enduring paradigm.359 These discussions also highlight the close relationship between 
creative fields and policy objectives and the limits of professional agency for media 
professionals. Ideological fluctuations and definitional struggles were a key part of Soviet 
political culture: in the 1920s, as Stalin struggled with his ideological rivals, Party 
members found it difficult to determine the “general line” and status of political figures, 
and often depended on Pravda editorials. Kirill Tomoff has argued that composers, as 
creative union members, had some ability to define who was a “cosmopolitan” during 
Zhdanov’s postwar anti-Western campaigns. Much of Soviet society was engulfed in 
similar interpretative uncertainty after Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin’s excesses at 
the Twentieth Congress. In contrast, which journalism was “bourgeois” was largely 
determined by the Cold War’s fixed ideological and geographic parameters, limiting 
journalists’ interpretive flexibility.360 Satiukov’s expectations for journalists are similar to 
those found in more recent sociological scholarship on journalism as a profession, 
especially newsroom ethnographies—a scholarly literature focused almost entirely on 
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Western democracies, with some recent exceptions. I further explore these affinities—
and their limits—in chapter five.361    
 In his discussion of newspaper content, Satiukov argued that one of the main 
responsibilities of Soviet journalists was to provide meaningful and accurate 
information—a process which apparently required as much emotion and sensitivity as it 
did logic. In contrast to the “sensationalism” of bourgeois coverage, Soviet journalists 
would draw their information from the “everyday life”  of their citizens, “their creative 
initiative and good deeds, which characterize the high spiritual qualities of the person 
from a new world.” In order to capture these qualities, journalists would need “a clear 
mind and a warm heart.”362 Despite the elevated language and ideologically tinged 
appeals to ordinary people, Satiukov’s interest in information and its transmission also 
reveals parallels with the journalism he denigrated. He singled out the failure of the 
Moscow city newspaper, Vecherniaia Moskva (Evening Moscow), to immediately report 
on the successful launch of a Soviet moon rocket, joking that the newspapers’ former 
editor and the American Vice-President Nixon were the only two people on earth who 
had not believed in the launch’s success. The importance of timeliness as a value in 
determining and shaping news is well established in sociological and communications 
literature on journalism—though the failure to report on a Soviet rocket launch likely 
carried different penalties than similar omissions would in the West.363 
 Satiukov devoted considerable time to cataloging Soviet journalism’s successes 
since the Journalists’ Union had formed, along with demonstrating “bourgeois” 
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journalism’s declining influence. He singled out the MOJ and its leisure house in Varna 
on the Bulgarian Black Sea as a site of cultural cooperation. He also discussed the 
competitive aspect of socialist journalism at length, claiming that newspapers in France 
and Austria had shut down at the same time as Soviet ones thrived. He offered a classic 
Marxist-Leninist interpretation to explain declining newspaper sales in the capitalist 
West. The key explanatory factor was not, of course, the developing popularity of 
television but rather the growth of advertising in place of more substantive content. 
Satiukov also decried the growth of media empires under the Rockefeller and Hearst 
families as a sign that objectivity was threatened by market forces. The notion of 
bourgeois “objectivity” was vehemently attacked, with supporting quotations from the 
writings of educational philosopher and former University of Chicago president Robert 
Hutchins on press responsibility at a meeting of the American Association of Newspaper 
Editors in Washington in the spring of 1955. Hutchins himself was a dedicated critic of 
newspaper monopolies and especially concerned that American newspapers were failing 
to inculcate democratic values in their readers. Satiukov argued that “objective” 
journalism existed in limited circles in the United States, as exemplified by their fair 
coverage of Khrushchev’s visit, and that similar “objectivity” could be found in anti-
colonial journalism in the developing world.364 Claims about objectivity were more than 
a discussion of professional values; they were also a declaration of political and social 
superiority. The sharp binary here serves as a reminder that definitions of “bourgeois” 
journalism were much less flexible than other political terms.365 
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 Pride in Soviet journalism’s international reach was as important as the elaborate 
description of bourgeois journalism’s decline. While heaping additional praise on 
Khrushchev’s success in the United States, which he had personally witnessed as a 
delegation member, Satiukov also stressed the increasing numbers of “internationally 
experienced journalists” (zhurnalisti mezhdunarodniki) and placed several Orgburo 
members in their ranks: D. F. Kraminov, B. L. Leont’ev, and Iu. A. Zhukov, along with 
Aleksei Adzhubei, Izvestiia foreign correspondent Melor Sturua, and others. The high 
value placed on international expertise throughout the Journalists’ Union’s incubation 
process demonstrates its importance to the organization’s working definition of 
professional success. Though few journalists could or did achieve the international stature 
of Adzhubei or Zhukov, these men were clearly meant to serve as inspirational examples. 
Other speeches indicate that all delegates to the Congress were expected to embrace the 
international aspects of creative union membership, including its front organization, the 
MOJ. Its president, the French communist Jean Maurice Hermann, celebrated its origins 
as an anti-fascist organization. Hermann expressed pride that the MOJ was the “first 
victim of the Cold War,” in light of the schism between it and the IFJ that emerged in the 
late 1940s.  P. P. Erofeev credited Khrushchev’s foreign policy of peaceful coexistence 
with adding new significance to the Journalists’ Union’s mandate to promote “friendship 
and cooperation between peoples.” Erofeev supported this contention with empirical 
data: the Journalists’ Union had tripled its number of foreign delegations, from five in 
1959 to fifteen in the coming year. And, presumably in answer to local complaints about 
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equity in representation in professional travel abroad, Erofeev noted that half of the 
representatives on these trips were from local publications.366  
 While the Writers’ Union was established at a moment of internal cultural 
consolidation, and represented state interest in bringing various literary factions that 
claimed to represent “proletarian” literature under state control, the Journalists’ Union 
was defined by the Khrushchev policy of “peaceful coexistence” between capitalism and 
socialism.367 The importance of this concept to journalists’ domestic and international 
agendas was stressed repeatedly. Its most interesting articulation, however, came from 
Iurii Zhukov, then the head of the State Committee on Cultural Connections Abroad, 
which was one of the major Soviet agencies responsible for promoting foreign exchange 
and cooperation among intellectuals in the postwar period.368 Zhukov sought to refute the 
idea that peaceful coexistence signified any kind of meaningful relaxation in the 
ideological Cold War, even after Khrushchev’s visit to the United States. He was 
particularly concerned with the United States Information Agency’s activities. He cited 
the large portion of its budget marked exclusively for  “psychological warfare,” its large 
number of foreign correspondence posts abroad, and its radio programming and 
publications. The overall aim of his remarks was to demonstrate the Soviet Union’s 
continued vulnerability. Zhukov also touched on the problem of limited opportunities for 
dialogue: Soviet literary figures had a responsibility to find a common language with all 
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proponents of peace, even if their other ideological viewpoints were hostile.369 D. F. 
Il’ichev struck an even less conciliatory note in the international portion of his address, 
arguing against those in the “bourgeois world” who were only in favor of peaceful 
coexistence so long as this ensured the preservation of capitalism as a system. The 
solution to this misunderstanding was to illuminate the logic of history and the inevitable, 
and indeed already accomplished, victory of socialism. Though Khrushchev himself had 
spoken about the need for “concessions” on both sides, Il’ichev insisted that 
compromises in trade and international politics in no way extended to the ideological 
realm. This lengthy excursus on Khrushchev’s foreign policy demonstrates that the 
inaugural congress was both a professional celebration and an ideological refresher 
course on the cultural Cold War.370  
 Zhukov’s battle plan put a particular onus on Soviet information agencies, since 
the official state news agency Sovinformburo received thousands of requests per year for 
information about the Soviet Union for use in foreign newspapers, especially after 
Khrushchev’s visit to the United States. Zhukov claimed that the Philadelphia Inquirer 
drastically increased its circulation after publishing Sovinformburo material on 
Khrushchev’s foreign policy. Success in the project of Soviet journalism now depended, 
in theory, on the ability to reach foreign audiences as well as Soviet ones. The 
relationship between writers and news agencies was also an important aspect of this 
project. Though writers like Il’ia Ehrenburg, Aleksei Surkov, and Nikolai Tikhonov 
regularly contributed to the news agency’s work, other writers were delinquent in their 
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responsibilities: Boris Polevoi had not provided a promised article for a Chinese 
newspaper, and Konstantin Simonov was similarly behind. An editor from Sverdlovsk 
had even prevented his employees from writing for the foreign press, despite warnings 
from the local party organization. Though Zhukov celebrated the high-level 
accomplishments of internationally expert journalists, his speech indicates that a sense of 
responsibility toward a global public was extended toward all journalists, not just those 
who had attained fame and renown. Local delegates protested that journalists who had 
traveled abroad, especially in recent delegations to the United States, did not present on 
their experiences outside of Moscow or the Russian Republic.371 
 Whereas various participants in the bylaws debate had focused on the Journalists’ 
Union’s domestic responsibilities and their relationship to professional identity, the all-
Union Congress’s elite nature made it a more appropriate setting to discuss the 
international aspects of conscious professionalization. This included establishing a 
professional ideal, the zhurnalist-mezhdunarodnik, and his opposite, the “bourgeois” 
journalist, and reminding the delegates that their audience was now global. The 
Journalists’ Union’s dual mandate determined the content of Soviet professional identity, 
just as international concerns had led to its creation.  
••• 
 The all-USSR Congress concluded with a variety of ceremonial speeches and 
gestures: the reading of congratulatory telegrams from the other creative unions, approval 
of resolutions on the Orbguro’s work, and protest of the unlawful imprisonment of the 
Greek Communist Manolis Glezos. The more significant exercise was the ratification of 
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the final version of the bylaws, which would be in effect until the Journalists’ Union’s 
Second Congress in 1966, and the election of a governing board and secretariat. Though 
these processes confirmed the close ties of the Journalists’ Union to the party apparatus, 
certain personnel changes also suggested an increased role for reform-minded journalists.  
 The new governing board’s ninety three members included all senior members of 
the all-USSR Orgburo, the secretaries of the republic branches, and the heads of some 
oblast’ branches, including Moscow and Leningrad.  Other significant additions included 
Aleksei Adzhubei, Melor Sturua (both of whom worked at Izvestiia, the former as editor-
in-chief, the latter as a special correspondent), M. A. Kharlamov of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and the dean of Moscow State University’s journalism department, E. L. 
Khudiakov.372 At the plenum convened after the all-USSR Congress, Satiukov was 
elected as the head of the Journalists’ Union’s executive board. From the original 
Orgburo, Pal’gunov, Burkov, Goriunov, Kraminov, and Erofeev were elected secretaries, 
along with the heads of the other Union Republic branches, Adzhubei, and Kurtynin.373 
The continued presence of international experts and the addition of younger figures 
closely associated with Khrushchev’s commitment to revolutionary renewal 
demonstrated that the Journalists’ Union retained its original structure but that the 
creative ideals it promoted could evolve.  Several of the major creative seminars under 
the new governing board would focus far more on the socialist person than on mass 
journalism.  
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 The conference formally concluded with the ratification of the creative union’s 
bylaws. As I discussed in chapter one, the changes to the document were less substantial 
than rank-and-file members had previously advocated. The document did not establish 
Zhurfond or substantive material benefits to members. The proponents of a more 
inclusive membership model were more successful: the final bylaws explicitly included 
freelance journalists and worker and peasant correspondents. The document also made 
more overt references to professional ethics, as slander and libel were added to the 
grounds for expulsion from the creative union. The ratification process did include an 
open floor vote with an opportunity for commentary. During this time, a journalist from 
Kemerovsk brought up the issue of local representation, which was prominent during the 
bylaws debate. He argued for the creation of primary organizations of the creative union 
below the raion-level, since the current practice of each publication electing 
representatives to the higher body. The head of the Moldovan chapter of the creative 
union argued that this was unnecessary and would produce redundancies: that journalists, 
unlike other creative union members, already had ties to their workplaces and party 
groups, so a journalists’ union chapter for every publication would be redundant. 
Following this exchange, the bylaws were unanimously approved.374 Though this policy 
would later be reversed, as my discussion of the 1966 Congress will show, it 
demonstrates the complicated nature of imposing a creative union on an already-existing 
professional and party structure. 
••• 
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 Though the presence of senior journalists who were also active Party members 
goes some way to demonstrate the close relationship between the mass media and the 
governing elite, the most convincing piece of evidence is perhaps the participation of 
Khrushchev himself in the events of the congress. The Soviet leader delivered an address 
to the delegates at the Kremlin after the event’s formal conclusion. In his remarks, 
Khrushchev recapitulated many of the same themes as the editors and Party elites who 
had presented over the previous three days: the close connection between journalism and 
foreign policy, the value and meaning of peaceful coexistence, and the importance of 
genre and reader relationships.375 
 Khrushchev took great pains to stress his own dual responsibilities, similar to 
those of the new creative union. He described his “astonishment’ at economic successes 
and then turned to foreign affairs. He described a Western view that “it is as though the 
Soviet Union changed its politics, and therefore it is easier to talk to us. This is of course 
untrue. We were born communists, live as communists, and do not die, but will move 
forward as communists!” Similarly, though Western observers argued that he had created 
peaceful coexistence, the doctrine actually originated with Lenin. He also insisted that 
“the people of capitalist countries are not our enemies, but our friends!” and the real 
enemy was the “imperialist circles, who rule in many countries. He also expressed pride 
that the Soviet Union had enough rockets to “wipe all of our presumed enemies from the 
face of the earth,” though this was only to defend the “struggle for peace” by having the 
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adequate means to resist those who sought war.”376 Like Il’ichev and Zhukov before him, 
Khrushchev worked to ensure the proper interpretation of his foreign policy, insisting on 
his fidelity to Leninist ideals and assuring his audience that opposition to the exploitative 
aspects of capitalism remained essential to his worldview. In some respects, 
Khrushchev’s rhetoric was the most militant, as he exulted in the size of the Soviet 
arsenal while insisting that it should never be used.  
 Khrushchev also connected journalism to foreign policy, acknowledging that the 
Cold War was about print culture competition as well as military and economic issues. In 
a discussion of his personal reading habits, Khrushchev admitted that while it might seem 
strange or awkward that he read capitalist newspapers more than Soviet ones, this was 
because “it’s good for us to know what’s happening in the capitalist world, what they are 
saying about the Soviet Union.”377 This kind of surveillance activity was in fact an 
important function of the Journalists’ Union, which tended to closely monitor the 
attitudes of foreign guests or the effectiveness of its international activities. Khrushchev 
also weighed in on more heated subjects, such as the relationship between writers and 
journalists, though his conclusions also carried serious implications for questions of 
professional identity and expertise:  
We call writers the Party’s assistants (pomoshniki). I hope that writers will 
not be upset with me, if I say that you, journalists, are not only trusted 
assistants, but actually the party’s lieutenants (podruchniki), active fighters 
in her great cause. Why lieutenants? Because you are always close at 
hand.  As soon as we need to explain and carry out some decision, we turn 
to you, and you, like the most reliable transmission belt, take the party’s 
decisions and carry them to the heart of our people.378  
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This vision of journalism would seem to support the long-held view of the Soviet press as 
a sterile mouthpiece of Party policy—transmitting party directives and propaganda 
directly from the Kremlin to newspaper subscribers. This recognition of journalistic 
expertise seems far more circumscribed than that enjoyed by composers. It is certainly 
true that journalists were not, and could not have been, acknowledged as masters of 
knowledge that the political leadership did not possess—there was too much overlap in 
authority between the two arenas for such a claim to be credible.379   
 Rather than limit himself to praising journalists, Khrushchev was equally 
concerned with possibilities for improvement, offering his own thoughts on audience 
engagement: 
Sometimes you pick up a newspaper, read it and set it down. And then you 
don’t remember what is in it. I tell you this so that you do not put on airs. 
You need to prepare the newspaper intelligently, and prepare it on a 
different day from the one where you compose it.  A real leader should 
anticipate which subjects and themes he should ask for. He should be able 
to choose not only a subject, but also to select experts (masterov), so that 
the theme should be so developed, that, like they say about a well cooked 
lunch afterward you want to lick your fingers.380   
 
 In this view, the successful journalist would be contemplative and thoughtful, and 
know well the skills of his employees and how to employ them to maximum effect. 
Leading journalists would engage their own analytical skills in a quest to inspire lasting 
values in readers rather than fleeting impressions. The importance of journalists’ own 
inward focus to successfully engaging audiences would become a major theme of 
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creative union work after the Congress as well. Though his very presence at the event 
indicates the political value—and supervision—of journalists, Khrushchev’s speech 
nevertheless imparted journalists with significant qualities of contemplation and political 
foresight. He affirmed the centrality of journalism to the Soviet project and to society at 
large—even implying that journalists were more valued than writers. Though the elite 
nature of professional status and its accompanying material benefits were unresolved 
issues, the all-USSR Congress concluded with unambiguous declarations of journalism’s 
cultural and social value.  
••• 
 In my first chapter, I described the Journalists’ Union’s status as both 
organization and argument, as well as that argument’s extended elaboration during the 
bylaws debate. The Journalists’ Union, however, was an argument that also took place in 
a public forum: the Journalists’ Union’s inaugural Congress in the fall of 1959. Here, 
more contrasts can be drawn between journalists and other creative union members: the 
characterization of journalists as always “close to the Party” is more accurate for them 
than other groups, given that senior journalists also had careers in the Party apparatus. 
The ability of journalists to connect to the public, and their responsibility to do so, 
connects my study of the journalism profession to persistent historiographic debates 
about the nature of creative work in a Soviet context. While Kirill Tomoff rightly points 
out that the search for professional separation from political figures is both 
counterproductive and impossible in a Soviet context, the composers he studies had more 
ability to shape the political process than journalists did, as their work was less accessible 
to oversight.  
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 Journalists’ close association with the party did not mean a straightforward 
resolution of professional questions. Journalists may have sometimes been a policy 
“conveyor belt,” but they also strove to determine who the most privileged members of 
this transmission team were and to defend their own social relevance against that of more 
established creative unions. The Congress delegates and speakers continued to argue and 
debate the boundaries of professional belonging and the social standing of journalists vis-
à-vis their literary counterparts. The internationally themed discussions of responsibilities 
were in some sense more straightforward, given the strict opposition between “socialist” 
and “bourgeois” journalism, though they highlighted the challenges of ‘peaceful 
coexistence” and the heightened political charge attached to mass media activity in a 
Cold War context. 
 Questions of continuity and change are also visible in the first three years of the 
Journalists’ Union’s existence. Demographic data and the bylaws commentary 
demonstrate that journalists had become more educated and politically active since the 
1930s. The Union’s architects drew explicit contrasts between the Soviet public of the 
Stalin era and their own readers, and even made some comments about the relative 
capacity of journalists to assert themselves as authors. My examination of journalists as 
social and organizational actors as well as individual authors demonstrates that the 
Journalists’ Union is key to understanding exactly how journalists conceptualized their 
various responsibilities. 
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Chapter 4  
Cold War Professionalism: Journalists, Institutional Change, and Cultural 
Diplomacy 
 
 In 1959, the Journalists’ Union, in a joint undertaking with the MOJ and the other 
socialist creative unions, opened a leisure resort (dom otdykha) in Varna, Bulgaria, near 
the Black Sea. The resort was a source of great pride, treated as a tangible sign of the 
Soviet Union’s growing international prestige and commitment to cultural diplomacy. 
But by July of 1960, Soviet journalists, along with their socialist colleagues, had begun to 
conduct themselves in troubling ways.  The resulting incidents, though not without comic 
undertones, were interpreted with the utmost gravity. One journalist, A. M. Khorobrikh, 
got so drunk during a “carnival” organized for guests that he “could no longer stand, and 
when he fell, bashed his face in.” (Ne smog derzhatsia na nogakh,i pri padanie razbil 
sebe litso). Khorobrikh was apparently so caught up in the celebratory atmosphere that 
the decision of Bulgarian colleagues to lead him away did not dampen his spirits. When 
left alone, he crawled out a window and appeared again in the public hall, this time with 
his “pants down to his knees.” A colleague from the same newspaper in Leningrad, P. P. 
Pirogov, was also a heavy drinker and became overly familiar with a female Polish 
colleague, staying out late with her in a local bar. In addition to these sins, Pirogov 
accepted payment for a contribution to a Bulgarian newspaper—a practice guests had 
been warned against, presumably because it was overly mercenary for committed 
Communists in a recreational setting. For others, the local area offered different 
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temptations; L. P. Kafanova was “needlessly distracted by walking around stores and 
other commercial matters” and confessed to her “thoughtless” conduct. This particular 
episode suggests that the greater availability of consumer goods in Bulgaria was of some 
interest to guests—but that this fascination could be interpreted as political unreliability. 
 The resort’s Bulgarian director, far from being a paragon of socialist civility, did 
little to improve matters. He kept the resort bar open until early in the morning and had a 
jazz orchestra that played “exclusively Western dances.” He even led off the dancing 
every evening with a Polish partner in an especially “immodest” manner. Apparently, the 
revelry would end with him inviting Polish women back to his room to view 
“pornographic films.” This association with dancing, jazz, and alcohol was not a new 
Soviet anxiety.  These discourses were particularly common in Khrushchev-era 
campaigns against youth who were seen as overly Western in their dress and 
comportment, the style-chasers, or stiliagi. These young people, like the resort-goers, 
were often fond of “bourgeois” jazz. These unorthodox leisure pursuits came to an abrupt 
end: the resort director was fired after a Bulgarian Communist Party investigation. 
Khorobrikh, due to his public intoxication, was reprimanded at a Party meeting, had a 
warning placed in his Party file, and was fired from his job. Pirogov received only a stern 
reprimand with a warning.381 The Soviet consul in Varna brought these incidents to the 
Central Committee’s attention, demonstrating that leisure-related mishaps were of great 
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political import.382 As part of its response to these scandals, the Journalists’ Union 
reminded local chapters of its high expectations: 
Be especially careful in selecting candidates…as the international leisure 
resort is not only a place for relaxation, but also a distinctive place, 
bringing together and protecting progressive journalists from all over the 
world, bringing about the expansion of international ties of journalists and 
the cause of strengthening global peace and friendship.383 
 
 The Varna episodes demonstrate that media managers had a particularly exalted 
vision of cultural diplomacy; even leisure activities were expected to advance Soviet 
values and international prestige. The journalists selected for such travel, on the other 
hand, were more interested in the possibilities such recreation afforded: whether that 
meant consumer goods, parties, or more intimate personal encounters in a resort 
setting.384 Though media managers channeled their anxieties through investigative reports 
and procedures, they were no less acute for their formality. Though the creative union 
was founded with an explicit cultural diplomacy mandate and actively pursued 
engagement with the outside world, interest in openness did not mean relaxed vigilance.  
••• 
 In this chapter, I demonstrate that journalists, through their work as creative union 
members and in other institutional settings, were active participants in the cultural 
diplomacy aspects of the Cold War. In so doing, I contribute to the growing 
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historiographical literature on the Soviet Union as a world power, and the pursuit of new 
kinds of global engagement under Khrushchev.  Though Soviet leaders actively pursued 
cultural diplomacy in the 1920s and remained a priority in the interwar period, most 
recent literature on these efforts focuses on the expansion of foreign contacts after 
1945.385 The Soviet Union’s new postwar borders, especially the acquisition of Western 
Ukraine and the Baltics, created new opportunities for the movement of goods, people, 
and ideas—which became particularly challenging at moments of global crisis, such as 
the Hungarian uprising in 1956. I discuss the impact of the Hungarian events on the 
creative union’s cultural diplomacy mission, as well as the broader interest in cultural 
contacts with fellow socialists in Eastern Europe.386 Recent research has demonstrated 
that Soviet interests in the Eastern bloc, especially in the two decades following the war, 
was driven by interest in constructing an “empire of friends” based on ideological 
compatibility and cultural exchange.387 Though exchange with Eastern Europe is only a 
part of my analysis, the MOJ’s commitment to “progressive” journalism also rested on a 
conviction that professional status and political orientation were more important than 
nationality. The organization’s efforts to advance this vision—and oppose the 
“bourgeois” journalism supported by capitalists and imperialists—form a crucial part of 
this chapter. 
 Khrushchev actively pursued engagement with the West as part of peaceful 
coexistence, through initiatives like the 1957 World Youth Festival and the 1959 
                                                
385 One important recent exception is David-Fox, Showcasing.  
386 On the impact of Hungary in the new Soviet borderlands, see Amir Weiner, “The Empires Pay a Visit: 
Gulag Returnees, East European Rebellions, and Frontier Politics” Journal of Modern History 78, no. 2, 
333–76. 
387 Rachel Leah Applebaum, “Friendship of the Peoples: Soviet-Czechoslovak Cultural and Social Contacts 
from the Battle for Prague to the Prague Spring, 1945–1969” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2012). 
  211 
American Exhibition. Though hosting foreigners was a risk, Khrushchev and his 
supporters were confident in the Soviet system’s competitiveness—and so were many 
Soviet citizens, judging by their response to the American Exhibition, in which many of 
them declared that the Soviet Union would surpass American achievements.388 The 
creative union’s sustained expansion of its cultural diplomacy mandate—of which the 
Varna resort was an important part—should be understood as part of this broader 
institutional and political history. As we saw in chapter one, Kraminov’s belief that the 
Soviet Union was losing foreign influence in the MOJ was a crucial factor in the 
formation of the creative union. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, these journalists with 
international experience found themselves heading up new cultural diplomacy agencies 
or advocating for the reform of existing institutions. The elite figure of the internationally 
sophisticated journalist, or zhurnalist-mezhdunarodnik, was integral to cultural diplomacy 
work.  For this group of journalists, the ability to represent the Soviet Union abroad and 
work closely with visiting foreigners were essential professional skills. As we have seen, 
several members of the Journalists’ Union’s Orgburo were considered zhurnalisty 
mezhdunarodniki—creative union efforts to improve work with foreigners were nearly 
always focused on cultivating enough qualified international experts for major 
international undertakings—and ensuring that their behavior while abroad was a source 
of pride rather than embarrassment. Though Soviet media elites continually stressed that 
their work was more sophisticated and detailed than “tourism,” journalists’ efforts to 
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engage with foreign visitors and understand other countries did involve leisure and 
cultural pursuits.389 
 As the MOJ had its own organizational history and structure, separate from that of 
the Journalists’ Union, some attention to its formation process is crucial background for 
this chapter. Soviet histories of the MOJ note its origins in the tumultuous atmosphere of 
wartime Europe and the aftermath of victory over the Axis powers: anti-fascist journalists 
held four congresses pledging their cooperation in the fight against Hitler—the MOJ’s 
formal creation dated to June 1946, at an International Congress of Journalists held in 
Copenhagen that June. Participation in this meeting involved twenty-one countries, 
including the USSR, the United States, and England. By 1947, at the organization’s 
second congress in Prague, tensions were on the rise between socialist and capitalist 
journalists over moving the organization’s headquarters from London to Prague. By 
1948, American and Western European journalists formally disassociated themselves 
from the MOJ, a period which Soviet sources refer to as a “schism” in the journalist’s 
cooperation movement, culminating in the formation of the International Federation of 
Journalists, based in Brussels. At the MOJ’s third congress in 1950, held in Helsinki, 
Finland, French journalist Jean-Maurice Hermann was elected president, a position he 
would hold for over two decades. By 1952, splits in the international journalists’ 
movement had adversely affected the MOJ’s standing: it lost consultative status with 
UNESCO that year and only regained it in 1969. At the time of Kraminov’s memo 
advocating the creative union’s formation, the MOJ had approximately sixty thousand 
                                                
389 My understanding of the political and cultural value of travel owes much to Gorsuch, All This Is Your 
World. 
  213 
members. By 1981 these numbers would increase to one hundred fifty thousand, though 
precise figures are disputed and difficult to trace.390 The MOJ took political stances in 
favor of “progressive” journalists—this involved a vocal commitment to pacifism, work, 
and leisure rights and protesting political persecution of the press. Over time, its agenda 
became increasingly anti-colonial—a process that would have profound impact on the 
Journalists’ Union’s cultural diplomacy initiatives.391 In addition to its Executive 
Committee, which usually met on a yearly basis, and its congresses, the organization also 
had a secretariat, composed of vice president, secretaries, and a treasurer. The secretary-
general was traditionally a Czech journalist. Throughout the period of this study, a 
Journalists’ Union member, often though not always the creative union president, was 
also an MOJ vice-president, as indirect recognition of the Soviet Union’s management 
role. One of the MOJ’s secretaries was also a creative union member—these 
representatives feature prominently in the narrative, as they often reported to both the 
creative union and the Central Committee.392 
 Many of the key figures in this chapter are familiar from previous episodes. Boris 
Polevoi’s American trip was an important catalyst for institutional change, and Leonid 
Il’ichev, who spoke at the inaugural congress as a member of the Agitation and 
Propaganda Department, also oversaw the creative union’s creation during his time at the 
MID. In the years before the inaugural congress, the Orgburo leadership assumed much 
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392 See note 390.  
  214 
of the responsibility for the MOJ, and senior members like Kraminov, Boris Burkov, and 
P. P. Erofeev remained involved in later years. Afterward, senior members of its 
secretariat occupied similar roles: including union president Pavel Satiukov, Aleksei 
Adzhubei, and M. A. Kharlamov, who had previously worked at the MID press 
department. The involvement of senior newspaper editors—some of whom had personal 
relationships to Khrushchev—further demonstrates the political value of journalism in the 
Cold War.  
 Cultural diplomacy was inextricably linked to promoting and expanding the 
Soviet Union’s ideological interests and global dominance. Though I do discuss Soviet-
American rivalry as part of the MOJ’s work, many of my findings connect to Soviet 
initiatives in the developing world—the cultural aspects of what Odd Arne Westad has 
termed the “Global Cold War.”393 I explore this theme through the MOJ’s rivalry with 
“bourgeois” journalists and efforts to bring in new members. In so doing, I significantly 
expand historical knowledge of “front” organizations and their operation. Cold War-era 
scholarship on these bodies stresses their usefulness for the Soviet leadership, as 
organizations not directly connected to communist parties but generally sympathetic to 
Soviet ideological positions. This made them able to operate in “parallel” to its foreign 
policy establishment. The amount of Soviet monetary aid to these organizations was 
substantial, though to my knowledge no coherent analysis of these subsidies exists.394 My 
work on the MOJ, rather than refuting the view of front organizations as extensions of the 
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political apparatus, aims to provide it with more nuance. While the Central Committee 
closely monitored its work, as did the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID), the creative 
union assumed primary responsibility for the MOJ. The proper management of the front 
organization was a continual source of friction and anxiety. Soviet representatives to the 
MOJ frequently criticized the creative union’s leadership and decision making, and 
petitioned the Central Committee with their own visions of the organization. Though few 
of these proposals resulted in significant changes, they demonstrate the high political 
value attached to cultural diplomacy and the continued drive for improvement. The 
creative union’s critics often employed the language of moral failure or laziness to argue 
for higher standards or increased oversight. 
 One of the MOJ’s most important undertakings was its responsibility to host 
World Journalists’ Meetings: gatherings in a major world city dedicated to discussions of 
professional concerns and the political issues of the day. These gatherings were open to 
non-MOJ members, though the main participants were close to the organization and 
Soviet journalists always had leading roles. In this chapter, I discuss three of these events, 
the meetings in 1956, 1960, and 1963. While the first two focused on rapprochement with 
the West, participants grew increasingly concerned with the developing world and 
managing the consequences of the Sino-Soviet split. The MOJ thus serves as an 
important barometer for Soviet foreign policy objectives and views on global politics.  
••• 
 Examining cultural diplomacy efforts prior to the Journalists’ Union’s formation 
proves that journalists played significant roles in this arena even in the absence of a 
creative union. Journalists’ travel abroad had lasting domestic implications for the Soviet 
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approach to cultural diplomacy and the political status of journalists. Boris Polevoi’s 
autumn 1955 visit to the United States, as part of a journalists’ delegation that included 
Aleksei Adzhubei, had lasting repercussions for Soviet cultural diplomacy. In late 
November of 1955, Polevoi composed a lengthy report of his journey. The trip was a 
monumental undertaking: in thirty-three days, the delegation visited New York, 
Cleveland, Salt Lake City, San Francisco, and Phoenix, before concluding their journey 
in Washington, D.C. Polevoi made special note of the delegation’s visit not only to 
newspapers and radio and television broadcasting stations but also to the journalism 
departments at Columbia and at UCLA. Both media managers and journalism professors 
expressed interest in furthering foreign exchange. As part of their efforts to 
“propagandize” the Soviet way of life, the delegates made media appearances and gave 
press conferences—Polevoi thought that audiences were generally “sympathetic” to the 
views expressed at these events. He was especially pleased that the audience for a final 
televised press forum in Washington numbered five million people. Even more 
fortuitously, two “betrayers of the motherland”—presumably émigrés known to his 
audience, as they were referred to only by their surnames, Volkov and Koriakov—did not 
have their “provocative” questions read by the moderator. As Rosa Magnusdottir has 
noted, Polevoi was quite frank about the weaknesses of the Soviet position as 
representatives of socialism to the West: knowledge of the United States was not current, 
and interactions in which Soviet representatives put too much stress on racial inequality 
could prove alienating. As far as future efforts to host foreigners, Polevoi suggested 
  217 
providing more detailed information about Soviet life, and that poor service on Aeroflot 
flights could have “political” repercussions.395   
 The logistical challenges of providing hospitality that would meet foreigners’ 
expectations would prove to be an ongoing theme for the Journalists’ Union. 
Magnsudottir’s analysis only gestures to the domestic implications of Polevoi’s visit. 
Polevoi did not limit his criticism of Soviet cultural diplomacy to the problem of limited 
Soviet knowledge of American life. In a separate report to the Central Committee written 
in December 1955, he and his colleagues wrote in scathing terms about the conditions of 
TASS’s Washington and American bureaus. He was particularly critical of the recall of 
qualified correspondents and their replacement by those who “had never worked in 
America and did not know the country” or who only spoke Spanish. TASS 
correspondents were too timid with American colleagues for fear of inciting conflict, 
where Polevoi thought that they should “conduct themselves without embarrassment” and 
not avoid political debates. Polevoi insisted Soviet TASS workers were underpaid, 
especially in comparison to their American counterparts and those who worked in 
embassies. In a particularly damning point which showcases his own professional pride, 
Polevoi complained that journalists’ pay was more like that of chauffeurs than to that of 
diplomats. This relative poverty impaired their ability to socialize, which “compromised 
them.” He also claimed that the dilapidated automobiles TASS workers drove was 
comparable to “representatives of a major American agency going around Moscow in a 
pre-revolutionary carriage.” To conclude his report, Polevoi asserted that “strengthening 
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correspondents’ cadres in a country like America, has, in our view, important political 
meaning.”396 
 The Central Committee took Polevoi’s concerns quite seriously, as Presidium 
member M. A. Suslov was among those who suggested that action be taken on the report. 
TASS director Pal’gunov forwarded his agency’s response to the case in March of 1956, 
which disputed many of Polevoi’s allegations. Pal’gunov’s assistant, the report’s author, 
assured the Central Committee that TASS foreign correspondents were now driving a 
new Ford, and that salary discrepancies between American and Soviet TASS employees 
were due to American income tax. Polevoi’s complaints that the new workers were 
inexperienced were met with reminders that the experienced journalists had been recalled 
because they had been abroad for over five years, with assurances that new 
correspondents would be sent shortly. TASS workers did make less than their 
counterparts who performed similar functions in embassies, and agency director 
Pal’gunov had made unsuccessful efforts to correct it. Proposals to send Pal’gunov to the 
United States to review the work of telegraph agencies there, or re-education courses, 
were ultimately not pursued.397   
 The effects of Polevoi’s report reached far beyond the media establishment.  In 
January of 1956, the administration of Moscow University and the Central Committee’s 
Science and Education Department requested that Polevoi speak about American 
journalism training, particularly at Columbia University, so that these practices could be 
studied and emulated.  In March of 1956, the Minister of Higher Education advocated 
                                                
396 RGANI f. 5, op. 16, d. 734, l. 147, 151–3; 148–53; RGANI f. 5, op. 16, d. 748, ll. 109–12. 
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that Soviet embassies popularize Soviet higher education abroad, by recruiting “qualified 
and erudite” professors and students to speak to curious foreigners. Soviet universities 
and other learning institutions would be encouraged to set up regular correspondence 
with their capitalist counterparts, as they had in Eastern Europe, and to send scientific 
literature abroad without prior censorship. The Ministry of Culture provided a list of 
similar proposals.398 In a report to the Central Committee in April 1956, an assistant to 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs asserted that ambassadors had already begun preparing 
speeches about foreign policy for universities along with film screenings, press 
conferences, and exhibits. More ambitious proposals included sending embassy personnel 
on trips to “establish useful practical cooperation with Americans, in particular for the 
support and strengthening of ties with those who were favorably disposed to members of 
Soviet delegations that have visited the United States.” The extent and detail of these 
responses demonstrates that Polevoi and his colleagues were seen as crucial sources of 
information for improving the Soviet Union’s image in multiple contexts.399 
 Polevoi’s visit was the catalyst for significant restructuring of cultural diplomacy 
agencies. The All-Union Society for Cultural Connections Abroad (VOKS) was 
established in 1925. In his definitive account of cultural diplomacy and VOKS, Michael 
David-Fox describes the great care that cultural diplomats took to present a positive and 
enlightened image of Soviet life to foreign visitors. In his conclusion, he argues that the 
shuttering of VOKS and its replacement by the State Committee for Cultural Connections 
Abroad (GKKS) was intended to “regularize” foreign exchange and also increase the 
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influence of the Central Committee. Archival records make clear that Polevoi’s visit to 
the United States was a crucial factor in bringing about this institutional change. In 
March of 1956, Leonid Il’ichev, then head of the MID Press Department, proposed that 
VOKS be “restructured, dispensing with its institutional character and turning it into a 
purely social organization.” In practice, this meant that the organization should be staffed 
“not by bureaucrats, but notable Soviet social figures, artists, musicians, writers, athletes 
and trade union activists.” Ideally, the organization would also organize its departments 
by country, rather than the previous arrangement according to “questions.” A restructured 
VOKS would be better able to facilitate bilateral cultural and scientific exchange, 
tourism, student visits, and youth festivals.400  
 Though detailed research into these proposals is beyond the scope of this study, 
Il’ichev’s memo does much to explain the central role for journalists in the restructured 
cultural diplomacy apparatus. For the first four years of its existence, the GKKS was 
headed not by a “bureaucrat” but by Iurii Zhukov, a senior member of Pravda’s editorial 
board who also took a leading role in the formation of he Journalists’ Union, as we saw in 
chapter one. Some of Il’ichev’s other proposals indicate a cautiously optimistic approach 
to the outside world, including the relaxation of Soviet censorship of foreign information 
sources, particularly foreign correspondents. He suggested regularized information 
exchange with foreign correspondents via the MID’s Press Department, and was 
particularly frank about freedom of information. He suggested that Soviet institutions, 
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provided that their work “did not have a specifically secret character,” prepare for more 
discussion with foreign journalists.  
Il’ichev was even relatively optimistic about sharing information: 
As far as censorship is concerned, at present it rarely…interferes with the 
content of information passed on by foreign correspondents, and operates 
only for the purposes of compiling reports about transmitted articles. It’s 
doubtful that the time is ripe for its cessation, since there is not another 
means for timely interference into crude and slanderous pronouncement 
than that which currently exists.  
 
The problem of combatting “slander” from abroad would continue as the GKKS and 
Journalists’ Union expanded their cultural diplomacy roles, as we will see below. As part 
of his interest in relaxing tensions, Il’ichev suggested allowing foreign correspondents 
access to the Central House of Journalists and increasing circulation of publications in 
English and French.401   
 In addition to advancing a new vision for the cultural diplomacy apparatus, 
Il’ichev submitted a series of suggestions for the new creative union in March 1956. 
Given his earlier suggestions that VOKS needed to become less “institutional,” his 
interest in the new creative union suggests that it was not only a reshaping of the 
journalism profession but also a reflection of a broader impulse to make cultural 
initiatives more effective. Il’ichev described a Journalists’ Union that “would establish 
working relationships with all analogous institutions which desire this.” In addition to 
facilitating the exchange of printed materials, the new organization should host 
delegations and ensure that they visited interesting places—major cities, factories, and 
collective farms.  When necessary, the creative union “could conduct press conferences 
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with the participation of foreign journalists,” and its trade journal could also promote 
exchange. Il’ichev’s suggestions, with their reliance on conditionals, stress the embryonic 
nature of the Journalists’ Union at this point—and that the preliminary response to 
Kraminov’s initial proposal had not yet resulted in a concept of organizational structure 
or practice.402 
 Il’ichev’s proposals combined concrete description with ideological and strategic 
objectives. The Journalists’ Union should “enter into contact with international 
organizations of journalists, influence their activities, in the needed direction for 
strengthening and increasing the role of the press in the struggle for peace and 
diminishing of international tensions, against disinformation and slander, against the 
subornation of the press, and for the complete freedom of journalistic activity.” The 
creative union would represent Soviet interests in UNESCO and other relevant 
international bodies.403 Though cooperation was clearly one of his major goals, Il’ichev 
also stressed the importance of competitiveness and increased knowledge of ideological 
enemies: the Journalists’ Union should analyze the foreign press, including professional 
training practices, together with “bourgeois propaganda methods against the Soviet 
Union and the people’s democracies.”404 This vision demonstrates that the development 
of international expertise and successful defensive strategies against ideological 
opponents would be a key part of journalistic responsibility in the creative union. By 
summer 1956, an article appeared in the creative union’s trade journal lamenting the lack 
of foreign language skill in the profession as a whole, since this presented major 
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obstacles to conducting interviews and making personal contacts.405 Dossiers on 
journalists who went abroad referenced to language skill, prior foreign travel, and 
ideological reliability.406 These specific qualifications suggest that the international 
dimension of “professional mastery” was easier to measure and define. In the first months 
and years of its existence, the Journalists’ Union took on a management role vis-à-vis the 
MOJ, and increasingly sent its own delegations abroad in addition to hosting foreign 
guests—demonstrating that Il’ichev’s vision of the creative union’s international mandate 
would prove formative. As I will show in later chapters, the overwhelming primacy of 
cultural diplomacy would become a source of friction between elite and rank-and-file 
journalists.  
••• 
 During the period of my study, the Journalists’ Union frequently hosted short-
term foreign guests and reported on their activities. These efforts significantly expanded 
over time: in 1958, the organization hosted only twenty-eight foreign journalists. By 
1964, it hosted nearly seven times that number: 194 guests in all.407 The creative union’s 
most important responsibility, however, was its oversight of the MOJ and the World 
Journalists’ Meetings, and I devote the remainder of this chapter to this theme. Though 
the MOJ, like the creative union, was formally dedicated to open cultural exchange, 
journalists were highly anxious about cross-cultural encounters, as they offered many 
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opportunities for political misbehavior, as we saw in the opening anecdotes about the 
Varna resort. Both MOJ journalists and diplomatic officials frequently appealed to the 
Central Committee to discipline the creative union or alter the organization’s policies, 
especially after mishaps in Varna. Though these efforts rarely succeeded, they attest to 
the great political value of cultural diplomacy and the place of journalists within such 
efforts. The World Journalists’ Meetings further illustrate the extent of these anxieties, 
while serving as an important political and cultural barometer.  In the creative union’s 
first years of existence, the organization concentrated on lessening Cold War tensions in 
Eastern Europe. After the Hungarian uprising, creative union members displayed more 
anxiety about Eastern Europe, and increasingly focused cultural diplomacy efforts on the 
developing world. When the 1960 World Journalists’ Meeting was less successful, MOJ 
representatives appealed to the Central Committee for redress. As a result, the 1964 
World Journalists’ meeting was meticulously planned and thoroughly devoted to the 
developing world. Creative union leaders took great pride in the Soviet Union’s increased 
stature in newly independent nations and persistently articulated their hostility to both a 
capitalist media system and to colonialism as a whole. Although the World Journalists’ 
meetings featured fewer obvious mishaps than the drunken antics at the Varna leisure 
resort, Soviet media managers did not relax their vigilance, especially in the face of rising 
tensions with China. The 1963 meeting showcases the extent of the MOJ’s 
transformation—while it has originated as an anti-fascist organization and spent its early 
years focused on Soviet relations with Western Europe, it became truly global over time. 
Just as the Journalists’ Union was formed in a moment of institutional and political 
transformation, the MOJ altered its own priorities under the creative union’s leadership.  
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 The Varna leisure resort and the World Journalists’ meetings were major 
priorities in the early months of the creative union’s existence. At one of the Orgburo’s 
first meetings in spring of 1956, Kraminov took the lead in discussions of the 
international mandate, since he worked closely with the MOJ as the editor of its 
publication, The Democratic Journalist. He informed the Orgburo that the Bulgarian 
Journalists’ Union had agreed to provide space on the Black Sea for an international 
leisure house for journalists (dom otydkha)—the house in Varna became a major project. 
Kraminov also presented plans for an international meeting of journalists (vstrecha) in 
Helsinki that summer. The event was to be dedicated to questions of mutual cooperation 
between professionals, “defense of interests,” as well as questions of leisure and material 
well-being.  The Soviet Union and China were the main financial backers—as a 
reflection of the creative union’s relative poverty, additional funds were solicited from 
the all-Union Council of Trade Unions. The Helsinki meeting also provided an 
opportunity to invite participants to the Soviet Union to familiarize them with the 
country—this became common practice after major MOJ events. At that time, the 
Orgburo relied chiefly on Inturist for assistance with visas and guides. Other Orgburo 
members were more focused on Cold War strategy than on logistics: as part of meeting 
“preparation,” Iurii Zhukov suggested that the central newspapers, Pravda, Izvestiia, 
Trud, and Komsomol’skaia pravda, all prepare applications for visas to the United States. 
Zhukov felt that the possible denial of entry visas “could put a trump card in our hands 
during discussions of international ties between journalists.”408 Visas and entry-exit 
permissions were a common pitfall of journalistic work in the Cold War—certain 
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particularly emotional cases involved American journalists married to Russian women 
who had been effectively trapped in the country during the political tensions of the 
Zhdanovschina and the Doctors’ Plot. Zhukov’s reasoning here demonstrated that this 
practice had strategic implications, and that no opportunity to embarrass the United States 
was considered trivial.409 
 Ongoing preparations for Helsinki included detailed discussions of the Soviet 
delegation’s goals and its composition—representing the Union republics as well as the 
RFSFR. Though some proposed that Kraminov serve as the delegations’ head, Maria 
Ovsiannikova suggested that Pal’gunov was a more appropriate choice, since he 
“indisputably” represented the Journalists’ Union, which would help the organization 
“create authority.” Ultimately, Pal’gunov became the delegation’s head, with Kraminov 
and Boris Burkov as representatives of the Orgburo. Dimitri Goriunov suggested that the 
delegation include more journalists with knowledge of foreign languages who were also 
zhurnalisti-mezhdunarodniki, which resulted in the inclusion of Ogonek editor Safronov, 
among others. The parameters of this debate demonstrate a desire to ensure that only the 
most reliable and qualified experts represented the new organization. Ovsiannikova also 
felt that the creative union should strive to increase international knowledge among its 
broader membership. Specifically, few Soviet journalists “had a complete understanding 
of the MOJ” because writers had attended more meetings of the organization in the past 
than had journalists. To correct this, more materials about the organization needed to 
appear in the press. Ovsiannikova’s assertion would seem to have some merit—
Konstantin Simonov, a representative to the MOJ prior to 1956, was and is considered a 
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writer and literary figure more than a journalist.  The importance of the MOJ in early 
Orgburo debates reinforces that while the bylaws debate contributed to “conscious 
professionalization” the Journalists’ Union’s cultural diplomacy required a specifically 
international form of expertise.410 
••• 
 The June 1956 world journalists’ meeting in Helsinki, with two hundred 
participants from forty-six countries, was the subject of stories in both the central press 
and Sovetskaia pechat’. In Pravda, the event was heralded as the first of its kind, uniting 
journalists of varying political convictions and religious faiths from across the globe. 
Though reporting on later international meetings would place an even stronger emphasis 
on the developing world, coverage of this first event highlighted speeches delivered by 
delegates from Mexico and India, along with the enthusiastic reception of Kraminov’s 
speech on the importance of material concerns to carrying out journalistic work. Primary 
documents from the MOJ’s self-published history indicate that many of these speeches 
were sharply critical of the effects of “commercial demands” on journalism work—a 
critique of capitalist press ownership, which was a common theme at such events. 
Kraminov’s more detailed discussion for the trade journal attempted to convey more 
atmosphere than information: “discussions…which took place in multiple languages, by 
the way, unanimously stressed that journalists could do much to improve friendship 
between peoples.” Kraminov also explicitly contrasted this unity with the efforts of the 
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“Atlantic bloc” of journalists to remain separate from progressive journalists and prevent 
Latin Americans from participating.  Kraminov accused an American foreign 
correspondent named Keyford of spreading “calumnious libel” about the Soviet press, 
which was spurned by a Pakistani delegate as “primitive.” The participants roundly 
condemned efforts to “bring the Cold War into the international meeting hall.” Kraminov 
stressed that cooperative efforts were continuing, as several participants in the gathering 
were invited to visit the Soviet Union and China.411 
  The concluding documents of the international meeting were also published in the 
trade journal—including a special resolution urging UNESCO to issue special 
“international cards” identifying journalists as members of their national organizations to 
confirm the “professional credentials of the holder.” Other goals directed at UNESCO 
included the creation of an “international journalism center” and special courses for 
journalists—these goals help account for later Journalists’ Union participation in 
UNESCO education projects. Improved freedom of travel for journalists, including 
access to entry and exit visas and travel discounts to facilitate movement, were also major 
goals. The resolutions explicitly condemned the “artificial” division of journalists into 
separate organizations along “Cold War” boundaries—a direct condemnation of the IFJ 
and MOJ schism. This call for unity, as we will see later, was most likely a reflection of 
the relatively relaxed atmosphere in the international arena during that summer, as the 
Hungarian crisis in 1956 would significantly complicate matters for the MOJ. A more 
lasting legacy of the Helsinki meeting was the plans to build a leisure house on the 
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Bulgarian Black Sea to facilitate international contacts. The event demonstrates that the 
openness to cultural diplomacy that had inspired the creation of the creative union 
quickly took concrete organizational forms and produced definitive results. The 
continuation of these international meetings, and the broader commitment to engagement 
with foreign journalists through leisure and tourism, demonstrates that the Helsinki 
proceedings should indeed be viewed as a foundational moment in the creative union’s 
history, though perhaps more for its establishment of organizational practices than for 
any definite achievement of its ideological goals.412 
••• 
 The Orgburo’s work in the wake of the Helsinki meeting reveals the importance 
its leadership attached to capitalizing on the gathering’s successes and the potential for 
disaster in any missteps. Most of the perceived setbacks were related to logistics and the 
creative union’s recent establishment, typical of any new organization that lacks an 
extensive budget or regularized procedures, the manner in which these setbacks were 
interpreted provides insight into the professional values of Soviet cultural diplomats at 
this moment. Anxieties increased mere months after the Helsinki gathering—while its 
initial objectives were focused on global unity, events in Hungary and Poland that fall 
resulted in increasing concerns about the stability of the Eastern bloc and future prospects 
for cultural exchange. 
 According to the Orgburo’s review of events on July 18, 1956, work in Helsinki 
was generally considered “successful and productive.” Pal’gunov suggested that the 
meeting’s results should be “popularized” through a series of speeches at the Central 
                                                
412 “Dokumenti mezhdunarodnyi vstrechi zhurnalistov” Sovetskaia Pechat no. 7, 39–41. 
  230 
Journalists’ House, along with articles for the central press. These should “touch on the 
problem of those people who hide under the calling of a journalist, so as to engage in 
subversive activity.”413 The stress placed on this theme serves as an important reminder 
that the increase in cross-cultural encounters under Khrushchev was not in itself a sign of 
trust. Indeed, foreign correspondents, especially from capitalist countries, were often 
accused of espionage during stays in the Soviet Union. So too were Western journalists 
perceived as having too much sympathy for the Soviet cause. Pal’gunov’s connection 
between journalism and espionage has some basis in fact—as Dina Fainberg points out in 
her study of foreign correspondents, the Novosti news agency, founded in 1961, was 
considered particularly useful to the KGB, since there were taboos or outright bans on 
recruiting from central newspapers.414 Despite these allusions to espionage, Soviet efforts 
to host guests after the conference were also generally successful—though the “absence 
of an apparat” meant that too much time was taken up with logistics. As a result, visiting 
foreign delegates mostly conversed with Orgburo members by phone rather than 
experiencing more “personal contact.”415 As we have seen, the belief that personal 
contacts were key to success had first appeared in Polevoi’s 1955 report on his U.S. visit, 
and had clearly become an evaluative standard for the creative union as well.  
 During the rest of the July 18 meeting, Orgburo members did not content 
themselves with the initial success of Helsinki; rather, they drew up a set of detailed 
proposals to determine the optimal structure for international efforts. This included 
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planning between ten and twelve various itineraries for foreign journalists, with attention 
to their specific needs, cities and locations of potential interest to them, and provision of 
opportunities to talk with ordinary people. Working with VOKS and Inturist, the 
Journalists’ Union would provide short handbooks “about important sites that could be 
interesting for foreign journalists and foreign tourists in general.”  In addition to setting 
up regular exchange with the people’s democracies, the Orgburo also identified particular 
countries from the capitalist world which merited increased contact: the United States, 
England, France, India, Japan, Egypt, Brazil, and Argentina. Pal’gunov was particularly 
attentive to the possible reception of any invitation directed to journalists from the 
capitalist west—“great caution” was needed in approaching the United States and other 
countries to avoid the impression that Soviet journalists were “people who are trying to 
force such correspondence on them.” To that end, rather than making “establishing 
correspondence” the goal, the objective became “to encourage correspondence with 
journalists’ unions.” In cultural diplomacy, it was important that the Journalists’ Union 
not appear aggressive or desperate.416 
 The Orgburo’s early cultural diplomacy efforts coincided with periods of major 
international upheaval that had particular implications for the MOJ—specifically, the 
unrest in Poland and the suppression of the Hungarian uprising in the fall of 1956.  
According to Оrgburo records from December 1956 concerning a conversation with MOJ 
president, Czech journalist Iaroslav Knobloch, the MOJ and the Journalists’ Union 
needed to strengthen unity among socialist journalists’ unions, where relations had 
become “rocky.” The “collapsed” Hungarian journalists’ union received ten thousand 
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dollars to strengthen its remaining “progressive” elements—it is unclear why the 
currency gift was in dollars rather than rubles. Knoblokh advised caution: while he 
approved of a Polish proposal to have a joint meeting with the Soviet Journalists’ Union 
and the other people’s democracies, the interested parties should undertake the work 
rather than the MOJ. To address the “schism” in the socialist bloc, the Journalists’ Union 
should organize a meeting of prominent journalists, perhaps with elections to its 
governing board as the “pretext.” In Knoblokh’s view, the “renewed Cold War” and 
complicated situation in these countries left the MOJ with a single goal: the creation of a 
single international journalists’ organization.  The Helsinki meeting had been a positive 
step in this direction. UNESCO could be of some help with this goal, as the MOJ was 
working to establish “consulting status” as a nongovernmental organization. Some 
members of the IFJ also supported MOJ’s efforts at ending the Cold War between the 
cultural organizations—Knoblokh suggested that MOJ should continue to pursue 
cooperation when opportunities arose. Like Pal’gunov, Knoblokh viewed “personal 
contacts” as key to this undertaking and suggested focusing less on the “political aspects” 
of the matter. As these proposals demonstrate, the events of 1956 left the MOJ and the 
Journalists’ Union with a dual mission: to restore harmony in the socialist bloc while 
continuing efforts to bring journalists from the capitalist world closer to the Soviet Union.  
 Pal’gunov reminded Knoblokh that the MOJ should act, particularly in dealings 
with the Poles and the Yugoslavs, “as if nothing had happened.” The latter reference 
would seem to be in reflection of Yugoslavia’s support of the 1956 uprisings. Despite his 
earlier exhortation to act as though the status quo were already in place, Pal’gunov 
reiterated that it was clear the Poles were hoping to use the prospect of organizing 
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journalists’ meetings to make MOJ a “mouthpiece for the Polish experience.” Pal’gunov 
said that MOJ need not facilitate such events, and cooperation between socialist 
journalists should occur through bilateral agreements between countries rather than the 
front organization. Nevertheless, the MOJ should see that meetings that took place were 
“sympathetic” to the Poles. Sentiment and personal touches were clearly not reserved for 
cultural diplomacy that involved capitalists. Pal’gunov’s suggestion that cooperation take 
place without the front organization’s direct intervention can be read in two ways: not 
only as an effort to avoid imperial overreach on the part of the MOJ and its Soviet 
managers but also as a part of a larger goal to ensure that the MOJ did not become a 
“client” to a smaller socialist state, similar to Kraminov’s alarm at the prospect of an East 
German leadership for the organization two years prior.  
 At this same December 1956 meeting where Knoblokh and Pal’gunov expressed 
anxieties about Eastern Europe, Kraminov took a more hopeful view of the international 
situation, though he too drew lessons from the failed revolts. He noted that the “fruitful” 
nature of the Helsinki gathering was particularly apparent in countries like Japan, India, 
and Italy and also in Latin America. Kraminov approved of the “progressive” views of 
the journalists involved and suggested an increased effort to work with Americans, since 
this relationship “to a significant degree influences the establishment of ties with 
journalists from capitalist countries.” While he acknowledged the capitalist world’s 
importance, the MOJ had historically devoted little attention to the socialist bloc. Given 
that journalists there were frequently “from the ranks of the intelligentsia, it is natural that 
they cannot entirely free themselves from the influence of former ideology.” In order to 
address this problem, Kraminov suggested that the MOJ send a representative to Hungary 
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to clarify the situation there. Though more detail would require a separate study, the 
episode conclusively demonstrates that the Journalists’ Union was clearly dedicated to 
managing the socialist media empire according to the Soviet definition of regional 
stability.417 
 Тhe aftermath of the failed Hungarian revolution also complicated the MOJ’s 
work in the developing world.  In March of 1957, preparations for an MOJ executive 
committee meeting included plans for a journalists’ congress directed at Asia and Africa, 
to be held in Bandung, Indonesia—a formal resolution in support of such a conference 
was adopted during the Helsinki meeting and signed by thirty journalists from Asia, 
Africa, and the Middle East. Orgburo members approved the proposal, especially since 
journalists from Central Asia could participate. However, due to “negative reactions” in 
Hungary, along with a tense situation in Indonesia, the MOJ and the Orgburo agreed to 
put aside these plans. To facilitate future meetings, they decided to establish a Committee 
for Cooperation Among Journalists to be managed by a French communist and with a 
separate address from the MOJ. This clandestine approach was designed to avoid 
“negative” views of the committee’s work—creative union leaders were acutely aware 
that the MOJ was not viewed as ideologically neutral. This cooperation committee 
included Western journalists, Eastern bloc journalists, and journalists from Latin 
America, North Africa, and Asia. MOJ president Jean-Maurice Hermann was a member, 
as was noted Soviet writer and journalist Konstantin Simonov. Though Kraminov had 
originally wished to schedule one earlier, in 1958 or 1959, the next World Journalists’ 
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Meeting occurred in 1960, in Baden, Austria.418 Along with preparing for this event, the 
Journalists’ Union leadership was forced to grapple with continuing scandals in the Varna 
leisure house.   
••• 
 The leisure resort (dom otdykha) for journalists that eventually came into being 
near Varna on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast was a major MOJ-creative union joint 
project, first discussed in the Orgburo in the spring of 1956. As mentioned above, the 
project gained more support in the context of the World Journalists’ Meeting in Helsinki. 
In April of 1958, Kraminov, in his capacity as an MOJ vice president, wrote to the 
Central Committee to advocate that the Soviet Union formally and financially back the 
project. Ideally, the leisure house would host journalists from all over the world, not just 
socialist countries, and would command a budget for some subsidies to pay for visits. 
While the Bulgarian Journalists’ Union had already authorized most of the costs for the 
resort’s creation, the other socialist creative unions were expected to contribute to its 
furnishing and upkeep. Kraminov requested two hundred thousand rubles from the 
Ministry of Finance, to ensure that the house had a furnished kitchen and camera 
equipment. He took pains to describe the popularity of the resort project—when the 
matter was debated at Helsinki, Soviet representatives were not the main voices in favor. 
Kraminov portrayed the project as truly multinational, as all the socialist creative unions 
supported the project, along with others in Latin America, Asia, and Western Europe. 
Several of these national organizations had already authorized financial contributions or 
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had made proposals to do so. Because of this wide base of support, Kraminov argued that 
“it would be impossible to justify the Union of Soviet Journalists’ nonparticipation in the 
house’s construction…this would create a bad impression among journalists from other 
countries.”419 
 As he had in 1954, Kraminov relied on the importance of international standing 
and authority to defend Soviet commitment to cultural diplomacy. The need for 
international contacts and prestige had driven the formation of the creative union and 
were still motivating factors for expanding its role in future undertakings. According to a 
February 1959 report from Pal’gunov, written а few months before the house opened, all 
creative unions who were members of the MOJ had participated in the project, and the 
requested funds had been granted in accordance with a 1958 decree of the Council of 
Ministers. Expenditures by other creative unions increased as completion neared, in a 
way that reflected badly on the Soviet Union: China had contributed five hundred 
thousand rubles, Czechoslovakia three hundred thousand, and the GDR four hundred 
thousand, all sums greater than the two hundred thousand rubles Kraminov had initially 
requested. As a result, the Orgburo requested an additional one hundred fifty thousand 
rubles from the Ministry of Finance to supply the resort with a variety of consumer items, 
presumably intended to increase the comfort of guests: radios, refrigerators, televisions, 
vacuum cleaners, down pillows, and a piano.420 Following Kraminov’s apparently 
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successful lobbying for these items, the costs of cooperation, in both rubles and prestige, 
continued to mount.  
 The incidents of drunkenness and avarice that opened this chapter were not the 
last time the Central Committee was required to intervene in disputes involving 
misconduct in Varna. In October of 1960, mere months after the first scandals, more 
problems developed. Visitors to Varna continued to pursue pleasure and enjoyment as 
much as enlightenment or professional development, despite what their superiors might 
have preferred. Because no trips to Sofia or other destinations were included in their 
twenty-day stays, journalists used more creative methods to expand their leisure 
opportunities. They personally called Bulgarian newspapers or the Bulgarian Journalists’ 
Union asking for tours. More brazen journalists even placed such calls from Moscow. 
According to a member of the RSFSR’s Agitation and Propaganda department, an M. 
Tiurin, such practices were “impermissible,” since they imposed extra financial and 
personal burdens on Bulgarian colleagues. Even worse, “these visits provide almost 
nothing in the way of practical work exchange, and not infrequently become simple 
pleasure romps or drinking binges.” The internationally active Soviet professional was 
not supposed to seek too much personal enjoyment, particularly by circumventing official 
channels. The Central Committee was not the only body concerned with this issue; 
Journalists’ Union records indicate that the organization’s leadership had also been made 
aware of the problem during visits with Bulgarian colleagues.421 
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 Tiurin offered his own set of solutions for wayward journalists, while reiterating 
his exalted vision of the Varna resort’s potential. He recognized that it was better to meet 
the demand for more travel than to ignore the problem: he suggested spending seventeen 
days in Varna, using the extra three days for trips around Bulgaria organized via 
Balkanturist, slightly increasing the cost of the journey. Turin made a point of saying that 
the Soviet ambassador to Bulgaria approved his plan. Raising another issue, Tiurin noted 
that the system of selecting visitors was problematic: some visitors to Varna, though they 
were selected by the Journalists’ Union, “had no relationship to press work…and 
sometimes made up thirty to forty percent of guests.” Others “lowered the standing of 
Soviet journalists” in unspecified ways. Тiurin was also concerned with the Varna 
resort’s diplomatic mission: each group tended to socialize with its own members, and 
“no work was undertaken to bring them closer.” If this were corrected, journalists could 
not only become more knowledgeable about the socialist press but also become more 
familiar with those who were “politically doubtful, often with a pro-Western orientation,” 
presumably with an eye to increasing their support for the Soviet cause. Though the 
earlier Varna scandal had concerned the dangers of foreign influence and possible 
subversion of socialist values, Tiurin clearly saw the resort as key to cultivating future 
allies.422 
 In response to Tiurin’s report, the creative union undertook a series of corrective 
measures, which P. P. Erofeev reported to the Central Committee. To resolve the travel 
issues, the creative union introduced a five day Inturist-sponsored Bulgarian tour and to 
improve “cultural work” for the guests. Erofeev attached an MOJ resolution containing 
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specific resolutions to attract more “capitalist” journalists to Varna and to take similar 
measures on behalf of journalists from the developing world. The resolution also urged 
member organizations to contribute materially to the resort’s upkeep by providing 
literature and entertainment for guests. The document also affirmed the organization’s 
vision of the resort as a place for “political work among journalists, international 
seminars, meetings, and the like.” In a comprehensive response to Tiurin’s initial 
complaint and the proffered reform proposals, the Agitation and Propaganda department 
approved the creative union’s new plans and informed Tiurin personally about the results 
of his initial letter.423 MOJ records indicate that by summer of 1960, the leisure resort 
was hosting a wide range of guests, including visitors from England, Austria, Brazil, 
Indonesia, Guinea, Chile, and Cameroon. In the same communiqué, the authors noted 
with satisfaction that, “some Western journalists, visiting Bulgaria, admitted that the 
creation of the leisure resort was a major achievement for the MOJ.”424 
 Unfortunately for the Journalists’ Union leadership, early measures to establish 
prophylactic procedures did not prevent further misadventures. A year after Tiurin’s 
memo, in the fall of 1961, the Journalists’ Union Secretariat received additional reports 
about “abnormal” conduct among Soviet journalists in Varna and repercussions reached 
all the way to the Central Committee. This time, the worst cases involved theft and 
pursuit of consumer goods, with other simple moral lapses. The theft incident involved 
two journalists. One, named Dolgashev, an employee of the Moscow oblast’ newspaper, 
The Leninist Herald, had stolen a dress. Another, named Niurin, had accepted scarves as 
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gifts from Bulgarian colleagues. Even worse, a masquerade ball held at the resort 
included “salacious scenes which bordered on the pornographic.” The offending skit 
depicted a woman with a prop lock between her legs, with paper chains. “Half naked” 
men, each wearing a headdress with the name of a Soviet newspaper, tried to open the 
“lock” with a long key. Ultimately, the one from Izvestiia won the day. The content of the 
skit played on journalists’ views of themselves as virile and masculine.  Another scene 
involved a fat man losing weight as a result of an enema that a nurse had neglected to 
remove in a timely fashion. In addition to complaints about these lurid performances, the 
report noted that other guests of the resort returned at late hours, made noise, and 
attempted to enter the house through their neighbor’s balconies.425 
 The author of this particular incident report, an official in the MID Press 
Department named Sergeev, not only echoed earlier anxieties about moral depravity and 
consumer goods but sought to limit the creative union’s control over the leisure resort. 
Sergeev was especially concerned with stopping “pilgrims” from going to the countryside 
“consumed by the search for consumer goods,” and sought to end unauthorized contact 
between Soviet and Bulgarian journalists. He recommended appointing a leader to whom 
all group managers would report and that “any of the slightest violations of the norms of 
conduct” would be discussed at a Party meeting. Sergeev argued that trips to Varna 
should cease after October because the conclusion of resort season would give guests “a 
great deal of free time,” presumably increasing the likelihood of misbehavior. Sergeev’s 
position at the MID demonstrates the political importance attached to the Varna leisure 
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house. He clearly believed that the diplomatic apparatus should have more say over the 
creative union’s international undertakings.426 
 These incidents, and Sergeev’s report, spurred a series of defensive responses 
from various parties involved. The appointed leader of the tour group that included the 
wayward journalists, a V. Medvedev, defended most of his charges and said that they 
behaved “worthily, with discipline and restraint.” The group leader denied that any 
actions of a few “unethical” journalists reflected poorly on him. He argued that 
responsibility rested with the local chapter who had recommended the unworthy 
members of the group, and that the Journalists’ Union was perfectly capable of choosing 
its own leaders for trips to Varna. Medvedev also calculated his own contributions: 
though he was “in need of a rest as the others,” he organized excursions and looked after 
a visitor who fell ill. He also claimed that he had advised Niurin not to travel to the 
countryside, absolving himself of responsibility for the scarf incident. When the side trip 
was discovered, Niurin was disciplined at a Party meeting and instructed to make a gift of 
his wristwatch to the Bulgarian who had given him the scarves. Medvedev also defended 
the carnival as mostly “inoffensive” in its content. He suggested that the spectators, many 
of whom were Party members, would have spoken up about inappropriate content, and 
noted that many of the performers were also Party members.427  
 A more active participant in the stage play, V. Ozerov, editor of the journal 
Voprosy literatury, argued that active participation in leisure activities such as the one in 
question helped dispel the perception of Soviet journalists as “gloomy, dry and boring 
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people.” The sketch some had considered “pornographic” depicted its participants as 
knights in medieval costume rather than stripped naked, and the Izvestiia knight was 
“beautiful and elegant.” After he trounced his opponents, the young woman “threw 
herself onto his neck.” The scene with the enema was a “an inoffensive sanatorium joke.” 
While Ozerov admitted that reactions to jokes could differ, the criticisms struck him as 
“puritanical.” He characterized Sergeev as trying to “show comrade journalists in a bad 
light and demonstrate his vigilance,” painting the official as overzealous and perhaps 
moved by a desire to impress his superiors at the expense of honest and innocent 
professionals. The other group leader confirmed Ozerov’s version of events and argued 
against the need “artificially” to control how journalists spent their time. In addition to 
defending the content of the stage plays, he also approved the response to the major 
incidents, noting that the other guests had been appropriately disapproving of errant 
colleagues.428 
 In his report on the case, Journalists’ Union Secretary I. Dzhirkvelov defended 
creative union autonomy and supported his colleagues’ efforts to discipline the 
delinquent. He explained that Niurin had received the woven scarves because of a 
longstanding relationship between his Briansk newspaper and the Bulgarian one. As for 
the theft case, when the crime was discovered, Doglaschev and his wife were 
immediately sent back to the Soviet Union. The journalist was fired and expelled from 
both the Party and the Journalists’ Union. Dzhirkvelov explained that the leisure house in 
Varna operated on a twenty-four-hour schedule and did not have the usual “leisure 
regime,” partly because the Bulgarian Journalists’ Union was fulfilling the mandate from 
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the 1956 meeting in Helsinki. It was not advisable for Soviet journalists to be subject to a 
more disciplined regime because this would set them apart from other journalists and 
counter MOJ policies. He argued that canceling fall trips would harm the resort’s budget 
and that the incidents were not the fault of the season but should be blamed on local 
Journalists’ Union chapters.429  
 As others had, Dzhirkvelov blamed those lower in the creative union hierarchy, 
while defending the authority of the Journalists’ Union to decide policy in Varna. The 
Central Committee’s Agitation and Propaganda Department review confirmed the 
appropriateness of disciplinary actions. As for the accusations of pornographic content in 
theatrical productions, there was “insufficient evidence” to support Sergeev’s claims, 
since closer review of the program content suggested there was “nothing objectionable.” 
The reviewers accepted Dzirkvelov’s rationale for keeping the resort open in the fall and 
affirmed the creative union’s decision to exercise more care in candidate selection. The 
report’s authors added that the Central Committee itself would take these matters “under 
control.” The second Varna scandal affirmed the need for careful screening and swift 
punishment for any misconduct—but the episode concluded in a way that did little to 
actually change the authority and autonomy of the Journalists’ Union.430 Later references 
to the leisure resort suggest that the search for perfect representatives of Soviet print 
culture remained problematic, though no major scandals took place after the fall of 1961. 
In 1964 and 1965, the Journalists’ Union Secretariat emphasized the need for “careful 
selection of candidates.” The object was to send only “the most authoritative journalists, 
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preferably those who spoke foreign languages, and to instruct them in detail so that they 
might worthily represent Soviet journalists.”431  
••• 
 Varna was not the only challenge the new creative union faced in the international 
arena.  As part of its efforts to monitor the MOJ, the Journalists’ Union assigned some of 
its own personnel to staff the organization. These individuals either served as assistants to 
the general secretary or were known as the Soviet “representatives” to the MOJ. These 
individuals were frequently anxious about the MOJ’s future, and dissatisfied with the 
creative union’s leadership of the organization. In this section, I provide a brief history of 
these complaints—usually extensive representative correspondence and the Central 
Committee. Though some of the criticisms had more lasting effect than others, these 
incidents offer unique insights into the mindset of cultural diplomats, both their views of 
Soviet tactics and of the outside world. These representatives wished for an activist 
creative union which would manage and direct the front organization and were 
continuously worried that poor behavior on the part of creative union leaders would cause 
serious political damage. Like other cultural diplomats, these officials were both 
interested in increased exchange and alarmed at the prospect of any ideological 
contamination that might result from relaxed vigilance.  
 In February of 1959, assistant to the MOJ general secretary, Mikhail Petrov, was 
satisfied with some aspects of the MOJ’s work but scathing in his assessment of the 
creative union’s Orgburo. Petrov argued that although the MOJ might be considered 
“passive” compared to other front organizations such as the International Council for 
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Trade Unions, it regularly conducted organizational work and took action with relation to 
the affairs of the day, such as Algeria, American aggression in the Middle East, and the 
political situations in the Belgian Congo and Cuba. The Bulgarian and Vietnamese 
Journalists’ Unions, along with the Germans, worked tirelessly, and the MOJ’s ties with 
Latin America had only strengthened over time.432 Despite these accomplishments, the 
MOJ’s work “lacked fighting spirit and singleness of purpose.” The greatest weakness, 
encouraged by poor leadership, was the sense that the MOJ was overwhelmingly an 
organization of socialists. Out of sixty thousand members, only about nine hundred were 
from capitalist countries. And most apparently sought simply to “traverse the wide world 
on someone else’s money.” At worst, they were “spies.” Petrov claimed that such 
“individual members”—in contrast to collective membership through affiliate 
professional organizations—were common in front organizations. Petrov accused his 
bosses of being more interested in access to visas than in doing ideological work to 
protest against “slander” in the bourgeois press. He aimed his invective at the “cults” 
around such journalists as the “Alsopites, Lipmannites and Drew Pearsonites, but the 
member unions of the people’s democracies are seen as cash cows (doinikh korov), since 
it is well known that…only countries from the socialist camp pay MOJ membership 
dues.”433 
 In mentioning access to visas, Petrov presented his colleagues as more interested 
in the benefits of foreign travel than in truly advancing the Soviet cause. At the same 
time, the MOJ itself was vulnerable to infiltration from ideological enemies. By naming 
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specific American journalists known for their criticism of the Soviet Union, Petrov 
demonstrated his preoccupation with ideological contamination, even as he also 
condemned Western journalists for only contributing to the organization’s expenses. 
Alsop was a notorious figure for more than his anti-Communism: while working as a 
Moscow correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune in 1957, he had been caught in 
a compromising position with a young man who was a KGB agent. Rather than submit to 
blackmail, Alsop reported the incident to the State Department and was recalled.434 
 Petrov was particularly concerned with “studying and knowing the enemy,” 
especially media organizations he claimed were backed by the United States that the 
MOJ did little to combat. He singled out the IFJ and the International Press Institute (IPI), 
founded in 1950 at Columbia University and dedicated to problems of freedom of the 
press. Petrov was also sharply critical of the MOJ’s French president, Jean-Maurice 
Hermann, though he was a potential candidate for the Lenin Peace Prize. Petrov argued 
that he was an unworthy candidate for the honor and should also be replaced at the MOJ, 
citing Hermann’s inappropriate reactions to the 1956 unrest in Hungary.435 Petrov 
presented the MOJ as besieged from all sides—its poor leadership and infiltration by 
greedy capitalists weakened its capacity to advance the Soviet cause. He presented 
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increased vigilance as the solution to this problem and went on to argue that the creative 
union’s leadership failed to appreciate the extent of its failures. 
 Petrov was particularly scathing in his assessment of the Journalists’ Union’s 
Orgburo, both its financial contributions and its overall capacity to host guests. He 
claimed that Pal’gunov, Goriunov, and Burkov “loved to speak about journalistic unity” 
but that they could not “overcome their narrow sectarianism,” which prevented them 
from taking advantage of opportunities to increase international support for the Soviet 
Union. A second World Meeting of Journalists failed because the Journalists’ Union did 
not commit to paying its share of the funds. A similar gathering for economic journalists 
also failed to materialize—Petrov was particularly critical of this, since it had particular 
support “among bourgeois journalists” and the MOJ still received letters about it.436 
Though Petrov was wary of too much foreign infiltration, he did not hesitate to castigate 
colleagues who missed important opportunities for exchange with their ideological 
opposites.  
 The creative union’s efforts to expand its financial and political support for 
journalists in the developing world expanded in the year before Petrov’s report, though he 
pointed to inadequacies in this area as well. At its 1958 Congress in Bucharest, Romania, 
the MOJ’s Secretariat decided to conduct a solidarity day on September 8, the 
anniversary of Czech journalist Julius Fucik’s execution by the Nazis. According to 
Dmitri Goriunov, the MOJ requested that all progressive journalists make anti-war 
statements and “intensify their struggle for peace,” while making monetary contributions 
to a solidarity fund. The Journalists’ Union’s Orgburo requested permission from the 
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Central Committee to hold festivities in Moscow, Leningrad, and other major cities, to 
“strengthen the international solidarity of journalists.” A “voluntary” (though presumably 
compulsory) collection of funds would be deposited in the Soviet Union’s state bank, to 
be spent on medical expenses, vacations to the Soviet Union, coats, shoes, and food for 
needy international journalists. Goriunov also requested that the holiday be publicized in 
the mass media. All of these requests were granted by the Central Committee.437 In the 
Journalists’ Union’s report on the first solidarity day, the main stress was on encouraging 
foreign journalists to speak about their impressions of Soviet life and for Soviet 
journalists who had been abroad to reciprocate.438 The solidarity fund and the hosting of 
World Journalists’ meetings expanded the creative union’s international responsibilities 
and financial burdens and the political pressure it faced from the Central Committee and 
the MOJ itself.   
According to Petrov, the Journalists’ Union also did not provide funds for the 
International Journalism Solidarity Fund in honor of murdered Czech communist Julius 
Fucik and was late with its dues payments to the MOJ. Another egregious failure of 
hospitality apparently took place in September of 1958, when seventy visiting 
Czechoslovak journalists were abandoned at the train station—Orgburo members refused 
to meet them or take their calls. Petrov claimed that this news reached “all of 
Czechoslovakia…and neighboring countries.” Petrov urged the Orgburo to pay greater 
heed to the MOJ’s decisions and cease its policy of “noninterference” in the organization.  
It should take steps to organize the delayed international meetings and to meet its 
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financial responsibilities to the MOJ.439 The Central Committee apparently 
communicated with Pal’gunov and passed on Petrov’s complaints to the International 
Department. Some of these weaknesses, especially in financial matters, may be attributed 
to the creative union’s relatively new status. Petrov clearly felt that any lapse in 
hospitality had great political import—he presented the abandoned Czechoslovak 
journalists as an international incident rather than a logistical mishap. 
 The major organizational changes Petrov called for largely did not come to pass: 
Hermann remained MOJ president and the creative union retained much of its 
organizational control of the organization. Iaroslav Knobloch was replaced by Jiri 
Meisner at a July 1960 Executive Committee meeting, over a year after the initial 
complaint.440  In 1960, the Journalists’ Union did increase its support for the International 
Journalism Solidarity Fund. Beginning that year, the Journalists’ Union would contribute 
seventy five thousand rubles to it, specifically to financially support “progressive 
journalists and their families” in their pursuit of leisure or education.441 The main 
organizational shift in the MOJ, away from Europe and toward the developing world, 
occurred after another Central Committee intervention, in response to the less-successful 
World Meeting of Journalists held in 1960. Petrov’s replacement proved to have his own 
complaints about the creative union’s performance. Where Petrov was concerned about 
relaxed vigilance vis-à-vis capitalists, his successors worried that the creative union 
leadership was overly dismissive of the MOJ’s mission.  
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 The second world meeting of journalists—the follow-up to the inaugural event in 
Helsinki—took place in 1960 in Baden, Austria. Where the Helsinki meeting had raised 
the hopes of further cooperation with the capitalist world and received substantial press 
attention, the MOJ focused more on the developing world in Baden. Based on press 
coverage, the Baden meeting was less significant than its predecessor. On October 19, 
Khrushchev’s greeting to participants appeared in Pravda, referencing the “professional 
and moral duty” of all journalists to come out in favor of disarmament and “against 
colonialism and racism.” That same day, a short description of events was published on 
the last page of the newspaper, which recorded only that representatives of seventy-five 
countries and forty-five journalists’ organizations were present, that Khrushchev’s 
message was met with applause, and that four years had passed since the last such 
gathering.442 As at Helsinki, criticisms of capitalist journalism were couched in Marxist 
and class-based language of the struggle against “newspaper monopolies.” In other ways, 
the rhetoric had changed over four years to reflect the MOJ’s shifting focus: new stress 
was placed on the anticolonial aspect of international solidarity and on providing 
education and technical training for journalists from less-developed nations. There were 
renewed calls for a “Bandung conference” of journalists from Asia and Africa. Clearly, 
Soviet media managers understood the symbolic power of Afro-Asian summits, first 
visible at the original 1955 Bandung conference.443  The delegates were also concerned 
with appropriate financial support for the MOJ’s activities, since the IPI in Zurich, 
“supported by Rockefeller” had over a million dollars at its disposal. The IPI had begun 
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to fund educational initiatives in Ecuador under the auspices of UNESCO and to run a 
seminar in Dakar, Senegal.444 Though the shift toward the developing world became a 
lasting priority for the MOJ, more significant initiatives in this area occurred years later, 
suggesting that the Baden meeting primarily laid the groundwork. Tensions with China 
were first visible there, as the Chinese delegation criticized president Jean-Maurice 
Hermann and the Indian delegations for not taking strong enough stances on colonial 
issues, while others noted that the MOJ should take a stronger management role of the 
International Committee for Journalistic Cooperation, which coordinated the meetings. In 
response, the Soviet MOJ secretary, Mikhail Shatskov, explained to his Chinese 
comrades that the official goal of the conference was to concentrate on “unifying” rather 
than “divisive” issues.445 The prospect of superior Western funding for cultural 
diplomacy, along with China’s leadership challenge, would become persistent concerns.  
 The Baden meeting’s limited results ultimately became a source of friction 
between MOJ secretary Shatskov and the creative union leadership, as Shatskov was 
particularly resentful of Danil’ Kraminov’s mismanagement of the gathering and 
provided a lengthy description of his grievances in a long letter to the Central Committee. 
Kraminov gave the impression of ill-preparedness, not sharing his plans for the event 
with Shatskov or with the MOJ’s Czech president, Czechoslovak journalist Jerzy 
Meisner. In contrast, the MOJ had prepared for the event far in advance. Its leadership 
publicized the meeting in newspapers and sent official announcement letters to member 
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organizations along with contacting individual journalists. The positive responses to this 
activity were all published in the MOJ newsletter, Democratic Journalist.446 
 Austria had been the only Western nation willing to host the gathering, and 
planning and visa procurement had gone well—though the IFJ refused to participate in 
the events and the MOJ had to use both dollars and socialist currency to cover expenses. 
Nevertheless, in Shatskov’s account, the Soviet Journalists’ Union, along with other 
socialist organizations, had failed to help publicize the meeting and had offered no 
guidance regarding organizational improvements following from the Helsinki meeting or 
made any detailed suggestions for the agenda. Although the Journalists’ Union 
Secretariat had formed a committee dedicated to the Baden meeting, including Kraminov, 
this body had never met. The Journalists’ Union Secretariat records support this claim: 
the preparatory committee was described, but Baden was not mentioned again until the 
1960 annual report. According to Shatskov, the only journalist who wrote about the 
meeting in the Soviet press was Aleksei Adzhubei, while the committee’s ostensible 
chair, A. A. Vishnevskii, had to be “begged” to provide information regarding Soviet 
participation. The situation had only grown more dire as the event approached, as 
Kraminov was “too busy for MOJ matters” and Satiukov was absent from Moscow. By 
fall of 1960, Shatskov was forced to appeal to the Central Committee’s International 
Department, particularly because the senior official from the Agitation and Propaganda 
Department was unavailable.447 
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 The situation was no better in Baden itself, as Kraminov, rather than taking time 
to go over draft resolutions with his fellow representatives, instead hosted a long 
discussion about issues relating to the Korean Peninsula. As a result, the meeting as a 
whole achieved only a “general discussion,” rather than the articulation of any specific 
shared goals or joint statements. Though this did not reflect badly on its outcome and 
befitted the event’s “democratic” nature, Kraminov’s own behavior caused serious 
misunderstandings. Presumably while in a state of intoxication during dinner (Shatskov 
mentioned “practically no bottles of Stolichania or Georgian cognac remaining”), 
Kraminov interrupted the toasts to the MOJ’s organizational success with the declaration 
that, “The MOJ does little” before downing his glass. In embarrassment, the MOJ’s 
Czech president, Meisner, then asserted that the MOJ had gathered journalists from sixty 
countries and “with more help from member unions could of course do more and better.” 
Kraminov’s behavior caused particular confusion among journalists from Eastern Europe, 
who subsequently asked Shatskov to clarify the situation. Meisner threatened to resign 
and return to work at his newspaper, and one German MOJ secretary also threatened to 
leave his “thankless job.” 448 
 Shatskov described Kraminov as generally delinquent in communications and 
resistant to all efforts to involve him in practical preparations. When he did contribute, he 
often made ignorant suggestions that Shatskov belittled and used to defend the MOJ’s 
existing arrangements. In one incident, Kraminov had proposed the creation of an MOJ 
monetary fund—perhaps a sign that he was so ill informed about the organization that he 
did not know one already existed. As a kind of rebuttal, Shatskov noted that the existing 
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fund had already offered important assistance to journalists from Madras, India, and 
induced them to support the MOJ rather than remain “neutral.” Moreover, Kraminov had 
offered no leadership regarding the status of the existing solidarity fund—an institution 
which “personified the brotherly support of our journalists for their impoverished 
colleagues from the capitalist world.” More significantly, Kraminov’s behavior left 
foreign journalists confused as to the future fate of the International Committee for 
Cooperation Among Journalists, specifically what kind of work the institution might 
conduct after the Baden meeting. Shatskov accused the entire Soviet delegation of 
“isolating itself” rather than socializing at meals. Тhe Soviet journalists also assumed that 
the MOJ would fund much of their personal expenses as well as trips for guests from 
Baden to Moscow and did not contribute translators or typewriters during the process. 
Shatskov concluded his tale of grievances with more personal reproaches for Kraminov. 
Just before the latter’s departure to Moscow, Shatskov requested that they schedule a 
discussion of the MOJ’s objectives and was rebuffed. Boris Burkov viewed a 
conversation as unnecessary, stating that it was “clear we need to strengthen the Soviet 
part of the MOJ.” Burkov noted that most of the matters had been settled in spring, and 
that while no one was accusing Shatskov of anything serious, he “lacked flexibility.” 
Dissatisfied in general, Shatskov asserted that he had “done all in his power” to advance 
the organization and the Soviet cause.449    
 To further bolster his case against the leadership of the Journalists’ Union, 
Shatskov provided proof of the publishing activity to promote the meeting, the MOJ’s 
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letters to other journalistic organizations, the Journalists’ Union’s Secretariat protocols, 
his own letter to the Department of Agitation and Propaganda, and reports of Czech 
journalists’ preparatory work. These records run to over thirty pages—clearly, Shatskov 
was anxious to demonstrate that if Baden had gone badly, the blame lay squarely with the 
Journalists’ Union.450 Yet Shatskov’s confrontation with the creative union was 
ultimately something of a draw. In January of 1961, when Journalists’ Union leaders 
reviewed the case with the International and Agitation and Propaganda departments of 
the Central Committee, it was determined that the Journalists’ Union had done more 
work than Shatskov’s complaints suggested. The organization had conducted most of its 
major preparations for the Baden meeting during an MOJ Executive Committee meeting 
in Leningrad. Additionally, the Journalists’ Union had hosted several participants before 
they traveled to Austria—similar visits for delegates had been arranged after the Helsinki 
conference and would be again at the next world meeting in 1963. In Baden, Soviet 
journalists “did a great deal of work” to ensure that the meeting achieved its main goals. 
Delegates met often with colleagues, contrary to Shatskov’s claims. Though this work 
was considered satisfactory, it was admitted that failure to attend to Shatskov’s requests 
and monitor Kraminov’s behavior was “a serious weakness” on the part of the 
Journalists’ Union. As for Kraminov, while some of his criticisms of the MOJ were 
accurate, it was observed that he had used some “sharp expressions” which gave offense 
to foreign communists, most notably general secretary Meisner and his East German 
colleague. The Central Committee instructed the Journalists’ Union to “exercise greater 
influence over the MOJ, and increase the international ties of the organization with other 
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nations, especially journalists from Asia, Africa, and Latin America.”451 This incident, 
like those involving the Varna leisure resort, resulted in no significant changes to the 
Journalists’ Union leadership: Kraminov retained his position in the Journalists’ Union, 
and Pavel Satiukov remained its president until October of 1964. In general, the 
repercussions from Baden were indirect: preparations for the next World Meeting, in 
1963, were far more extensive.  
••• 
 The MOJ began a marked shift of its initiatives toward the developing world at its 
fifth Congress, held in Budapest in 1962. There, the Journalists’ Union delegation noted 
that the developing world was “more and more uniting around the MOJ, expecting active 
support of their professional interests….” Specific activities included round table 
discussions, representation at the 1960 world meeting in Baden, and other “personal 
contacts.”452 Most importantly, a UNESCO representative had attended the conference, 
and considered proposals about restoring the MOJ’s membership. Journalists’ Union and 
Central Committee records indicate that the creative union routinely sought participation 
in UNESCO activities, particularly through the Center for Journalism Education (CUEJ), 
in Strasbourg, France, which had a special focus on training journalists from developing 
countries and was founded by UNESCO and the French government. In an undated 
report, Soviet representatives to UNESCO strongly advocated increased Soviet 
participation in this program, since journalists from the United States and England 
regularly took part, and Soviet foreign correspondents based in Paris could attend 
                                                
451 RGANI f. 5, op. 33, d. 143, ll. 111–2. 
452 GARF f. 10124, op. 1, d. 40, ll. 132–4. 
  257 
meetings. Since the Composers’ Union had taken active roles in UNESCO international 
work, it was thought that journalists could follow suit. Even before he became dean of 
MGU’s Journalism Department in 1965, Iasen’ Zasurskii was often a representative to 
the program’s administrative council. In a 1962 report sent to both the creative union and 
the GKKS, Zasurskii made special note of the Strasbourg Center’s interest in African 
journalism, his personal friendships with Africans, and the general interest in Soviet 
literacy campaigns in Central Asia and the development of a multilingual press there. 
Zasurskii’s efforts serves as a micro-level indicator of the broader shift in the Journalists’ 
Union’s activities away from Europe and toward the developing world.453  
 Expanded uses of the Solidarity Fund also demonstrate this shift: In 1962, the 
MOJ undertook plans to construct a “school” for journalists from developing countries. 
Periods of study were to be accompanied by trips to the Soviet Union, so that students 
could get work experience in the Soviet mass media. There were also proposals to 
increase the fund’s financial stability through publication of books and memorabilia, 
including stamps, postcards, and photo albums, as well as sporting events and 
performances.454  Solidarity funds were also used to send delegations to Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America, sending well-known journalists to give lectures and talks, and organizing 
study programs at Moscow University.455 One of its more famous beneficiaries was 
Franco-Algerian journalist Henri Alleg, who became internationally known for his 
experiences of torture at the hands of French paratroopers during the Algerian conflict. In 
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1962, the solidarity fund paid for Alleg’s son to attend a Pioneer camp.456 A year later, 
the solidarity fund would cover educational costs for journalists from Honduras to attend 
courses at Moscow State University in 1963. Funds were also allocated so that a 
journalist from Kenya would have a coat and hat during his stay in Moscow, with similar 
expenditures a few months later for Nicaraguan journalists.457 Investments in educational 
initiatives were another major project, including schools in Budapest and Algeria. The 
dean of Moscow University’s journalism department was a member of the Budapest 
school’s administrative board.458 
 1962 was an important transition year for the MOJ: preparations began for a third 
world meeting of journalists—this one to focus on Africa and the Middle East and 
intended to achieve greater stature than its predecessors.459 The 1963 meeting was 
planned carefully and had a unique structure: participants traveled through several North 
African and Mediterranean countries by steamship, rather than converging in a single 
European city. Preparations began in July of 1962, in parallel to preparations for the fifth 
MOJ Congress in Budapest.460 In January of 1963, Kraminov, apparently still a 
mezhdunarodnik in good standing despite his earlier run-ins with the MOJ leadership, 
oversaw preparations in Rome—the journey was originally scheduled to begin there and 
to last for about two weeks. An international journalists’ committee, consisting of 
participants from Mexico, India, Algeria, China, and Indonesia, along with Jean-Maurice 
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Hermann and a Soviet Journalists’ Union member, was responsible for organizational 
planning. It was hoped that about two hundred fifty journalists from eighty to ninety 
countries would ultimately take part in the event.  Journalists would be able to board the 
steamship Lithuania in several cities, with planned stops all along the Mediterranean and 
North Africa. Subsequent press coverage made much of the delegates traveling together 
and the reception they received at various stops. Notable figures would be invited to the 
opening event in Rome, including Soviet cosmonauts and American astronauts. The stop 
in Algiers was to focus on anti-colonialism and efforts to establish an “independent 
national press.” Though the itinerary focused on developing countries, the meeting’s 
working languages remained Western: French, Spanish, English, and Russian. The 
Journalists’ Unions of states where stops took place were in charge of arranging 
entertainment and relevant professional contacts, and publicizing the meeting in the local 
media. The meeting’s main mandates concerned questions of ethics, other professional 
concerns, and international cooperation.461 Final preparatory discussions were scheduled 
for August and September, and TASS and Novosti correspondents were instructed to 
publicize the event in the countries where they were accredited. In June of 1963, MOJ 
representatives reminded the Journalists’ Union of the special anti-imperial focus, and 
that the Soviet delegation had a special responsibility to ensure that events “took place 
under the banner of unity…the struggle for peace and the full liquidation of 
colonialism…uniting journalists not only from the socialist camp, but from the world 
over.”462 
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 The slogans under which this meeting took place demonstrate that the relative 
relaxation of tensions at Helsinki had been something of an aberration. The creative 
union’s preparations for the conference were extensive and aimed at both showcasing 
Soviet accomplishments and reducing opportunities for embarrassment or ideological 
contamination. Instructions to Soviet delegates stressed that the principles of peaceful 
coexistence did not extend to acceptance of capitalist ideology and that journalists from 
developing nations should be reminded of the “methods of the reactionary bourgeois 
press.” At the same time, the Soviet delegation was encouraged to seek out and interact 
with capitalist counterparts in order to promote Soviet foreign and domestic interests 
more effectively. Boris Burkov and Dmitri Goriunov headed the Soviet preparation 
committee, while Pavel Erofeev was in charge of reporting from the meeting of socialist 
journalists’ unions in Budapest. Тhis was a gathering separate from an official MOJ 
congress dedicated entirely to world meeting preparations—it had originally been 
scheduled to take place in Moscow. The following month, MOJ general secretary 
Meisner reiterated the intended itinerary and reported that there was growing interest 
from Africa and Asia due to the meeting’s anticolonial agenda.463 Before the Lithuania 
began its journey, a meeting of the International Committee for Cooperation Among 
Journalists was held in Naples. The ship’s final official itinerary began in Algiers and 
ended in Beirut, with stops in Tunis, Tripoli, Alexandria, Piraeus, Famagusta, Istanbul, 
Varna, Costanza and Odessa.464  
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 The internal “work plan” for the 1963 gathering demonstrated increased attention 
to detail compared to the Baden meeting. Adzhubei, Satiukov, and Goriunov were 
expected to oversee press conferences and the speeches that Soviet delegates delivered, 
along with meetings between participants and social and political actors. Kharlamov, 
Satiukov and Adzhubei were responsible for arranging a visit between meeting 
participants and Khrushchev during their stay in the Soviet Union. Goriunov and Burkov 
were to ensure that Soviet foreign correspondents were active participants in the 
proceedings, and that material about them appeared in the local press of various countries 
included in the itinerary. All participants were to be provided with published literature 
about the Soviet mass media and the Journalists’ Union, and an appropriately stocked 
library with Soviet political material and fiction. Creative union personnel were charged 
with consulting with the Ministry of the Navy to ensure that all entries and exits from 
major ports occurred on schedule. Journalists were also placed in charge of monitoring 
the luggage of delegates and guarding against the “entry of anti-Soviet literature and 
other material which disrupts friendship between peoples”—the journey was an occasion 
for paranoia despite its stated goals of openness. No detail was too small for attention: 
participants and local dignitaries were to be provided with souvenirs, including postcards 
of cosmonauts and the steamship itself, and menus, food, and laundry service were all 
provided for.465 
 The extensive preparation process demonstrates how much the Third World 
Meeting was seen as an opportunity for the Soviet Union to enhance its prestige via the 
representatives of its print culture. Participating organizations were sent a survey to fill 
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out to describe the status of newspapers and journalists in their country.466 The 
Journalists’ Union’s own answers are illuminating both in terms of quantitative data and 
the obvious effort to use the survey in order to highlight the superiority of the Soviet 
system. Figures included the yearly circulation of newspapers and journals. Particular 
accomplishments of the Soviet model, as revealed by the survey, included the large 
number of letters from readers, and that the press operated according to the “Leninist 
principle of peaceful coexistence.”  These ideological foundations were apparently the 
“secret” to the international stature and accomplishments of Soviet journalism. The 
results of the survey also offer insight into journalism’s status as a profession in the 
Soviet Union, four years after the creative union’s inaugural congress: the number of 
journalists whose “principle employment” was in the mass media now numbered fifty 
thousand, of whom some thirty five thousand were members of the creative union. 
Survey questions regarding professional standing and trade union membership presented 
the creative union as both argument and evidence of an alternative structure for Soviet 
print culture in comparison with that of the west: one creative union was sufficient for all 
journalists, because the Soviet Union “lacks antagonistic classes, and unites all journalists 
in their common cause to serve the people.” Most journalists were also members of the 
Trade Union for Cultural Workers which, when formed in 1963, replaced the trade union 
for newspaper workers created in 1917—this continuous history of trade unions would 
seem to demonstrate that the Soviet Union had always given journalists collective 
representation. By this accounting, the trade union, too, was responsible for supporting 
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the “professional mastery” of its members, in addition to providing for their working 
conditions and leisure.467  
 The characterization of requirements for membership in the creative union 
continued the emphasis on writing and qualitative output discussed above in chapter one: 
“the only condition for Journalists’ Union membership is that one always works honestly 
and writes truthfully.” The moral language here echoes that of some of the bylaws, which 
were also referenced in the report on survey questions about work experience for creative 
union members. Though the survey stressed the privileges of a Journalists’ Union 
membership card, such as travel, leisure, or attendance at creative seminars, the Soviet 
response stressed that, “before the law, all journalists, like all Soviet citizens, are equal.” 
In response to the question about a “moral or ethical codex” that governed professional 
behavior, both the “Moral Codex of the Builders of Communism” and the Journalists’ 
Union bylaws were presented as foundational documents. (The former document was 
adopted at the Communist Party’s Twenty-Second Congress in 1961, and consisted of 
twelve principles which affirmed the importance of respect, hard work, collectivism, 
ethnic tolerance, and “solidarity with all the workers of the world”). In presenting the 
Journalists’ Union to the world, the particularities of socialist morality and Soviet 
subjectivity were as central as the specifics of professional journalistic work. Answers 
about educational attainment stressed that Soviet people were “in general people of 
intellectual labor.” Although presentation of a particular diploma was not a requirement 
for work in journalism, most Soviet journalists had some kind of higher education. In 
response to questions about job security, the answers fit Soviet views on work: loss of a 
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job could occur only with trade union consent and most often in cases where the print 
organ itself was “liquidated,” the overall size of staff was decreased, or the journalist was 
somehow found to be incompetent. Unemployment, as per official views on the matter, 
was nonexistent.468 
 The description of “advantages” journalists received reads almost like an 
advertisement for the Soviet welfare state’s more privileged members: journalists 
received stipends on business trips and free transit during those trips, as well as access to 
additional housing comparable to those of other creative unions, though journalists 
received no particular tax advantages. Again, factual description mingled with rhetoric in 
the description of social position. “The answer to this question would be incomplete, if no 
mention were made of the deep respect Soviet journalists enjoy among the people. His 
honesty and faithful service to the people, his hostility to ideological opponents, to 
everything that impedes the people’s forward progress, his certainty of the victory of 
communism in the Soviet Union, is well known and is a major source of pride for the 
Journalists’ Union of the Soviet Union.” The language here is even more elevated than 
that of the Journalists’ Union’s inaugural congress: journalists are presented as a source 
of national pride without specific references to a “public” or “readers”—they belong to 
the entire public and serve its broader purposes.469 The idealized vision of journalism 
presented here, as a deeply respected profession with social protections, working for a 
literate and sophisticated audience, demonstrates that the “conscious professionalization” 
discussed in chapter one had been projected onto the world stage. 
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••• 
 The effects of the Sino-Soviet split were increasingly felt at creative union and 
MOJ events, particularly in the lead-up to the World Meeting aboard the Lithuania. 
These issues would occupy a central place in Soviet analysis of the event itself, both in 
press coverage and in internal correspondence between the creative union and the 
Communist Party. In 1963, the long-planned Afro-Asian Journalists Congress in 
Bandung finally took place, nearly eight years after it was first delayed due to 
international tensions over Hungary.  As a sign tensions were mounting, the KGB 
notified both the Central Committee and Boris Burkov, in his capacity as Novosti 
director, that the Chinese might seek to publish damaging articles in the Algerian press in 
connection with an upcoming speech by president Ahmed Ben-Bella.470  
The Journalists’ Union had originally planned to send a ten-person delegation to 
Bandung and to send Kraminov on a trip to North Africa and the Middle East to improve 
Soviet prospects at the congress. At Bandung, the Chinese forcefully denied Soviet 
representatives any leadership role, despite the efforts of the Mongolian an Indian 
delegations. Kraminov’s absence from the conference due to illness was also thought to 
have weakened the Soviet position. The controversy apparently extended to the 
involvement of the Indonesian government, as the assistant minister for Foreign Affairs 
publicly opposed Soviet participation and Indonesian delegates who wanted to take a 
conciliatory stance were hesitant to act without word from Sukarno, whose personal 
opposition to Soviet prominence at the conference was confirmed by the Polish 
ambassador. Even IFJ representatives in Luxembourg had recently expressed suspicion of 
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the Bandung meeting, since it lacked participation from India and the Soviet Union—this 
suggests that the Sino-Soviet split complicated the traditional bipolar rivalry between the 
two organizations. While the Bandung Conference was not ultimately a major setback—
the MOJ expanded its contacts in Africa—the situation confirmed the importance of the 
upcoming third international meeting to Soviet efforts in the developing world.471 
 In keeping with the increasingly tense international climate, the third international 
meeting, like its predecessors, was the topic of major correspondence between the 
creative union and the Central Committee’s Agitation and Propaganda department, from 
the planning stages to retrospective discussions. The Journalists’ Union’s formal travel 
request for the delegation indicates that some of its most senior members attended, 
including Satiukov, Adzhubei, Goriunov, Burkov, Kharlamov, and Erofeev, and 
secretaries of republic-level journalists’ unions. Similar travel requests were made for 
film and radio personnel, including director Sergei Gerasimov, who would go on to direct 
a 1967 film about a foreign correspondent. Journalists’ Union secretary Vishnevskii 
noted that they all had been chosen “in view of the meeting’s importance,” and requested 
that the Central Committee also send a representative. P. A. Naumov, head of the 
International Department, was chosen to fulfill this role. 
 The 1963 World Meeting on the steamship Lithuania received sustained attention 
in the central press, in another sharp contrast with the Baden gathering. From September 
23 to October 19, twenty articles appeared in Pravda covering its various stages.  
Izvestiia published nine articles on the subject, several written by Adzhubei himself. The 
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more extensive Pravda coverage contained more detail of the events and reception at 
each location where the Lithuania docked, with special mention of Satiukov’s arrival as 
leader of the Soviet delegation. Pravda’s special correspondent indicated that the meeting 
in Algiers would be the “most representative,” as the delegations to events at that stop 
included substantial numbers from Africa and Asia as well as Europe. Special emphasis 
was placed on the participation of “journalists who were, not long ago, under the colonial 
yoke” and of representatives of nations still struggling for independence. The broader 
goal of reducing international tensions and the “Cold War” was presented as a unifying 
aim among participants. Articles about the Algerian events stressed that whereas the 
Baden gathering had been devoted to the independence struggle, now Algeria was on its 
own “path to socialism,” with its government ministers and national press as leading 
figures in the gathering. Pravda’s special correspondent to the meeting rhapsodized about 
the Algiers’ beauty and its symbolic value as a site of resistance.472  
Izvestiia coverage was more essayistic, offering jabs at the “Western press,” 
which supposedly considered the gathering to be somehow not “free” or “voluntary,” 
while describing the beauty of the Italian landscape as participants boarded the boat. At 
the official opening reception, Satiukov read Khrushchev’s greeting to participants. Much 
attention was paid to the speeches of Cuban and Arab journalists about the struggles for 
press freedom and for broader world peace and against “neoimperialism.” A Mongolian 
journalist spoke about the dangers of the Sino-Soviet split to the greater cause of Asian 
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unity, portraying the Chinese as “schismatics.” Algerian president Ben-Bella’s greeting to 
participants was, like Khrushchev’s speech, met with “thunderous applause.” Ben-Bella 
spoke in support of the planned 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and used the forum to 
defend his own agricultural policies and economic reforms.473 
 Emphasizing the theme of mutual cooperation and solidarity, Pravda coverage 
contained many anecdotes of journalistic cooperation—with special mention of a 
proposal from a Kenyan journalist to study Mongolia’s wire service in preparation for a 
new project in his own country, as well as the attendance at the meeting of the editor of 
L’Humanite and a renowned Laotian journalist, and the telegram of greetings sent by 
persecuted Greek journalist Manolis Glezos. The decision to host the next international 
meeting in Latin America was also repeatedly communicated. The head of the GDR’s 
Journalists’ Union stressed his own country’s work in the developing world as well, 
including its own solidarity fund and educational initiatives, some of which took place 
under MOJ auspices. A provocative American journalist expressed skepticism about 
these initiatives and asked whether the graduates experienced “political re-education.” 
This question was met with acrimony and evaluated as an episode that showcased the 
meeting’s “democratic” nature and the prominence of journalists from the developing 
world within it. Later coverage emphasized that while Canadian, American, and 
European journalists were an ideological minority at the meetings, they too participated 
actively, though their contributions had more of a “professional character” (delovoi 
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kharakter). Later stops in Tunisia and the United Arab Republic similarly highlighted the 
role of government ministers in meetings with participants and press conferences.474 
 At the stop in Alexandria, much was made of the planned participation of Gamel 
Abdul Nasser on October 1, the date of arrival in Cairo. Nasser addressed the plenary 
meeting of journalists and, as had Ben-Bella, emphasized their value to the broader cause 
of peace in the world and his support for the Test-Ban Treaty. Jean-Maurice Hermann 
also spoke at this gathering, and the participants sent greetings of solidarity to Kenyan 
leader Jomo Kenyatta. Participants visited the Aswan Dam and the Suez Canal. In Beirut, 
the delegation was also met by the Prime Minister. In addition to describing the meetings, 
Pravda’s coverage presented evocative imagery concerning the presence of the US Navy, 
with the “menacing maws of its cannons” evoking memories of the American role in 
stemming Iraq’s 1958 revolution and the sharp contrast between this reality and the anti-
imperialist and pacifist views of meeting participants. Similar imagery was used to 
describe the situation in Cyprus, in reference to both British troops and the presence of 
the American cruiser Little Rock, described as supporting “American business interests” 
in Cyprus’s mines. The article also offered lengthy descriptions of the destruction of 
national forests since the island’s colonization and of the struggle of Cypriots for 
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freedom. After leaving Cyprus, the Lithuania docked in Varna and Jean-Maurice 
Hermann officially closed the meeting.475 
 The more substantial concluding event for the boat trip was a reception for 
participants held in Moscow, an event that was planned along with the boat trip itself. 
These gatherings reinforced the importance of anti-colonialism to the MOJ’s agenda, and 
the Soviet Union’s status as an inspiring leader for newly independent nations. In October 
of 1963, the Journalists’ Union formally requested permission from the Agitation and 
Propaganda department for the follow-up event, which would bring together 
“representatives of the social leaders of the capital” (predstavitelei obshestvennosti 
stolitsi) and foreign guests in the House of Unions in the city center.  
The political value of cultural diplomacy was an explicit theme of the planned event:  
 
In the speeches of meeting participants and also in official resolutions, the 
most important political problems should be emphasized: the struggle of 
peoples for peace and disarmament, for national freedom and 
independence, strengthening the unity and solidarity of workers the world 
over, the great example of socialist countries, their cooperation in the 
course of global development, the growing role of journalists in social life 
and in the ideological upbringing of peoples and the building of a new 
world. 
 
The request was signed by Satiukov, Goriunov and Adzhubei, and granted shortly 
after.476 Journalists’ Union President Satiukov formally requested that the “better known” 
among the forty journalists who would be visiting Moscow receive an audience with 
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Khrushchev, as their arrival in Moscow was an event of “great significance…and a fitting 
conclusion to the International Journalists’ Meeting.” This request was also granted.477  
GKKS records indicate that in 1963, sixty-two participants from twenty-six 
countries visited the Soviet Union after the third international meeting. These particular 
tours were aimed at “familiarizing [the visitors] with the life and achievements of the 
Soviet people in the realm of economics, science and culture, with the work of the Soviet 
press and allowing them to visit major institutions in Moscow.” It was hoped that these 
undertakings would improve the creative union’s working relationship with foreign 
journalistic organizations.478 In advance of this reception, Pravda published a selection of 
its joint survey with Novosti, asking participants to assess the meeting’s significance and 
results, whether they made valuable personal contacts, where the next meeting should 
take place, and any other messages they wished to convey to their Soviet colleagues. The 
published responses included those from journalists from Mexico, Spain, Bulgaria, and 
Mali. All the responses reiterated the importance of anti-colonialism, the Soviet 
contribution to this cause, the value of personal contacts formed at the meeting, and the 
importance of hosting a future meeting in a developing country.479 The MOJ’s 
transformation into an anti-colonial and truly global organization was clearly meant to 
endure beyond the 1963 boat trip.  
 The closing meeting in the Hall of Unions was presided over by D. F. Il’ichev, 
and most of the Journalists’ Union governing board took part: Satiukov, Goriunov, 
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Erofeev, Kharlamov, Adzhubei, and others. In his speech, Satiukov emphasized all of the 
major themes of past press coverage: the third meeting’s greater representativeness and 
the duty of all “professional journalists” to work for peace and against imperialism, rather 
than limit themselves to “professional problems.” Satiukov claimed that Chinese 
journalists did not participate because they believed the meeting would concern entirely 
“professional matters,” a misconception that the author called a “regret.” Goriunov 
reiterated the anecdote about the American journalist who had insulted the Africans by 
suggesting they were ideological puppets, and Adzhubei spoke about the growing 
resonance of the Soviet cause in the developing world, especially the importance of 
foreign aid to projects like the Aswan Dam. The MOJ’s general secretary asserted that 
not even the Western press had been able to remain silent about these recent successes. 
As a reminder that the meeting also held domestic resonance, the head of the Moscow 
branch of the Journalists’ Union, A. M. Subbotin, spoke about how closely he and his 
colleagues had followed the events abroad.480   
••• 
 The official report to the Central Committee on the boat cruise and the Moscow 
reception was signed by eight of the Soviet delegates, including Satiukov, Burkov, 
Adzhubei, and Kharlamov. While they were pleased by first time participation from 
several African and Southeast Asian nations, they were forced to note that some 
representatives did not attend “under pressure from China,” and cited the report of Cuban 
and Mexican delegates reported that representatives of China’s news agency had also 
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worked to discourage Latin American participation, claiming that “there would be no 
Africans there, but only Europeans.” More countries were represented at this meeting 
than had been in Baden, but the meeting’s main achievements were qualitative: the 
MOJ’s representatives were favorably received by political leaders during their travels, 
who appreciated their commitment to the cause of national independence. These included 
Algerian President Ben-Bella, Gamul-Abdul Nasser in Egypt, and Mali’s first president 
Modibo Keita, and PCI members Luigi Longo and Palmiro Togliatti. Ben-Bella’s 
participation was of “great significance.” Khrushchev’s written message to meeting 
participants also made a favorable impression. Western journalists even declared that 
they had “very much wanted to receive a message from President Kennedy, though 
unfortunately no such message appeared.” Soviet representatives had appealed to White 
House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger, who had initially promised some American 
attendance.  However, “after a visit to the White House,” Salinger reversed his position 
and only a single American observer attended the meeting. Speeches were closely 
scrutinized for indicators of ideological reliability: while French journalist Robert Buteau 
reacted more “nervously” to strident critique of imperialism and attempted to discuss 
“professional” matters, the majority of participants were strongly in favor of a more 
“revolutionary” position, and critical resolutions were drafted when Latin American and 
African journalists cooperated with socialists. The meeting had diplomatic repercussions 
for countries besides the Soviet Union: East German journalists were particularly grateful 
for the chance to visit nations in the absence of formal diplomatic relations agreements. 
The journalists had originally decided to boycott activities in Italy if the East Germans 
were denied entry, though this was ultimately unnecessary. The entire affair was seen as 
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“strengthening the GDR’s international status,” since it took place during one of Konrad 
Adenauer’s state visits to Italy, over the objections of the FRG’s embassy.481 
 The meeting affirmed the Soviet Union’s status as a center of world communism: 
journalists critiqued China for “isolating itself” and after discussion with Soviet 
representatives about China’s damaging actions, several meeting participants “sent 
material to their newspapers in this spirit.” The meeting’s final communiqué was 
generally consistent with Soviet foreign policy. The delegation argued that the steamship 
meeting had more “international resonance” than previous events, due to the participation 
of political figures like Ben-Bella and Nasser, along with Ghanian President Kwame 
Nkrumah. In general, the success of the steamship journey showed the “enormous 
authority” the Soviet Union enjoyed due to its anti-imperial stance. More importantly, the 
“overwhelming majority” of attendees “would write sympathetically about the Soviet 
Union in the future.” These reports illustrate the challenges of assessment of cultural 
diplomacy efforts: counting guests and noting their nationality provided unambiguous 
data, yet descriptions of future results depended on necessarily uncertain qualitative 
descriptions of “sympathy” and “support.”482 
 Тhe delegates’ list of recommendations for the future drew on past 
recommendations, such as publicizing the event for nonparticipants and affirming ties 
with the developing world. In light of the organization’s new global commitment, it was 
decided that that the fourth international meeting should be held in Latin America. Other 
proposals reflect a new effort to present the Soviet Union in a positive light and to 
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coordinate activities with socialist journalists: the delegates proposed creation of a special 
“press group” which would coordinate propaganda efforts among socialist countries to 
better popularize their achievements—this institution could be based in Sofia rather than 
Prague, presumably to avoid overlap with the MOJ. Delegates noted that the Aswan Dam 
had impressed meeting participants, particularly in light of the extent of Soviet aid, which 
indicated that “more effective propaganda abroad of Soviet technical and economic aid to 
new and developing nations” was needed in both print and films. Both the Writers Union 
and Journalists’ Union should ensure that “well-known writers” visited construction sites 
and depicted Soviet specialists assisting foreign workers, an extension of the socialist 
realist “master plot” to the international stage. The delegates suggested establishing a 
“Friendship Medal” for particularly distinguished workers on joint Soviet and foreign 
construction projects. The meeting for participants in Moscow and other Soviet cities was 
cited as an important positive development.483 
 Overall, the boat trip devoted to the developing world appears to have been more 
successful than its predecessors, particularly since it attracted more political figures than 
previous meetings had, while damage from the Sino-Soviet split was kept to a minimum. 
It also achieved its stated propaganda focus on colonialism and imperialism and on the 
opportunities that Soviet foreign aid offered to newly independent nations. The few 
accounts of the MOJ’s activities written by Western scholars have viewed it with varying 
degrees of alarm or scholarly detachment: both types of analysis present the organization 
as particularly successful at maintaining ties and support in the developing world and at 
improving its relationship with UNESCO. My findings indicate that the 1963 meeting 
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was a prime example of the MOJ achieving many of its stated goals, with the creative 
union playing the main management role.484 
••• 
 A 1965 report from a Soviet MOJ secretary reinforces the transitory nature of 
cultural diplomacy success, even after an event as successful as the 1963 World 
Journalists’ Meeting. In later years, media managers remained anxious that delegation 
visits were overly formal and ineffective. As before, these reform proposals came from 
Soviet representatives to the MOJ anxious to improve both the front organization and the 
creative union. The document focuses on institutional change as a solution to ongoing 
problems, with a pervasive sense of anxiety that current methods were inadequate to the 
tasks facing the MOJ. Though the suggested methods reflect new political concerns, the 
familiar anxieties make the document a fitting closing episode for this chapter.  
 In June of 1965, The MOJ’s new Soviet secretary, Efremov, wrote another report 
to the Central Committee about the organization’s international position, concentrating 
on “strengthening the cooperation of socialist countries in peaceful information sources.” 
Unlike the complaints of his predecessors, which focused on finance or personal conduct, 
Efremov wanted the MOJ’s work to become more precise and scientific—a stance which 
reflects the new interest in social science research in the mid 1960s. Efremov noted that 
the MOJ had experienced significant growth despite the Sino-Soviet split, most of it in 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America. He argued that socialist countries needed to conduct a 
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more precise study of which newspapers or media personalities were most popular in 
their home countries to better focus efforts. The absence of a real knowledge base 
resulted in invitations being issued to journalists who were not necessarily influential 
enough to warrant such attention. When guests did arrive in the Soviet Union, work with 
them was confined to “theater trips and concerts and toasts at banquets,” rather than 
formal study of their published works, with an eye to correcting “misunderstandings 
about our countries.” He suggested that the MOJ make more of an effort to counter 
Chinese projects in the developing world and increase its study of the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s educational programs.485 
 Despite the institutions of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, there was minimal 
coordination between socialist countries in the realm of information, and this also 
resulted in waste of funds: if journalists from abroad were already visiting the GDR, it 
would be more economical to fly them from Berlin to Moscow than from their home 
countries. Efremov advocated expanding existing cooperation agreements between 
socialist countries to include schedules of visits and assigning a special liaison between 
socialist journalists’ unions. To support his proposals, Efremov cited interest in them 
from the general secretaries of the Hungarian, Czechoslovak, Bulgarian, and East 
German Journalists’ Unions, along with other MOJ representatives. He claimed that there 
was even hope his initiatives would include the United States, citing Lyndon Johnson’s 
recent dissatisfaction with journalists’ critique of U.S. government policy—implying that 
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increased friction with the government would make American journalists more 
sympathetic to the MOJ’s particular vision of press freedom.486 
 Efremov’s vision also involved changes to the Soviet Journalists’ Union’s 
structure and stature. His first proposal involved increased monitoring of the foreign 
press, which would require extensive use of foreign correspondents and the MOJ’s own 
archives—these tasks, like others in cultural diplomacy, would rely on specialists with 
language skills. He also suggested creating an institute on global information under the 
auspices of the Journalists’ Union, which could then make recommendations to the Party 
and the government. This analytical work would ideally be accompanied by efforts to 
“monitor the changes in the opinions of particular journalists.” In Efremov’s view, this 
work could be done by foreign correspondents of the central newspapers and news 
agencies, as well as by the MID Press Department. Efremov was particularly concerned 
about the status of the Journalists’ Union: the MID Press Department needed to verify 
that the creative union was always aware of visiting journalists, since “many journalists 
visit the Soviet Union, not through an invitation from the Journalists’ Union, but as part 
of other cultural or political events and governmental delegations.” Improving the 
creative union’s status would fit the most recent party program, as the role of social 
organizations was expected to grow during the period of official transition from socialism 
to communism. If the creative union was “fully equipped with zhurnalisti-
mezhdunaroniki” and worked closely with TASS, Novosti, and foreign correspondents, it 
could assume many of the same functions as the MID Press department.487 
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 Four things are particularly striking about this set of proposals. First, note the 
contrast between Efremov’s assessment of the global media environment and Kraminov’s 
original vision for the creative union, dating to over a decade before. Closer ties in the 
socialist camp had been an explicit argument for the formation of a Soviet Journalists’ 
Union. The lack of coordination between socialist journalists discussed here suggests a 
certain degree of failure in the accomplishment of this task. Secondly, Efremov’s 
audacious vision for the creative union itself is striking: an international expertise so 
complete that it might surpass that of the MID, a government body formally devoted to 
foreign exchange. But this vision, like that of his predecessors, assumed that new 
institutions would automatically solve problems. These proposals also reflect the growing 
interest in social-scientific approaches to analyzing social groups and attitudes. While 
Soviet sociologists like Boris Grushin were interested in domestic public opinion, 
Efremov applied these concepts to the task of supporting the Soviet Union’s global 
standing.488 While Efremov’s proposals received no response from the Central 
Committee, they reveal that the challenges of cross-cultural encounters during the 
creative union’s inception persisted into the Brezhnev era. Although the MOJ provided 
the creative union with unique opportunities in cultural diplomacy, it clearly remained in 
a subordinate position to other institutions. The call for additional restructuring suggests 
that the initial hopes for the new organizations remained—at least in some areas—
unrealized.  
 Examining cultural diplomacy during the Khrushchev era demonstrates 
conclusively that journalists and media managers were key figures in designing and 
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implementing new institutions devoted to managing contact with foreigners. Under the 
management of the new Journalists’ Union, the already-established MOJ expanded its 
scope. The figure of the zhurnalist-mezhdunarodnik was central to this work: familiar 
with other cultures, conversant in other languages, and, most importantly of all, 
ideologically reliable and with an established journalistic reputation. If rank-and-file 
journalists displayed a consciously professional attitude during the bylaws debate, 
creative union cultural diplomacy demonstrates that the creative union gave new 
opportunities and responsibilities to an elite within the profession.  
These expanded responsibilities made for increased anxiety, and with that anxiety 
came structures of surveillance and monitoring, especially in the context of the leisure 
house in Bulgaria. Privately, the creative union seemed unable to guarantee that expanded 
international contacts could proceed without mishap—precisely because its standards for 
behavior were so high. Despite these mishaps, the Journalists’ Union retained its 
management of the MOJ, and most Central Committee interventions confirmed decisions 
the creative union had already made. Though the MOJ was a frequent source of anxiety 
for the creative union, it also provided unique occasions to portray Soviet socialism in a 
positive light. The three World Journalists’ Meetings discussed in this chapter serve as 
important political and cultural touchstones: the first reflects the particular optimism of 
the early Khrushchev years, while the second and third indicate a broader institutional 
shift of attention away from Europe and toward the developing world. By the 1963 boat 
trip, world leaders outside the Soviet Union (though arguably within the Soviet orbit) 
recognized and supported the political importance of the MOJ and journalism in general. 
Later sources indicate, however, that the search for a perfect model of cultural diplomacy 
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would continue, with many of problems continuing unresolved: a sense that institutions 
were outdated and that an insufficient number of journalists had the necessary skills to 
achieve political goals. Though Soviet media empire had not yet “lost” the Cold War, 
persistent anxieties coupled with political challenges prevented the creative union from 
meeting its own expectations, either for its own personnel or reaching and winning over 
foreign audiences.489 
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Chapter 5  
Professionalism and Personhood: Genre and Creative Politics Under Khrushchev 
  
 The Journalists’ Union’s domestic mandate expanded significantly after the 1959 
inaugural congress.  In this chapter, I track these developments through the organization’s 
creative sections, all-Union seminars, and plenums, as they relate to three major themes: 
professionalization and training, creative agency, and Soviet views of personhood and 
reader needs. While journalists were conscious of their professional identity, they 
struggled to define journalism’s academic nature and how, or if, it could be taught to 
future generations. Many of the participants in the organization’s 1962 higher education 
seminar are familiar from past chapters or took significant leadership roles in the 
Brezhnev era: Boris Pankin offered reflections on KP’s work with young journalists and 
his own experiences at the paper, while Izvestiia journalist L. M. Ivanova openly 
questioned the value of educational programs. The assistant dean of Moscow University’s 
journalism department, Iasen’ Zasurskii, discussed the existing curricular structure and 
his hopes for reform. While discussions of higher education necessarily assumed the 
value of Marxist-Leninist ideology to programs of study, discussions of existing curricula 
and reform prospects were devoted to questions of career preparation, rather than 
doctrinal discussions and disputes. Uncertainties about the content and value of 
journalism education programs are an enduring subject of debate in the United States and 
other modern democracies, indicating some convergence between print cultures rather 
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than inadequate Soviet professionalization.490 Discussions of language training and 
international expertise were more politicized, since training future international experts 
was a particularly urgent task in a Cold War environment.  
 As in earlier chapters, treating journalists as professionals raises broader questions 
of comparison and distinction, especially the appropriateness of treating the Soviet Union 
as a “modern state.” Recent studies point out that its leaders, like their European 
counterparts, were interested in social reform on a “scientific” or “aesthetic basis” and in 
cultivation of expert hierarchies. The key distinctions were those of ideology and method: 
Soviet leaders were dedicated to a Marxist-Leninist and collective vision of culture, and 
frequently resorted to coercive tactics to achieve these objectives. This vision of 
modernity had clear repercussions for the professionalization project: journalists were 
always subject to Party and state control and supervision. These limits on agency would 
extend to the creative union itself: while rank-and-file journalists argued for an expanded 
and powerful organization, its president, Pravda editor Pavel Satiukov, stressed Party 
leadership as the guiding principle of creative union work, and rejected more audacious 
goals.491 
 Though Satiukov sought to limit the creative union’s organizational reach, later 
creative events featured particularly optimistic and authoritative statements about 
journalism’s value. In the interest of analytical depth, I concentrate on a few particularly 
resonant seminars dealing with reader response, youth journalism, and the genre of 
publisistika. The creative union held a seminar for workers in correspondence 
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departments in Аugust of 1963, and participants also discussed the new popularity of 
sociological opinion polls, an issue which became more important at later genre seminars. 
The youth journalism and publisistika seminars, which I treat in the most detail, occurred 
within weeks of each other, in June and July of 1964, and featured open celebration of 
de-Stalinization. As the practical and philosophical concerns were similar at both events, 
I have adopted a thematic rather than strictly chronological analysis. Though I also 
feature remarks from journalists outside Moscow, several of the participants were from 
central newspapers and familiar from previous chapters. Aleksei Adzhubei delivered the 
opening address to the publisistika seminar, while Voronov and Goriunov both spoke at 
length on youth journalism.  By this point, Goriunov had left KP to become director of 
TASS, while Adzhubei, Khrushchev’s son-in-law, became editor-in-chief at Izvestiia. As 
we saw in chapter three, Voronov, a close associate of Adzhubei’s, became editor-in-
chief at KP after Adzhubei’s departure and remained there until the summer of 1965. The 
earlier plenary debates about the creative union’s function, and Satiukov’s insistence on a 
limited role for the organization, did little to diminish these individuals’ sense of 
themselves as authors with a public mission.  
 Other major figures at the 1964 seminars had launched their careers under Stalin 
but actively participated in debates about professional responsibility and genre politics. 
Pravda journalist Evgenii Riabchikov’s participation in the seminar points to both 
continuity and change from the Stalin era. Riabchikov had achieved some fame writing 
about early Soviet aviation, and had even interviewed literary giant Maxim Gorky. In 
1937, he was accused of espionage and imprisoned in a work camp on the White Sea 
Canal. Later, he was exiled to Norilsk but returned to KP after the war and was formally 
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rehabilitated in 1956, later becoming a Pravda correspondent.492 Riabchikov addressed 
the familiar problem of journalism’s relationship to literature, insisting on clear genre 
boundaries and that practitioners take pride in their commitment to factual accuracy. 
Izvestiia journalist Tatiana Tess devoted her remarks at the publisistika seminar to the 
moral and ethical theme. While other members of the creative union were relatively 
young and had made their careers during the war or immediately after, Tess was born in 
pre-revolutionary Odessa and had been a close friend of the writer Isaak Babel’. She 
worked at Izvestiia from 1934 until 1983, the year of her death. She was thus in a unique 
position to reflect on journalists’ response to social evolution, which she framed largely 
as a search for new genres and reader engagement. These efforts would not only help the 
public but would also improve journalists’ understanding of the world and of themselves. 
While most of these journalists valorized the letter as a means to improve newspaper 
content and to mold audiences, not all remarks on correspondence were positive—at all 
three seminars, various participants complained about the high volume of correspondence 
and overly demanding approaches to the newspaper. 
 Since Soviet journalists spoke so frequently about moral qualities and reader 
needs, it is vital to understand the ideological framework which determined how these 
terms were interpreted and employed. Even as they celebrated de-Stalinization, creative 
union members’ conceptions of their work rested on a fundamentally illiberal vision: the 
reader they sought to form and cultivate was collectivist in outlook, and questions of 
moral formation were not only about individual conscience but the larger good of society 
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and progress toward socialism. Where the “mass journalism” of the 1930s was dedicated 
to industrialization, creative union leaders moved beyond these issues to include 
questions of moral growth. In short, postwar print culture was explicitly focused on an 
illiberal collectivist self-fashioning, the formation of a socialist “new person” in harmony 
with society. This “socialist subjectivity” has hitherto been identified primarily with the 
production of diaries, biographies, and other personal texts.  Journalists in the 
Khrushchev era were equally preoccupied with identifying such “new persons” and 
influencing their development through the newspaper. Existing treatments largely discuss 
this trend in terms of Adzhubei’s relationship with Khrushchev and his work at Izvestiia. 
As part of my efforts to embed journalists in various institutional contexts, I move 
beyond a single publication in this chapter and discuss the creative union as an important 
site for discussions of socialist personhood as it related to genre politics and professional 
values.493  
 The desire to understand and convey the inner life of readers was consistently 
proclaimed on multiple occasions, but narratives of individual growth were frequently 
discussed in terms of their universal applicability. While internal development of 
individuals was an official public value—and less contentious than it had been under 
Stalin—individual growth was most important when it provided a template for broader 
social action. Another key departure from Stalinist subjectivity was the stress placed on 
contemplation and voluntary self-actualization. The vision of transformation advanced in 
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the creative union depended less obviously on violence and destruction.494 Where higher 
education debates pointed to some convergence with other modern states, conversations 
about genre and reader interactions were more distinctly “Soviet,” as creative union 
members often explicitly rejected liberal notions of the autonomous self and expressed 
anxiety that the value of individualism might be misinterpreted. Creative union leaders 
argued that successful reader engagement required moral development on the part of the 
journalist: journalists should strive to improve themselves and their clarity of analytical 
vision, rather than pursue objectivity or distance from readers. As in 1956, the pursuit of 
controversial and challenging topics was presented as an important public service, though 
censorship remained an obstacle.  
 More practical discussions of reader needs in the creative union demonstrated the 
growing importance of social science methods along with traditional work with letters. 
As in the 1930s, Soviet culture remained “radically focused on the recipient” of its 
efforts, though the methods used to achieve this focus had changed, as part of journalists’ 
efforts to understand their more literate and sophisticated public.495 Though concerns 
about readers were explicitly ideological, new methods for reaching readers relied on 
sociological opinion polls, a method of public engagement common to other, democratic 
states. KP’s Institute for Public Opinion (hereafter the IOM) was a major center for these 
initiatives, conducting and publishing several major surveys in the 1960s under the 
leadership of Boris Grushin. The development of sociology contributed to a new 
conversation about professional values in the Journalists’ Union, since sociological 
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methods presented new possibilities for reader engagement. The new enthusiasm for 
polling presents another instance of Soviet convergence with other states, as histories of 
opinion polling in the United States explicitly link construction of and engagement with 
sociological research to the development of “modern consciousness,” though American 
initiatives were more closely associated with the emerging field of “market research” 
than with government bodies.496 Though many of the creative seminars reveal a 
fundamental optimism about Soviet society after de-Stalinization, even close associates 
of Adzhubei expressed concerns about the proper relationship between the individual and 
society or glossed over Stalinist excesses, and celebrations of personhood could focus on 
the punitive aspects of reform projects. Responsibility toward readers not only informed 
debates over genre and methodology but also lead to frank discussions about the role of 
censorship and the responsibility of Soviet journalists to reach the public before Western 
media sources could. Like the cultural diplomats I discussed in chapter four, participants 
in creative union seminars reflected on the distinctions between Soviet and “bourgeois” 
journalism and compared their own effectiveness and authority to that of their rivals. 
Though the creative union’s influence over its rank-and-file members remained limited, 
its engagement with the philosophical challenges of renewing the Soviet project 
increased substantially by 1964.  
••• 
 One of the more significant organizational undertakings after the inaugural 
congress was an expanded commitment to higher education. Intervention and control 
over these processes is considered a key attribute of any modern profession: increased 
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interest in these matters in the Journalists’ Union further demonstrates the concept’s 
applicability to Soviet institutions.497  In 1960, its commission for work with young 
journalists heard proposals for restructuring journalism higher education, and committed 
to collecting more data on instructors and graduates.498 In March of 1962, the creative 
union held a “conversation on the preparation of journalistic cadres.” While some of the 
seminar’s main themes reflect the particularities of a socialist journalism model, there 
was significant overlap with journalism in liberal democracies, demonstrating the 
relationship between “conscious professionalization” of the creative union to our 
understanding of postwar Soviet modernity. Like Western journalists, creative union 
figures struggled to create educational programs to adequately prepare students for 
journalism work—and while some of their concerns were explicitly ideological, many 
related to journalism’s uneasy disciplinary fit in the university curriculum—a problem 
Western journalists still confront.499 The creative union leadership deliberately sought a 
greater influence over education and training standards—a goal closely associated with 
professionalization.500 In his analysis of the creative union in the 1970s, Thomas 
Remington presents higher education and training as one of the organization’s few 
substantive undertakings. Many of the anxieties about admissions standards and 
curricular content he identifies originated in the decade after the inaugural congress.501 
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Though these initial efforts were more about aspirations than accomplishments, they 
demonstrate a sustained interest in controlling and directing the profession’s future. 
 The opening speaker at the 1962 higher education seminar was Liubov 
Mikhailovna Ivanova, who had held a senior staff position at KP before moving to 
Izvestiia. Ivanova was candid about deficits in professional training, even questioning its 
relevance. The best journalists did not necessarily have degrees: Ivanova “never met a 
quality journalist who graduated from an educational institution.”  Many working 
journalists found their way to the field by cultivating relationships and submitting short 
pieces, rather than through training. Programs did not demonstrably yield more qualified 
individuals: Ivanova was especially concerned about the length of the “incubation period 
from a journalism school or department, to a real journalist.” Though some of her 
colleagues disagreed, Ivanova was “firmly convinced that journalism education is 
necessary, that we should strengthen and develop it, improve it, and to do this we must 
settle many questions.” Skepticism about the value of university curricula is a major 
tension in Western academic approaches to journalism, though most analyses of this issue 
focus on liberal democracies. Seen in this light, Ivanova’s questions point to a broader 
convergence between Soviet journalism practices and those of other modern states. 
Though her educational dilemmas may have been at least partly due to the organization’s 
relatively recent development, the persistence of such anxieties outside socialist societies 
suggests that these uncertainties were fundamental to journalism. These debates further 
establish a clear contrast between journalism and musical composition: the status and 
value of conservatories was always a part of creative union work and a frequent path to 
membership. This suggests—however inconclusively, in absence of a detailed archival 
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study—a possible overlap with the Writers’ Union, whose members were not necessarily 
products of a particular educational program.502 
 Though she defended higher education, Ivanova’s descriptions of the ideal 
journalist were not rooted in a course of study but rather her conviction that, “a person 
grows and becomes a journalist, in spite of the fact that he has a diploma…a person 
should achieve party-minded maturity…”503  
This vision of professional development relied more on ideology than an educational 
program, a theme Ivanova expanded on:  
One can distinguish the experienced journalist from the inexperienced by 
depth of thought, the ability to evaluate a phenomenon…no higher 
education institution can teach us the secrets and knowledge of our 
profession. The journalistic profession belongs to those professions, which 
makes its own way. I think that this is accurate, but I think that our 
journalism departments…produce educated people, who know too much 
theory and have too little practice.504  
 
This vision of journalism as a field requiring particular intuitive, perceptive aptitude 
closely mirrors the Anglo-American scholarly debate about journalism as a “craft” rather 
than a profession. In a review essay devoted to this problem, John Henningham discussed 
journalism’s reliance on “tacit” or “mysterious” knowledge rather than directly traceable 
to an educational program, similar to Ivanova’s statements above.505 Despite her 
skepticism, an increasing number of Soviet journalists held university degrees in the 
postwar period, including Iurii Voronov and Boris Pankin, both of whom feature 
prominently in this chapter and the larger dissertation. Memoir literature generally 
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supports Ivanova’s impression that many young people were recruited through personal 
relationships and valued their work experiences more than their diplomas. Voronov in 
particular had a habit of supporting university friends in their search for work.506 Though 
a serious examination of higher education outcomes and employment patterns is beyond 
the scope of this study, key journalists remained skeptical about any clear link between 
education and success in the field.  
 More concrete discussion of admissions, curricular content, and reform fell to 
Iasen’ Zasurskii, then аssistant dean of Moscow University’s journalism department, and 
to a lesser extent to Boris Pankin, who remained on staff at KP. This portion of the higher 
1962 education seminar was, like Ivanova’s opening address, a balance between 
describing existing affairs and entertaining reform proposals. Both interpretive strands 
highlighted journalism’s ambiguous academic status, along with the field’s political and 
social importance in a Cold War environment. Zasurskii was the first to address reform in 
terms of admissions and enrollment. While the creative union had taken more interest in 
the candidate selection process after the examination stage, “unfortunately, their vote is 
not decisive in the evaluation of examinations. We have asked for a long time that the 
Ministry of Higher Education introduce a special creative profiling exam, but this 
question is still unresolved.” Zasurskii felt that additional “help” from the creative union 
would be useful but did not elaborate.507 These descriptions of the candidate selection 
process emphasize the creative union’s limited influence, despite its stated commitment 
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to future generations of the profession. Zasurskii considered altering admissions 
standards: the program typically only admitted students who had two years of work 
experience (stazh), but he contemplated waiving this requirement in favor of students 
with “an inclination to journalistic work” (sklonnost’ k zhurnalistkoi rabote). For her part, 
Ivanova believed journalists were not stringent enough with admitted students, compared 
to their creative colleagues. In conservatories, students who did not sing well were 
redirected to the program for choir teachers, while journalists who lacked real skill often 
left with degrees. Boris Pankin suggested universities intentionally admit too many 
students to discourage the less dedicated.508 While there was a clear dissatisfaction with 
current admissions practices, the range of solutions reflect the intangible nature of 
journalistic success: no clear definition of an “inclination” to journalistic success was 
given, yet time in an educational program would somehow determine its presence. 
Zasurskii advocated a less strict admissions policy to find this “inclination,” while Pankin 
and Ivanova focused on negative reinforcement—a diverse array of tactics that suggests 
uncertainty as to the best course of action. 
 After discussing admissions, Zasurskii described the typical subjects for the early 
years of the university program: political economy, dialectical materialism, historical 
materialism, history of philosophy, and modern and contemporary history. The Higher 
Education ministry had recently introduced required logic courses. Students themselves 
decided whether to concentrate in print journalism, radio, television, or publishing. 
Elective courses were heavily slanted toward the humanities, especially Russian language 
and stylistics. Zasurskii described philology, languages, and literatures as the subjects 
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“journalists cannot live without.” More recently, the department had begun cooperating 
with the economics faculty on analysis of production centers in factories and agriculture, 
and offering lectures on economic topics which commonly interested readers. Zasurskii 
argued that future journalists would need an understanding of economic performance and 
citizens’ material well-being.509 
 Boris Pankin supported this increased focus on economics as a corrective to the 
humanities’ dominance in the original curriculum, since the existing program produced 
journalists who were culture experts. Though he valued these journalists, Pankin 
considered economics the “backbone” of journalism. Most journalists who arrived at his 
newspaper suddenly found themselves “studying to find out what they didn’t know, what 
they did not study in the institute.”510 The prevalence of cultural expertise, and 
humanistic training, points to journalism’s status as “mind work”—intellectual and 
cultural labor held in high esteem in a Soviet context due to its association with literary or 
artistic production.511 At the same time, Pankin’s forceful critique of the existing system 
presented the newsroom as more formative than the university. In partial recognition of 
this, Zasurskii described the curriculum’s emphasis on practicum programs, typically 
begun in the second year, which included a ten-week period at small-circulation or raion-
level newspapers, ten weeks in oblast’ or republic newspapers in the third year, with the 
final year including a six-month work period, with evening or correspondence 
coursework. Most of this training occurred in Moscow at central publications.512 These 
descriptions reveal an unresolved tension between practical or vocational training and 
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more abstract humanistic traditions—a lasting legacy for journalism education in the 
United States, as well.  These affinities had a clear limit, however: Soviet journalists, in 
their understanding of practice as well as education, insisted on the centrality of 
Marxism-Leninism.513     
 Zasurskii admitted that more focused programs, including economic 
specialization or international affairs, would not lead to “universal journalists” who could 
work in the raion press where they would have to cover a variety of topics. Zasurskii 
additionally proposed special study for graduates of international relations and economic 
programs to “make them journalists” referencing programs in the United States and 
Poland.514 These proposals reveal an ambiguity: if successful journalists were made out 
of a real “inclination to the work” it is not obvious how someone who originally trained 
to be an economist or a diplomat would uncover this intuitive capacity through a course 
of study. Specialization further complicated the relationship between professionalization 
and education—such programs often made journalists unsuitable for the raion newspaper 
would seem to limit rather than expand graduates’ work opportunities. Raion-level 
journalists were, on the whole, less educated, and, if Moscow oblast’ is any indication, 
they shared Zasurskii’s concerns about graduates’ preparedness for their work, as we will 
see in chapter six. Zasurskii’s failure to reconcile the universal and particular goals of 
education, like Ivanova’s focus on intuitive aptitude, reveals an ongoing struggle to 
define the profession’s relationship to the academy. In his overview of the Soviet press, 
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Mark Hopkins points out that these questions—whether to provide specialization by 
subject, by genre, or a “liberal arts education”—were discussed as early as 1952, when 
Moscow University’s Journalism Department was established.515 As late as 1970—the 
year Hopkins’ work was published—Zasurskii and his colleagues continued to struggle 
with attracting quality students, as they were still bound to give preference to those with 
work experience and established publishing history. The persistence of these issues 
indicates the creative union remained unable to exercise sustained influence over 
education policy.  
 Pankin and Zasurskii’s discussion of specialization at the 1962 seminar was not 
only about domestic professional preparedness but also reflected the growing importance 
of Cold War competition to defining professional stature. Language study was required 
for all five years of the journalism program, for about six to eight hours per week, and the 
department hosted several foreign students.  Though he did not state who supported these 
goals, Zasurskii further noted calls for a specialization “on international themes” so that 
students could get more exposure to foreign languages and understand how major 
international events. This was a marked departure from past practice: many of the known 
zhurnalisty-mezhdunarodniki in this study received language training in prewar programs 
of study or established their other credentials through diplomatic and war correspondence 
work.516 This potentially expanded role for MGU in internationalized journalism 
education demonstrates the ongoing importance of international expertise to professional 
development and an effort to make this training more systematic than in the past.  
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 Like Zasurskii, Boris Pankin considered international experience essential, since 
most journalists would go abroad within two years of employment—a statement which 
confirms the privileged position of journalists from central newspapers. Many of his 
colleagues who went abroad “experienced great difficulties with foreign languages.” 
Foreigners were surprised and confused when senior journalists lacked this skill—as 
always, the possibility of damage to the Soviet Union’s reputation was a key aspect of 
cross-cultural encounters.517 Pankin drew on his own international experience to bolster 
his points—when he was part of the group accompanying Khrushchev to Austria, he 
noticed Western journalists typing their stories and sending them by wire, while “we sat 
by the phone and read until we were hoarse”—proof that typewriting was an essential 
skill. While he did not directly reference Cold War competitiveness, his choice of 
example demonstrates the close link between journalism’s international and domestic 
functions—trips abroad still served as inducements to improve, seven years after the 
Polevoi delegation’s American trip. As we saw in chapter four, travel abroad and contact 
with foreigners was an essential skill for elite journalists, one with many expectations 
attached.518  Based on his American experiences, Pankin considered American journalism 
students “less cultured and less theoretically literate” than their Soviet counterparts, but 
they enjoyed closer connections to senior members of the profession. No matter how 
renowned and individual was, “they don’t shrink from coming [to the university, to speak 
with students, advise them, and answer their questions.”519 Though he acknowledged 
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socialism’s fundamental superiority, Pankin still presented American achievements as a 
standard to meet or surpass.  
 Though the creative union’s seminar on higher education saw leading journalists 
express anxieties about university training, these issues point less to a failure of Soviet 
professionalization and more to a fundamental debate in the journalism field across 
national boundaries. Though Pankin argued that Soviet journalists could learn from 
American methods, modern Anglophone media scholars, as well as professionals, have 
long expressed dissatisfaction with university training and journalism’s place in the 
American academy. Just as professions have long been considered a “modern” social 
category, journalism’s fraught relationship to the university points to Soviet convergence 
with other print cultures.520 Higher education—and its relationship to the creative union’s 
broader mission of professional mastery—remained an important organizational priority 
after Khrushchev’s forced retirement in 1964, providing an important point of continuity 
between the creative union’s early years and the Brezhnev era.  
••• 
 Most of the creative union’s plenums after the inaugural congresses were 
procedural formalities, though the various agendas are important indicators of political 
priorities. Аs the organization acquired more members and expanded its scope of activity, 
plenums began to touch on more sensitive topics and feature more intense debate. The 
first plenum, held during the November 1959 inaugural congress, was focused on global 
socialist concerns, such as fraternal greetings to China and protest at the murder of 
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Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba.521 The next plenum was held during the 
spring of 1961, in anticipation of the CPSU’s 22nd Congress. Plans were made for local 
chapters to hold conferences and congresses in December, though these meetings were 
ultimately pushed back to the following February. The third plenum was held in 
December of 1961 and remained limited to a discussion of the most recent Party 
congress.522 
 1962 was a period of increased creative activity, with creative seminars and more 
substantive plenum discussions. In May, the Journalists’ Union hosted a collaborative 
seminar with the Writers’ and Artists’ Unions on writing about literature and art. 523 This 
increasing specialization was noted in 1962’s annual creative report for the entire Soviet 
Union: seminars for literary editors and translators took place in Ukraine, while in 
Uzbekistan and Georgia, there were seminars on the nonfiction ocherk and the feuilleton. 
The all-Union body endorsed a recent Ukrainian initiative: giving entry and exit surveys 
to seminar attendees to assess their needs and the effects of participation.524 Despite this 
new interest in subjective opinions, quantitative measures of success predominated: a 
hundred Moscow journalists had provided “creative help” to oblast’- and republic-level 
colleagues, whereas in the previous year only forty such visits took place. In total, the 
journalists engaged in this creative assistance visited sixty-seven cities to the previous 
year’s twenty-five.525 A “lecture group” to “propagandize among press workers” on 
particular themes, including genre, press history, and international issues, had formed in 
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1961, with the explicit goal of establishing ties between skilled “central journalists” and 
the localities, though its activity appears to have been limited.526 As part of preparations 
for a 1963 plenum on “questions of mastery,” there were planned discussions about thick 
journals, international reviews, the journalist and the listener, news and sensationalism, 
and the role of the press in increasing popular participation in the new party and state 
control commissions.527 By 1962, the creative union had about thirty-five thousand 
members.528 Although the plenum on mastery did not ultimately take place until 1965, as 
we will see in chapter six, the next two years featured more substantial growth, and 
nationally known journalists began to reflect more on professional identity, genre, and 
reader interactions.  
 The creative union’s June 1963 plenum was officially devoted to the struggle 
against imperialism, the new Party-state control commissions, and the importance of 
ideological work in demonstrating the Party’s recent successes. While president Pavel 
Satiukov touched on all of these themes in his address, he spent more time discussing 
possible areas of improvement along with rank-and-file requests for a more activist 
creative union—effectively continuing debate about the meaning of professionalization. 
As in the period of the inaugural congress, some of the calls for improvement would 
seem to challenge professionalization: the impulse to “attract the popular masses” to 
newspaper work led Satiukov to criticize the “sad fact that in both large and small 
newspapers, the overwhelming majority of materials are written by full-time, professional 
journalists.” And though their work was necessary to show “the literary image of events” 
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journalists needed to solicit more workers’ contributions to their newspapers.529 Satiukov 
was clearly required to promote Leninist principles of popular press participation, even as 
he addressed an audience of elite media professionals in a creative union. His other 
suggestions for improvement relied on collaboration more than exclusivity, such as more 
coordination between creative unions, to ensure that more literary and musical reviews 
were written by experts.530 Even more than at the 1962 cadres seminar, journalism was 
presented as a profession dependent on others’ expertise—writers and composers’ 
knowledge was crucial to properly informing the public about the cultural sphere.531 
 Satiukov continued to discuss the distinctions between journalism and other 
creative fields, focusing first on the Journalists’ Union’s size and membership issues. At 
thirty-six thousand members, the journalists’ union was the “most massive” creative 
union in the country. This created a special obligation to establish stringent selection 
criteria for members, since past practices had involved scandals and errors.  In one case, 
an editor from Voronezh accepted payment for an article he had not written and then 
engaged a chauffeur and a car, presumably with the stolen funds. Rather than recognizing 
his mistake, the editor argued that he had not been  “shaky on a party line I should have 
followed” and asked to be reinstated. Satiukov compared this to Khrushchev’s 
denunciation of the writer Viktor Nekrasov, specifically his declaration that writers who 
were out of step with the Party did not belong in it, and reminded his audience, “we must 
be implacable…judging a person not by his declarations, but by his acts, his practical 
activities, bringing the party line to life.” This included the proper relationship to those 
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who “sought to use our high calling for mercenary ends…careerists. We should purge 
ourselves of these people as fast as possible.” As proof the problem was unresolved, 
Satiukov cited recent applications to the Moscow city branch by pensioners and a 
prosecutors’ assistant, and declared that the creative union should be “freed from this 
ballast.”532 This outrage against a journalist who had disgraced his calling demonstrates 
the continued importance of moral standards—though this was a major theme of cultural 
diplomacy, it was equally prominent in discussions of domestic professionalism. The 
desire to combat careerism and materialism presents authentic professionalism as a love 
of creative activity for its own sake. Though membership requirements were a major 
feature of the bylaws debate, clearly no closure had been reached in the intervening years.  
 Other speakers at the 1963 plenum echoed Satiukov’s desire for exclusivity and 
advocated more serious professional development in the creative union. The head of the 
Ukrainian Republic branch, E. A. Lazebnik, lamented that the creative union had 
repeatedly put off holding a plenum on “questions of creative mastery.”  The event was 
finally held in 1965, and Lazebnik himself would deliver one of the major addresses. In 
Ukraine, creative work was more robust: the creative union held a very popular seminar 
on newspaper and journal editing, where more than two hundred journalists had actually 
attended, out of fifty invitees. Like the participants in the cadres seminar a few months 
earlier, Lazebnik bemoaned the state of higher education—it provided information about 
“theory and practice, what an editorial board does…but how to write, this is studied least 
of all.” Though the previous seminar had focused on Moscow University, Lazebnik’s 
sentiments indicate that dissatisfaction with journalistic higher education was not limited 
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to the capital.533 Lazebnik was equally concerned with membership issues and the need 
for more selectivity: in the Odessa chapter, some lecturers from the Znanie society—a 
“social” or “public” organization (obschestvennaia organizatsiia) dedicated to the 
dissemination of political and scientific information—wished to join the creative union 
and presented their publication records, which were deemed insufficient for admission. 
They had only pursued membership to get a salary increase. Like Satiukov, Lazebnik 
noticed an increase in applications from pensioners and policemen and endorsed a more 
careful approach to membership for workers’ and peasants’ correspondents.534 These 
criticisms demonstrate an increased dissatisfaction with the original membership 
model—though a stricter policy would not emerge until the creative union’s second all-
Union congress in 1966.  
 Other speakers at the 1963 plenum discussed their growing dissatisfaction with 
the creative union, pointing to persistent tensions between local journalists and the 
organization’s elites. A representative from Lipetsk named Bakurov critiqued Satiukov’s 
speech for its lack of substance. He argued that the last two plenums had been “conducted 
in haste” (na skoruiu ruku) and that this left “practical questions” unresolved, and that 
“everyday leadership…is not felt on the part of the governing board.” Because of this, 
requests for assistance were often unanswered or delayed past the point of usefulness. 
Bakurov had personally requested a visit from journalists who had recently been abroad, 
and there was no reply from the creative union. Bakurov considered this particularly 
upsetting since Lipetsk was only an eight-hour train journey from the capital. He further 
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complained that the creative union’s infrequent plenums were a violation of the bylaws, 
and noted the long delay in organizing a publisistika conference, despite the genre’s 
acknowledged importance.535 A year earlier, local journalists had held their own 
conferences, and journalists in Moscow oblast’ made similar complaints to Bakurov’s. In 
response, the all-Union body had agreed to study the grievances in more detail, though no 
major alterations were made.536 These critiques highlight the creative union’s struggles to 
meet its domestic mandate, a problem Satiukov would directly address in his closing 
remarks, though specific reform efforts were not undertaken until 1965, a subject I will 
return to in chapter six. 
 Satiukov’s responses to his critics were extensive—a decisive effort to rebut rank-
and-file complaints in favor of his own less ambitious vision for the creative union. Since 
most of his colleagues had already attended recent speeches on ideology in the Central 
Committee, he felt a brief speech was justified. It was not necessary for him to discuss all 
major political issues, since, “the majority of our members are active party workers, who 
fulfill wide and specific party functions and major political goals” and that the 
Journalists’ Union was expected to devote itself to “specific creative problems.” At the 
same time, for a “multinational organization,” it would be difficult for any leader to give 
specific universally applicable recommendations, and such a practice would be “not 
entirely fair.”537 
 Satiukov went on to describe his limited goals for the Journalists’ Union:   
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We are a creative organization, but an organization politically governed 
completely and in its entirety by the Party’s decisions, the party line, and 
we are the lieutenants of the Party. Therefore, to have as a goal that in the 
Journalists’ Union there would be assignment of work, or 
recommendations given, is impossible…We struggle for the party line 
through creative methods, and other methods for realizing the party line 
are conducted through the publications and other bodies, where our Soviet 
journalists work… detailed recommendations for specific institutions… 
could somewhere tie down the creative initiative of our Union. We are in 
favor of its development taking into account the concrete conditions of 
individual republics, and taking into account the decisions of the 
communist parties, we interpret the line of the Party’s Central 
Committee.538 
 
 This statement presents a striking contrast not only to rank-and-file desires from 
the bylaws debate but also to the relatively expansive vision of the inaugural congress. 
Now, Satiukov presented the Journalists’ Union as an organization with a limited scope, 
without the power or the inclination to determine national journalistic practices, and only 
to discuss “creative questions.” His vision of journalists as “the Party’s lieutenants” 
stressed the profession’s limits and the Party’s authority—a more politically active 
creative union would be redundant rather than productive. A key difference from the 
Composers’ Union emerges here: if the Party apparatus had to “professionalize itself” in 
order to properly evaluate music, journalists were already enmeshed in Party structures to 
such an extent that even the creative union’s leader advocated a subordinate role.539 
 Satiukov was more hopeful about the organization’s future, as he discussed the 
possibility of hosting a purely “creative plenum,” as a joint exercise between republic-
level branches or the Moscow and Leningrad chapters. He hoped that the creative union 
would soon “discuss the problem based on the experience of local and central 
                                                
538 GARF f. 10124, op. 1, d. 190, ll. 116. 
539 On the Party apparatus “professionalizing” itself in the aftermath of the Zhdanovschina, see Tomoff, 
Creative Union, 150–1. 
  306 
newspapers, to develop an expansive creative discipline.” He regretted the-all Union 
body’s inability to meet all local requests, citing his own busy schedule and the demands 
of hosting many foreign guests. While there were 288 journalists sent to localities, 
satisfying all requests would require over a thousand journalists and more money than 
membership dues provided. The Party’s leading role further justified holding fewer 
creative events than members desired: “we could hold a plenum every quarter, but there 
is no great need for this, because the specifics of our work consists of our close 
cooperation with the party organizations.”540 Leadership in the localities would require 
more resources and personnel—a logistical problem no doubt compounded by the Soviet 
Union’s geography and vast newspaper networks. Satiukov’s mention of foreign guests 
and his own busy schedule was a direct acknowledgement of conflict between cultural 
diplomacy and domestic professionalization.  In his closing thoughts on membership, he 
reiterated his dissatisfaction with the more inclusive original model, noting, “it is not 
necessary to have a union with a hundred thousand members,” and while there were 
many peasants’ correspondents in the Soviet Union, membership for all of them was not 
a goal: the “swelling of [creative] unions is not a normal thing.” While there were 
currently “a hundred and seventy members in Lipetsk,” fifty “wonderful, professional 
journalists” might be more desirable, so that the rest could “stretch toward that goal.” 
Satiukov presented an exclusive membership model as an inducement to improvement, 
and implied that the earlier inclusive model had somehow violated the spirit of creative 
organizations.541 As they had been during the bylaws debate, creative union leaders were 
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more willing to recognize organizational limits than rank-and-file members. Though the 
organization’s bylaws were not formally amended until 1966, several of the changes 
made—which I will address in detail later—correspond to critiques made at this plenum 
or during the creative union’s incubation period, reinforcing that professionalization was 
always a multistage process.  
 
••• 
 While the creative union’s membership policies and relatively limited scope were 
contentious policies, most creative union members agreed that audience engagement was 
a crucial professional value. Discussions about reader interaction focused not only on 
traditional methods of correspondence but also the newly popular sociological methods 
of gauging reader interest. In this section, I will discuss a 1963 seminar entirely devoted 
to correspondence work before moving to the 1964 seminars on youth journalism and 
publisistika, which included further discussion of reception issues. Recent scholarship on 
reader letters has largely concerned literary politics as a means of analyzing social 
change, and I argue that conceptions of the reader were equally critical to journalism 
practice and professional identity. Though reader letters themselves are not always 
accessible to historians, the creative union clearly considered work with correspondence 
part of “professional mastery.”542 Many discussions of reader response concerned the 
internal lives of citizens, particularly their moral and intellectual development—a theme 
which I first discussed in my KP case study as the staff grappled with the Twentieth 
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Congress. While discussions of correspondence and polling were generally optimistic 
about the value of reader participation and that Soviet society was progressing, other 
kinds of correspondence work were linked to the disciplinary initiatives of the 
Khrushchev era, especially popular policing and the new Party-State control 
commissions. The new journalism was indisputably focused on personhood and 
subjectivity, but this formation process had its punitive aspects, which are more visible 
when one turns away from prominent reformers and focuses on practices.  
 In 1963, the creative union hosted a seminar for senior members of 
correspondence departments (otdel pisem) on the republic, oblast’, and krai levels. The 
head of Sovetskaia Rossiia’s department celebrated the changes in his job under 
Khrushchev. In the Stalin period, letters were “registered” but little else was done: after 
“Leninist principles had been restored,” the reader had become more “active” and 
correspondence departments were transformed from аn “inert counting house” to a 
“creative department, equal to other departments.” This speech should be read as part of 
the self-fashioning in response to de-Stalinization more than as a straightforward factual 
statement: social histories indicate that petitions and other written exchanges remained 
important in Stalinist society.543 At the same seminar, a senior journalist named Chuprin 
from Ukraine’s Worker Gazette (Rabochaia gazeta) described the subjective nature of the 
reading process: most letters should be read by more than one person, since different 
people could be “attracted” to different aspects. The task was a demanding one, as the 
newspaper had received about twenty four thousand letters the previous year, an average 
                                                
543 GARF f. 101024, op. 1, d. 195, ll. 43–5; on petitioning, see especially Sheila Fitzpatrick, Tear off the 
Masks!, 155–82; on the downfall of reader studies, see Lenoe, Closer to the Masses, 169–74. 
  309 
of eighty to a hundred per day. After sorting, letters were categorized into actionable 
categories: “‘for future investigation, for action to be taken, for reply or to be left 
unanswered.’” Chuprin advocated a particularly cautious approach to anonymous letters. 
While there were fewer of them than in the past (possibly because anonymity was more 
important in the Stalin era), they were not archived, because “there is no addressee and it 
is known how much it is worth to put trust in such a letter.” And although their writers 
were presumed to be “afraid of the truth,” they were always examined, despite the 
“burden they posed.” After the facts were checked, the majority of them were found to 
contain some truth and investigated.544 In her work on petitioning practices during 
Stalinism, Sheila Fitzpatrick treats anonymous letters as their own genre, where authors 
were more sarcastic or expressed criticism of outsider groups. Chuprin’s skepticism 
points to a hierarchy of authorship, where signed letters had more value to journalists, 
though he admitted to finding value in anonymous letters, indicating that every member 
of the reading public deserved access to journalists’ investigatory powers.545 
 The process of investigation was described in some detail, particularly the 
importance of close interactions between newspapers and other Soviet institutions. 
Letters were not usually sent directly to the source of the problem, but rather to “higher 
institutions.” For example, if a letter came criticizing the leadership of a local trade 
union, the letter was sent to the oblast’ leadership.546 Published letters should indicate the 
writer’s party membership and occupation, “in order to attract the corresponding 
audience to the letter.” This vision of journalism emphasized a different skill set than 
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writing, positioning the journalist as a kind of sociopolitical interlocutor, who can agitate 
on behalf of the reader. As in Bolshevik and early Soviet journalism, ascription and 
categorization on a class basis was essential.547 
 In her address to the 1963 correspondence seminar, L. M. Emilianova of KP’s 
correspondence department turned from the practical to the emotional and subjective 
aspects of correspondence work. This was important not only for readers but also for the 
journalists who read and processed reader concerns: “Letters take on a great value in this 
way…they prompt his specific thoughts, to state his beliefs, his personal feelings on one 
or another matter. And to think about a letter, this is important and comprises the 
foundation of work with letters.”548 In the 1930s, the discipline of “reader studies” fell 
out of favor, as agitators and officials supported public discussions where officials could 
direct opinion, rather than the previously anonymous written feedback. This was due to 
changing political attitudes: reader studies became suspect as it was increasingly 
considered overly “subjective.”549 The recovery of sentiment, authenticity, and the self is 
not a new theme for historians of the Khrushchev era—what is instructive here is the 
connection between subjective growth and professional practice. The journalist was 
presented as both an active leader—an authority figure who selected letters—and as a 
reader influenced by another’s words.  
 Emilianova later argued that journalists had a particular responsibility to 
investigate and analyze correspondence, and provided several examples of more 
successful articles. Letters themselves might only indicate a “theme” whereas the “task of 
                                                
547 GARF f. 10124, op. 1, d. 193, ll. 12–4, on the history of using reader letters to study particular classes, 
see Lenoe, Closer to the Masses, 70–1. 
548 GARF f. 10124, op. 1, d. 194, l. 44. 
549 Lenoe, Closer to the Masses, 169–74. 
  311 
the journalist is to uncover content, to show what is important and what is not.” In one 
article, “The Unattractive Girl” (Nekrasivuiu devchonku), a young woman wrote in about 
her desire to be an actress despite her lack of good looks. Barred from entering her 
chosen field, she was without a meaningful occupation (bezdel’nichaet). The paper asked 
Stalin Prize winning actor V. O. Toporkov to reply and describe how a good acting career 
did not depend on looks, and wanted to start a “conversation, about labor, about activity 
in life, about true beauty and fleeting beauty.” The case resulted in five thousand 
responses, proving that an “insignificant fact” from a letter could produce a “great 
general theme…there are letters which seize on a very small theme, which the reader 
might not notice, if a journalist does not help him.” This example, and the careful 
scrutiny it required, was part of the rubric “sorting the editorial board’s mail” (razbiraia 
redaktsionnuiu pochtu).550 Though journalists could be inspired by correspondence, they 
were also presented as more knowledgeable than their readers. Readers could describe 
their experiences, but only a truly perceptive journalist could interpret them. Letters could 
call attention to more serious failing, as in the rubric “under the judgment of society” (na 
sud obshestvennosti). A particularly tragic case involved a young farmer who drowned 
while his comrades, former military men, simply watched. The boy’s mother wrote about 
her “inability to see these farmers,” and a correspondent traveled to interview the 
bystanders about their motives. The material resulted in three thousand letters, at which 
point the editorial board had to decide what to do next: “it was possible to publish the 
material and conclude with an exclamation point: oh, what a shame…but one must think 
more about the theme when the mail comes after such a controversial article.” The 
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newspaper solicited recollections about heroic behavior and received many responses.551  
Readers themselves could provide the inspirational examples journalists so frequently 
sought—effectively furnishing examples of the “positive hero” to counter the tragedy of 
the drowned young man. As we saw in the KP case study, the ability to identify and write 
about exemplary protagonists was an important newsroom value—one which links 
journalism to the socialist realist novel.552 
 Emilianova’s later descriptions of correspondence work emphasized its moral 
dimensions and the selection of proper rubrics. One possible form was the selection of 
multiple letters on a single theme, which was particularly useful when “subject matter 
concerns moral and general human themes, when alone a single good person acted 
according to the highest, most humane human law, and a second was a coward…As a 
rule, these letters do not go unnoticed, and are discussed in collectives, and in the 
family.” Emilianova was particularly encouraged when readers described personal 
conversations they had after reading a particularly stirring story in the newspaper. She 
argued that moral themes concerning matters which “do not fall under our civil code” or 
“do not fall under the codex of our procedural laws, should be discussed by society.” 
(obsuzhdeni obshestvennostiu).553 The contemplative aspect of correspondence work had 
a clear didactic function, related to what Thomas Wolfe calls the “pedagogical 
orientation” of the Soviet press.554 This depiction of the “moral and ethical theme” 
presents it as a morality tale, dependent on the contrast between good and evil. In this 
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reading of the genre, the ideal article spurred discussion in private life, and might reform 
individuals who could not be brought to justice in more conventional ways.  
 Emilianova was equally candid about the logistical and creative challenges of 
responding to letters, while emphasizing that reader feedback was a source of 
professional pride and inspiration. KP’s editorial board tried to anticipate materials which 
would “spur a response from readers” as befit the “responsibilities of the journalist.” At 
the same time, Emilianova “envied” the number of letters Pravda had recently received 
after publishing correspondence from a collective farm worker.555 This comparison 
presents correspondence as a limited resource for which that all publications competed. 
At the same time, Emilianova admitted that not all letters were significant and suggested 
burning the more trivial ones, such as housing complaints. In her view, the newspaper’s 
ability to truly improve individual situations was limited: “No doubt this [case of 
complaint] was already decided by society (obshestvennost’) and decided appropriately.” 
When she claimed that at least ten percent of letters involved housing, a voice from the 
audience interrupted and said, “no, even more than that.”556 
 Clearly, journalists found it acceptable to disparage quotidian assistance requests 
and treat letters responding to a moral or ethical issue as superior, just as they disparaged 
anonymous letters. The sheer volume of correspondence was equally daunting: in the 
previous year, KP received two hundred seventy thousand letters, all of which had to be 
archived. She suggested the creative union consider petitioning the Central Committee on 
this issue.  Even worse than housing complaints was the increasing number of letters 
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from convicted criminals (osuzhdnenikh). A person who had been convicted of rape, for 
example, might have enough time to write “a hundred and three complaints, and a 
hundred and three organizations will take up this task.” Work like this made it all the 
more necessary and difficult to “sort out” (razobrat’sia) when a “genuine letter” arrived. 
The situation was even worse in the winter—possibly because people had more time to 
write—and the newspaper could receive up to three thousand letters a day.557 The vision 
of the Soviet public is notably less exalted: readers could be more interested in personal 
concerns than their own subjective growth, and deviants could impede correct assessment 
of “real letters.” Correcting social ills could be time consuming, especially in cases of 
bribery or misallocated housing. The problem of social malcontents abusing 
correspondence was a major theme in Sergei Gerasimov’s 1967 film, The Journalist, 
discussed in chapter six.  
 Other speakers at the correspondence seminar focused far more directly on the 
punitive functions of the press, particularly S. P. Mezentsev, head of the press department 
of the Party-State Control Commissions—an institution closely involved with new 
policing tactics under Khrushchev. As its name suggests, the new body, introduced in 
1962, combined Party and state institutions in an effort to educe corruption and other 
social ills. The institutions recruited large numbers of popular activists and have been 
treated as an example of increased surveillance and coercion under Khrushchev.558  
Mezentsev argued that the press was an “active and mobilized helper” for his institution 
and acknowledged the changes in Soviet society since the 1930s. At that time, 
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correspondence work had relied on “big organizers, knowing a lot about life. “ This was 
in contrast to the  “new demands…that workers in the correspondence departments must 
themselves be capable of writing (umeli pisat’).” He was particularly pleased that more 
newspapers were publishing special rubrics devoted to Party-state control, and that the 
organizations were receiving large numbers of letters. In his view, a reduced 
correspondence burden would make it “easier for journalists to work” especially if 
complaints could be resolved locally.559 Party-state control was presented as a mechanism 
appropriate to a more advanced socialist society and have a positive effect on 
professional work habits.  
 Mezentsev argued that newspapers should “provide information for the masses 
about the work that the control organs are doing.”560  The new institutions struggled with 
the proper relationship between Soviet values and criticism, particularly the “sensational 
approach” to poor behavior, which could result in describing “good-for-nothings and 
their loathsome face…this must be done, but not through advertising…to look at who is 
guilty and how to correct it.” He argued for greater cooperation between “journalists and 
specialists…specialists lack experience, but journalists have observations…we should 
combine this.”561 Like the discussion on economics and higher education at the 1962 
cadres seminar, Mezentsev’s image of the “ideal journalist” emphasized the limits on 
professional expertise and the need to collaborate with other experts. As part of this 
cooperation, journalists should begin to evaluate “each letter from the perspective of 
general party and state interests.” While he admitted that many letters touched on court 
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cases, housing issues, or people who had been dismissed from their jobs, others could 
contain “big questions…significant not only for a given raikom (the party committee for 
the raion-level), but that have union-level significance.” These should be sent to the 
committee, especially in cases where a local body had been unresponsive. Even 
apartment questions could merit attention, if, for example, they concerned a new building 
which somehow did not house any workers. This was a more instrumental approach to 
correspondence work—journalists sorted letters for another institution, rather than 
advancing social progress through writing. Mezentsev also saw correspondence as a 
disciplinary tool for moral improvement. A bad factory director would ideally “become 
ashamed when someone from his factory appeals to the raion, it should be a blow to him, 
it means they don’t trust him, they don’t come to him even one time.” It was entirely 
possible, and even desirable, that the flow of letters would decrease over time, as social 
conditions improved—a rare admission that less correspondence could be a positive 
outcome.562 While correspondence could spur social development through contemplation, 
as in moral and ethical pieces, Mezentsev focused on the disciplinary aspects. He freely 
complained about journalists who relied on “old methods” of social control, rather than 
relying on the new “cooperative groups” which would organize and inform the social 
control committees about all the critical materials that had recently been published. These 
groups were envisioned as an “intermediary body between journalists and the 
committee.”563 Where Emilianova claimed that journalists had a unique capacity to shape 
private life, Mezentsev wished to see this inclination harnessed to his institution and its 
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reform mission. These preoccupations reinforce an important difference between 
Khrushchev-era reform projects and  “work on the self” under Stalin—the new reform 
agendas intended a subjective transformation without the threat of violence or arrest.564 
••• 
 
 In June and July of 1964 the Journalists’ Union hosted two significant creative 
seminars—a joint seminar with the Komsomol called “The Journalist and the Demands of 
Life,” which was devoted to youth journalism issues, and another on the genre of 
publisistika. I discuss both events, which took place within weeks of each other, as 
arguments for a particular model of Soviet journalism and genre politics, one particularly 
dedicated to social reform and a recovery from Stalinism. Journalists were encouraged to 
recover their authorial voices in the service of cultivating Soviet subjectivity in their 
readers. Unlike in discussions of higher education, which featured some convergence 
with Western debates, these conversations about the recent past, genre, and moral and 
social development relied on explicitly Soviet cultural values, especially service to a 
collective and socialist realist genre tropes. According to creative union records, about 
three hundred journalists took part in the publisistika seminar—a third of whom were 
from the Soviet Union’s republics, krais and oblasts. The list of participants highlights 
the close cooperation between leading journalists and the Central Committee. The head 
of its ideology department, A. G. Egorov, took part “along with other responsible 
workers from the department,” revealing an ongoing close relationship to the Party 
apparatus.565 In addition to this official recognition, the publisistika seminar received a 
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great deal of attention in the creative union’s print journal. Though most of its 
participants were from central publications, it was clearly considered significant for all 
professionals.566 
 D. P. Goriunov, then TASS director, gave the opening speech at the 1964 youth 
journalism seminar, which reviewed the historical and social developments of recent 
years. Unlike Adzhubei and Satiukov, who were fired not long after Brezhnev took 
power, Goriunov remained in his position until 1967, when he embarked on a diplomatic 
career. The introduction is worth quoting at length, as it encapsulates many major themes 
of Khrushchev-era journalism: 
To avoid a tone of didacticism, refrain from comrades counting on some 
kind of instructions, some sort of recipe for how we make a newspaper, 
how we deal with one or another problem of the upbringing of youth…we 
gather here to exchange opinions, exchange accumulated experiences, and 
not to share recipes, instructions or orders…It seems to me, that before 
such a qualified audience it is not necessary to speak about the source of 
this phenomenon. It must be stated that the creative atmosphere in the 
country, in particular in the ideological realm, is connected with the 
liquidation of the consequences of the personality cult, very fruitfully 
expressed in the development of the Soviet press and Soviet 
journalistics.567 
 
 Goriunov’s argument was almost an expanded meditation on the creative union’s 
commitment to professional growth and social reform.  His journalism was inherently 
collaborative, rooted in investigation and dialogue. He presented the recent past as a 
“liberal age”: journalism had recovered its vitality, its ability to debate central 
questions.568 Goriunov’s optimism about the present created a rhetorical distance between 
Stalinism and Khrushchev’s rule—without acknowledging the complicity of the current 
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leadership in perpetuating the personality cult. Instead, he relegated the difficult work of 
comprehending Stalinism to the past, rather than advocating an ongoing recovery 
process.  
 Goriunov presented journalism’s advancements in terms of individual growth and 
development, a theme many of his colleagues would also take up.  Newspapers “no 
longer resembled each other…but had acquired their own particular face…” This 
diversity was particularly key to managing the “upbringing of youth” (vospitanie 
molodezhi) and “find the correct tone in conversations with their young readers, which 
will most of all act on his feelings, on his reason.”569 He presented the reader entirely as 
an object to be acted upon, though his stress on both sentiment and intellect reveal an 
interest in the moral and ethical aspects of print culture. He was particularly concerned 
with finding the proper “tone” for audiences, especially youth, citing their sophistication 
and intelligence.570 Most of Goriunov’s examples of journalistic success were tied to KP, 
his former workplace: He singled out Vasilii Peskov, who had recently won the Lenin 
Prize for his book, Walking through the Dew, and claimed that the paper had trained 
eighty percent of the nation’s leading journalists. Peskov had come to Moscow from 
Voronezh during Goriunov’s tenure as editor, and Goriunov singled him out for having 
“his own face in Soviet Journalism and the Soviet press, not resembling anyone else.” 
Peskov was so popular that people as far away as Khabarovsk in the Far East requested 
he visit and write about their challenges, particularly the new issues raised by growing 
tensions with China. Goriunov viewed this level of adulation as a substantive 
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achievement 571 Goriunov praised Peskov as an exemplary individual, who used his 
particular talents in the service of national improvement.  Other discussions of model 
Soviet citizens at these seminars similarly positioned individual talent as essential to 
collective progress.  
 In his address at the publisistika seminar weeks later, Aleksei Adzhubei touched 
on similar themes to Goriunov, an unsurprising overlap since the two had worked closely 
together at KP. Unfortunately, archival records preserve only a summary of the address 
rather than a full transcript. Where Goriunov had focused on de-Stalinization and youth 
journalism, Adzhubei expanded on the value of personhood to professional and social 
development, taking a positive view of the Party’s connection to journalists. From his 
perspective, this relationship was “directly connected with the material and technical 
foundations of communism…and the formation of new social relationships, the 
upbringing of the new person,” reinforcing that journalists were rhetorically invested in 
both material and subjective development.572 Adzhubei’s main subject, the Soviet genre 
of publisistika, deserves some explication. Though the term may be loosely translated as 
an “essay” or “commentary” piece, the publisist as an author was bound to a higher 
calling—to address a particular social or political problem, expound on it at length, and 
offer possible solutions. The genre had its roots in famous nineteenth century essays 
written by reform-minded intellectuals—both Pushkin and Vissarion Belinskii were 
considered publisisty as well as literary figures. This genre, more than any other, 
demonstrates the particularity of Russian and Soviet genre politics—publisistika was and 
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is treated as a distinct art form, and practitioners could be known as publisisty as well as 
journalists or writers. A recent Party plenum had designated media workers “the shock 
forces of the ideological front,” a calling which reinforced the responsibility of the 
publisist to accurately describe Soviet society and its needs.573 
 Adzhubei, as befit his role as a journalistic reformer close to Khrushchev, stressed 
that publisistika as a genre had “suffered serious consequences from the period of the 
personality cult.” The Central Committee now recognized what made journalism less 
effective: “dry and boring articles…doctrinaire reports…simplification…silence about 
difficulties…all of this damages our connection with readers.”574 Adzhubei’s ideal 
journalism was active, lively, and grappled with social complexities. At the same time, 
their commitment to describing “the truth of life” did not make publisisty “dispassionate 
chroniclers of everyday life” (ne besstrastnye bytopisateli).  
The obligations he described were extensive and demanding:  
To see and correctly comprehend the leading tendencies of developing 
events, and, with party minded conviction, express them in the newspaper. 
When our publisistika is honest, open, brave, and romantic when it 
correctly shows life…the Soviet reader accepts it. He is stern and 
outspoken, and does not tolerate literary embellishment. And it is 
necessary to always write, imagining the gaze of the person you are 
addressing.575  
 
Journalists, in their roles as publisisty, were not limited to description of the present but 
could focus on the incipient potential in events, provided their convictions stemmed from 
their ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism, just as the Soviet novel was meant 
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to depict present struggle with an eye to a triumphant future.576 Adzhubei had a 
particularly exalted vision of the ideal reader and the genre he deserved: the brave, 
honest, and romantically inclined publisist had to meet exacting standards and pursue a 
mutually beneficial relationship with those he wrote for. Adzhubei’s rejection of 
“dispassionate” approaches and insistence on an ideologically clear vision reinforces that 
Soviet journalists did not aspire to objectivity, even as they insisted on factual accuracy. 
The dangers of “embellishment” were also a major theme at the 1964 youth journalism 
seminar, as I will show in my analysis of Evgenii Riabchikov’s remarks there.  
 Adzhubei went on to provide “specific examples” of particularly successful 
publisistika, again, in the words of the transcriber, “stressing the idea of the necessity of a 
lively, human conversation with the reader. Propaganda of Marxism-Leninism, 
publisistika on economic, scientific, and moral and ethical themes, all this should be 
completely addressed to the person, to his reasoning and feelings.”577 Readers had both 
sentimental and intellectual needs, which developed in an explicitly socialist ideological 
framework, as the references to economics and Marxism-Leninism indicate. Tatiana Tess 
expressed similar opinions in her remarks, and presented improved connections between 
journalists as a positive gain, “made with our labor, our hearts, our thoughts…everything 
that we put into our work.” While she did not seek to criticize established traditions, 
when she looked back at the past, Tess saw a “sphere that we practically left 
unexamined…a person’s internal world…that which we in our work call the moral and 
ethical theme.” This involved both the new aspects of personhood and the holdovers from 
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the past, personal thoughts, and even “doubts”—describing nearly all aspects of “Soviet 
subjectivity,” as Jochen Hellbeck presents it in his case studies of Stalin-era diarists, all 
of whom engaged in rigorous descriptions and accountings of internal life, with an eye to 
creating a more authentic socialist self. She and Adzhubei shared an appreciation for this 
new genre, and Tess even declared that a proper approach to moral issues was just as 
important as understanding the process of constructing new hydroelectric stations. 
Subjectivity could serve as its own “master plot,” an argument KP journalists had made 
in 1956.578 
 Adzhubei’s description of successful publisistika focused on both knowledge and 
reader relationships: “erudition, a great store of knowledge…impressions and а wide 
familiarity. Without this equipment the publisist remains at the level of the average 
reader, and cannot enrich him, convince him, or captivate, and cannot write 
interestingly.”  Though all journalists were expected to maintain expertise, Adzhubei 
portrayed the publisist as exceptionally skilled, with a specific store of “equipment” and 
an ability to engage with any subject.579 These abstract notions of achievement are similar 
to Ivanova’s vision of professional development from the 1962 cadres seminar: a 
description of journalism as a philosophical outlook as much as a concrete skill set. Тhe 
balance between universal skill and specialization posed some challenges to defining 
journalistic expertise. While it is clear that engaging use of genre was key to Soviet 
definitions of professional development, Adzhubei offered no clear sense of what types 
of knowledge were necessary in order to engage in audience persuasion. This tension 
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persisted into the Brezhnev era, as we will see in chapter six. At the same time, he was 
certain that was no longer enough for journalists to aim at “average” readers—authentic 
publisitika mattered precisely because it could reach the exceptional. Adzhubei’s vision 
of the reader is far more exalted than the portrait from the 1963 correspondence seminar, 
where Emilianova and others admitted that audiences were unsophisticated or approached 
the newspaper for entirely instrumental purposes. Adzhubei envisioned an exalted future 
where all readers were sophisticated enough to appreciate genre use.  
 In his speech at the Komsomol seminar, KP editor Iurii Voronov explicitly linked 
genre to professionalization: Almost as though he were expanding on the creative union’s 
bylaws, he described professional challenges as “mastery,” claiming: “it is necessary to 
be a journalist in spirit and in mastery (po dukhu i po masterstvu). In spirit means to see 
precisely and in a timely fashion, what is currently necessary to write above all…to be a 
publisist in mastery, means to be a master of one’s task, to have clear language and the 
like.”580 Voronov, like Adzhubei, linked the craft of writing to vision—the ability to 
choose a topic and take a position. Absent from this definition is the concept of 
“objectivity” so common in academic literature on journalism. This is unsurprising, given 
the long-standing Soviet practice of critiquing “bourgeois objectivity” for obscuring 
material and class realities, which a Marxist-Leninist approach considered central. 
Journalists were now active and developed authors, with specialized knowledge to share 
with the public.581 Just as the zhurnalist-mezhdunarodnik, as an experienced international 
                                                
580 RGASPI M-1, op. 32, d. 1166, ll. 14–15. 
581 On the importance of objectivity as a journalistic value, see Zelizer, Journalism, 58–9. 
  325 
expert, represented the pinnacle of excellence in cultural diplomacy, the publisist set the 
standard for domestic achievement. 
 In their addresses at the 1964 seminars, Voronov and Vassili Peskov each stressed 
the importance of moral authority to successful creative output. Peskov argued that 
journalists needed to develop “good taste” and a “journalistic outlook” (krugozor). These 
qualities developed over time, and depended on things like reading habits, visiting 
exhibits, and the cultivation of personal friendships. This tactic would have a direct effect 
on readers: 
In order to speak with a person and teach something, you need to set out 
on such a way of life, which would aid in the formation of a person’s 
internal world, so that he himself could teach people. Therefore, how we 
structure our leisure, where we are, where we spend our time, whether we 
sit in a tavern or organize our leisure more widely, this is what our 
worldview depends on…and the increase of our spiritual riches. 
 
Peskov saw parallels with the search for the “positive hero,” and much of the reader 
response to his book concerned this theme. His hero was a person “whom I love, whom I 
can’t bypass without having written about him, a person I should tell people about.” 
Peskov argued that journalists, like writers, could serve as these kinds of inspirational 
figures.582 Peskov’s catalogue of successful journalism habits reads much like an 
endorsement of appropriately Soviet “cultured” behavior. Clearly, a properly ordered 
internal world and personal life would yield benefits in the professional realm. The 
pursuit of “culturedness” became a middle class value following the sacrifices of the war 
as a way to accommodate popular desires for consumer goods and enhanced leisure time. 
Officially sanctioned “kulturnost” was often contrasted with the “petty-bourgeois” 
                                                
582 RGASPI M-1, op. 32, d. 1166, ll. 72–4. 
  326 
attachment to material gain, to give it greater legitimacy. Journalists, as promoters of 
official values, were clearly expected to embody them in their own personal lives, since 
Peskov suggested they seek opportunities to “work on themselves.”583  His interest in 
leisure, friendship, and personal time serves as another instance where journalists were 
both promoters and objects of the new subjectivity—authentic professional development 
meant becoming more like the positive hero.  
 Though he spoke more about the profession in general than particular genres, 
Voronov, too, linked positive development to individuality and self-actualization. In his 
concluding discussion of “professional matters,” he took as inspiration an epigram from 
national literary icon Alexander Pushkin, urging his colleagues to work more inventively. 
In his “Travels to Erzurum,” the poet calls his friends and colleagues too “lazy and 
incurious” to properly memorialize the recently murdered poet Griboedov, and Voronov 
found the epigram equally relevant to understanding recent newspaper content.584 
Voronov clearly expected his audience to be intimately familiar with the reference. While 
creative union leaders frequently presented journalism as distinct from literature, 
Voronov drew from belles-lettres to inspire self-improvement in his colleagues. 
Expanding on this point, he urged his audience not to assume that work experience alone 
signified creative maturity. While experience might signify “mastery” in other fields, 
journalism was unique, as some would leave the Komsomol press because they had 
“stopped growing as a journalist…which leads to creative stagnation.” Тhough economic 
and moral themes had lasting value, journalists needed to be aware of the pressure to 
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constantly come up with “current material,” following Gorky’s example, and to make 
their work memorable even if newspapers came out daily. Voronov exhorted his 
colleagues to “work on oneself, and remember that journalism demands real knowledge, 
no less than other professions.”585 Journalistic expertise was so intimately linked to the 
evolution of Soviet society and meeting public needs that professional knowledge was 
both a goal for the present and far off in the future. This stress on constant evolution may 
go some way to explaining the earlier uncertainties about higher education content and 
the preoccupation with an author’s subjective development.  
 As they expanded on the need for self-improvement and better genre work, both 
Adzhubei and Voronov presented conflict and criticism as key to progress. Adzhubei was 
distressed that journalistic writing did not adequately reflect the Soviet Union’s 
impressive technological achievements, and he declared, “we write about these great 
victories in a dry and shallow way.” While publistika had not sufficiently tackled 
economic problems, journalists further neglected the social problems and contradictions 
that were still a part of Soviet life, a phenomenon Adzhubei regarded as particularly 
dangerous. “This inclination to depict labor, life, and everyday existence (byt’) in a 
socialist society as an easy matter, which will work itself out…since under our conditions 
there are not the strong contradictions of the capitalist world, there is nothing to fight for.  
Such an approach…threatens the cause of the upbringing of youth as a generation of 
fighters and builders.” In Adzhubei’s interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, progress 
toward socialism was not cause for premature celebration but required even deeper 
attention to heightened conflict, lest younger generations grow complacent. The problem 
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was not limited to maintaining a combative spirit, however—Adzhubei warned that if the 
diversity of life was not adequately captured by publisistika, “the person (people?) will 
start to look for answers from the rumor mongers or the clergy,” and exhorted 
zhurnalisti-mezhdunaroniki to portray events “before everyone else and more sharply 
than everyone else.” The references to “rumor-mongers” may have been an implied 
reference to foreign media sources like the Voice of America—as my KP case study has 
shown, Soviet journalists were increasingly concerned with increased access to these 
information sources. As others had, Adzhubei argued that the creative union should 
concern itself with both domestic and international matters—while it was an unqualified 
good that international experts were becoming skilled at political commentary, this was a 
key value for domestic journalism as well.586 As Satiukov had at the 1963 plenum, 
Adzhubei sought a balance between the creative union’s domestic and international 
mandates.  
 Voronov’s discussion of social conflict and media competitiveness was more 
explicitly literary than Adzhubei’s, pointing to overlap between cultural fields. While he 
conceded that “absence of conflict” was an important value, he argued for a different 
definition of “conflictedness” based on reader reactions, drawing on the earlier adulation 
of Vassili Peskov’s work to prove his points: “Conflictedness is conflict of a completely 
different sort, when a person writes that he is ashamed that he passed by what Vassili 
Peskov saw, when a person has his eyes opened to something…When people say, I’m 
ashamed, or they say thank you, this is a very important quality, which we should 
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teach.”587 Voronov’s reference to “absence of conflict,” which was one of socialist 
realism’s foundational principles, requires further contextualization. Literary criticism 
from the Khrushchev period demonstrates that the doctrine of “absence of conflict” was 
openly re-evaluated: in a speech at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961, Alexandr 
Tvardovskii, editor of Novyi Mir, the literary journal most closely identified with de-
Stalinization, was concerned that literature that omitted the “difficulties” in Sоviet life 
was failing readers. This speech was later cited in a literary encyclopedia entry on the 
doctrine.588 Voronov’s belief in the pedagogical value of conflict was reminiscent of 
another aspect of socialist realist doctrine: the classic “production novel” tended to depict 
a protagonist who had to overcome “spontaneity” and uncertainty and reach 
“consciousness” in order to fulfill a goal.589 
 In her reflections on the moral and ethical theme, Tatiana Tess presented 
psychological conflict as key to successful storytelling. In another story about spiritual 
poverty, Tess described how a Russian Civil War veteran had written to the Izvestiia 
about one of his comrades who had been a deserter. An investigation, after a second letter 
from this disgruntled comrade, revealed that the man had been awarded the Order of the 
Military Red Banner many years after his 1920 service. Tess personally visited Aleksei 
Adzhubei to ask to investigate the affair, highlighting the sense of “responsibility” she 
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felt. The story reminded her of the relationship between composers Mozart and Salieri. 
The first man, Gronskii, who had written the complaint, spoke more about his enemy 
than himself, had a spotty employment history, and did not work even though he was not 
of retirement age. The other, Ganzhenko, was a Cossack with an interesting life story 
who did not remember the man who was so fixated on him. Tess described it as a classic 
story of youthful envy lasting into adult life and claimed she had retold it because it 
demonstrated how important it was for journalists to “not only follow facts…for a single 
fact can become a source of contemplation…of the new relationships between people, of 
the relationship of a person to himself and our relationship to him.”590   
 Tess’s anecdote contains much that is typical of Soviet morality tales: the 
vengeful Gronskii did not contribute to society or have a healthy relationship with his 
collective, while the object of his hatred was dignified and free from petty grudges. At 
the same time, the episode neatly illustrates the centrality of personhood to Tess’s 
personal journalistic values: though the story concerned an important episode of Soviet 
history, she concentrated on the internal struggle between Gronskii and his comrade. Her 
arguments point to a vision of social progress determined by individual development. For 
her, journalism was a narrative with explanatory power. Anglophone cultural studies 
scholars have taken similar approaches to journalism, though the idea of narrative and 
storytelling has been received badly by practitioners. Communications critic James Carey 
called motivation and explanation journalism’s “dark continent”—what it most wishes to 
achieve and yet struggles to because of the daily realities of the news cycle. Carey argues 
that “to explain is to abandon journalism in the archetypal sense: it is to pursue ‘soft 
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news,’ ‘trust me’ journalism…from the journalists’ head rather than the facts.” Tess and 
other proponents of subjectivity-focused journalism celebrated interpretation without 
these reservations—pointing to another divergence between American and Soviet 
journalistic ideals.591 
 Though the new focus on personhood was celebrated as a unique Soviet 
accomplishment at the 1964 seminars, Voronov in particular struggled with the disturbing 
implications of too much focus on the individual. While he considered the moral and 
ethical theme vital, Voronov was quick to condemn poor examples of the genre, such as 
an article in Komsomolets Tadzhikistana, which concerned a group of young girls who 
returned money they found on the street to the police, even though they were near a 
candy shop at the time.  Their decision to avoid temptation ostensibly proved that proper 
Communist morals were taking root. Readers disagreed, and viewed this as “ordinary 
honesty.” While such cases might have been valuable as informational reporting, they 
were not suitable for the moral or ethical frame, especially since celebrating such 
behavior was more typical of bourgeois newspapers—when such stories were published 
in the capitalist world, those involved received awards.592 Clearly, true moral and ethical 
journalism had to involve deeper questions—the equation of superficial coverage with 
bourgeois practice was a clear rebuke. Returning lost property was presented as typical 
behavior: so typical that even bourgeois citizens engaged in the practice. True ethical 
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journalism, in this analysis, required focus on exceptionalism that was clearly traceable to 
the influence of Marxist-Leninist ideals.  
 Though he embraced the focus on personhood and moral development as 
journalistic values, Voronov remained anxious about their implementation, since the 
meaning of individual responsibility could be misinterpreted. As an extension and 
improvement of the moral and ethical genre, Voronov suggested introducing economic 
questions into the moral realm. He argued that young people should see problems of 
waste as “moral,” and youth should be encouraged to relate “to the state as to 
themselves.” In his studies of theft and bribery, James Heinzen states that most citizens 
viewed such behavior as morally neutral—Voronov clearly found this trend 
unacceptable.  Another solution was to focus on the problem of “the collective and the 
individual,” which befit the spirit of de-Stalinization.  
Referencing the recent past, he declared forcefully: 
 
We have struggled decisively and justly with those instances, when the 
person brought moral damage…against when there was undeserved 
repression, carried out in the name of the collective. However, sometimes 
in defending certain students from the collective of the higher education 
institution, we forget that my responsibility before society remains, and 
the question about my personal responsibility remains primary.593  
 
 Voronov presented Stalinist terror as a case of warped individual will. His 
narrative glossed over the popular dimensions of the repressions and discussed violence 
and death in terms of “moral damage” without naming the perpetrators. However 
dangerous evocations of collective will could be in the hands of a destructive individual, 
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Voronov clearly viewed individuality as a dangerous tendency among the young—his 
reference to students reveals the persistence of such anxieties, formerly a major theme at 
KP in 1956. He was concerned that young people would “develop an unhealthy 
relationship” to the idea of their individuality, that they were “responsible only for my 
own conscience”—a pervasive concept in “old writers,” presumably a reference to pre-
revolutionary authors. This kind of thinking led to people creating their own social 
groups, which, while not dangerous in itself, it was concerning  “for those people who 
write about their independence.”  Referring to such people as “outlaws,” Voronov 
reaffirmed the principle that “we ought to worry about every person” and reiterated the 
Marxist conception of the direct relationship between labor and social benefit: “from each 
according to his abilities, to each according to his labor.” The problem of individual 
capability was especially central to the evaluation of “identity” (s tochki zrenia lichnosti), 
to the future of Communism.594 Voronov’s conception of individual growth as 
interdependent rather than autonomous points to a deeper cultural continuity. The 
cultivation of a new personality (lichnost’) was crucial to social service for the pre-
revolutionary intelligentsia, and these values, embraced by the Bolsheviks and harnessed 
to Marxism-Leninism, became Soviet values as well.595   
 Voronov made no direct reference to a particular social phenomenon or group, 
though his distrust of individuality and sociability outside of official frameworks was 
obvious. Recent historical scholarship may offer some insight into his concerns: young 
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intellectuals increasingly began to gather in small groups to discuss ideas, a phenomenon 
frequently referred to as “kompaniia.”  In his study of the intelligentsia, Vladislav Zubok 
presents many examples of revolutionary idealism that were not synonymous with 
support for the Party. Voronov’s views seem in opposition to these forms of social 
activity, since he identified them with literary work that lacked a revolutionary pedigree 
and took a cautious approach to the individual conscience. His direct reference to those 
who wrote about their own independence is evocative of earlier literary controversies, 
such as the critical response to Vladimir Dudintsev’s Not By Bread Alone, which I 
discussed at length in chapter two.596 Though it is not possible to prove whether any 
particular episode inspired Voronov’s caution, his words highlight the ambiguous aspects 
of the reform project. While journalists’ recovery of authorial power was of clear social 
benefit, the reading public’s interpretation of policy could be de-stabilizing. These 
arguments challenge the distinction Thomas Wolfe sets up between the relatively 
independent press under Khrushchev and the suspicion of individual initiative under 
Brezhnev: Voronov only celebrated individualism in particular forms.597 The extent to 
which a focus on personhood also meant toleration of new ideas was another unresolved 
tension of creative work.  
••• 
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 While some journalists struggled to balance their interest in individuality with 
their commitment to collective progress, others turned to challenges that are more 
familiar from the inaugural congress: the relationship between journalism and literature, 
and the need for Soviet journalists to surpass their “bourgeois” counterparts. Like 
Voronov, Evgenii Riabchikov linked an understanding of genre to professional success, 
claiming that a proper appreciation of facticity would lead journalists to understand that 
their field had distinct advantages over literature. Riabchikov’s in-depth discussion about 
the importance of facts and truth presents another opportunity to reflect on the nature of 
Soviet and liberal views of journalism. While the interest in factual accuracy points to a 
common preoccupation, the close links between journalism and literature seem more 
reflective of the value Soviet culture placed on linguistic labor. Riabchikov considered it 
“entirely logical” that discussions about tradition and “mastery” related to the “native 
brother, the closest sphere—literature.” He was not the first to discuss affinity between 
the two professions, since both Boris Polevoi and Aleksei Surkov had stressed the 
possibility of mutual benefit and exchange at the inaugural congress, and rank-and-file 
journalists argued for economic and social parity between the professions during the 
bylaws debate. Though both were “written with the same pen, on the same paper,” 
Riabchikov advised young journalists to avoid using the “methodology” of literature, 
since the art form depended on “creative images…of typical traits in typical 
circumstances, and journalism relied entirely on facts.” Riabchikov’s main example was 
particularly rеvealing: the recent work of Konstantin Simonov, who first achieved fame 
as a war correspondent.  Riabchikov reminded his audience that Simonov had indeed 
based his protagonist in The Living and the Dead, Serpilina, on an actual Soviet officer, 
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S. F. Kutepov. But comparison of the actual biography to the novel revealed that 
Simonov had “collected multiple similar actions” to compose his character, and made a 
“different person.” As a personal example, Riabchikov described meeting a man who was 
in prison with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and inspired the character of Buinovskii in the 
concentration camp novel One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch. He argued that the 
man’s profile in Izvestiia was more inspiring for readers since they could see a “real 
life.”598 In the sociology of journalism, facts are often discussed as a part of news making 
in the United States. Journalists construct “webs of facticity” to establish the legitimacy 
of their sources and quickly convey information. Riabchikov’s defense of facts thus 
points to a convergence of journalistic values. Though I have found many instance of 
journalists expressing envy of writers, Riabchikov’s vision did not position journalism as 
a  “younger” sibling to its literary relative—as had occurred at the inaugural congress in 
1959.599  
 Continuing his interest in problems of facticity, Riabchikov went on to describe 
less salutary examples and what young professionals should learn from them. Recent 
experience at Moscow University confirmed his pessimism about the younger 
generation’s appreciation of this value. During diploma defenses at Moscow University, 
both young journalists and instructors debated whether it was appropriate to print ocherki 
with invented names or altered facts. In Riabchikov’s view, there was a clear and 
unambiguous response to this question: “there is a wonderful form of literary creativity, 
it’s the short story.”  The ocherk “describes a real person…where facts and names are 
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given, and here it seems to me such distortions are not permissible.” Unsurprisingly, 
Peskov’s prize-winning work was a clear example of how to properly achieve this 
standard, since he “tells us very poetically and romantically about living people.” Тhis 
was in contrast to the work of the Village Prose writer Valentin Ovechkin, whose work 
could tentatively be called an ocherk but, argued Riabchikov, they were more accurately 
classified as a short story. A postwar literary movement that spanned generations and 
themes, Village Prose works concentrated on rural life, often with an attitude of 
veneration and nostalgia.600 Facticity, then, not only distinguished journalism from 
literature but also provided the justification for normative judgments of colleagues. 
 Definitions of genre could help to determine professional boundaries—there was 
nothing immoral or inappropriate about the short story unless a journalist used its 
conventions improperly, without a professional’s unswerving commitment to factual 
accuracy. These kind of boundaries between genres, in an American context, were often 
used to distinguish the “soft news” of the “feature story” from the “hard news” found on 
a newspaper’s front page.601 While Peskov’s literary technique and choice of subject 
matter were clearly evocative of the Village Prose movement, Riabchikov’s view of 
genre boundaries reads as an attempt to acknowledge similarity while protecting a central 
professional value.  While the use of similar distancing techniques in the United States 
points to some affinity between the two print cultures, the effort to distinguish between 
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literature and journalism seems far more reflective of a Soviet cultural landscape.602 As in 
the literary examples involving Simonov and Solzhenitsyn, facticity was used to establish 
journalism’s status as a taxing and demanding field: “if you begin to describe real facts, 
this is a hundred times more difficult than to change names and go on the path of the 
short story.” Riabchikov considered it particularly upsetting that Anatolii Zlobin, who, 
after writing two novels, “stopped writing ocherki.” While it may have been the case that 
Zlobin “will be an excellеnt novelist and will be an excellent writer,” his departure from 
the “documentary ocherk” (dokumentalnyi ocherk) is “bitter and upsetting for us.”603 
While someone like Boris Polevoi could cross professional boundaries and belong to both 
the Writers’ and Journalists’ Unions and openly celebrate the connections between 
journalism and literature, Riabchikov highlighted literary gains at his own profession’s 
expense.  
 Where Riabchikov was concerned with professional approaches to facts and 
genre, other speakers at the publisistika conference were interested facticity as it related 
to criticism and their responsibility to inform the public. Where Riabchikov focused on 
facutal distortions, these journalists argued that silence on controversial topics was its 
own dereliction of professional duty. A journalist from Stavropol’ was even critical of 
Adzhubei: if the Izvestiia editor wished to see journalists be “brave” about their social 
problems, such as a recent rash of fires, he should “give the order not to us, but to the 
censor.”604 Bravery, then, was less a matter of individual courage than official sanction—
a familiar theme from my KP case study. This was the only reference to censorship I 
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have found at a creative union event—perhaps the political value of publisistika 
contributed to the more forthright reflections on professional agency. A journalist named 
Kondrat’iev from the city of Kuibishev offered a spirited defense of writing on 
controversial topics. When journalists chose “shaky” (nesolidnie) topics, this could result 
in failures to properly instill moral values. While it was upsetting for journalists to hear 
statistics about rising crime and sexual license, and “uncomfortable to write about sexual 
education of youth, in particular schoolchildren, is it really comfortable when ninth-
graders begin to engage in debauchery? It turns out that, a fact itself exists in life, but it’s 
somehow uncomfortable to write about it.” Soviet official reticence about sexuality has 
recently received more attention from historians.  Stalin-era  educational programs were 
often confined to medical literature or propaganda posters about healthy proletarian 
sexuality. Open reference to sexual misconduct was not in itself unusual—licentiousness 
and criminality were frequently linked in official discourse.605 
 What is striking here is the insistence on journalists’ responsibility to overcome 
their personal discomforts and overturn cultural norms.  In a less inflammatory example, 
Kondrat’iev argued that some journalists might find it “awkward” to write about dairy 
workers, since their form of manual labor was nonmechanized. But, in the final analysis, 
“we are speaking about a person” and narrow mindedness in journalism was “terribly 
dangerous.” Newspapers should turn away from “nursemaids” who feared conflict and 
raise even contentious subjects, including the previous year’s poor harvest and resulting 
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rises in food products. Audience needs were more important than avoiding controversy, 
and he defined success as the certainty that “people understood facts correctly, and 
thought about them correctly, and not in a petty-bourgeois fashion.”606 Kondrat’iev’s 
remedies departed from cultural orthodoxy: arguing that dairymaids were just as 
proletarian as factory workers was certainly an expansive definition of the “masses.” 
While it was not uncommon for Soviet journalists to argue for more extensive coverage 
of economic issues, the mention of harvest failures and food prices is in some contrast to 
the usual exhortations to write only about triumphs. Still, all of this clearly remained 
within defined parameters—writing about failures was expected to somehow reassure or 
perhaps even pacify the population, as a “petty-bourgeois” response would likely have 
involved more overt expressions of dissatisfaction. 
 Other discussions of openness and transparency referenced the international 
ideological struggle, demonstrating the difficulty of drawing a clear line between the 
creative union’s two mandates. At the publisistika conference, foreign broadcasting was 
discussed largely as a motivator for Soviet journalists to improve their work and change 
their attitudes toward disseminating information, often in the broader context of the 
changing political climate. Тhe editor of the Lithuanian republic newspaper, Tiesa, a G. 
Zimanas, argued that prior to Stalin’s death, journalists had “gotten out of the habit of 
arguing” but had recently begun to “genuinely debate.” His example was particularly 
topical: discussion of how to implement the corn campaigns in Lithuania had resulted in 
debates between journalists and party officials. Zimanas was unusually frank about the 
tensions facing Soviet journalists—specifically, their investigative mission and conflict 
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with the Party.  On one hand, people could declare, “you can achieve the solution of this 
problem yourselves,” which, while an accurate statement, “publistika suffers as a result 
of this, and not our own prestige.” On the other hand, people could declare, “you became 
wise only after a Central Committee decision.” Zimanas was circumspect in his 
evaluation of the former statement, declaring, “I do not wish to state the opposite of this, 
but this is a very complicated question, here there are contradictions which do not always 
appear immediately.” For Zimanas, there was no publisistika “without the struggle of 
opinion.” This did not mean allowing “dangerous speeches,” but it did require the setup 
of an “open conversation” in the newspaper, which sometimes required “removing 
informational taboos.” Again, the specific example was agricultural: there had been 
problems with the harvest the previous year, and some “nonparty members” found out 
about this issue before others by listening to foreign radio broadcasts, which resulted in 
“all kinds of conversations” when there was less bread available. It was therefore very 
important that the newspapers be timely in discussing important issues, or, as Zimanas 
said candidly, “there are some things, which become known sooner or later, and we 
should speak about them ourselves.”607 
 The arguments here included a more expansive view of journalistic agency, which 
reflects the less rigid ideological climate of de-Stalinization. While he maintained the 
importance of a relationship between the press and the Party, Zimanas hesitated to 
characterize the press as a mirror for policy, and instead offered a vision of the mass 
media as a site for debate, within acceptable parameters. His direct reference to foreign 
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radio broadcasts may be partly due to the particular complications of the Baltics as the 
relatively porous Western frontier, but rather than concentrate on castigating “bourgeois” 
sources, Zimanas focused on the ways foreign influence placed obligations on Soviet 
journalists to improve themselves. While Soviet journalists rejected Western notions of 
objectivity and individualism, they could not easily set aside the challenges of Cold War 
competition. Like KP journalists in 1956, Zimanas argued that greater access to 
information and discussion of social problems was essential to this task. The use of 
sociological methods to reach audiences was another dimension of this contest, and the 
last major theme of this chapter. Where Zimanas was anxious that Soviet approaches to 
controversy were a disadvantage, social scientists exhibited more faith in Soviet values.  
••• 
 The turn toward sociological methods of understanding and shaping public 
opinion was an important part of the creative union’s activity after its inaugural congress, 
for both correspondence experts and journalists interested in publisistika.  Where analysis 
of genre tended to describe abstract methods of forming readers, discussions of opinion 
polling were more specific. In this section, I introduce the American experience of 
polling as a comparative case to demonstrate the importance of collectivist values and 
Cold War competition to the Soviet experience of sociological data. During the 1963 
correspondence seminar, Emilianova’s last major theme was the pursuit of audience 
engagement, specifically, “to instill in the reader the wish to write to a newspaper.” Some 
of these tactics involved mass journalism techniques: Komsomol “raids” and party 
control work. Newer techniques involved opinion polling or conducting a reader’s survey 
(chitatelskuiu anketu) and KP’s publishing of the work of its Public Opinion Institute 
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(hereafter IOM). One of the IOM’s polls involved the work of communist labor brigades, 
while the most recent had been about free time and another, aimed at the “cultural level” 
of readers, was “what would you take with you into space?,” including specifics about 
which music or sports items or other examples of humanity’s accomplishments might be 
selected. The resulting contributions were valuable, especially those from older readers 
who had been “made wise by life.” While early Soviet “reader studies” concentrated on 
the simultaneous cultivation of literacy and cultured reading habits, the creative union’s 
members could focus on sociological methodology and reader-generated content, since 
their audience was more sophisticated.608  
 As part of their interest in reader relationships, publisistika experts eagerly 
embraced the new polling methods. A Moscow University faculty member, E. P. 
Prokhorov, commented that writers extensively analyzed socialist realism, including 
volumes on theory published by the institute of world literature, and suggested journalism 
would benefit from similar dedication.609 He quoted a speech by Ideology Department 
head D. F. Il’ichev from the Twenty-Second Party Congress on the need to 
“scientifically” consider ideological work. Though journalists often spoke about engaging 
the sentiments and rationality of their readers, “there is a large gap between these words 
and a concrete conversation about publisistika.” Prokhorov drew on both historical and 
contemporary evidence to support his points—Marx had argued for more study of public 
opinion, and Khrushchev himself continued to make similar points. Even worse, 
American journalist Walter Lippmann’s book on the subject was in its seventh or eighth 
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edition, along with others concerning “the formation of a public opinion that is amenable 
to the bourgeoisie.” In disappointing contrast, a single work on the subject had come out 
in the Soviet Union, which “we have, apparently, let out of our sight.”  Scholarly analysis 
was integral to the process of understanding “how public opinion differs from ideology, 
from morals, or from politics.” Prokhorov further stressed public opinion’s continually 
evolving nature: “in order to form public opinion, we must know its status at a given 
moment,” and without such knowledge, the publisist  “shoots into the air.” This new 
methodology presented a different problem, since the “publisist must be a sociologist, as 
well as an artist.” Тhis “holistic” approach was apparent in the work of Agranovskii, 
Radov, and Mikhalevich, while others failed to master the “weaving together of the 
rational and the emotional image.”610 Soviet academics and journalists, despite being the 
product of a Marxist-Leninist state, had progressed no further in their understanding of 
society than their bourgeois counterparts and were even falling behind. Prokhorov saw 
public opinion as a field of study in its own right, not merely part of ideology or even 
subjectivity. He discussed “readers” in terms of their emotions and thoughts, without 
reference to class-based language, except to clarify that his was a sociology of public 
opinion that would differ from Lipmann’s. This conception of journalism as both artistic 
and scientific suggests an effort to move beyond the profession’s literary roots, though in 
a different direction from Pankin’s earlier suggestions about adding economics to 
university curricula. Anatolii Agranovskii, who features prominently in Thomas Wolfe’s 
investigation of 1960s journalism, was particularly well known for his focus on ordinary 
people and their inner lives. The open celebration of him here not only indicates the 
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extent of his popularity but the overall embrace of his particular approach to the moral 
and ethical theme.611 
 The “scientific” approach to the reading public was a theme addressed not only by 
academics like Prokhorov but also by Valentin Chikin, who worked closely with Grushin 
at the IOM along with his writing for KP. Chikin spoke approvingly of the Academy of 
Science’s recent initiatives, and described the IOM’s novelty: it was not a “substantive 
organization” but rather a special rubric in the newspaper—this was an important 
corrective, since readers had at first assumed it was an educational institution. A woman 
from Cheliabinsk had written such an “application,” referencing her interest in a career 
change to study “information.” While Chikin referenced the episode for its “comical” 
nature, the anecdote effectively presents Soviet sociology as a new and unfamiliar field, 
especially for potential research subjects. Returning to the serious side of opinion work, 
Chikin noted that journalists could no longer rely “only on their own observations…we 
must also seriously study people’s opinions.” While letters were an invaluable source of 
insights, they still had “defects,” and opinion polls could especially improve pieces on 
propaganda or political themes. This was a marked shift from the usual exaltation of the 
letter at earlier seminars. To demonstrate sociology’s value, Chikin cited the IOM’s first 
poll from May of 1959, where subjects were asked their views on the possibility of 
averting war, and published when it was unclear whether the Paris Peace conference 
would be held due to the U-2 crisis. According to Chikin, the bourgeois press argued that 
Khrushchev had ordered the poll to support his position, since most citizens had 
answered in the affirmative. Chikin viewed the data as a sign that government policy and 
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popular opinion coincided, which was a great propaganda victory. Polls about the 
younger generation had a similar significance, since Chikin alleged that propagandists in 
the West were particularly eager to find flaws, rather than the “the true face of Soviet 
youth” visible from sociological studies.612 These examples suggest that opinion polling 
was useful for advancing arguments about the superiority of socialism and the resonance 
of Soviet cultural values for respondents.  
 Chikin’s domestic examples, particularly recent polls about the public’s 
perception of its material position, were more appreciative of sociological nuance. He 
argued that while the “general question” of the population’s well-being was a resounding 
affirmative, polling demonstrated the diversity of individual experience. The majority of 
poll participants reported improvements to their quality of life and, even among those 
who said their standard of living was worse, it was “for happy reasons” like the birth of a 
child or their salaries had decreased because they had left Moscow. In his conclusion, 
Chikin noted that while the creation of public opinion institutes was not appropriate for 
every newspaper, he was certain sociologists could be useful to journalists.613 Diverse 
perceptions of economic progress were presented as valuable, rather than being 
immediately equated with deviance or misunderstanding as they might have been in the 
Stalin era. Soviet people could now impart meaning to their own experiences—though 
the evaluative component, which privileged journalists and experts, was always presented 
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as more significant. As Simon Huxtable has pointed out, Chikin was eager to claim that 
surveys could change readers’ opinions as well as record them.614  
 Grushin’s personal papers preserve both foreign and domestic reporting on the 
IOM’s work—both types of media highlighted the relative novelty of such polling in the 
Soviet Union and the explicitly socialist concerns of its surveyors. An early KP 
publication about the IOM stressed that Soviet citizens of all social groups were 
interested in pressing issues of the day, as evidenced by the large number of letters the 
newspaper received. The IOM was presented as a new means for analyzing foreign and 
domestic policy and the “communist upbringing of workers.” A CBS news report on the 
recent poll about the state of the younger generation directly stated that the IOM was less 
interested in the “spiritual world” of Soviet youth and more focused on using the polling 
data to conduct social campaigns against hooliganism and other forms of deviance. These 
assessments assumed that polling data revealed deep truths but that Soviet ideology 
prevented this knowledge from being fully appreciated.615 
 In their own responses to the IOM, selected Soviet readers expressed hopes that 
the results would be widely published and that the data would allow citizens to “verify 
the correctness or incorrectness of their thoughts and ideals,” as one factory worker from 
Zaporozhia put it. A worker from Dnepropretrovsk argued that the IOM publications 
“forced one to argue and to think,” in contrast to the newspaper’s more typical 
“informational bulletins.” Several respondents positioned the IOM’s work as part of a 
longer Soviet tradition of engagement with the “masses” or argued that polling was 
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particularly useful in light of the new goal of building a Communist society. Others 
positioned polling as part of Cold War competition, arguing that KP’s questionnaire 
about the young family had been more substantive than a similar 1948 poll published in 
America magazine, the State Department’s Russian-language magazine designed to 
inform the Soviet public about life abroad. Not all respondents were enthusiastic, 
however—a forty-seven year-old engineer from Baku believed that the recent poll on the 
young family should have been “more significant” and contained little to show young 
people “who they are in essence.” Asking young families themselves was useless, since 
subjects lacked expertise. Any prescriptions for the future should involve “smart people” 
who would then offer their proposals to the state and let it make policy. Future endeavors 
should be “desk work for scientists, and not for young fools, who cannot boil soup for 
themselves.”616 Soviet citizens who embraced the IOM envisioned sociological research 
as part of progress toward Communism, where forward momentum depended on 
embracing new methods of self-understanding. Polling was another avenue for Soviet 
citizens to feel confident about domestic social evolution and the ultimate victory over 
capitalism. Enthusiasm for sociological data, at least in these instances, was about 
knowing individuals for the pursuit of collective goals. This is in some contrast to Gallup 
polls and other social surveys in the United States, whose promoters were explicitly 
interested in empowering individuals to act as democratic subjects.617 If polling’s 
successes were ultimately tied to socialist visions of progress, the skepticism about the 
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IOM was equally particular, since the engineer from Baku implied that polling 
respondents were not “smart people,” in contrast to trustworthy academics or politicians.  
 Concerns about the value of survey data were not new or unique to the Soviet 
Union—the first subjects of modern American sociological research in the “Middletown” 
studies of Muncie, Indiana doubted that the research team possessed more complete or 
genuine knowledge of the area than residents themselves. But their objections did not 
present academic expertise or state action as superior to more individualized modes of 
knowing, as the skeptic of the Grushin studies did. In comparing American and Soviet 
polling, it becomes clearer that the “modern consciousness” at work in the IOM conveyed 
the endurance of socialist subjectivity rather than the emergence of a liberal public.618 
Soviet sociologists, like American ones, compelled citizens to think about themselves as 
they encountered new forms of knowledge, but Grushin’s subjects engaged with modern 
methods without rejecting their Soviet selves. As they celebrated the IOM, creative union 
members operated within a similar framework.   
••• 
 Satiukov’s closing speech from the publistika seminar is a fitting place to 
conclude the story of the creative union under Khrushchev. He listed some of the 
standard criticisms the organization faced, such as a lack of plenums on creative topics, 
problems with the creative union’s trade journal, and a lack of exchange between central 
and local newspapers. He offered his own commentary on socialist personhood, arguing 
that while portrayals of cosmonauts were beneficial, Soviet society lacked works 
featuring ordinary people, such as workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia: “We are very 
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much concerned with his convictions, his integrity, a person’s character…fighting with 
all his being against the morass of the petty-bourgeois…speaking about the laboring 
person…we should not write only about percentages, his fulfillments, but we should go 
more deeply, to know about his intellectual reserves.”  Emotional depth had become a 
generally accepted standard for measuring the success of journalistic writing. Satiukov 
singled out Peskov’s recent work as a successful depiction of everyday life and socialist 
people. 
 Satiukov’s discussion of censorship is perhaps the more fitting conclusion: some 
matters, it was obvious, “should be withdrawn…but of course limitations are not always 
correctly enacted, but it is impossible to reject certain limits. The preservation of state 
secrets is completely necessary and not all journalists fully remember what it is possible 
to say and what is not possible.” Satiukov’s acknowledgement of censorship’s 
imperfections reflects the limits of liberalization: complaints about Glavlit could be aired, 
but censorship was ultimately defended. At the same time, his speech demonstrates a gap 
between the creative union’s rank and file and its leadership: Satiukov could respond to 
complaints about censorship, but his references to flaws were much more cautious than 
the earlier complaints. Most importantly, Satiukov portrayed it as a professional 
responsibility for journalists to remain aware of the boundaries of the permissible, 
without acknowledging the challenges of such an exercise. While contemporary 
historians of de-Stalinization have recently emphasized the conflict and confusion 
stemming from radical paradigm shifts, Satiukov and other leaders of the Journalists’ 
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Union, presented recovery from Stalinism as a complete and discernible process.619 In 
focusing on the triumphs of personhood rather than past trauma or the limits of reform, 
Satiukov, as he had in 1963, offered a circumscribed vision of journalistic agency. While 
the capacity of journalists to instill socialist values was expected to be limitless, their 
ability to alter the political and institutional landscape was not.  
••• 
 While the 1959 inaugural congress crowned journalists “The Party’s Lieutenants” 
and generally celebrated Soviet print culture, the meaning and value of journalism was 
far from settled, and some journalists continued to question the value of the creative 
union itself, either directly, as in the 1963 plenum, or indirectly, by calling attention to its 
lack of influence. However remote figures like Adzhubei, Tess, or Voronov were from 
the day-to-day operations of most newspapers, the creative union clearly provided them 
with a forum to raise substantive theoretical questions. As creative union members, these 
leading Soviet journalists reflected on a diverse range of issues, from sociology to genre 
politics. The all-Union seminars and plenums, then, read almost as a more concrete 
extension of the bylaws debate: instead of offering remarks on a single document, 
journalists reviewed their own values and work practices in light of Khrushchev’s reform 
agenda and their relatively recent commitment to a reader’s internal world.  
 While Soviet journalists were expected to master an evolving body of knowledge, 
personhood was at the core of all such debates, whether journalist sought to define the 
nature of an “educated professional” or discussed the value of correspondence work. As 
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much as they obsessed over readers’ internal development and the best means to interact 
with their audience, creative union members also expressed concerns that individualism 
might be dangerous—as was most evident in Voronov’s remarks to the 1964 youth 
journalism seminar. Though they celebrated encounters with individuals, the real success 
of most of these stories was the capacity of an exemplary figure—or a delinquent—to 
reveal broader truths to a large number of readers and thus reshape society. This 
attachment to illiberal views of print culture extended to the new interest in sociology and 
opinion polling—Soviet journalists saw sociology as a means to further cultivate the 
appropriate ideological outlook in their readers.  
 Close analysis of the Journalists’ Union’s creative seminars and interest in 
professional development raises the question of Soviet journalism’s comparability to 
other print cultures and the Soviet Union’s relationship to other modern states. For 
creative union elites, the United States was an important comparative standard, and in 
this chapter, I have most often compared Soviet and Anglophone print cultures, as 
journalism scholars frequently focus on the latter case. In many respects, Soviet 
journalists’ insistence on the uniqueness of their work should be taken seriously. Soviet 
journalism explicitly rejected any commitment to objective reporting, preferring instead a 
Marxist-Leninist view of society and social progress. The particularly high status of 
reading and writing in Russian culture, and the growing importance of certain genres, 
such as publisistika and the moral and ethical theme, further set Soviet journalism apart. 
Not only were Soviet journalists dedicated to a materialist and politicized journalism, 
they also embraced the emotional life of exemplary individuals as vital subject matter for 
a truly dedicated professional. Emotion and motivation are not often considered 
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prestigious or appropriate topics in American journalism—in this sense, Soviet 
journalists were not inaccurate when they accused their “bourgeois” counterparts of 
inattentiveness to this aspect of readers’ experience.  
 Other aspects of the Journalists’ Union’s work reveal points of intersection along 
with departures from American or Western European practice, suggesting that Soviet 
journalism, in the final analysis, should be placed in the developmental trajectory 
scholars have termed “modern.” In their commitment to professionalization, creative 
union members were interested in social reform and in supporting the development of 
expert knowledge. The affinities are clearest in higher education. Though they assumed 
all journalism education required a solid foundation in Marxist-Leninist theory, creative 
union leaders grappled with many of the same issues as their American counterparts: the 
extent to which journalism should be considered part of the humanities and how to 
adequately prepare graduates for future work. Journalism’s uneasy disciplinary fit 
remained a key problem for the creative union into the 1970s.  
 Membership questions and the extent of the creative union’s authority were a 
growing concern for the creative union in the 1960s—the terms of this debate reveal both 
convergence with other states and particularity. As they had during the bylaws debate, 
rank-and-file creative union members insisted that professional status should be conveyed 
only on the ideologically reliable and professionally sophisticated. They even expressed 
hopes that the creative union would adopt policy positions and take a leading role in 
newspapers throughout the nation. In so doing, they embraced the notion that 
professional status, especially work that was socially and politically valuable, should 
convey increased influence. This optimism was quickly curtailed by the creative union’s 
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own president. As Satiukov made clear in his 1963 plenary address and at the 1964 
seminars, the creative union would always remain close to the Party, and any discussions 
of professional agency required acknowledging that dominance, including an acceptance 
of censorship. Though creative seminars attest to journalists’ continued sense of political 
responsibility, they exercised this capacity in more limited ways due to the Party’s greater 
ability to supervise their work than that of other creative professionals. 
 Methods of audience engagement are another area where Soviet journalism was 
distinct from its Western counterparts. In their dedication to reader interests and needs, 
Soviet journalists increasingly deployed modern means to non-liberal ends. Grushin’s 
sociological studies at the IOM were aimed at understanding and shaping a socialist 
public, in contrast to the liberal and democratic agendas that drove the development of 
opinion polling in the United States. Like the subjects of the first American surveys, 
Soviet citizens had their own opinions about the effectiveness and value of the IOM’s 
mission, but they engaged the modern methodology without rejecting socialist values. 
 Creative union work on genre and readers further highlight the contradictions and 
tensions in journalism work under Khrushchev. Soviet professionals were expected to 
celebrate de-Stalinization without dwelling on past or present flaws or their own 
participation in the system. Readers could be encouraged to work on themselves, but this 
included not only the search for positive heroes but also the use of disciplinary 
mechanisms. Due to their close proximity to party elites and extensive social 
responsibilities, journalists directly confronted the challenges and limits of liberalization. 
The creative union, then, served as a forum for defining both Soviet professionalism and 
Soviet personhood. While some of these issues remained part of the creative union’s 
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work in later years, the 1964 creative seminars were the clearest articulation of this new 
subjectivity, as many of its proponents experienced major professional upheaval in the 
early Brezhnev years.  
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Chapter 6  
“This Great Army of Journalists”: Professionalization and Reform in the Early 
Brezhnev Years 
 In the opening minutes of Sergei Gerasimov’s 1967 film, Journalist, young and 
energetic journalist Iurii Aliabev receives two promising assignments. He is newly 
promoted to the foreign affairs department of his newspaper and will soon go to Europe 
on assignment. Before he can depart, Aliabev is given one last domestic assignment: to 
travel to a small town in the Urals, where a woman named Anikina writes letters claiming 
that she is beset by vengeful neighbors. When he arrives in the small mountain town, 
Aliabev discovers that Anikina is not a victim of injustice— her letters are denunciations 
of her neighbors crafted entirely out of spite and a desire for personal gain. The trip 
carries other rewards for him, however, as he makes many friends in the province and 
becomes smitten with a young Komsomol member named Shura. Rather than denounce 
Anikina and continue his investigation, Aliabev decides to leave for France, though he is 
deeply tormented at parting from Shura. While abroad, he engages in ideological debates 
with a young American colleague and resists the temptations of Western life. In the end, 
it is the return home that is most transformative for Aliabev, as he finally exposes 
Anikina and proves himself worthy of Shura. Gerasimov’s film won the Grand Prize at 
the Moscow Film Festival in the year of its release, adding to his already established 
reputation. He won three Stalin Prizes for his films The Teacher, The Young Guard, and 
For the Liberation of China. In 1958, he adapted the Stalin Prize-winning novel, The 
Quiet Don, whose author, Mikhail Sholokhov, had also received the Nobel Prize for 
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literature. The film is, at its core, a cinematic depiction of the relationship between 
professionalism and personal growth, along with the tension between domestic and 
international responsibilities.620 Throughout this chapter, I will periodically return to 
Aliabev’s personal and professional journey as they relate to the creative union’s 
professionalization project in its second decade.  
 The years after Khrushchev’s forced retirement were tumultuous for journalists, 
as they were for other groups within the Soviet intelligentsia. In an effort to make sense 
of this transition, in recent years, historians have debated the fate of reform and the extent 
to which Brezhnev’s rule constituted a “re-Stalinization.” Beginning from the premise 
that the term “stagnation” was applied retroactively by Gorbachev to discredit his 
predecessors, this new scholarship points to a more complex picture. I reach similar 
conclusions, in contrast to Thomas Wolfe’s pessimistic view that journalists became the 
“public relations arm of the Soviet Union’s most powerful institution,” and found 
themselves in a contradictory position where their work was still necessary to the 
function of the state but viewed with suspicion. While this view is unsurprising given 
Wolfe’s overwhelming focus on Adzhubei—who was fired from Izvestiia and removed 
his post in the creative union in 1964—other journalists were more optimistic about their 
professional possibilities at the start of the Brezhnev period. These optimists, who 
included Pravda journalist Len Karpinskii, celebrated Khrushchev’s removal because 
they had little faith in his personal power to bring about change. Early appointments in 
the creative union further demonstrate some continuity with the Khrushchev period: 
Aleksei Rumiantsev, an early pioneer of the reform-focused journal, Problems of Peace 
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and Socialism, was initially appointed editor-in-chief at Pravda and replaced Satiukov as 
head of Journalists’ Union.621   
 The early months and years of Brezhnev’s rule point to a somewhat incoherent 
official stance toward journalistic criticism and creativity. There were significant 
personnel changes at central newspapers in 1965. Rumiantsev was fired in the spring of 
that year after penning a controversial editorial on cultural politics. Less than six months 
later, Voronov published an article on a controversial corruption case and was also fired. 
Adzhubei’s replacement at Izvestiia, Vladimir Stepakov, lasted in his post for less than a 
year. One reformer began his work not long after these firings: Egor Iakovlev, later a 
close associate of Gorbachev’s, took on an ambitious restructuring of the creative union’s 
trade journal in 1966. He remained editor-in-chief until 1968, when anxieties surged 
about the Prague Spring’s broader implications. Though these upheavals would seem at 
first to indicate a sustained interest in removing reformers, it is important to note that 
Iakovlev and Rumiantsev were appointed to their posts under Brezhnev and removed 
only in response to specific articles or editorial positions. Though these upheavals would 
seem at first to indicate a sustained interest in removing reformers, it is important to note 
that Iakovlev and Rumiantsev were appointed to their posts under Brezhnev and removed 
only in response to specific articles or editorial stances. Distrust between journalists and 
officials was a cyclical occurrence in a dynamic process rather than an official policy 
position, in which the general anxieties regarding the Prague Spring were a more decisive 
event than Brezhnev’s assumption of power. In his description of the first years of 
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Brezhnev’s rule, Vladislav Zubok argues that most intellectuals “wanted dialogue, not 
confrontation with the state bureaucracy and the communist regime.” I have found this to 
accurately describe the position of journalists at this moment, as well. Those who 
continued to pursue an agenda of reform and renewal did so out of enthusiasm for the 
new political order, not as a rejection of it.622   
 Continuities in policy and personnel are even more apparent in the case of the 
Journalists’ Union, and many of the protagonists of this chapter are familiar from 
previous episodes. Dmitri Goriunov remained a prominent member of the creative 
union’s governing board and stayed in his post as TASS director until 1967, when he 
embarked on a diplomatic career in Africa. L. M. Ivanova and E. A. Lazebnik, who 
appeared in chapter five in discussions of creative mastery and higher education, 
addressed these subjects at length at creative union plenums. Moscow oblast’ chapter 
president V. N. Golubev assumed a new role in the creative union, taking charge of its 
new section on work with local newspapers. Though he was now a pensioner, former 
Orgburo president N. G. Pal’gunov also participated in major events before the 1966 
congress. Former Orgburo member Boris Burkov, still director of the Novosti news 
agency, gave a major address on the organization’s new bylaws.  Though he features only 
briefly in this chapter, Iasen’ Zasurskii began his long tenure as dean of Moscow 
University’s journalism department in 1965.  
 Under its new leadership, the creative union took several steps toward 
strengthening its domestic mandate. It held two major plenums in 1965 alone: one in 
February and one in December, and prepared for a second all-Union congress in late 
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September of 1966. As part of this process, local chapters held conferences a few weeks 
prior. The all-Union Congress, which convened at the end of that same month, featured 
the adoption of new bylaws and organizational structures. Rather than treat each event in 
isolation, I discuss the major debates across these gatherings. Some issues, like genre 
politics and higher education, reveal important thematic continuities between the 
Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods, though these discussions generally failed to introduce 
new solutions. Debates about material privilege, foreign travel and cultural diplomacy, 
and membership policies were more heated and drawn out, as all three issues intersected 
with the ongoing effort to revise the organization’s bylaws. While the first bylaws debate 
saw journalists express high expectations of the new organization and hopes for its future, 
the second featured more frustration and a persistent gap between rank-and-file 
expectations and those of elite members. The persistent attention to bylaws, when 
journalists faced more serious challenges to their agency, points to another kind of 
structural weakness. Since Satiukov had made clear in 1963 that the creative union would 
not exercise any great influence over newspaper content or journalism policy, revision of 
membership policies and privileges was one of a few areas where the organization could 
exercise real control.  
 Though the debates over its domestic mandate show important continuities, the 
creative union’s second congress suggests that significant shifts in values and practices 
were underway, even as the creative union continued its public dedication to engagement 
with the moral and ethical theme and the reader’s inner world. Attitudes toward foreign 
influence suggest an increase in xenophobia, and the organization took a more restrained 
approach toward social science data than it had at the 1964 seminars. To further illustrate 
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these shifts, I engage in a close reading of two publications: KP under Boris Pankin and 
the creative union’s restructured trade journal under the editorship of Egor Iakovlev. Both 
cases suggest that examining journalism provides important nuance for our understanding 
of the period’s cultural and intellectual history. While members of the editorial board 
were anxious about KP’s coverage of dissident writers, there was less debate than in 
1956. Perhaps more importantly, Pankin’s reaction to the case suggests that Voronov’s 
firing, and a scandal about Grushin’s polling institute the following year, were moments 
of far greater impact. Iakovlev’s policy stances at Zhurnalist, in contrast, demonstrate 
that reformist journalism persisted into 1967, with the Prague Spring as a pivotal moment 
of transition.  
••• 
 At the end of February 1965, a mere weeks after he was elected head of the 
creative union, Rumiantsev published an article in Pravda on cultural politics, titled, 
“The Party and the Intelligentsia.” The article’s themes and content demonstrate 
Rumiantsev’s support for intellectual freedom within a socialist context, and he was fired 
not long after its publication. Though a recent set of interviews with former Central 
Committee officials suggests the piece was co-written, I treat Rumiantsev as the author in 
the absence of concrete evidence to the contrary.623 Rumiantsev’s essay displayed a 
profound optimism about the relationship between the Party and intellectuals, taking his 
inspiration from the revolutionary past and the more recent lessons of de-Stalinization. 
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His vision of the future, which privileged intellectual expertise over political stature, was 
perhaps his most utopian vision, which helps account for official disapproval of the piece.  
 At the start of his essay, Rumiantsev developed his belief in the mutually 
beneficial relationship between the Party and the intelligentsia through an analysis of the 
revolutionary past and Marxist-Leninist theory. Rumiantsev reminded his readers that 
Lenin himself had supported scientists and argued against treating all intellectuals as 
“opposed to the proletariat.” Since socialist society had advanced even further in recent 
years, Rumiantsev argued that it would be “absurd” to treat intelligentsia members as 
“builders of socialism and communism as an inferior sort.” This defense of the 
intelligentsia’s social contributions was not new—Stalin himself had formally recognized 
the intelligentsia as a vitally important “social stratum,” bestowing both prestige and 
material privilege on creative elites.624 Parts of Rumiantsev’s vision for the future were 
similar to the genre politics I discussed in chapter five, as he expressed a deep 
commitment to the internal life of individuals. He highlighted the capacity of creative 
works to introduce individuals both to “social life and the people’s internal world.” Real 
creative effort, the kind he called “a manifestation of the human spirit…cannot be 
stimulated by an order, does not endure a statist-bureaucratic approach…but comes from 
social demands, which have received their form from the internal compulsions of the 
scientist or artist.” While he defended socialist realism and the importance of dialectics, 
Rumiantsev considered “free expression and clash of opinions” to be a key part of fruitful 
creative development. He warned against making overly hasty assessments about 
ideological phenomena, citing Lenin’s declaration that “in cultural matters, haste and 
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sweeping gestures are most dangerous of all.” He then offered his own vision of how to 
remain true to this ideological heritage: the fundamental criteria for judging an artistic 
work should be “the building of communism, expressed in the continuous free 
development of the identity of each member of society.”625 This harmonious relationship 
between mental labor and social development positioned intellectuals as uniquely capable 
of bringing about the communist future. 
 Rumiantsev’s truly radical stance—which explains the article’s unpopularity with 
the Party leadership—concerned his reflections on the difference between political 
expertise and creative skill. He began this section with a bold declaration: 
The Party’s role as the ruling and organizing foundation of Soviet society 
strengthens according to the principles of socialist democracy—and the 
most important of these principles is the principle of collective 
leadership…Тhis collective inspiration cannot manifest itself when the 
principle of collective leadership is trampled on. Аnd this is 
unsurprising— a single ‘great leader’ believed himself to be the sole 
arbiter in all spheres of human аctivity, relating with mistrust and 
intolerance to people of mental labor, who baselessly pretended to 
authority in one or another sphere of life. 
 
 Here the historical parallels grew more direct and potentially subversive—though 
he continued to avoid mentioning Stalin by name, Rumiantsev did reference one of his 
titles, and Stalin’s propensity for taking positions in intellectual debates was well-
established. His portrayal of Stalin’s relationship to intellectuals fits neatly with the 
established narrative of the “personality cult” as a blighted time in contrast to the more 
enlightened present, similar to the narratives of journalistic repression from chapter five. 
Though the principle of collective leadership was an official doctrine, forcefully 
propounded by Khrushchev after the Twentieth Congress, Rumiantsev did not praise the 
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Party without reservation.626 It was likely his statements about the future of the Party’s 
relationship to the intelligentsia that earned official ire, rather than his critique of the 
Stalin period.  
 Turning to the present and his vision of the future, Rumiantsev laid down a set of 
principles he thought would contribute to a more fruitful collaboration between the Party 
and intellectuals and fully redress past wrongs. At the core of this was his vision of skill 
and competency within the Party apparatus, which he described as a series of grave 
obligations:  
The Party demands from all of its members, in all fields of government, 
from the lower ranks to the more senior, competence and a completely 
scientific approach to all of the questions brought forth by life. Neither 
leadership in itself, nor the occupancy of a post, provides a basis for 
interference in the course of life, competence and practice in one or 
another sphere of knowledge provides this. The Communist Party, as the 
ruling and governing force of Soviet society, carries out its functions 
precisely because it relies on a leading scientific worldview, the method of 
Marxism Leninism; because it employs highly qualified cadres of 
specialists in all spheres of activity, relying on their knowledge and 
creative initiative; because it concentrates within itself the ideological 
singleness of purpose of the entire Soviet people and the Communist 
future.627 
 
 Rumiantsev insisted that authority came from competence rather than position: a 
subtle though unmistakable challenge not only to Stalinism but also to any political 
management of the cultural sphere. Since Rumiantsev had already positioned the 
intelligentsia as the group which historically engaged in mental labor and acquired skill 
and competence, his vision of the future presupposed a leading role for this group, one 
which the Party would simply allow to flourish. Rumiantsev did not specify how the 
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intelligentsia was to respond to mismanagement of its work or how one was to determine 
the inappropriateness of official intervention. This interpretive challenge is similar to the 
ambiguities KP journalists confronted in chapter two—how to condemn corruption 
without de-stabilizing political authority.  
 A 1990 Pravda interview published three years before his death offers some 
insights into Rumiantsev’s motives for publishing the piece. Rumiantsev unfavorably 
contrasted the atmosphere at Pravda to his prior time in Prague, specifically the 
“toadying” of subordinates. He called “The Party and the Intelligentsia” the product of 
many years of personal reflection and conversations with both foreign and Soviet 
colleagues. His personal attachment to it is perhaps further confirmed by his tendency to 
quote the article during the interview, especially his conviction that creative activity 
could not be produced “by order.” Rumiantsev claimed that he knew the article would 
have an unfavorable reception and he hesitated to show it to colleagues. Though the 
article had resulted in official “scolding,” he had received many letters of support from 
intellectuals and regretted not having them in his personal archive.628 These reflections 
position the article as a deeply emotional philosophical commitment, borne partly out of 
disillusionment. Even more than in the original piece, Rumiantsev relied on the social 
value of intellectual labor more than political approval—reader support meant more than 
official reprimands. As a result of Brezhnev’s displeasure with the article, Rumiantsev 
was removed from his post at Pravda, and Goriunov replaced him as acting chief of the 
creative union. Though Rumiantsev’s removal took place some months before the formal 
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arrest and trial of Andrei Siniavskii and Iulii Daniel’—a milestone I will address later in 
this chapter—it points to growing concerns with excessive liberalism in cultural matters. 
••• 
 Only a few months after Rumiantsev’s firing from Pravda, Iurii Voronov was 
replaced at KP—the last major personnel shift at a central newspaper under Brezhnev. 
Like the controversy surrounding Pankin’s youth club article a decade earlier, Voronov’s 
firing was a response to the paper’s criticism of a corrupt official, though the conflict 
involved high levels of the Politburo rather than displeased local bureaucrats.  
 Voronov was among those reformers encouraged by Brezhnev’s early policies. 
He was particularly cheered by the downfall of Soviet geneticist Trofim Lysenko. 
Lysenko, a critic of Mendelian genetics who promoted the inheritability of acquired 
characteristics, had dominated Soviet agronomy since the 1920s. He was removed from 
his post in the Academy of Sciences early in 1965, and central newspapers featured 
articles denouncing his policies.629 Voronov’s next target was corruption in the Soviet 
military. In July of that year, well-known publisist Arkadii Sakhnin published “In Flight 
and After,” whose principal subject was a naval official named A. N. Solianik. For his 
long career in Soviet whaling fleets, Solianik had received the Hero of Socialist Labor 
award and represented his home district at the CPSU’s Twenty-Second Congress in 1961. 
Sakhnin’s article demonstrated the extent of Solianik’s corrupt behavior.630 Boris Pankin 
recalled going through a massive envelope of evidence against Solianik with his 
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colleagues and becoming so incensed that they decided to take the case to Voronov.631 
Pankin’s stress on empirical evidence of wrongdoing, and the moral imperative to present 
the facts to the public, structured much of the later newsroom reaction to the case. At the 
July 28 editorial board meeting on Sakhnin’s article, Goliakov, that week’s weekly critic 
or designated reviewer (dezhurnyi kritik), linked Solianik’s abuse of power to Lysenko’s, 
since the latter had also “fought the newspaper” when criticism of his work appeared.632 
Though they worked in separate fields, Lysenko and Solianik had committed the same sin 
of abusing their positions.  
 The Solianik case, like my KP case study of 1956, demonstrates the structural 
limitations Soviet journalists faced in their pursuit of social reform. The reactions in the 
editorial board, which I analyze below, were overwhelmingly positive, describing the 
abuses of a corrupt official and calling for his removal offered hope for continued social 
rejuvenation. The official reaction to the case demonstrates that the Party leadership did 
not share this expansive view of journalistic responsibility: criticism of deviant 
individuals was permissible, but it could not point to broader systemic abuses or 
implicate prominent figures. In his review of Sakhnin’s article, Goliakov praised the 
work not only for its subject matter but for its wider resonance: “it will no doubt force 
many other people who find themselves in ‘captain’s posts’ to examine themselves.” The 
article called attention to “indifference, bureaucratism, and lack of principle,” deficits the 
entire nation needed to correct. Goliakov expressed his sense of personal and professional 
obligation to continue this struggle, declaring, “No responsibility is more serious for us, 
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than the responsibility to bring about the resolution of these problems.”633 As was the 
case in 1956, the successful journalist was portrayed as unafraid to challenge authority, 
especially those in “captain’s positions.” Now, clarity of critical vision was more 
explicitly linked to reform of the individual conscience along with the socialist body 
politic. Criticism was presented as an ethical stance rather than a de-stabilizing force. 
 Voronov did not expect opposition to the Sakhnin article: according to Pankin, he 
was more self-assured after Khrushchev’s removal and believed firmly in the official 
declarations from the CPSU that the struggles to fight corruption would continue, as 
would an overarching commitment to individual freedom. Pankin describes Voronov as 
particularly cheered by Lysenko’s downfall.634 Voronov, like Goliakov had in his weekly 
review, saw scientific reform as proof of Brezhnev’s broader interest in social renewal. 
This link would prove tenuous, however, as the Solianik case involved Brezhnev 
personally and tested the limits of journalists’ reformist role.  
 The account of Voronov’s official reprimand over the Solianik case relies on 
memoirs and secondary literature, due to an absence of archival sources. Though the 
authors had different relationships to parties involved, all make special note of Voronov’s 
vulnerability in the face of political disapproval. Boris Pankin stressed Solianik’s position 
as a popular hero whose feats in the whaling fleet were regularly covered in the press. 
Pankin even suggested that reaction might have been even swifter under Khrushchev, 
since Brezhnev was in a “paradoxical position,” having committed himself to addressing 
his predecessor’s mistakes despite his personal dislike of controversy. After the head of 
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Ukraine’s Communist Party accused the paper of distorting facts, a formal investigation 
was launched. This process was headed by Aleksandr N. Iakovlev, then an assistant head 
of the Central Committee’s Ideology department and a future supporter of Gorbachev. 
Iakovlev headed the inquiry at the urging of Politburo member Mikhail Suslov. His 
investigation proved the facts of the case, so when the matter went to the Secretariat for 
review, Iakovlev was “surprised” to see Brezhnev himself attend. Тhe resulting 
discussion, at which Iakovlev was not permitted to speak, began unfavorably for the 
paper, though Suslov was more restrained than expected, and advocated that Solianik be 
removed from his duties. Brezhnev only broke his silence to “bark” at Iakovlev and 
Voronov, “Don’t make a fuss!” Pankin, based on his conversation with Voronov 
afterward, recorded Brezhnev’s remarks as, “Criticize, but we won’t permit you to make 
a fuss!” In Iakovlev’s view, Voronov was fired because Solianik had given lavish gifts to 
Party leaders, including Brezhnev himself. Other accounts cast the episode as a power 
struggle between Politburo member Alexander Shelepin and Brezhnev—the latter, a 
longtime supporter of Voronov’s, hoped to discredit Brezhnev and the Ukrainian 
leadership by bringing down Solianik.635 Voronov’s decision to publish implicated the 
paper in a complex web of client politics. While the Kaluga authorities had been unhappy 
with Pankin’s 1956 article about their mistakes with youth leisure, that uproar occurred 
on a much smaller scale. Though Voronov’s firing occurred not long after Rumiantsev’s, 
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both were reactive attempts to restore order and minimize political fallout rather than a 
coherent persecution of reformers.  
 In the aftermath of the Solianik case, Voronov was dismissed from KP. After a 
brief period at Pravda as an editorial board secretary, he was ultimately assigned to West 
Germany as a foreign correspondent. Though work abroad was often associated with high 
status, Voronov’s situation was different. As a native of Leningrad who had survived the 
German blockade as an adolescent and retained feelings of enmity toward Germany for 
his whole life, Voronov was deeply unhappy during this period. Colleagues who recall 
the episode in memoir accounts stress both the cruelty of the punishment and the injustice 
of his demotion.636 While Rumiantsev’s replacement at Pravda, M. V. Zimianin, had 
more experience as a Party functionary and diplomat than as a journalist, Voronov’s 
successor was Boris Pankin, who remained editor-in-chief at KP until 1973. 
 Though a detailed study of KP under Pankin is beyond the scope of this study, it 
is impossible not to discuss KP’s approach toward liberal intellectuals, particularly those 
who were positioned as traitors for publishing their work abroad. KP journalists, as befit 
their role as active participants in the cultural Cold War, were responsible for ensuring 
that the public understood the danger such individuals posed—and that Western 
sympathy for such individuals was misplaced. One prominent piece in this genre was a 
February 1966 essay by Arkadii Sakhnin entitled, “I Do Not Understand,” about dissident 
author Valerii Tarsis. Tarsis had become a target of official disfavor under Khrushchev, 
as he published a short story abroad in 1962. KP’s article, which described Tarsis’s early 
life and subsequent attempts at a literary career, presents him as the moral inverse of the 
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positive hero—an individual without scruples and motivated entirely by avarice and 
malice. Тhe article opened with the recollections of an Italian named Cesare Di Zappuli, 
who had first met Tarsis on a trip to the Soviet Union in 1960. Tarsis was depicted as 
eager to meet with a foreigner, and the two men met later in a cafe, where Tarsis’s 
mother in law brought some heavy packages, which the Italian carried out only with 
difficulty—Sakhnin later explained that these packages contained the author’s slanderous 
manuscripts which he hoped would be published abroad. Sakhnin then described the 
young Tarsis and his work in publishing, taking great care to stress that the young man 
could be “obsequious” one moment and “brazen” the next. Even worse, he had a 
tendency to pass off the work of literary acquaintances as his own. By the time he began 
work at the Goslitizdat publishing house, he began to spy on colleagues and pry into their 
personal lives for the purposes of denouncing them, which made him an object of fear 
and dread. Tarsis did have a particular talent for languages and began to work as a 
translator, which gained him entry to the Writers’ Union—a skill that Sakhnin presented 
as evidence of his untrustworthiness.637 
 His troubles with the literary establishment were compounded by sins in his 
personal life—he left his first wife for a teenage girl and then accused his first wife of 
embezzlement to ensure that she could not bother him further. Tarsis was also presented 
as a mediocre writer—Sakhnin cited an unfavorable 1957 review of Tarsis’s novel, The 
Dream from Novyi Mir, which described the incoherent plot and characterized the 
relationships and behavior of the characters as “improbable” and incomprehensible. 
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Tarsis nevertheless continued writing novels and to disparage Soviet society in private 
conversations in his apartment. Not long after his meeting with Di Zappuli, Tarsis 
claimed that an Italian publishing house had accepted several of his works. Тhough Tarsis 
was delusional on this point as on others—Sakhnin took care to stress his long history of 
mental instability—the publishing house decided to take his work in the interest of 
discrediting the Soviet Union and knowing they could profit by distributing it through 
“underground channels” inside the country. They commissioned a “slanderous” work, 
which Tarsis readily produced, knowing he would be paid in dollars. To discredit the 
work further, Sakhnin cited an approving review from New York Times foreign 
correspondent Harrison Salisbury, underlining the latter’s anti-Soviet stance. Salisbury, 
and other Western journalists who reviewed the work, did not extensively praise its 
merits but attributed its popularity to its anti-Soviet nature. Sakhnin’s quotation of 
Salisbury is essentially accurate, however hyperbolic the rest of his descriptions were. 
Sakhnin described the extent of Tarsis’s delusions but maintained that he could feel no 
sympathy for the man. He described a meeting with him in which the author “did not 
seem sick” and dedicated himself to “struggle with the Bolsheviks.” Sakhnin was most 
disturbed that Tarsis was protected by Soviet law from any personal retaliation he might 
have wanted to inflict.638 Tarsis was stripped of his Soviet citizenship shortly after the 
article appeared and emigrated to Switzerland.639 
 When Sakhnin’s article was up for review at a letuchka, the participants were 
concerned with any possible misinterpretations or ambiguities in the paper’s stance. This 
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was not because editorial board members themselves disagreed about the facts of the case 
of its interpretation—all of them condemned Tarsis and all others who published abroad. 
Letuchka participants openly compared Tarsis’ case to the public trial of dissident writers 
Iulii Daniel’ and Andrei Siniavskii—an event which deeply troubled Moscow’s liberal 
intellectuals.640 The concerns about misinterpretation seem directed, instead, at the 
possibility that ambiguous wording or imprecision in the article might provoke sympathy 
from readers. In his review of events, weekly critic Goliakov compared and contrasted 
the trials of dissident authors to other recent criminal processes, such as those against 
currency speculators. While condemnation of economic criminals tended to be 
“unanimous,” the “infamy” of these writers provoked diverse reactions. Though it was 
natural for people to wish to “make sense of events themselves,” it was equally important 
that the newspaper not create “misunderstandings” but “give readers facts, and not 
epithets.” In this regard, Goliakov considered Sakhnin’s essay more successful than 
Izvestiia’s critique of Siniavskii and Daniel’ written by Iurii Feofanov. KP’s article had 
“given the reader the opportunity to evaluate these events themselves. But Feofanov gets 
upset himself and makes the reader perplexed, when speaking about the worth of the 
Soviet court, he writes about things which were considered even under the civil code.” 
The critique of Feofanov here is striking—it was still important for readers to engage 
with the case on their own terms, even when the desired outcome of such contemplation 
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was obvious. Though the reference to civil law is ambiguous—Feofanov himself did not 
use the phrase—it implies that he supplied irrelevant detail.641  
 Feofanov wrote a series of articles about the case under the rubric, “From the 
Courtroom.” In keeping with this title, much of his analysis focused on legal procedure 
and audience reaction during the trial. His coverage featured more detail and overt 
epithets than Sakhnin’s—he claimed that Siniavskii’s chosen pen name of Abram Tertz 
was meant to evoke the name of a legendary criminal from 1920s Odessa, and routinely 
called Daniel’ “naive” for claiming that he did not consider his work anti-Soviet. He even 
included excerpts from Article 70 of the Soviet legal code, which concerned the 
definition and penalties attached to anti-Soviet slander, as if to ensure that his reader truly 
appreciated the seriousness of the crime. At the same time, Feofanov took great pains to 
establish that Siniavskii and Daniel’ had shown their work to many friends—and that 
many of these individuals had failed to recognize the seriousness of their crime, instead 
concentrating on the language and content of their published works.642  His response to 
the case, then, was not only more pointedly didactic but also more damning of liberal 
intellectuals. Where Tarsis was a deluded lone actor, Siniavskii and Daniel’ had 
“infected” others, who still did not appreciate the seriousness of their crime even after 
their arrest. 
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 Another participant in the letuchka, Bilenkin, criticized Sakhnin’s article for its 
imprecision and exaggerations. He considered it excessive to criticize Tarsis for knowing 
foreign languages, since this was a common literary skill. It was also unbelievable to him 
that Tarsis could have successfully had his first wife imprisoned under false pretenses. 
Sakhnin’s use of quotations was confusing, especially since he presented quotes that, 
“belonged to fictional characters as though they precisely represented the author’s 
position. It is possible that this is true. But the article needs to show this and prove this!” 
Though he found Tarsis personally repugnant, the evidentiary standards for arguing 
against him needed to be as high as any other case. Another journalist, Egorov, spoke 
more about the diversity of public responses, particularly the responses “in a particular 
part of the intelligentsia…In connection with his process, Herzen has been mentioned, 
even Lenin’s name in the period of emigration. Let us explain to people whаt a lofty 
patriotic flame these great emigrants lit and what is the essence of this emigration.” 
Pankin agreed with many of the critiques but cited official support for the article: notable 
writer Konstantin Simonov had written a personal letter to Sakhnin praising it. Pankin 
closed the meeting with this remark, as if to give Simonov the last word on the subject.643 
As in November of 1956, it was crucial that KP show no deviation from the official 
stance on such a controversial issue, and that the newspaper’s coverage guide readers to 
the correct conclusions. At such a sensitive moment, the preoccupation with factual 
accuracy and interpretive precision was a matter of political importance as much as 
professional pride. This was likely even more important so soon after Voronov’s firing. It 
is not entirely clear why Pankin would need to invoke Simonov’s approval, however, 
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since Sakhnin’ condemnation of Tarsis was unambiguous. His stance may be explained 
by his relatively new status as editor—hed had held the position for less than a year—and 
lingering caution in the aftermath of the Solianik case. Though he does not mention the 
Tarsis article in his memoirs, Pankin palpably conveys the nervousness and anxiety at the 
paper in those months.644 
 KP journalists were clearly aware of the sensitivity and importance of the various 
campaigns against writers—and of the challenges the new evidentiary standards 
presented for their work. The attempt to equate a character’s views with those of a text’s 
author, while not questioned directly, was presented as a challenge to conventional views 
of journalistic facticity. The problem of historical precedent was its own difficulty: Soviet 
public culture celebrated intellectuals who had been persecuted under tsarist repression, 
and, in these mythic usages, publishing abroad was a sign of healthy dissent. Soviet 
readers would have been intimately familiar with Lenin’s publications from exile and 
with Herzen’s work in London. Excluding Tarsis—or Siniavskii and Daniel’—from this 
tradition required a carefully crafted narrative. Official grappling with the past was not in 
itself new—the October Revolution myth underwent substantial reworking in the 
transition from the NEP to Stalinism. What is distinct here is the presentation of 
journalistic work as self-consciously historical, similar to the “foundation narratives” 
crafted by the Bolsheviks about their seizure of power.645 While the early months of de-
Stalinization had made the Soviet past less coherent, the literary scandals of the late 
1960s required a unified narrative; political pressure to report correctly was even higher 
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than it had been during the controversy surrounding Not By Bread Alone. At that time, 
even Voronov had been able to sympathize with Dudintsev’s plight. Pankin, in contrast, 
celebrated the paper’s negative coverage without reservation, using the praise from 
Simonov as proof of harmony between the literary establishment and the newspaper.  
 The Solianik case, and the literary scandals which followed it, both involved 
highly sensitive topics, since the former detailed domestic corruption and the latter 
described writers publishing abroad.  The Solianik article was cause for greater 
celebration, since it allowed the paper to continue its combative stance begun earlier that 
year with its attacks on Lysenko. At the same time, the article’s reception demonstrates 
the deep gulf between professional aspirations and the Party’s sense of the permissible: 
exposure of corruption could attack only lone individuals rather than systemic problems. 
The essay on Tarsis demonstrates the pressures of the cultural Cold War on domestic 
newspaper content: since his cause had attracted foreign sympathy and his crime was so 
grave, editorial board members debated whether his public excoriation had been 
sufficiently thorough. Any ambiguities might lead readers to doubt his guilt or equate his 
behavior with that of unimpeachable revolutionaries who had published in exile. At this 
moment, KP’s stance on literary dissidents was rigid and entirely in step with the Party’s 
response—in contrast to the doubts some had expressed during the Dudintsev scandal a 
decade before. 
*** 
 In the next major section of this chapter, I turn away from newspapers and back to 
the Journalists’ Union—specifically, its plenums and second congress, and what those 
events reveal about professional values and practices under Brezhnev. Gerasimov’s film, 
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with its emphasis on professional and personal growth and the relationship between 
foreign and domestic work, is a particularly useful thematic touchstone. The first part of 
Journalist, “Meetings,” deals with Aliabev’s promotion to the foreign affairs bureau and 
his last domestic assignment in the Urals. Aliabev is young, well dressed, and 
sophisticated; when he arrives in the Urals, he is greeted as a kind of celebrity. But it is 
Aliabev who is most changed by his journey: he befriends the provincial newspaper 
editor, Reutov, and learns to enjoy fishing trips. He eagerly attends a local theater 
performance and is more engaged and lively during meetings with Shura and her worker 
friends than with his Muscovite girlfriend. Contemporary reviewers of the film noted that 
Aliabev is more of a calm observer during this segment, and the other characters, 
especially Shura, are more prominent. For these critics, Shura’s kindness and work ethic 
made her the “real embodiment of the new person,” and the Urals scenes reveal “the 
spiritual beauty of Soviet people.”646  This preference for domestic triumphs is one of the 
film’s enduring themes, and is also visible in the creative union’s activities after October 
of 1964. In its second decade, creative union leaders displayed an acute awareness that 
the organization’s domestic mandate had been neglected in favor of cultural diplomacy. 
Where Gerasimov’s film presents local journalists as competent and perhaps superior to 
Aliabev—local editor Reutov is more able to recognize Anikina’s malice—creative union 
members expressed no such certainty and argued that local journalists were in greater 
need of support from the organization. At the same time, the organization’s views on 
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reader relationships and genre closely correspond to events in the film, as I will address 
later in this section. 
 The tumult at central newspapers in 1965 altered the creative union’s leadership 
structure in important ways, though some of the leaders in favor of a renewed domestic 
mandate are familiar from previous chapters. At the organization’s fifth plenum, on 
February 5, 1965, both Pavel Satiukov and Aleksei Adzhubei were removed from their 
posts. A. M. Rumiantsev, Satiukov’s replacement at Pravda, was appointed the creative 
union’s president. Despite his official recognition as the organization’s leader, 
Rumiantsev did not address the event. His controversial Pravda editorial, “The Party and 
the Intelligentsia,” was published only a few weeks later—it is possible, though not 
proven, that he was already slated for removal.647 The creative union remained closely 
affiliated with the Communist Party: seventy-eight percent of its members held either full 
or candidate membership in the Party. As in the past, women were underrepresented 
among delegates to the Congress, as they were in the organization as a whole, accounting 
for only 57 out of 462 delegates.648 Тhough M. V. Zimianin was by this time editor-in-
chief of Pravda, he would not begin his decade-long leadership of the Journalists’ Union 
until later in the year—D. P. Goriunov became acting head after Rumiantsev’s removal.  
 Several speakers at the February plenum critiqued the creative union’s excessive 
focus on cultural diplomacy and the secretariat’s general ineffectiveness. The editor of 
Rabotnitsa, the journal for female workers, Valentina Vavilina, critiqued the hierarchy 
and structure of the creative union. She questioned the wisdom of staffing the 
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organization’s secretariat almost entirely with editors in chief of newspapers or directors 
of central information agencies, since “they are extremely busy people, not in a position 
to seriously direct the creative internal life of the Journalists’ Union.”649 This critique 
highlights the creative union’s persistent structural limitations: as early as 1963, Satiukov 
had insisted that the organization could not manage publications or dictate newspaper 
content. Vavilina’s suggestion that leading media managers were too overworked to 
direct the creative union further points out the organization’s distance from day-to-day 
media work. At the same event, a journalist from Perm named Kuznetsov described the 
limited work of many local branches. Though the creative union had important 
international goals, he wished to see enhanced effort to assist “this great army of 
journalists” inside the Soviet Union. In practice, this meant strengthening oblast’-level 
organizations in recognition of those journalists who could not attend all-Union seminars 
in Moscow.650 While the Secretariat’s work with the Council of Ministers on housing 
issues was a positive sign, this coordination only took place on the republic level. Since 
the Russian Republic did not have its own bureau of the creative union, it was not clear 
how these matters would be resolved there.651 In partial recognition of these issues, the 
creative union significantly expanded its work with raion-level newspapers in 1965, a 
decision which seemed designed to correct longstanding grievances about local neglect. 
The commission’s first head, Moscow oblast’ chapter president V. N. Golubev, 
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concentrated on educational disparities between raion journalists and their counterparts at 
more prestigious publications.652 
 Though the creative union’s next plenum, in December 1965, was devoted 
entirely to domestic matters, its speakers addressed longstanding problems for the 
organization: the definition of journalistic expertise, and the quality and features of 
educational programs. E. A. Lazebnik, who delivered the address on professional 
mastery, had first complained about the creative union’s lack of intervention on the 
subject at a 1963 plenum, while L. M. Ivanova’s complaints about higher education were 
often very similar to her proposals at the 1962 cadres seminar. As we saw in chapters 
four and five, Lazebnik was the editor of Ukraine’s Rabochaia gazeta in addition to 
holding academic posts at Kiev University, and Ivanova remained on Izvestiia’s editorial 
board. Though they had distinct areas of expertise, Ivanova and Lazebnik were each 
concerned with the nature of professional knowledge, journalism’s relationship to other 
fields of creative inquiry, and the value of sentiment as a tool to engage audiences. 
Though an entire plenum devoted to domestic issues was a significant change, the 
arguments offered at this event differed little from Khrushchev-era discussions, and 
highlighted journalists’ inability to resolve interpretive challenges or expand the creative 
union’s influence. 
 In her remarks on higher education, Ivanova called specialization itself into 
question. The demands on journalism were greater than ever: audiences were more 
sophisticated and interested in reading about specialized topics, from agriculture to art. 
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This lead Ivanova to openly wonder if “future journalists must contain within themselves 
at least two professions?” Successful students would need “natural thinking abilities” and 
“skill with language” (vladenie iazikom). These skills could be developed if an individual 
already possessed them, but they could not be taught. Lazebnik’s view of “professional 
mastery” was similarly expansive—he argued that journalists’ success depended on their 
ability to incorporate philosophy, sociology, and economics. Mastery could not be 
“pressed into the narrow frame of language and style, as some journalists think.”653 
Ivanova’s rhetorical questions relate to fundamental aspects of this study: the extent to 
which Soviet journalism constituted a profession and the role the creative union played in 
this process. Ivanova and Lazebnik each presented journalism as its own discipline that 
nevertheless required a specialized knowledge of other fields—an implicit challenge to 
the utility of degree programs. Lazebnik’s views further highlight the extreme pliability 
of professional mastery as a concept, since it could include language-based skill as well 
as familiarity with other fields of inquiry. 
 Despite their ostensibly separate interests, Lazebnik and Ivanova both felt that the 
ability to elicit reader engagement was an essential skill for journalists. Lazebnik was 
particularly concerned with reader’s emotional needs, suggesting that the focus on 
inwardness and sentiment that was so apparent during the 1964 genre seminars remained 
a priority. While journalism during the first Five-Year-Plans focused on “production,” 
there was now more interest in “intimate conversation with the reader.” The cultivation of 
intimacy was essential as educated readers had enhanced not only their “moral 
perception” but also their participation in a “culture of feeling,” and they would be more 
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invested in works with appeals to both reason and sentiment. It was not enough that most 
Soviet people read newspapers out of a sense of “duty.” For her part, Ivanova supported 
including more social science in university programs and urged young journalists to 
move beyond genre in their understanding of professional responsibility. Rather than 
strive to become an ocherkist or feuilletonist, each student and teacher should think of 
“influence on the reader, from the point of view of the lively subject matter in which he 
would like to participate.” The tendency toward “academism” was compounded by most 
instructors’ clear lack of practical newsroom experience.654 Both Ivanova and Lazebnik 
presented journalism as a social practice, where genre was only a vehicle for expression 
of a deeper commitment. Lazebnik’s belief that most Soviet people saw newspaper 
engagement as an act of civic participation evokes the high cultural value of books and 
reading—in the new social climate, every citizen could access this resource, and 
journalists should not lose sight of this opportunity to influence society as a whole.  
 These prescriptions are strikingly similar to the focus on the internal world from 
the 1964 creative seminars. While Khrushchev’s specific policy prescriptions and 
leadership style had fallen into disrepute, the dedication to reader sensibilities had not. 
Gerasimov’s depiction of reader relationships and personal growth demonstrates similar 
continuity. Aliabev’s experiences in the Urals are itself an example of the moral and 
ethical theme: wen he confesses his love to Shura, she rejects his advances, fearing a 
scandal and claiming that nothing lasting can come from their relationship. After their 
encounter, both are shown in torment, with voiceovers expressing their mutual regard and 
uncertainty. Aliabev upbraids himself for his poor behavior, and Shura contemplates the 
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depth of her regard for the young journalist and her mother’s suffering at the hands of 
men. This is the first scene where Aliabev is portrayed as a person of deep intellect and 
feeling. The next morning, fresh from this revelation, he discovers Anikina is not what he 
expected. Far from being a victim in need of investigatory expertise, she is bitter and 
vengeful. Alone in his bedroom, he overhears her dictating a letter to her foster-son, 
describing an illegal abortion mill in Shura’s apartment. Though he confronts her, 
Anikina is unrepentant, and Aliabev soon departs for Moscow. His editor describes 
Anikina as an example of “social forces” used for ill. Anikina’s abuse of the near-sacred 
journalist-reader relationship establishes her as the film’s villain: to the Soviet viewer, 
her letters would evoke the Stalinist practice of denouncing neighbors for personal gain. 
Gerasimov offers his own solution to the problem of professional development: 
investigation and encounters with readers will result in professional and personal 
growth.655 
 In their remarks on Lazebnik’s draft speech, members of the creative union 
Secretariat criticized Lazebnik for his overly academic orientation and his failure to 
describe professional attainment in the newsroom—the place where most journalists 
matured creatively.656 Lazebnik’s privileging of publisistika and descriptive writing was 
common among young professionals. At the 1966 Moscow oblast’ conference, creative 
union members complained that university graduates’ preference for these genres made 
them unsuitable for work in raion newspapers, as they struggled to write on more 
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common topics such as the Komsomol or the economy.657 This preference for interpretive 
over descriptive writing is unsurprising, given the social weight attached to publisistika 
and the popularity of its more famous practitioners. At the same time, it suggests that the 
creative union’s vision of professionalization was not only abstract but also irrelevant to 
local journalists’ needs and experiences. Young graduates’ preference for publisistika is 
understandable—descriptive writing allowed journalists to assume an analytical stance 
and argue specific points as knowledgeable authors, in contrast to descriptive reporting. 
Gerasimov’s cinematic depiction of professionalism makes a similar statement, since 
local editor Reutov encourages Aliabev to write an ocherk comparing and contrasting 
Anikina’s complaints with his own experiences. It is implied that Aliabev does not 
complete the article before leaving for his foreign trip—it is only later in the film that he 
properly contextualizes his experiences and address the social wrong he had discovered. 
 Social responsibility was an equally important theme in creative union discussions 
of higher education, though material support issues also played a significant role. While 
Ivanova complained about aspiring journalists who only entered the profession for 
“money and glory” and did not understand that truly successful journalism required a 
“sense of endless responsibility before myself and other people,” Moscow oblast’ 
journalists struggled to attract practicum students to their newspapers, as stipends were 
insufficiently high.658 The contrast between Ivanova’s deals and the struggles of oblast’ 
journalists suggests that a sense of social mission did little to overcome young people’s 
desire to live comfortably. Ivanova advocated replacing the current admissions system, 
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which privileged work experience, with a process that required a written portfolio and an 
interview by a special commission—she referred to such a process as a “creative 
contest.”659 This view of professionalization, even more than her opening remarks, 
stressed journalism’s contributions to the development of Soviet society—a public 
mission which transcended any possible material benefits. This assertion closely 
correspondents to Jurgen Kocka’s definition of Central European professional status: 
“social prestige based on competence, professional ethics, and the special importance of 
[its] work for society and common weal.” Given the official disdain for wealth and 
excess in Soviet culture, it is unsurprising that elite creative union discussions focused 
more heavily on this aspect of professionalization, even as rank and file members were 
concerned with material support.660 However strongly its elite membership sought reform 
and encouraged debate on educational issues, they controlled neither admissions nor the 
faculty at universities.  Like professionals in Germany, another country where state 
agencies had decisive influence on the development of professions, “practitioners did not 
control the transmission of knowledge.”661 Even in the 1970s and 1980s, university 
admission was based on work experience and many journalists found workplace 
“socialization” more important than their degree programs. Explaining this persistent 
trend would require extensive study of the Ministry of Higher education bureaucracy.662 
••• 
 Aside from the plenum on higher education and mastery, the renewed focus on 
the domestic mandate was devoted to three subjects: the organization’s membership 
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standards, material support benefits, and foreign travel and cultural diplomacy. These 
issues dominated creative union events from 1965 to 1967. All three themes were tied, 
directly or indirectly, to the creative union’s bylaws, which determined membership 
policies and contained explicit language about material support and cultural diplomacy. 
The near-constant conversations on these topics over such a long period is striking, since, 
as we have seen elsewhere, journalists faced more profound structural limitations, such as 
official opposition to critical campaigns and the power of state and Party officials to 
remove popular editors and censor newspaper content. The preoccupation with the 
bylaws, then, reflects the creative union’s subordinate position. Since the organization 
had no direct control over newspaper content, limited influence on higher education 
policy, and struggled to establish an independent support base, membership policies and 
responsibilities were one of a few arenas where the creative union exercised exclusive 
influence. Though the organization’s development remained at least partly driven by 
member input, the tenor of this second debate over bylaws suggests more frustration than 
optimism, and a persistent gulf between rank-and-file expectations and elite goals.  
 Egorov’s specific remarks about the creative union at the February 1965 plenum 
stressed both its relative youth and its growth. While the initial decision to create the 
organization had been correct, it still had serious deficits. Regrettably, “we feel that we 
have a union only when we pay dues, we still do not feel creative assistance from the 
Journalists’ Union.”663 Membership was a persistent issue—just as Satiukov had at 
previous plenums, Egorov commented that some members of the creative union had 
“written only a few short pieces, were not journalists by profession or active workers’ 
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and peasants’ correspondents.”664 Though both elite and rank-and-file journalists had 
invested a great deal of effort in finalizing the bylaws during the incubation period, this 
did not guarantee members’ attachment to the organization or alleviate concerns about its 
expansive membership approach. In their comments on the bylaws before the second-all 
Union congress, journalists from Moscow oblast’ admitted that many capable journalists 
in the oblast’ were not members of the creative union. An editor named Aleksandrovskii 
pointed out that the chapter had more young journalists than senior authority figures, as 
those with more established careers felt they had nothing to lose in remaining outside the 
organization during its incubation period. He saved his harshest criticism for those who 
remained members but did not substantively contribute: “you, members of the union, 
have gained nothing, besides having paid membership dues.”665 As during the original 
bylaws debate, writing and creative output were considered to be the key marks of a 
qualified journalist. At the same time, local journalists were no more attached to the 
organization than they had been a decade previously, since Aleksandrovskii complained 
about its “passive members.” 
 In a separate address at the February 1965 plenum, the editor of the journal 
Tekhnikha Molodezhi (Technology for Youth), В. D. Pekelis’ brought up specific 
examples of moral and professional decay. Pekelis’ had noticed some young women 
expelled from the House of Friendship for their “indecorous” conduct. To his dismay, 
when he went to the nearby Central House of Journalists for dinner, he heard music and 
discovered women doing a kind of “twist” which would have made them suitable 
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subjects for KP’s columns on delinquency, under titles such as “Their Morals” or “An 
Evening in a Cabaret.” The young women in question had entered the house “with so 
called journalists, people in our union by chance, but, sadly, members of our union.” The 
episode illustrated the clear necessity of “cleansing our ranks of such haphazard 
people.”666 The behavior here was strikingly reminiscent of the earlier scandals in Varna, 
with music, dancing, and female misbehavior explicitly linked to moral decay and 
general organizational contamination.667 Where “philistine” newspaper coverage took a 
shallow approach to the most pressing ideological concerns of the day—the cultural 
contest with the West—unprincipled creative union members failed to consider how their 
behavior reflected on the profession as a whole. Gerasimov’s film contains a similar 
example: Aliabev is promoted to the international department because a senior member 
has become an alcoholic who cannot fulfill his responsibilities. Rather than accept his 
failures and reform, the senior journalist is unrepentant. When in Switzerland on 
assignment, Aliabev is both attracted and repelled by bourgeois society: he puts a franc in 
a nickelodeon, only to discover that it is an erotic peepshow in which women strip down 
to their lingerie. Rather than turn away immediately, however, he puts in another franc—
and only then does he pronounce the entire thing “disgusting.” When he is taken to a 
disco, Aliabev refrains from dancing. Immediately, bourgeois ideology is equated with 
sexual perversity, drawing on a longstanding Soviet cultural trope. Though his real 
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maturation comes with his return home, Aliabev’s behavior both in the newsroom and 
abroad is above reproach.668  
 The new attention to the bylaws—and by extension, the creative union’s goals 
and needs—is also visible in the pages of its trade journal. In August of 1965, the 
responsible secretary of the Moscow city branch of the creative union, a G. Garbunov, 
published a short article for Sovetskaia pechat’ on the creative union’s membership 
issues. He was particularly concerned with a membership “loophole” in the original 
bylaws, which allowed those without strong professional ties to enter the organization. 
He cited the clause that opened membership to anyone who “contributed” to the press 
(sotrudnichat’), even if they only wrote occasionally. Adding to the confusion, the 
document’s second membership clause stipulated that members must have three years’ 
work experience—a “contradictory” state of affairs. Significantly, membership 
applications from less qualified candidates nearly always referenced the first clause as 
support for their applications; simply denying them membership outright would have 
constituted a clear procedural “violation.” As a result of a too-liberal application of these 
clauses, the Moscow branch of the organization had excessively large numbers of artists 
and photographers. The author advocated more precise formulations and, specifically, 
that staff positions be required for membership. Other interpretive ambiguities arose 
during membership debates about workers’ and peasants’ correspondents, as journalists 
themselves were obligated to decide what made one correspondent “more active” than 
another.669 A September 1966 address from former Orgburo president Pal’gunov reveals 
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the quantitative effects of this expansive membership policy. In 1956, the Orgburo had 
decided not to create an “academy of journalists” that would have perhaps four or five 
hundred members but had instead established a “mass creative organization.” To 
demonstrate the fruitfulness of the second option, Pal’gunov noted that out of 
approximately fifty one thousand journalists in the entire Soviet Union, about forty three 
thousand belonged to the creative union. Though all-Union plenums often featured 
complaints about a lack of interest in the organization, Pal’gunov’s data demonstrates the 
creative union’s substantial growth since the inaugural congress—at that time there had 
been only twenty two thousand members. The Journalists’ Union remained the USSR’s 
largest creative union by far—at its largest the Writers’ Union had only ten thousand 
members.670 
 As the creative union began to prepare for its second all-Union congress, a trade 
journal editorial appeared in June 1966 urging local journalists to think seriously about 
their responsibilities to the organization and promising future attention to the matter.671 In 
a similar article that July, a journalist from Volgograd insisted that membership should 
signify more than the mere satisfaction of statutory requirements. His more novel 
suggestions included restricting membership to those who had published in oblast’-level 
or central publications, even if they were staff members on a raion-level publication. This 
requirement would inspire raion-level journalists to “raise their mastery.” In their work 
with membership applications, members should be especially attentive to the work 
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histories of freelance journalists.672 These proposals indicate a clear effort to make the 
organization more exclusive than it had been originally by privileging journalists who 
occupied staff positions and thus earned their living through media work. The proposals 
in favor of a more prestigious publishing history were an even more obvious departure 
from the vision that had triumphed during the original bylaws debate, as most raion 
journalists only published locally. Since the creative union had recently pledged to 
improve its work with these journalists—and created a new commission devoted to this 
task—this standard seems almost contradictory, though it would have undoubtedly 
achieved the author’s stated goal of a more “professional” body. 
 Other material from the trade journal, along with commentary from the Moscow 
oblast’ conference, suggests that dissatisfaction with the creative union was expressed not 
only in critique of the bylaws but through discussion of material privilege and benefits. 
Other local journalists linked membership issues to the creative union’s longstanding 
debates about local representation and financial support. In an August 1965 article in the 
trade journal, a journalist from Leningrad noted that even in newspapers with large 
numbers of creative union members, colleagues seldom met to discuss creative union 
matters, and the “designated representative” to the oblast’ organization merely collected 
dues or issued tickets to events, rather than leading substantive discussions. The creation 
of primary organizations could improve the atmosphere in a publication, perhaps even 
improving upon or taking responsibility for conducting letuchki. The complaint that dues 
were not differentiated by income, first raised during the original bylaws debate, was 
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brought up again.673 These visions for revised bylaws indicate a persistent desire to 
increase both the creative union’s influence and members’ financial security. The 
mention of letuchki is particularly telling, since it demonstrates that a more powerful 
creative union would draw on and enhance existing practices of professional sociability. 
••• 
 The expanded work on domestic journalism issues in the Journalists’ Union did 
little to alter the creative union’s commitment to cultural diplomacy and the general sense 
that journalism was essential to the cultural Cold War. The second part of Gerasimov’s 
film, “The Garden and Spring,” acknowledges this: Aliabev asks his editor to send him to 
Switzerland even as Anikina’s perfidy has not been fully investigated. Though he urges 
Aliabev not to let the matter rest, the editor lets his young protégé depart for Switzerland, 
temporarily letting international responsibilities outweigh domestic concerns. Discussions 
of foreign travel inside the Journalists’ Union featured both rank-and-file and elite 
journalists defending the value of cultural diplomacy. The interests of these two groups 
diverged in important ways, however: creative union elites were more concerned with 
inadequate news coverage of foreign countries and presented trips abroad as a 
professional responsibility for the expert and ideologically reliable few. Rank-and-file 
members, in contrast, viewed travel as a material and social privilege and presented their 
lack of access to it as a sign of their own marginalization. Gerasimov’s Aliabev is much 
closer to the elite vision of the zhurnalist-mezhdunarodnik: he speaks English and French 
and works for a central publication. Aliabev makes a successful personal contact while 
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abroad: he meets a his ideological opposite, a young American journalist named Sid 
Barton, who teases him for being a “pacifist” and claims that the essence of journalism is 
“sensationalism”—confirming Soviet tropes about Western journalists. Barton later takes 
Aliabev to a disco, where the latter refrains from dancing—the camera remains focused 
on the twisting movements rather than Aliabev’s disinterest, however, which somewhat 
undercuts the moral message. Barton is portrayed as relatively proficient in Russian, and 
he shows Aliabev around Paris, including introducing him to his Communist friend 
Michelle, and Aliabev defends his friend from colleagues who dislike his work and cast 
aspersions on their friendship. Barton is presented as more misguided than dangerous. 
Though he is not won over to the Soviet cause, he admits that the Soviet Union was the 
first nation to propose disarmament. He further encourages Aliabev to talk about Shura, 
indirectly contributing to Aliabev’s decision to return to the Urals immediately after 
leaving Europe. Though media elites were often concerned with the negative effects of 
foreign influence, Aliabev is strengthened in his resolve through time abroad. Though the 
film was reviewed very positively, Pravda’s film critic believed that the foreign scenes 
lacked the sense of a “tense struggle” and the reality of ideological clashes.674 The 
Pravda reviewer cast Gerasimov’s portrayal of the relative amity between Aliabev and 
Barton as an artistic misstep marring an otherwise excellent artistic work. Real 
journalistic errors in cultural diplomacy or foreign coverage were treated with far greater 
seriousness—this became a major theme of creative union events in the early Brezhnev 
era.  
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 At both the February 1965 plenum and 1966 all-Union congress, creative union 
elites used familiar arguments about sensationalism and foreign influence to critique 
domestic newspaper content. These anxieties were frequently coupled with discussions of 
the creative union’s cultural diplomacy efforts and the need for effective foreign 
coverage. In his remarks at the 1965 plenum, A. G. Egorov displayed significant anxiety 
about Soviet foreign coverage, especially of the people’s democracies and the developing 
world. Reporting from Eastern Europe was so lacking that Egorov asked, “does it not 
seem to you that we write about life in these countries, with the language of ‘local 
journalism’ forgetting that we are speaking about states, where each one has its own great 
history, its culture, and spiritual life?” Egorov considered relationships to be particularly 
complicated and worried about foreign media making use of “any inaccuracy” in Soviet 
coverage of these nations—though he did not name a specific agency, this was likely a 
reference to foreign radio broadcasts or Western media sources. Coverage of developing 
countries should stress the “mutually beneficial” aspects of these relationships. In his 
address to the 1966 congress, Goriunov was similarly concerned about Eastern Europe 
coverage and reminded his audience that readers in newly independent countries were 
now “three-fifths of all human kind,” evoking the anti-imperialist strain which was so 
central to the 1963 World Journalists’ Meeting. Goriunov called foreign exchange the 
creative union’s “most important responsibility,” and celebrated the MOJ’s promotion of 
foreign exchange between socialist journalists. He made special note of the 
organization’s educational endeavors for journalists from the developing world. Goriunov 
was careful to stress that cultural contacts were not limited to “developing” countries. 
Exchange with capitalist counterparts was most productive “when the basis for these 
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contacts constitutes sincere professional interest, a wish to know each other better.”675 
The immediate mention of challenges in international propaganda by both speakers along 
with Egorov’s critique of Khrushchev makes the continued importance of cultural 
diplomacy in creative union work clear. In Egorov’s view, more diverse and multifaceted 
coverage would improve the Soviet Union’s international standing, and prevent foreign 
media outlets from using “inaccuracies” or superficial content to their advantage. His 
comments about the developing world demonstrate acute sensitivity to the politics of 
foreign aid and the consequences of alliances with less technically advanced nations.676 
Goriunov’s discussion of capitalist cultural diplomacy is particularly revealing when 
compared to the creative union’s early years—whereas the Helsinki meeting ten years 
prior had hinted at possible reduction of Cold War tensions, Goriunov took a decidedly 
more cautious stance toward the West a decade later. His reference to “sincerity” implies 
that he believed that other capitalist journalists were more interested in ideological debate 
or persuasion than meaningful exchange.677 
 In his discussion of the creative union’s exchange programs at the February 1965 
plenum, Egorov focused on logistical issues: a tendency toward overly formal visits and a 
shortage of adequate guides. Despite these concerns, he also noted significant 
quantitative increases—the creative union had hosted nearly a thousand visitors from 
1960 to 1964. Yet quantitative improvement did not mean the system was flawless: when 
Soviet journalists went abroad, the effects of their journeys were not always well studied, 
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and knowledge of foreign languages was still at a premium. Of the 210 Soviet journalists 
who had visited foreign countries from 1963 to 1965, only 55 were from non-central 
newspapers. As if to defend the bias toward elite journalists, Egorov declared, “these trips 
are not tourism, but great political work.” When journalists traveled without a sense of 
responsibility toward the public, they produced “objectivist and philistine” coverage of 
foreign countries, an epithet that linked failed cultural diplomats to a pursuit of 
“bourgeois” cultural value. Egorov apparently meant that this coverage was too 
superficially moralistic and did not deeply analyze American failures, as he went on to 
provide an example of an otherwise successful journalist who “failed to deeply study 
American life.” Unlike this errant correspondent, truly committed Soviet journalist were 
obligated to take more profound approaches and follow the “Leninist principle of party-
mindedness” in their work.678 Changes in leadership had not altered the creative union’s 
interest in the reception of cultural diplomacy and adequately training journalists for 
cross-cultural encounters. The standards for cultural diplomats remained so high that elite 
selection standards that limited opportunities for local journalists were openly presented 
as professional necessities.  
 Former Orgburo president N. G. Pal’gunov made similar points in his address to 
the 1966 Moscow oblast’ conference. He pointed out that journalists “from the 
periphery” were less likely to possess foreign language skills and declared, “it is not 
useful for journalists to go abroad merely as tourists, since the most important aspect of 
foreign travel was development of “personal contacts.” Pal’gunov remarked that 
journalists were able to spend more time overseas than in the past, in part due to 
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exchange agreements with other socialist countries, and he celebrated increased 
assistance to the developing world and Soviet membership in the MOJ. Though he 
recognized journalists’ personal interest in travel, Pal’gunov’s view of cultural diplomacy 
placed utility over enjoyment.679 
 Strikingly, discussions of travel were associated with another longstanding 
grievance: the absence of Zhurfond, a separate material support fund for journalists that 
the creative union would have controlled exclusively. Journalists in Moscow oblast’ 
strongly advocated for such an institution and often used travel to illustrate their sense of 
marginalization and deprivation. One journalist named Aleksandrovskii followed up his 
calls for Zhurfond with a direct comparison to the Writers’ Union. Colleagues who had 
recently traveled did so through personal or work connections and not with the aid of the 
creative union. Writers, however, gained travel access through creative union 
membership.680 These journalists were well aware of the legal and social distinctions 
between trade unions and creative ones and felt comfortable arguing for privileges based 
on these distinctions. At the same time, when local journalists compared themselves to 
writers, they concerned themselves with economic status and social privilege rather than 
genre politics. Though he defended the high standards attached to foreign travel, 
Pal’gunov affirmed the creative union’s commitment to providing for members’ leisure 
and material support, reminding his audience about the leisure house in Varna and the 
new facilities on Hungary’s Lake Balaton. Both locations provided opportunities to 
combine vacation with meeting foreign colleagues. Pal’gunov promised that the 
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Zhurfond project had not been abandoned and described tentative plans for a resort in the 
Moscow oblast’ city of Zvenigorod.681 Though he could not promise them equal access to 
foreign travel, Pal’gunov clearly felt obligated to remind local journalists of cultural 
diplomacy’s importance. At the same time, his mention of vacation opportunities and 
Zhurfond demonstrates some willingness to abide by a socialist social contract that 
entitled creative professionals to special opportunities for leisure. Such privileges were 
enshrined in both the creative union’s bylaws and the Soviet Constitution.682  
 Dmitri Goriunov took a similarly complex stance in his remarks on this topic at 
the September 1966 all-Union congress.  Goriunov supported increased work with 
oblast’-level organizations, especially in the Russian Republic, because there was no 
Republic-level organization to oversee such activity.  As a symptom of this problem, 
requests from known genre experts, like feuilletonists or sports reporters, to visit 
localities and conduct seminars “were frequently left unanswered.” To improve their 
professional work, journalists should have access to “transit tickets” around their oblast’, 
similar to those held by trade workers or prosecutors, since “journalists travel more than 
others.” Goriunov proposed improvements to the organization’s creative infrastructure, 
such as a “creative resort” (doma tvorchestva) and special living arrangements for union 
members. Goriunov acknowledged that “persistent proposals are made for the creation of 
Zhurfond, and it is necessary to create a scientific research center for journalistic 
problems under the auspices of the union.”683 Some of these proposed improvements 
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reflect longstanding complaints dating to the bylaws debate and intervening years, 
particularly concerning the neglect of local needs by specialists and possible 
underrepresentation of the Russian republic. Goriunov’s remarks highlight journalism’s 
unique status compared to their literary counterparts: an RSFSR Branch of the Writers’ 
Union was formed in 1963—as an institution, it would come to be closely identified with 
rising Russian nationalism, particularly as the Brezhnev regime grew distrustful of more 
liberal trends within the intelligentsia.684 No Russian branch of the Journalists’ Union 
ever formed under the auspices of the all-Union body, despite the creative union’s large 
size and Russian majority.  
 Goriunov’s request for subsidized transit reinforces the link between creative 
union membership and material advantages. His vision for the creative union’s second 
decade involved increasing material benefits for members and the profession’s overall 
academic authority: both aspirations reflected longstanding grievances of rank-and-file 
members.  At the same time, the creative union itself had failed to meet its members’ 
basic needs: Goriunov cited a particularly troubling case involving a journalist from 
Krasnodar with a sick child, and noted that the Secretariat’s folder of unanswered mail 
was very large.685 Even as Goriunov presented journalists as a group in need of more 
social support, he took pains to describe the obligations creative union membership 
imposed. Remarks from Moscow oblast’ chapter president Golubev go some way to 
describe the complexities of the Zhurfond project: though he endorsed establishing a 
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creative union fund, Golubev considered it impossible for his colleagues to abandon their 
trade union affiliation, not least because this would result in the loss of pensions.686  
 Golubev was not the only creative union leader concerned about the implications 
of local demands for material support. In his address on the bylaws, secretariat member 
Boris Burkov insisted that any intervention in journalists’ workplaces—such as 
approving job dismissals or providing paid leave—would have usurped the functions of a 
trade union. He was equally dismissive of any proposals that would have enhanced the 
creative union’s disciplinary powers and made them more like those of the Communist 
Party. These additional procedures, according to Burkov, would have resulted in a “loss 
of creative character.”687 The other longstanding debate that Burkov touched upon in his 
speech concerned the procurement of “advantages and privileges”—among them, 
housing and pensions—which would render journalists more equal to their other creative 
counterparts. Burkov acknowledged the “many” voices in favor of the creation of 
Zhurfond, and he tentatively suggested that its main source of income would come from 
publishing activities and a small percentage of authorial honoraria. Plans for the use of 
the fund ranged from tangible benefits such as travel, prizes, and contests to an expansion 
of creative activity through funding of research and publishing. Unlike his more 
extensive discussion of other proposals, Burkov merely stated that the creative union’s 
new governing board would undertake this project.688  As we saw in chapter one, 
journalists were the only creative professionals who were also members of the trade 
union for cultural workers—the other organizations relied on their own exclusive support 
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funds. Though a detailed study of the Soviet welfare state is beyond the scope of this 
study, it seems clear that undoing a longstanding relationship in favor of a new support 
fund was a distinct organizational challenge—especially since Zhurfond never came into 
existence.689 Whether this absence was due to institutional inertia or a more profound 
problem would require further study of the creative union’s financial structure. The 
rejection of expanded disciplinary procedures—which would have expanded the power 
and influence of local creative union chapters—further demonstrates the gap between 
elite and rank-and-file desires. 
••• 
 The most significant agenda item at the September 1966 all-Union congress was 
the discussion and ratification of new bylaws. Boris Burkov, director of the Novosti press 
agency, delivered this address, and many of his remarks were based explicitly on 
comments from rank-and file-members. Burkov praised the initial bylaws and declared 
that much of the original organizational structure, including its legal status and 
relationship to the trade union, would remain in place. The changes to the bylaws, as had 
been the case seven years earlier, were made on a consultative basis by asking local 
organizations for input, along with consulting existing creative union bylaws, both Soviet 
and Eastern European. I was unable to find an archival collection reflecting these aspects 
of the process in the materials concerning congress preparations; in this section I rely 
almost entirely on Burkov’s published address and on the new bylaws.690 
                                                
689 A. I. Schiglik, “Vvedenie,” 15–8. 
690 “Ob izmeneniakh i dopolneniakh k ustavu soiuza zhurnalistov SSSR: Doklad B. S. Burkova,” in 
Doklady vystupleniia rezoliutsii, Prilozhenie k zhurnalu Sovetskoi pechati, (Moscow: Pravda, 1966), 22–3. 
  403 
 The bulk of Burkov’s remarks expanded on issues addressed previously in the 
trade journal or at the Moscow oblast’ conference. He came out strongly in favor of a 
stricter membership policy, arguing that the inclusion of freelance journalists and 
workers’ and peasants’ correspondents had brought more damage than benefit. Burkov 
argued that the “union is losing the signs of creative unification of professional 
journalists, that is people who have dedicated themselves exclusively to journalism,” 
unlike the other creative unions, the bylaws of which were much more specific. Burkov 
was particularly clear about the repercussions of this policy. Since it was impossible to be 
stricter about membership than allowed by the bylaws, there had been a “bloating of 
organizations, unnatural growth of their numbers, due to people who were in journalism 
by chance, who do have neither the necessary qualifications, nor sufficient experience, 
nor professional interest.”691 Though others had celebrated the organization’s size as an 
indication of its social value, Burkov portrayed the other creative unions as more 
successful professional bodies due to their greater exclusivity. The new “primary 
organizations” of the creative union—chapters made up of members who worked in the 
same publication, below the oblast’ level—would continue to work with nonprofessional 
press contributors. Prospective members would now be required to submit 
recommendations from journalists with at least five years’ work experience, and Burkov 
hoped that in future members would submit a list of published works to “characterize the 
journalists’ ‘profile’ and the level of his mastery.” With stricter membership policies, the 
creative union would become “an organization created, so to say, by professional 
journalists of professional journalists.” Burkov’s new vision for the organization is in 
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some contrast to the dominant views of the membership debates during the incubation 
period, when many participants had supported including workers’ and peasants’ 
correspondents. Staffing newspapers with these correspondents had once reflected the 
particular aspirations and needs of post-revolutionary society that sought to replace 
“bourgeois” specialists with proletarians. By stepping away from this class-based vision 
of journalism, these new proposals effectively made the creative union more professional 
than revolutionary.692 
 The conclusion to Gerasimov’s Journalist serves as the film’s closing statement 
on the nature of professionalism and the relationship between work abroad and domestic 
reform—like the revised bylaws, the last scenes of the film attempt to define professional 
success and how a model journalist should seek to achieve it. A conversation with his 
American friend Sid Barton helps Aliabev realize that he is still in love with Shura, and 
he returns to the Urals almost immediately after leaving Europe. As we have seen, 
successful cultural diplomacy was expected to result in both personal growth and creative 
output. Aliabev’s decision to return to the Urals demonstrates that he has fulfilled the 
former mandate and that he now understands that the real meaning of his life resides in 
the Soviet Union and not his prestigious foreign posting. Aliabev finds things much 
changed in the small town—his friends at the local paper are cool toward him, and over 
lunch with Reutov, he learns that Shura was forced to leave her apartment and live in the 
factory dorms after Anikina wrote another series of slanderous letters. He finds Shura 
depressed and timid, and it is only on a late night visit to the dormitory that he is able to 
truly convince her of the depth of his feelings. He tells her of his time abroad, including 
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his friendship with Barton—in this moment, he fulfills the responsibility of any good 
zhurnalist-mezhdunarodnik to inform and enlighten Soviet audiences about life abroad. 
At the film’s close, Shura has arrived in Moscow and Reutov has given the pair his 
blessing. 693 
 Izvestiia’s film critic reflected at length on the film’s ethical dimension, 
commenting on Aliabev’s dual responsibility to restore Shura’s faith in people and 
unmask Anikina. He presented the work as a “film novel” (kinoroman), with echoes of 
the Russian classical tradition and the “struggles of our contemporary person to resolve 
great moral problems.”694 Soviet reviewers immediately grasped the narrative as a moral 
and ethical journey, one where Aliabev becomes worthy of Shura and his new career. 
Strikingly, no mention is made of any consequences for Anikina’s malice, and we are 
never shown any news story that resulted from the case. In the end, Aliabev the ardent 
suitor is a more enduring image than Aliabev the investigator, which seems particularly 
appropriate for a film released after the firing of Adzhubei, Rumiantsev, and Voronov. 
The film affirms the centrality of personal development to professional growth but 
subordinates criticism and social reform to psychological drama. 
 Though the creative union’s altered bylaws likely did little to alter the gap 
between journalists’ sense of their professional identity and their actual material and 
social position, the document does reflect some effort to more precisely define the 
meaning of membership. In keeping with the substance of Burkov’s address, the principal 
alterations to the bylaws were in membership structure and requirements. Burkov’s view 
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of membership corresponded closely to the main contours of the earlier bylaws debate: he 
invoked the values of “collectivism, creative help, honesty, intolerance for injustice, 
idleness, dishonesty, careerism, acquisitiveness, national and racial intolerance,” and the 
Moral Code of the Builder of Communism. Burkov advocated that these moral principles 
should be expressed in the bylaws.  The importance of morally upstanding professional 
practice, and the explicit reference to a foundational document of Khrushchev era social 
policy, demonstrates a continuity of professional expectations.695 The creative union’s 
essential ideological goals remained the same as in the original document—the 
construction of communism and struggle against bourgeois ideology. 
 Yet there were some substantial additions. The organization was now obligated to 
“propagandize Soviet patriotism,” a formulation that does indicate changed political 
priorities.696 Under Brezhnev, “Soviet patriotism” came to be closely associated with a 
revival of Russian nationalism and an increased emphasis on Soviet military victories, 
especially in the Great Patriotic War. The opening clauses further stressed the 
requirement to “bring the Party’s decisions to life,” and “struggle against pageantry, self-
assuredness, and conceit.”697 Despite these new rhetorical figures, the organization’s 
goals and objectives were fundamentally unaltered.  The “goals and objectives” section 
still described the importance of professional mastery, creative work, and the importance 
of ensuring that members adhered to “journalistic ethics.” Its creative work was still 
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carried out through creative commissions and publishing activities, and international 
work remained a major concern. Journalists who “constantly and actively worked in press 
organs or radio and television,” continued to be eligible for membership at the discretion 
of the all-Union Secretariat, though worker and peasant correspondents were no longer 
listed along with “professional journalists” as possible members—a clear, if somewhat 
limited effort to restrict the organization’s size.698 The new document formally 
established “primary organizations” in newspapers, journals, and information agencies, 
which would meet regularly in any publication or agency with more than three creative 
union members.699 Though the organization remained committed to its members’ 
“cultural and quotidian needs,” these were addressed through the trade union rather than 
with a separate support fund.700  
 As the establishment of primary organizations was the most significant positive 
change to the bylaws, the concept deserves some explication here. The term referred to 
local chapters of the creative union below the oblast’ or krai level, based at individual 
publications. Though many local journalists had advocated for the creation of these 
bodies, the Orgburo had decided against establishing them during the initial bylaws 
debate. The main reasons for the reversal at this point were practical, and closely related 
to the organization’s large size. As we saw in chapters one and three, in the 
organization’s early years, every publication was to designate a “representative” to the 
oblast’ and republic bodies. This individual was personally responsible for the collection 
of dues and to report on any creative activities of note. Since it was now entirely possible 
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for a publication to have five to seven members of the creative union, even in a small 
city, or for particularly large organizations to have more than three hundred members, no 
single person could effectively execute these functions. Burkov hoped that primary 
organizations would help “with the perfection of creative work in the collective” and 
expressed confidence that they would not “duplicate the work of the party or the trade 
union in the publication.” Their activity would consist of lectures, professional exchange 
with other publications or agencies, and provision of assistance to all journalists, 
including the young and non-staff, in matters of “theory and practice.” Burkov’s 
proposed lecture topics for such events focused on the issues related to the cultural Cold 
War, including the “psychological warfare of international imperialism” and “the 
methods of bourgeois propaganda.” Though some suggested making attendance at 
republic- or oblast’-level creative events mandatory for members of the creative union, it 
was considered better for primary organizations to take responsibility for their own 
members’ development. The new primary organizations would be set up in particular 
publications, provided they had more than three members. Primary organizations would 
have a secretary to lead their meetings. In organizations with more than forty members, 
more secretaries could be elected, and these organizations would have discretion over 
membership decisions, pending the final approval of a larger local organization.701 The 
creation of primary organizations was not only the fulfillment of an aspiration from the 
bylaws debate but also a clear practical and philosophical response to the organization’s 
growth.  
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 The section on responsibilities included the original clauses about professional 
development and press work, with expanded attention both to questions of morality and 
to hierarchies of authority. Every creative union member was expected to be an 
“objective, truthful leading fighter for the cause of the Communist party,” “to speak out 
against damage to the state,” and to “resist any effort to stifle criticism,” while also 
remaining faithful to “journalistic ethics” and the “formation and development of the 
person of a communist society.”702 The importance of morality and socialist personhood 
points to enduring principles from the original bylaws debate and in creative work in 
general. At the same time, this vision of responsibility contained important tensions: 
journalists like Voronov viewed criticism precisely as a means to fight “damage to the 
state” but nevertheless found themselves at odds with political leaders who themselves 
“stamped out criticism.” The new bylaws offered no clear insight into how to criticize 
without political or personal repercussions, in part because the document assumed an 
essentially harmonious relationship between the Party and the creative union.  
 Journalists were still dependent on the trade union for their material needs, 
however much they complained about this disparity.  Though creative union members did 
achieve more material privilege over time—Thomas Remington discusses both housing 
advantages and greater access to cars as important advantages among journalists in the 
1970s and 1980s—these advantages were not on the same scale as those offered by the 
other creative unions. The reasons for this remain somewhat obscure, though their origins 
may well lie in the organization’s incubation period. When they chose to establish 
membership on an individual rather than collective basis, the Orgburo members had 
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helped to ensure that the Journalists’ Union would be the nation’s largest creative 
organization. Over a decade earlier, the Central Committee had estimated that the Soviet 
Union had twenty-five thousand journalists—even if only half of these individuals had 
become creative union members, this would still have produced an organization many 
times larger than any of its counterparts. This no doubt made the establishment of a 
support fund a daunting task, though concrete evidence of this would require a more 
sustained financial history of creative unions.703 
 Though central newspapers had major personnel upheavals in 1965, many central 
figures from the creative union’s early years remained involved in its work and were re-
elected to the governing board, though some had changed positions in the intervening 
years. These included figures who had been key cultural diplomats under Khrushchev: 
TASS assistant director A. A. Vishnevskii, who had participated in preparations for the 
1963 world journalists’ meeting, Moscow News editor Iakov Lomko, and Kraminov, who 
remained editor of Za rubezhom. P. P. Erofeev’s profile indicates that he became the 
creative union’s representative to the MOJ. Former Sovetskaia pechat’ editor Viktor 
Podkurpov was re-elected, as was Mikhail Kharlamov, who now directed the Politizdata 
publishing house. Pal’gunov was included as well, though his inclusion seems largely 
symbolic since he was now a pensioner. Iurii Voronov, though he was out of political 
favor, was included, along with his KP successor, Boris Pankin. Other personnel changes 
reflected increases in favor or status: Vassili Peskov, no doubt because of his Lenin prize 
and national profile, was elected, as was Egor Iakovlev, in reflection of his new status at 
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the trade journal. Iasen’ Zasurskii, now dean of Moscow University’s journalism 
department, was also included, as his predecessor Khudiakov had been.704 Despite the 
earlier high-profile firings in 1965, the overall composition of the editorial board featured 
many of the same figures from the organization’s first decade.  
••• 
 Though the creative union’s plenums and bylaws revisions are essential to tracing 
the professionalization process in the early Brezhnev era, a truly comprehensive 
evaluation of values and practices requires moving beyond the Journalists’ Union once 
again. In this concluding section, I employ Komsomol memoranda, creative union 
records, and the history of its reformed trade journal to trace attitudes toward reform, 
criticism, and sociological methods. Komsomol memoranda from late 1965, together 
with Goriunov’s remarks at the creative union in September 1966, reveal an increasingly 
cautious approach to reform and de-Stalinization. Though many of the methods for 
reaching audiences were familiar, such as the use of social science research or cultivation 
of the moral and ethical theme, anxiety about foreign influence had only increased and 
the language of reform and renewal was replaced by an increased xenophobia and a more 
restrained approach to audience engagement. Soviet patriotic values were also embraced 
as one solution to the increase of foreign influence and the popularity of samizdat 
literature; according to Komsomol First Secretary S. P. Pavlov, these values had 
practically been absent from public culture in recent years. A central issue was the 
interpretation of the recent past, particularly the “vulgar and subjective approach to the 
evaluation and revelation of the so-called period of the personality cult.” In the author’s 
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view, such approaches unnecessarily denigrated the entire period’s accomplishments, 
such as the Stakhanovite movement and the consolidation of Soviet culture. Such overly 
negative views were pervasive even in institutions and publications that “had a 
responsibility to orient the entire ideological apparatus.” One recent error included an 
encyclopedia article which described Hitler’s rule as a “personality cult.” Тhough he 
admitted the personality cult had been “damaging,” Pavlov argued for “corrective” 
interpretations of the recent past and even approvingly spoke of the American practice of 
reciting the Pledge of Allegiance in schools, suggesting that similar rituals be introduced 
into Soviet life.705 Much as KP journalists had, Pavlov and his colleagues saw de-
Stalinization as a crisis of historical and cultural interpretation, though they were more 
certain that the process was harmful—the critical view of the past was portrayed as a kind 
of infection that had spread to the most essential aspects of Soviet life. At the same time, 
the entire approach to cultural and political education demonstrates a keen awareness of 
the need for a specific ideological content—as though the “discursive spaces” left behind 
by Stalin’s death would remain empty if no suitable alternative were found. The praise of 
an American patriotic ritual, in a series of reports disparaging foreign influence, points to 
the extent of this perceived crisis.706 Parts of Goriunov’s address at the September 1966 
congress are consistent with this tone, as he disparaged “those who slander the 
motherland under the guise of criticizing the personality cult or other negative 
phenomena,” and sharply criticized the increase in foreign words in newspapers.707 
Though peaceful coexistence remained an official policy, anxieties about foreign 
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influence had acquired a new urgency, as Soviet journalists were now enjoined to resist 
the very language of ideological enemies.  
 Goriunov’s remarks on journalists’ investigative responsibilities still presented 
criticism as key to social progress, though his approach as acting head of the creative 
union differed from the stance he had taken as KP editor.  He lamented that many 
journalists had not been taught to “think independently and express original judgments” 
which resulted in “colorless” work. The most important thing, in his view, was to 
imagine the reader as a “thinking interlocutor, who understands you, and to try and 
convince him of the fairness and reasonableness of one or another step.” Any celebration 
of successes should be moderate, just as criticism should not result in a “nihilistic” 
approach to problems.”708 Goriunov presented journalists as rational figures who could 
exercise their own critical capacity, even after the earlier controversies such as Voronov’s 
firing. At the same time, he took a far more cautious approach toward criticism than he 
had in 1956. At that time, Goriunov had supported Pankin’s critical initiative and rejected 
the accusations leveled at the paper by the Komsomol leadership; only those who were 
anxious about de-Stalinization, like Komolov, had associated criticism with “nihilism.” 
This stance on criticism contrasts sharply with the generally optimistic approach of the 
1964 creative seminars as well, suggesting that the shift in tone was due to both the 
political climate and Goriunov’s new seniority and published position. Though Goriunov 
would lead the creative union’s next reform project—the reshaping of its trade journal—
the enhanced anxieties here suggest the gradual emergence of a new set of journalistic 
values, which prioritized social stability over reform.  
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 The process of restructuring the creative union’s trade journal, like its bylaws, 
spanned several years. The publication’s transformation into a more political journal 
demonstrates that reformist journalism did not disappear after 1965, even as xenophobia 
and moderate approaches to social change were acquiring prominence. Complaints about 
the trade journal were frequent at both the February plenum and the all-Union congress: 
both Moscow oblast’ chapter president V. N. Golubev and Kurtynin expressed serious 
dissatisfaction with it. Golubev was unhappy that the Writers’ Union had more 
publications, even though the Journalists’ Union was larger. For his part, Kurtynin hoped 
that future iterations of the journal would allow the profession to “delve into a wide array 
of social problems.”709 Where Kurtynin focused on analytical depth as the key to both 
creative seminars and a successful publication, Golubev raised the familiar issue of 
competitiveness with the Writers’ Union.  In his address at the 1966 all-Union congress, 
Goriunov devoted significant time to the trade journal, admitting that it remained 
“insufficiently popular” among members, and assured his audience that it was “in the 
process of reconstruction.” Apparently, censure from the Central Committee seven years 
earlier had done little to improve the print organ’s standing or its quality.710 
 By the time Iakovlev became editor, the prospects for change were promising—
new artists and designers came to the publication, and Goriunov personally supported 
Iakovlev’s efforts. The two worked to rename it Zhurnalist, the same name it had when it 
was the trade publication for journalists in the 1920s and 1930s. A Central Committee 
decree was passed authorizing the name change and making Iakovlev a member of the 
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Pravda editorial board. These official sanctions gave Iakovlev more license use the 
journal as a platform to defend local newspaper editors from Party figures, and, in his 
words, to turn the journal from a “factory” publication to a “social and political 
journal.”711  
 A long analytical piece, called “Milk or Rope,” of which Iakovlev was 
particularly proud, is an illuminating example of his efforts. The article’s аuthors were 
fairly well known—Genadii Lisichkin was a graduate of Moscow’s prestigious State 
Institute for International Relations (MGIMO), went on to head a collective farm in 
Kazakhstan during the Virgin Lands campaign, and became an influential economist, 
reaching the height of his fame during perestroika. His co-author, Iurii Chernichenko, 
was a member of the Writers’ Union and an ocherkist who specialized in agricultural 
themes. He would later host a successful television program. The article dealt largely 
with questions of agricultural reform through analysis of one particular collective farm in 
Moscow oblast’, run by a chairman named Ivan Snimschikov, who had first assumed the 
post in 1954.  In response to the high costs and low profits associated with producing 
milk, the chairman had decided to invest more of his peasants’ energy into making rope, 
which could be produced year-round. By 1963, Snimschikov was accused of being a 
“Nepman”—a pejorative term from the 1920s which referred to entrepreneurs who took 
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advantage of Lenin’s New Economic policy, and he was soundly criticized in the 
newspapers.712   
 Due to a series of administrative restructurings, he remained in his post even after 
an oblast’ Party committee had recommended his removal. He and his colleagues were 
particularly enthusiastic about the Party’s 1966 emphasis on rational economic reforms 
and returned to their previous undertaking, which allowed the farm to become more 
profitable and to improve the infrastructure and standard of living of its members. When 
the journalists investigated the structural reasons for Snimschikov’s decisions, they found 
a problem with the current pricing system—all milk was priced the same, regardless of its 
quality. If the nature of a product corresponded to its pricing, the agricultural output near 
places like Moscow oblast’ would improve.713 Like other examples of critical journalism 
in this dissertation, the article featured a protagonist who had undertaken a controversial 
or daunting task of great social significance. The article’s overall conclusions, however, 
implied that the original attack on Snimschikov as an individual had been incorrect; more 
cogent contemporary analysis correctly identified the systemic nature of the problem. 
 The article’s political weight and controversial nature has been the subject of 
some analysis in recent historical works and newspaper articles. In a study of political 
persecution under Soviet rule, the writer N. A. Andreev included the episode in a 
reflection on Party interventions in agriculture. He focused on the multiple authorial 
voices in the article—Lisichkin took the positions most sympathetic to Snimshikov, while 
Chernichenko was anxious and disturbed by the trend he represented. Though the text 
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itself does not overly distinguish one author’s contributions from another, the pro et 
contra approach is visible in several instances. Detailing Snimschikov’s initial 
persecution as a Nepman, the author quotes him in ways that highlight his social 
conscience: “A Nepman worked for himself, and I work for society. Let us speak like 
people. I am overfulfilling the supply plan…Who is harmed by our ropes, construction, 
and shipping? It is built by us, and for whom if not for society?” At a later point, the 
author describes the positive press the collective farm had received since the 1966 
agricultural reforms, including the “ecstatic focus on the fruits of satisfaction and labor. 
But, strictly speaking, all of this only arouses curiosity and gives rise to unanswered 
questions…By what means [is all of this achieved]?” A third narrative voice emerges as 
section breaks in the article are accompanied by descriptions of the role of the press in 
agricultural reporting, describing improvements and an increase in analytical depth over 
time. The “introduction” to discussion of Snimschikov’s initial persecution concludes 
with the remark: “public opinion (and journalism, as its inextricable part), was not ready 
to plunge into the essence of problems and the primary sources of increase.” At the 
article’s conclusion, this authorial voice suggests that twenty years in the future, the 
views in the article will themselves appear incomplete from the perspective of a more 
perfect Communist future.714 
 The multiplicity of views sets this piece apart from critical articles like Pankin’s 
piece on youth clubs or even Rumiantsev’s unorthodox approach to cultural politics, 
since the “liberal” and “conservative” interpretations of the phenomenon were both 
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presented in full. At the same time, the third narrator openly embraces a historical, even 
dialectical, view of journalistic progress, imagining future readers who have progressed 
even further in their understanding of both society and economics. The presentation of a 
unified text suggests a single author, but the various voices occupy three distinct views 
on the world and even distinct chronological spaces. The two commentators are anchored 
in the present on the collective farm, though they take on the voice of Snimschikov and 
his critic, respectively. The third voice takes the reader through past struggles, toward a 
present resolution, and gestures toward an even more hopeful future. 
 The use of multiple perspectives and open acknowledgement of the problem’s 
complexity is similar to the publitsistika of Anatolii Agranovskii, whose essays Thomas 
Wolfe takes as emblematic of the “new journalism” under Khrushchev. Its persistence 
into 1967, like the continued engagement of professional discussions with the moral and 
ethical theme, suggests genre politics changed less rapidly than the political leadership 
had. However, the fate of the story’s protagonist is illustrative of a less tolerant social 
environment as time went on—in 1969, Snimschikov was accused of theft of state 
property and sentenced to six year’s imprisonment along with the seizure of his personal 
assets.715  
 Iakovlev’s reform agenda came under similar attack after the tumult of the Prague 
Spring brought on intensified desires for ideological stability. Changes in the leadership 
of the Agitation and Propaganda department—and Zhurnalist’s unpopularity with other 
leading editors—made the editor’s situation increasingly precarious. A supporter of 
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aspects of the reforms of Prague Spring, Iakovlev had the new Czechoslovak Law on the 
Press published in the journal, which caused “ferocious bitterness” and fears that if the 
journal were allowed to continue publishing, similar events might occur in the USSR. 
These anxieties, combined with some controversial photography and design choices, 
provoked official ire. After an official meeting of the Central Committee, Iakovlev was 
dismissed as editor.  In the resulting decree, Iakovlev was accused of committing “serious 
mistakes…incorrect illumination of the practice of Party leadership of the press, radio, 
and television. Ideologically weak materials that incorrectly orient press workers are 
published often.” Special mention was made of the mistakes with illustrations. Iakovlev’s 
firing, like that of other reformers, had a clear precipitating cause—a major foreign 
policy setback and corresponding anxieties about domestic reform made his greater 
tolerance for controversy dangerous. In most treatments of the period, the Prague Spring 
is discussed as a major blow to reform-minded intellectuals, and developments at 
Zhurnalist fit this broader pattern of initial optimism followed by disillusionment.716 
 This pattern emerges at other, more central publications as well. The IOM was 
moved from KP and transferred to the Academy of Sciences after Len’ Karpinskii and 
Fedor Burlatskii published a controversial article on censorship not long after the institute 
conducted an unpopular poll on the Komsomol.717 In 1968, Grushin set up a new Center 
for the Study of Public Opinion under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences. 
Sociologists and academics did come under increased official scrutiny after the Prague 
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Spring. Grushin himself left for Prague in 1974 and only returned to Moscow with the 
advent of Gorbachev’s reforms.718  
 Though Boris Pankin remained KP editor until 1973, and continued the paper’s 
coverage of environmental devastation at Lake Baikal, he clearly considered 1968 a 
transformative moment in his career. Not long after the tumult in Prague, KP had 
unfavorably reviewed two novels by conservative writer Ivan Shevtsov, In the Name of 
the Father and the Son and Love and Hatred, which depicted its more Stalinist characters 
as genuine heroes and excoriated any “freethinkers,” as Pankin put it. KP printed a 
critical review of the works, and the more conservative editor of Sovetskaia Rossiia fired 
back, accusing KP of violating the “collective leadership” of the Party. The resulting 
furor reached the attention of foreign radio sources, including Radio Free Europe and the 
Voice of America. As he had during the Voronov affair, Politburo member Aleksandr 
Iakovlev supported KP. In the end, it was decided that the final word on the matter would 
be an announcement via the Novosti news agency affirming the Soviet government’s 
opposition to the personality cult. Pankin argues that Brezhnev’s displeasure with the 
affair helped contribute to Iakovlev’s assignment as Soviet ambassador to Canada in 
1973, and his own removal from KP that same year.719 As they participated in the efforts 
of reform and renewal in 1956, only to be rebuked after the Hungarian crisis, journalists 
were equally caught up in the foreign policy tumult and domestic reaction to 1968. 
Where Egor Iakovlev was removed for overtly championing the Czechoslovak cause, 
Pankin experienced more intense domestic pressures for overtly supporting de-
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Stalinization. As in 1956, the situation in Eastern Europe complicated domestic 
journalism work, though the reprisals were more severe under Brezhnev. 
 
••• 
 Given the close links between journalism and the politics, it is unsurprising that 
the transition from Khrushchev to Brezhnev had serious consequences for newspaper 
editors and leading figures in the creative union. At the same time, certain aspects of 
these personnel transitions reflect the political challenge of media work in a Soviet 
context, irrespective of political leadership. Both the Rumiantsev and Voronov episodes 
illustrate the tendentious place of criticism in journalism work, whether in the context of 
a corruption campaign or a philosophical meditation. But these issues were not in 
themselves products of Brezhnev’s personal antipathy toward journalistic activism—as I 
have shown in my KP case study, criticism was a difficult issue even at the height of de-
Stalinization, and xenophobic rhetoric increased after the Hungarian uprising. The full 
effect of 1968, and the distinct journalistic culture of the 1970s, awaits the work of other 
scholars and a more thorough investigation of memoir literature. 
 As for the creative union’s philosophical and political work, the organization’s 
second decade was less about the consolidation of orthodoxy and more focused on 
improving domestic professionalization. At first, this involved giving voice to 
longstanding grievances on a larger scale—debates about higher education and center-
periphery relationships were now taken up in Moscow by elite leaders rather than simply 
aired locally. The revision of the bylaws openly acknowledged the importance of primary 
organizations to facilitate local creative development. This revision process also 
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highlighted the persistence of unresolved issues from the incubation period—particularly 
about membership exclusivity and material support. Later data indicates that the statutory 
changes limiting membership for workers’ and peasants’ correspondents did little to 
diminish the creative union’s size— it was still the largest in the country until the Soviet 
Union’s dissolution. As far as material concerns, as I have noted many times, no evidence 
for the creation of Zhurfond exists, though the creative union did succeed in improving 
its members’ access to housing, vacations, and automobiles over time.720 While the 
reasons for this failure would require a detailed study of trade union politics and the 
Soviet welfare state, the creative union’s large size and complicated administrative 
structure seem likely causes. Like the material issues, education reform remained a 
longstanding problem for the creative union—as late as 1977, Iasen’ Zasurskii continued 
to advocate updates to the admissions system and curriculum. Some of these, such as 
waiving the work experience requirement, were first debated in 1962. Though these 
setbacks point to a persistent gap between professional consciousness and professional 
achievements, the reasons for this failure appear more administrative and economic than 
ideological. All of these failed reform projects were discussed at public gatherings, by 
creative union members who were also Party members, with prominent members of the 
ideological apparatus in attendance.  
 The content of creative work, like professionalization efforts, adhered to earlier 
approaches in many respects, though close reading of source materials betrays an 
increased paranoia about foreign influence. The definition of professional mastery, 
though no less abstract than in the past, still rested on the new popularity of social science 
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data as a means to understand both readers and media workers.  The moral and ethical 
theme remained in place as a dominant genre and celebrated approach to both writing and 
reading. While some of these discussions, such as engagement with emotions or the 
relationship between journalism and literature, were not fundamentally different than 
those of past years, there was a marked increase in xenophobic rhetoric. Due to political 
setbacks, most major social science initiatives took place within academic research 
centers, rather than publishing their results in newspapers and engaging more directly 
with research subjects as readers. The overall effect of these shifts changes an increased 
distrust not only of journalists, but also of the reading public.  
 Though the relative spirit of celebration and optimism characteristic of the 
inaugural congress was less in evidence at the all-Union Congress in 1966, there were 
important continuities both of personnel and thematic emphasis. The most important of 
these was the ongoing effort to balance the creative union’s international and domestic 
mandates, so clearly epitomized in Gerasimov’s cinematic depiction of the profession. 
The pursuit of cultural diplomacy grew more complex in the creative union’s second 
decade as work in the developing world expanded, but its fundamental goals—and the 
apparatus for achieving them—remained unaltered. This is in stark contrast to the 
domestic arena, where reform proposals proliferated and many remained unresolved. At 
the same time, my work in this study, along with memoir literature, points to a strong 
professional consciousness that was not always expressed through increased agency or 
access to material support structures. In this sense, the conclusion to The Journalist 
expresses a deeper truth: Aliabev’s principle achievement is his personal growth rather 
than lasting social reform.  
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Conclusion 
 The Journalists’ Union undertook its domestic and international mandates at a 
pivotal moment in Soviet history, as media managers and political leaders sought to 
spread Soviet values abroad while engaging in domestic de-Stalinization. As Danil’ 
Kraminov’s 1954 memo makes clear, the organization was created to increase Soviet 
effectiveness in the cultural Cold War by supporting its members in their domestic media 
work and serving as a key agent of cultural diplomacy and foreign exchange. Though 
journalism was always politically significant in Soviet life, the creative union’s formation 
period was unique: the Journalists’ Union was not formed to increase control over 
journalists but to expand their responsibilities and improve their qualifications. The 
composition of the organization’s Orgburo highlights the centrality of war experience and 
both foreign and domestic expertise to the new organization. 
 As they drew up bylaws for the Journalists’ Union, the members of the creative 
union’s Orgburo discussed the meaning and value of their work in their efforts to 
determine how exclusive the new organization should be and what advantages and 
responsibilities would come with membership. Beginning in the fall of 1957, draft bylaws 
were made available to local branches of the creative union, which debated them 
extensively in the lead up to the inaugural congress in November of 1959. This lengthy 
process showcases the uniquely consultative approach to creative intellectuals under 
Khrushchev—though the establishment of a creative union was driven by larger global 
concerns, the organization’s ultimate form was determined on a partially consultative 
basis. The majority of Journalists’ Union members had full or candidate membership in 
the Communist Party, and many of its key figures had close ties to the Central 
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Committee’s Agitation and Propaganda Department. Unlike other creative fields, 
newspaper content was easily accessible to senior political figures, making journalistic 
agency more complicated than that of composers. The creative union’s 1959 inaugural 
congress made this relationship particularly explicit, as Khrushchev himself addressed 
the delegate and encouraged them to celebrate their status as “The Party’s Lieutenants.” 
The organization’s new governing board included many journalists close to Khrushchev.  
 The kinds of comments and suggestions rank-and-file members offered the 
Orgburo reveal important traits of Soviet professionalization. Like other “modern 
professionals,” journalists saw themselves as engaged in socially significant work that 
required a certain level of skill and education. As they argued that this skill set should be 
accompanied by economic and social advantages, rank-and-file journalists evoked the 
privilege attached to writing and reading in Russian and Soviet culture and the stature of 
the Writers’ Union. Since they also produced written texts for wide audiences, rank-and-
file journalists felt that their creative union should also provide access to leisure, travel, 
and creative development through an independent financial fund that the creative union 
would control. Though their organization’s large size necessitated putting this project on 
hold, material support became a key theme of all future discussions of professionalization 
inside the organization. 
 As the final bylaws show, rank-and-file members’ vision of professional 
responsibility was more easily achieved than their material aspirations. Plagiarism, 
slander, and libel were included in the expulsion criteria. Though some members hoped 
for an exclusive organization, open only to the most skilled writers or established figures, 
more members advocated including workers’ and peasants’ correspondents and young 
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journalists, a policy which was ultimately enacted. Debates about the value of inclusion 
and the need for high membership standards, like material support issues, were persistent 
topics of discussion well after the ratification of the bylaws in 1959.  
 The actual content of the inaugural congress saw its key speakers address many 
professional and political problems that would dominate the creative union’s agenda in 
the coming years and into the early Brezhnev era. These included strong opposition to 
any of the traits of “bourgeois” journalism—particularly an overemphasis on 
sensationalism—and insisting that the Soviet media system was healthier than its 
capitalist counterpart. Though they celebrated Khrushchev’s recent trip to the United 
States and defended the value of “peaceful coexistence,” the participants in the inaugural 
congress made clear that foreign policy reform and the pursuit of cultural diplomacy did 
not mean compromise of Soviet values.  
 The inaugural congress, even more than the bylaws debate, opened up the 
question of journalism’s relationship to literature and the more established and privileged 
position of the Writers’ Union. In his address at the event, Adzhubei went to great lengths 
to position journalism as both distinct from and superior to literature, even as he 
acknowledged that many of his colleagues regarded belles-lettres as more prestigious. In 
their remarks there, Orgburo members acknowledged rank-and-file dissatisfaction with 
the creative union’s financial resources and defended the decision to make the 
organization less elitist by including freelance journalists and other “nonprofessionals.” 
Though the inaugural congress was presented as the conclusion of the incubation period, 
many of these issues featured again and again at creative union plenums and seminars in 
the 1960s.  
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 Though the creative union was an important site for the articulation of 
professional identity, it did not control the content of newspapers, and its proximity to the 
Party made open debate less likely. The Soviet newsroom, on the other hand, was an 
officially sanctioned space for sociability, as my case study of KP during 1956 
demonstrates. During weekly letuchki, KP journalists openly debated de-Stalinization’s 
social implications, and its meaning for their broader communicative mission. Though 
they expressed some concern that the “positive hero” was overshadowed by critical 
articles, international upheaval transformed these initial doubts into full-blown arguments 
and debates. The autumn 1956 uprising in Hungary, and subsequent unrest among Soviet 
students, saw the KP editorial board split between champions of criticism and those who 
identified it with social instability, even if they did not repudiate the Twentieth Congress 
itself. These events impacted not only the reception of critical articles but also the paper’s 
response to literary works, such as Dudintsev’s Not By Bread Alone. The fall of 1956 
only heightened the contrast between journalist’s behavior in Party meetings and in 
letuchki, as the atmosphere in the Party cell became increasingly xenophobic. In the 
winter of 1957, the paper was sharply censured by the Komsomol Central Committee for 
a critical article by Boris Pankin, which might well have been embraced only a few 
months prior. While examining the letuchki highlights the extent of oversight journalists 
experienced, it also demonstrates that truly frank debates about professional 
responsibility took place in the newsroom rather than the creative union. Though this 
distinction is partly one of timing—the Journalists’ Union had no members until 1957—
the creative union’s activity in later years was never as controversial as KP letuchki.  
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 The importance of the international climate was especially apparent in the 
Journalists’ Union’s efforts to conduct cultural diplomacy. Though they provoke laughter 
in the contemporary reader, the antics of Soviet journalists in the Varna leisure resort 
were treated as matters of great political import. Well before the Varna resort was built, 
internationally experienced journalists were key figures in efforts to restructure the entire 
domestic cultural diplomacy apparatus, including the creative union, as the aftermath of 
Polevoi’s American trip shows. Most cross-cultural encounters were marked by high 
levels of anxiety—a rhetorical commitment to openness was central to peaceful 
coexistence but did little to assuage journalists’ fears about loss of prestige and 
ideological contamination. The Varna resort continued to generate controversy and 
oversight from the Central Committee, though the creative union managed to maintain 
control of the project. The front organization’s political stances reflect the Soviet Union’s 
own struggles to maintain superpower status: before the Hungarian uprising, creative 
union leaders hoped for increasing contact with the “bourgeois” world, inspired by the 
success of the first World Journalists’ Meeting. Subsequent years saw the organization 
turn more to the developing world, as if in recognition of this lost opportunity, where it 
successfully navigated the early years of the Sino-Soviet split. But Soviet representatives 
to the MOJ were seldom content with the organization’s efforts or the creative union’s 
management of its affairs and continually proposed new organizational structures or a 
more vigilant approach to foreign influence.  
 The creative union’s work to expand its domestic mandate after 1959 took the 
form of more frequent plenums and increased increased genre seminars. These events 
featured the participation of prominent political figures and leading journalism reformers. 
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Though the topics were diverse—ranging from higher education to the genre of 
publisistika—they demonstrate an increased effort to professionalize the organization and 
ensure that all Soviet journalists understood their responsibilities to the newly 
sophisticated reader. Some of these seminars expanded on issues that were first apparent 
during the inaugural congress—creative union members continued to be divided on the 
issue of journalism’s relationship to literature. The nature of domestic professionalization 
efforts raises issues of Soviet journalism’s comparability to that of other nations. While 
discussions of higher education point to some convergence with Western print cultures, 
the pursuit of audience engagement was founded on fundamentally illiberal premises. 
Even as they embraced the modern methodology of sociological research and opinion 
polling, creative union members wrote for individuals who understood their personal 
development as a political and national project and did not seek autonomous inner lives 
separate from the social whole. Though they venerated reader response and the newly 
popular moral and ethical theme, this interest in inwardness was most often expressed in 
terms of its social and political utility to inspire large numbers of readers. The tensions in 
this pursuit of individuality were not the creative union’s only domestic challenge. Rank-
and-file members of the organization remained dissatisfied with the creative union’s 
social influence and material status, along with its membership policies. Creative union 
president Satiukov dealt a decisive blow to these aspirations, openly defending the 
leading role of the Party in media work and taking a decidedly cautious approach to 
critics of censorship.  
 The creative union’s evolution after Khrushchev’s ouster adds to ongoing debates 
about the extent of continuity and change in Brezhnev’s style of rule and approach to the 
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intelligentsia. Though some prominent reformers were removed from their posts 
immediately, others remained in place until they took unpopular policy positions—
suggesting that Brezhnev and his close supporters feared journalism’s destabilizing 
potential but only reacted to specific instances rather than pursuing a coherent policy of 
repression. Journalists’ response to the literary scandals of 1966 suggest less debate and 
controversy than had erupted during the early months of de-Stalinization. Journalists 
were much more affected by the removal of reform-minded editors than the regime’s 
increasing distrust of the liberal intelligentsia.  
  Within the creative union itself, there were also important continuities in the 
organization’s leadership and its major initiatives: though Adzhubei and Satiukov were 
fired, Goriunov, Burkov, and other figures who had been prominent during the 
Khrushchev period remained in place. The creative union remained concerned with 
cultural diplomacy, though xenophobic rhetoric and anxieties about foreign content were 
more prominent. The organization’s efforts to refocus on its domestic mandate reveal 
important shifts in values amid continuities: revision of the bylaws and discussions of 
privilege and membership reveal the extent of rank-and-file dissatisfaction with the 
creative union and reinforce the organization’s relative weakness, as it was unable to 
exert control over higher education, provide all its members with foreign travel, or 
establish an exclusive means of material support. Similar changes are visible at creative 
seminars: discussions of criticism were more qualified than in the past, and social science 
data was confined to expert use rather than being published in newspapers. My 
preliminary findings indicate that 1968 was a more transformative moment than other 
upheavals: Iakovlev’s firing from the creative union’s print organ, followed by Pankin’s 
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experiences at KP, point to an increasingly tense climate for more reform-minded 
journalists. The limited memoir literature on journalism in the Brezhnev era suggests that 
professional consciousness remained strong, even as the regime became more suspicious 
of activist journalism.  
 Though I have taken issue with many of his analytical positions, Thomas 
Remington’s overview of the creative union in the 1970s and early 1980s suggests that 
the organization’s first decade was particularly formative, in that many of its challenges 
remained constant. While the organization expanded its capacity to dispense material 
advantages, it did so without a separate support fund, and Iasen’ Zasurskii’s reform 
agenda was little altered between 1962 and the 1970s.721 The creative union and the MOJ 
remained important forums for cultural diplomacy—World Journalists’ Meetings were 
hosted throughout the 1970s, and more events took place in Western Europe, suggesting 
that further study of the effects of detente on foreign exchange is warranted. As Michael 
David-Fox has noted, the late 1960s featured another important institutional change—the 
GKKS was shuttered in 1967 and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumed responsibility 
for cultural diplomacy. In ending the Party-state hybrid arrangements that had prevailed 
up to that point, Soviet leaders embraced a more “conventional” approach to hosting and 
receiving foreign guests, similar to that of other modern states.722 These new institutional 
arrangements did little to diminish journalists’ roles as cultural diplomats, as Dina 
Fainberg’s work on foreign correspondents has demonstrated. These deep continuities, 
then, suggest that Soviet professionalization was always tied to national service, whether 
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that service took place in a domestic newsroom or a foreign delegation.723 Though 
sustained engagement with journalism under perestroika awaits the work of other 
scholars, Thomas Wolfe’s conclusions about the 1980s are instructive in one important 
respect: they suggest a growing disengagement from the Party among some section of 
professionals—a marked contrast from the deep enthusiasm for reform and socialist 
development so evident in my protagonists.724 
 Thomas Wolfe, as other historians have, openly compares Khrushchev’s reform 
project to Gorbachev’s—the career trajectories of several of my protagonists suggest 
further affinities. Iurii Voronov returned from Germany in 1984 and became editor of the 
journal Znamia and headed the Central Committee’s culture department from 1986–88. 
From 1988 to 1990, he edited Literaturnaia gazeta—an unsurprising career move since 
Voronov was elected a secretary in the Writers’ Union in 1984 and was also a published 
poet. Voronov replaced Aleksandr Chakovskii, LG’s longtime editor whose political 
stance has been interpreted in various ways by contemporaries and scholars. After 
leaving KP, Boris Pankin headed the newly established All-Union Association for 
Copyright, before becoming Soviet ambassador to Sweden in 1982 and to 
Czechoslovakia from 1990 to 1991.Pankin’s participation in perestroika was even more 
overly political than Voronov’s: he was the USSR’s last Minister of Foreign Affairs, and 
was appointed to that position due to his personal opposition to the August 1991 putsch 
where high-ranking Party members attempted to depose Gorbachev and replace him with 
a more orthodox leader. Iasen’ Zasurskii remained dean of Moscow University’s 
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Journalism Department from 1965 until 2007. Zasurskii thus presided over the creative 
union’s greatest transition into an independent social organization in a state without 
censorship. Тhe Journalists’ Union of the RSFSR, which formed in November of 1990, 
became the Journalists’ Union of the Russian Federation in 1992.  
 Journalists’ experiences after 1991 reveal not only the formative influence of the 
Soviet experience on discussions of values and practices but also the renewed importance 
of questions about professional autonomy and material support.  Continuities should be 
contextualized rather than assumed, however. Though it traces its own origins to the 
Orgburo of the Journalists’ Union of the Soviet Union, the Journalists’ Union of the 
Russian Federation (hereafter the RUJ) now espouses many of the liberal principles that 
were openly denigrated by its predecessor. The organization is a member of the IOJ, 
while the MOJ faded into obscurity after 1989. Not all of the cultural diplomacy activity 
of the Soviet period is irrelevant to current practice: Iasen’ Zasurskii has maintained his 
ties with the journalism education center in Strasbourg to the present day.725 
 Though the RUJ remains a “social and creative organization” with ties to a trade 
union, its bylaws, adopted in 1993, explicitly state that it is tied to no party or ideology. 
And while it is dedicated to the “carrying out creative and professional activity of 
Russian journalists,” along with their “economic and professional-creative interests,” it is 
founded on the principles of “press freedom, democracy and tolerance,” and its bylaws 
openly prohibit censorship. In short, where the bylaws of the Soviet Journalists’ Union 
rested on an illiberal Marxist-Leninist conception of press work, its successor has 
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embraced a liberal conception of journalism. It retains ties to higher education and 
awards prizes for journalistic excellence. Like its predecessor, however, the RUJ features 
only briefly in this conclusion. While many of its members are openly critical of their 
profession’s precarious status in contemporary Russia, the organization’s capacity to alter 
these circumstances is relatively limited. It retains a database of murdered journalists and 
provides material support to the families of deceased colleagues.726  
 Questions of state interference in the mass media, rather than fading away with 
Soviet legal structures, have only acquired new urgency in recent decades, resulting in 
new scholarship and critical articles in both English and Russian. Perhaps the most 
notable, and disturbing, shift is the number of journalists who have been murdered or 
died under suspicious circumstances in the Russian Federation. Though this trend is most 
closely associated with Putin’s rule, the constitutional crisis of 1993 and the renewal of 
hostilities in Chechnia that same year saw many journalists lose their lives. What is 
striking about Putin’s first and second terms, however, is the number of investigative 
journalists who died under suspicious circumstances while researching government 
corruption and human rights abuses.727 I will briefly describe two cases from the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, before moving to recent events in Ukraine and their 
implications for journalists’ relationship to the state.  
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 Two cases stand out in light of my previous findings: Iurii Shchekochikhin began 
his journalistic career at KP, and was considered one of its rising stars in the 1970s.728 
Shchekochikhin began a political career in the 1990s, and was elected to the Duma as a 
member of the liberal Iakbloko Party in 1995. He devoted his political and journalistic 
career to exposing corruption and human rights abuses, openly opposing the Chechen 
wars. He frequently wrote for the opposition newspaper Novaia gazeta. In 2002, he was a 
member of the investigative commission into the causes of the 2000 apartment bombings, 
a series of attacks in three cities, including Moscow, which killed and injured hundreds 
and were initially blamed on terrorists from the Caucasus. Shchekochikhin was a member 
of the Kovalev Commission, an investigative body which explored the possibility that the 
state security services had masterminded the bombings but was unable to publish 
conclusive findings due to government obstruction. The trials of the defendants were 
closed to the public, so that the evidence against them was never accessible to journalistic 
investigation. Government critics saw the bombings as a means of assuring popular 
support for a new Chechen offensive and to increase the popularity of then-unknown 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who assumed the presidency not long after.729 
 Some of the obstacles to journalistic agency can be directly traced to government 
initiative. Since 2000, the government has been increasingly hostile toward critical media 
sources, especially television. Oligarch Boris Berezovskii was once a controlling 
stakeholder in Russian Public Television (Obschestvennoe Rossiiskoe Televidenie, or 
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ORT). As Berezovskii and others close to him became increasingly critical of Putin’s 
policies, the government became increasingly hostile to media sources owned by 
oligarchs. Putin openly discussed this stance in an editorial in the French newspaper Le 
Figaro, claiming that criticism would not be tolerated from such outlets. His words were 
soon followed by legal and political actions. Berezovskii was forced out of ORT and sold 
his shares. In spring 2000, the NTV television station was raided on charges of tax 
evasion. In the aftermath, its founder, Vladimir Gusinskii, sold his controlling shares to 
the state-controlled energy company Gazprom.730 
 Shchekochkhin’s last major corruption case once again brought him into direct 
conflict with the state. He investigated the criminal activities of FSB officers, including 
money laundering and illegal imports, a scandal known as “Three Whales,” after the 
furniture-shipping complex implicated in smuggling goods without paying customs 
duties. Just before he was due to discuss the case with the FBI in the United States—
since the case also had ties with American organized crime—Shchekochikhin died under 
mysterious circumstances in a Moscow hospital.731 Shchekochikhin’s post-Soviet 
journalism career, with its focus on corruption, has some kinship with the Soviet 
investigative tradition, with crucial distinctions. In a post-socialist setting, he was able to 
work openly in opposition and directly implicate those in positions of authority. Cases 
like Shchekochikhin’s highlight the challenges of investigative journalism in a post-
socialist space: the absence of an independent judiciary and the continued influence of 
the FSB make real systemic change unlikely. The murder of Anna Politkovskaia, which 
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attracted widespread Western media attention, confirms this trend. Politkovskaia gained 
fame for her coverage of human rights abuses in Chechnia for Novaia Gazeta; her early 
career has significant overlap with figures from my study. From 1994 to 1999, she wrote 
for Obschaia Gazeta, Egor Iakovlev’s post-Soviet news venture, covering refugee issues. 
Politkovskaia was a graduate of Moscow University’s journalism department, and Iasen’ 
Zasurskii spoke at her funeral.732 
 In recent years, journalists who came to professional maturity have called for a 
greater reckoning with the Soviet past and its journalistic legacies. In 2008, three former 
Izvestiia journalists—Pavel Gutiontov, Leonid Shinkarev, and Al’bert Plutnik—
published a manifesto calling for a new appreciation of Soviet journalism as a means for 
media renewal. Though they faintly evoked Lenin by titling their document, “April 
Theses,” their manifesto has more in common with the journalism of the 1960s than the 
revolutionary period. The authors began by arguing that however much contemporary 
journalists might wish to leave the past behind, they unwittingly found themselves 
adopting the worst of past practices and discarding useful legacies. They celebrated 
“freedom of expression” as a key distinguishing principle between Russian and Soviet 
journalism but declared, “it would be ideal if in these conditions, journalistics would be 
able to preserve the best of the past, having added the best of the present.” These remarks 
make the authors’ mission clear: to find a meaningful heritage for post-Soviet journalism, 
without celebrating censorship or state power.733 
                                                
732 Part of Zasurskii’s speech is found in “V Moskve prostilis’ s Annoi Politkovskoi” Izvestiia, 10 
September 2006. http://izvestia.ru/news/317979 (27 August 2014). 
733 Al’bert Plutnik, Leonid Shinkarev, and Pavel Gutiontov, “Byla sovetskoi stala svetskoi: pochemu 
rossisskaia gazeta teriaet chitatelia?” Rossisskaia Gazeta, 22 April 2008. 
http://www.rg.ru/2008/04/22/tezisy-smi.html (26 August 2014); The search for a “usable past” is a 
  438 
 The role of the state was a key issue for manifesto authors, as a key structuring 
principle for both journalists’ behavior and their creative accomplishments. State power 
was presented as a permanent distinguishing feature leading to both strength and 
weakness: 
Тhe Russian press, as nowhere else in the world, was created for the needs 
of state power…in each line of a newspaper our reader was accustomed to 
seeing the state’s point of view…censorship had a negative psychological 
effect, but it forced journalists to make use of the sharpest nuances of the 
Russian written language, to become brilliant at hinting. Thanks to all of 
this, the Russian press came close to ‘great literature,’ as nowhere else in 
the world.734  
 
 The language of Russian exceptionalism here is striking. Though “top-down” 
journalism was presented as detrimental to readers and print professionals, it gave rise to 
the close relationship between journalism and literature, presented as a significant, 
perhaps unprecedented, accomplishment.  
 Reader relationships were an even greater source of pride for the “April Theses” 
authors than linguistic skill, especially the letter to the editor and investigative missions. 
The authors held up Sakhnin’s essay on the abusive whaling captain, and Voronov’s great 
personal courage in publishing the story, as an example of the kind of “investigation” 
which contemporary journalists would do well to adopt. Part of journalism’s social power 
had come from its structural weakness, since, “the defense of the ‘little person,’ 
immersion in his problems, was bequeathed to us from great Russian literature in large 
part because journalists were not in large part permitted to write about ‘important 
persons.’” A similar caution existed in contemporary Russia, the authors argued, as 
                                                                                                                                            
common theme for studies of history and memory in recent years. For an example from the post-Soviet 
case, see Rosalind J. Marsh, Literature, History and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia, 1991–2006 (New York: 
Peter Lang, 2007), especially 152–4. 
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journalists were now afraid to delve deeply into corruption and the realities of oligarchy 
since newspapers had been “transformed into businesses.” In a clear moment of nostalgia 
for the moral and ethical theme, the authors lamented that journalists had lost interest in 
writing about real “family problems” and instead were preoccupied with elites and the 
nature of business success.735 The “newsroom values” here are familiar from my study of 
the Soviet Journalists’ Union: reader relationships that allowed for investigative authority 
into personal problems, a focus on the lives of ordinary individuals, and a willingness to 
confront corruption. The specific mention of Voronov and the Solianik case highlights 
the authors’ firm belief in taking controversial stands for the public good. At the same 
time, the manifesto is hostile to capitalism—or at least its post-Soviet variant—since 
private ownership of newspapers prevented real corruption investigations and interest in a 
new celebrity culture obscured the struggles of ordinary individuals.  
 Unsurprisingly, the “April Theses” contain few concrete solutions to the ills 
plaguing Russian journalism. The authors themselves admitted that, a “free press 
demands many things. An independent judiciary, for example. Active local government. 
Those who undertake policies must take responsibility for what they carry out. Еconomic 
transparency. But all of this is mere noise without an independent press.” At various 
points in the essay the authors insisted that journalists needed to recover a sense of 
“personal pride,” and individual authorship—similar to the distinct authorial voices 
ocherkisty like Agranovskii cultivated. They were openly disdainful of the Internet, as it 
“is not a profession, but allows anyone the slightest bit literate to write what he saw.” 
This skepticism about new media sources seems reflective of the author’s generational 
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status and the date of the essay.736 The preference for a strong authorial voice, while 
explicable, ignores an important historical reality: Agranovskii published when 
circulation numbers were extremely high—there is no acknowledgement in the essay that 
declining readership might lead journalists to less cerebral approaches. Even the policy 
prescriptions about party structures and the judiciary seem necessary but not sufficient, 
since they only hint at the tangible effects of Putin’s media policies. While the authors 
were open about the Marxist-Leninist past, they made no mention of the murder of 
activist journalists or increasing state control of media outlets as explanations for 
investigative journalism’s decline.  
 Though I have thus far described print and television media issues, the last decade 
has seen another media explosion in Russia: an increase in Internet news outlets and the 
explosion of social media networks. Though this media evolution has had important 
political consequences, this was in response to unforeseen domestic events rather than a 
renewal of journalism’s public mission like that espoused in the “April Theses” In the fall 
of 2011 and winter of 2012, the largest protests since the end of Soviet rule erupted in 
Moscow and other cities, as increasing numbers of people expressed concerns about 
occurred in response to irregularities during elections for the state Duma and called for 
new elections. Much of the information about these events circulated on online social 
networks, as state-owned outlets paid little attention or painted the protests as destructive 
unrest. The protests did result in firings from newspapers, reminiscent of cases from the 
late 1960s: editors at the business daily Commerce-Power (Kommersant’ vlast’) were 
fired after publishing a caricature of then-Prime Minister Putin which referred to election 
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fraud. 737 Though the protests fizzled out after violent crackdowns in May of 2012 during 
Putin’s inauguration for a third term as president, media issues took on new prominence 
in the following year.  
 The development of a mass protest in Kiev in November 2013, in response to 
former president Viktor Ianukovich’s refusal to sign a cooperation agreement with the 
European Union, highlight that regional unrest still has important implications for 
Russian media space and domestic policy. Russia’s state-run media persistently portrayed 
the protestors as dangerous nationalists with fascist tendencies and denounced 
Ianukovich’s removal as illegitimate—a narrative that has important overlap with Soviet 
coverage of the 1956 Hungarian uprising. This narrative also circulates abroad in 
Russophone communities in former Soviet republics.738 Due to modern media 
technology, Putin’s supporters need no longer rely on cultural diplomacy and foreign 
delegations—their vision, like that of their opponents, can circulate through television 
and internet sources. Perhaps the best known is Russia Today, a news channel which 
releases pro-Russian broadcasts in multiple languages. The use of journalism in foreign 
policy is not new, but unlike the MOJ, the channel’s status as a government-funded 
initiative is not hidden or denied publicly. The station’s mandate to present a more 
positive and affirmative image of Russia is reminiscent of the Journalists’ Union’s 
mandate to promote “objective” rather than “bourgeois” journalism, though its goals are 
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explicitly nationalist rather than devoted to the international cause of proletarian 
solidarity. 
 The state response to the Ukrainian events and an increase in Western sanctions 
reveals both an increase in repression and a renewed focus on material incentives as a 
means to reward journalists with closer ties to the state. In March of this year, the editor 
of the news service Lenta.ru was fired, and its entire team resigned—a move which 
signaled the loss of yet another independent media outlet. In a more open attempt to crack 
down on the Internet, Russian bloggers with large numbers of followers must register 
with the state as journalists, and by 2016, personal data of Russian social media users 
must be available on Russian servers.739 These maneuvers have been accompanied by 
positive incentives for the more compliant: on April 22 of this year, Putin officially 
rewarded some three hundred journalists for their “objective reporting” on events in 
Crimea and the region’s return to Russia, though the text of the order was never 
published. The state orders many of these individuals received come with substantial 
increases to their state pensions—up to three or four times higher than the nationally 
fixed figure. Where members of the Soviet Journalists’ Union complained about regional 
inequalities in material access, the main differentiating factor under Putin appears to be 
the extent to which a journalists’ writing praises or excoriates the regime’s goals. Recent 
commentators have noted that the scale of this award was unprecedented—in 2008, in the 
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aftermath of conflict in Georgia, then-President Medvedev only gave eleven such 
awards.740  
 Former Izvestiia journalist Pavel Gutiontov, one of the authors of the “April 
Theses,” wrote a blistering essay in response to these events, published by the Russian 
Journalists’ Union. The essay is both an excoriation of his privileged colleagues and a 
meditation on professional values of the past and present, and is thus a fitting conclusion 
to the dissertation. In his account, Gutiontov made special note of the fact that most of the 
awardees had close ties to state run media, including Channel One and Russia Today. He 
then began by calling it decidedly “strange” that the order was unpublished and its details 
kept secret, since “are not journalists people whose profession presupposes work for the 
public, and nothing else besides?” He then speculated that the honorees themselves 
“suspected that they are doing something inappropriate, something not right, which will 
give rise to improper interpretations it would be altogether better to avoid.”741 
Gutiontov’s remarks here highlight his vision of professionalism—an insistence on 
transparency, which reflects his embrace of liberal values. Where many of my subjects 
took pride in their connection to the state and felt that it should be accompanied by 
material recognition, Gutiontov declared that close ties to the state were now “improper” 
and damaging to reputations. 
 Gutiontov’s recognition of journalism’s importance in the cultural Cold War 
further underscored his deep misgivings about the politicization of media work, 
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especially the use of militarized rhetoric. Gutiontov felt that, “this very concept of an 
information war is embedded in social consciousness and strongly associated with the 
concept of journalism itself…but real journalism is not a weapon of war, or a special 
operation for the achievement of victory, but a precise and fragile instrument, naturally 
functioning in conditions of peace and mutual understanding.”742 Relying on a militarized 
function of journalism would not result in lasting notions of professional achievement, as 
political objectives would invariably change, leaving journalists little to celebrate when 
they looked back on their awards. 
 To support these points, Gutiontov described the careers of several distinguished 
Russian journalists, including figures who feature in my study. Konstantin Simonov 
received many state awards for his work, but Gutiontov was careful to note that, “that 
war was Great and Patriotic…and what of that war which today’s troubadours puff up, 
with greedy blazing eyes and their polished copper horns?”743 Gutiontov presented 
Simonov as an example of genuine national service in a time of crisis, in contrast to his 
contemporaries, who artificially exaggerated the extent of conflict for their own material 
gain. The image of the troubadour is particularly arresting, since pro-Kremlin journalists 
are cast as mere instrumentalists following a score written by someone else, rather than 
producing their own narratives.   
 Тhe rest of Gutiontov’s list of journalists who worked for many years and 
received relatively limited state adulation included Vasilii Peskov, who featured in 
chapter five, and Izvestiia correspondent Leonid Shinkarev, famous for his coverage of 
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Siberia and the Far East along with his foreign coverage.  He argued that the Soviet 
Union’s most decorated journalist, Iurii Zhukov, was far less beloved and remembered 
than these figures. Gutiontov’s list of celebrated journalism figures is, like his earlier 
essay, a clear attempt to give Russian journalism a “usable past” from the traditions of the 
1960s.744 Strikingly, the list includes journalists who were members of the creative union, 
but Zhukov, who was instrumental to its founding and the conduct of its cultural 
diplomacy, is deliberately outside the narrative. While he presented journalism as a 
public service, as many creative union members did, Gutiontov’s preference for 
separation from state institutions and a journalism less overtly devoted to foreign policy 
represents a significant departure from Soviet practices and contemporary Russian 
realities.  
 Gutiontov’s closing remarks focused on a different historical contrast—between 
the journalism of the 1990s and the Putin era. He reminded his readers that Dmitrii 
Kiselev once refused to read an official television announcement about unrest in the 
Baltics in 1991, which resulted in his being fired and subsequently receiving an award 
from the Lithuanian government. As his political views evolved, the Lithuanian 
government stripped him of the award—a decision Gutiontov considered entirely 
appropriate, as “the Kiselev who was stripped of the award is not the one who received it. 
Today’s Kiselev would be happy not to remember this sad fact of his biography.” Kiselev 
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is notorious for his anti-Western rhetoric, which has grown particularly intense since the 
protests in Ukraine, which he considers illegitimate and fascist 745 
 This example, and Kiselev’s diverse career, highlights the extent of Russia’s 
evolution in the nearly twenty-five years since the Soviet collapse. Perhaps most striking, 
however, is the contrast between Gutiontov’s career and Kiselev’s: while the former is 
respected in liberal circles, Kiselev has a much wider audience and undoubtedly earns 
more for his work. Gutiontov’s contrast between Putin’s version of “objective” 
journalism and his own is evocatively drawn, and more compelling to contemporary 
audiences than Soviet resistance to “bourgeois” journalism standards. In a moment where 
Putin’s government enjoys relative popularity and a near-monopoly on the media, it is 
opposition journalists who struggle to maintain the professional agency and material 
support for their work that Soviet journalists once desired. An understanding of audiences 
is perhaps even more urgent at this moment than it was in the Soviet period. Alternatives 
to state narratives are more accessible than they once were, but as long as most of the 
population receives its news from television rather than the Internet, it seems far more 
likely that the regime’s version of “objectivity” will continue to dominate and that the 
Russian Journalists’ Union will remain even weaker than its Soviet predecessor.746  
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